Judgement ORDER :- The facts leading to this revision petition succinctly are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for injunction restraining the respondent-Corporation from recovering property tax levied in respect of shop No. C-9.3, New Subzimandi, Azadpur, Delhi on the ground that the respondent-Corporation was not competent to determine and impose the property tax with retrospective effect under Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act without first issuing a notice under Section 124 of the said Act, Issues in the case were framed as far bad, as 8th August, 1977. Since the onus of all the issues lay on the respondent-Municipal Corporation of Delhi, it was called upon to adduce evidence first. The evidence of the respondent closed on 28th March, 1979, but the case was then adjourned to 21st August, 1979, for evidence of the plaintiff. However, no evidence could be recorded on the adjourned date of hearing and the case was further adjourned to sixth December, 1979, at the request of the plaintiff. On that day again the evidence of the plaintiff was not recorded because Mr. Golani, counsel for the plaintiff, was stated to be busy in the High Court. Even though Order 17 Rule 1, Civil P.C., as amended by Amending Act 104 of 1976, (hereinafter referred, to as the Code) which confers on Court discretion to grant time to a party at any stage of the suit and adjourn the hearing of the suit, does not recognise the fact of the pleader of a party being engaged in another Court as a ground for adjournment, the trial Court allowed the adjournment be cause there was no opposition by the opposite party. However, 25th March, 1980, which was the adjourned date of hearing happened to be a holiday. So, the matter was taken up on 16th April, 1980, and final opportunity was given to the plaintiff to produce his entire evidence on 4th August, 1980. A further direction was made that the witnesses be summoned on the responsibility of the plaintiff. All the same no P.W. was present on 4th August, 1980 and none had been summoned. Hence, finding that there was no justification for grant of further opportunity, the trial Court closed the evidence of the plaintiff and adjourned the suit to 18th September, 1980, for hearing of arguments. All the same no P.W. was present on 4th August, 1980 and none had been summoned. Hence, finding that there was no justification for grant of further opportunity, the trial Court closed the evidence of the plaintiff and adjourned the suit to 18th September, 1980, for hearing of arguments. The plaintiff again sought adjournment on the ground of illness of his counsel and there being no opposition it was adjourned to 30th October, 1980, for final arguments. On that day, the plaintiff-petitioner moved an application under Order XVIII Rule 2 (4) of the Code praying that he be permitted to lead both documentary as well as oral evidence so as to meet the ends of justice. The said application was opposed by respondent-Corporation and eventually vide impugned order dated 21st January, 1981, the request of the plaintiff was turned down. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff has come up in revision. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has canvassed with considerable favour that on its plain reading sub-rule (4) of Order XVIII Rule 2 confers wide powers on the Court to direct or permit any party to examine any witnesses at any stage and as such the interest of justice demanded that the petitioner should have been granted one more opportunity for producing his evidence. His line of argument is that in case the impugned order is allowed to stand it will result in miscarriage of justice inasmuch as the plaintiff's suit may be thrown out in toto and at any rate the Court may find it difficult to grant the necessary relief to which he would have been otherwise entitled but for closure of his evidence. R.2 of O. XVIII runs as under: "(I) On the day fixed for hearing at the suit or on any other day to which the hearing is adjourned, the party having the right to begin shall state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues which he is bound to prove. (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (it any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. (3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. (2) The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (it any) and may then address the Court generally on the whole case. (3) The party beginning may then reply generally on the whole case. *(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage." * Inserted by Act 104 of 1976, Sec. 69 (i) (1-2-1977) 3. On a plain reading of this rule, it is crystal clear that it is designed to regulate the hearing of the suit and examination of the witnesses. It lays down the order of examination of witnesses. However, sub-rule (4) which has been recently introduced in the said rule by Amending Act 104 of 1976 expressly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage. The non obstante clause with which this sub-rule opens thus gives overriding effect to the same with the result that the Court may exercise the discretion vesting in it under sub-rule (4) at any time. Further the expression "at any stage" will in the context of the rule clearly imply any stage previous to delivery of judgement. In other words, the trial Court had the discretion to permit the plaintiff to adduce his evidence both oral as well as documentary notwithstanding the closure of his evidence earlier vide order dated 4th August, 1980. Obviously the power conferred by sub-rule (4) is untrammelled and uncontrolled by any; previous order made by the trial Court with regard to the evidence or examination of "witnesses of the parties. However, the Court must record reasons before exercising the discretion under this sub-rule. It is well settled that wherever discretion vests in a Court to permit any particular act or pass any particular order, the same must be exercised judicially and for valid reasons. It cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 4. That being the legal position, let us come to the facts of the instant case. It is well settled that wherever discretion vests in a Court to permit any particular act or pass any particular order, the same must be exercised judicially and for valid reasons. It cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 4. That being the legal position, let us come to the facts of the instant case. As may be noticed from the foregoing resume of the proceedings of the trial Court no effort seems to have been made by the plaintiff at any stage up to 4th August, 1980, to summon his witnesses or produce them in the Court, even though three or four opportunities had been granted to him. Even on 4th August, 1980, no explanation was furnished as to why no witnesses had been summoned or was present in Court. Under these circumstances, the learned sub-judge was perfectly justified in closing the plaintiff's evidence. Even in his application under Order XVIII Rule 2 (4) of the Code the plaintiff did not assign any specific reason for not adducing his evidence at any earlier stage and all that he stated was that he was prevented by some unavoidable family circumstances to lead evidence. To say the least, this is hardly any ground much less valid ground for granting another opportunity to the plaintiff to produce his evidence. It may also be noticed that nothing has come on the record that even on the said date the evidence of the plaintiff was actually present. Hence, the learned Sub-Judge has rightly observed in the impugned order that :- "The plaintiff has also been given a good number of opportunities to adduce his evidence and no grounds have been shown in the application as to why the plaintiff was not able to lead his evidence despite so many opportunities and warnings." 5. However, he was in error in further saying that Order XVIIl Rule 2 does not provide for opening of plaintiff's evidence again after closing the, same. As stated above, there is no such limitation or restriction on the power of the Court while exercising discretion under sub-rule (4) of Order XVIII R.2 of the Code and all that he has to see is if there is any valid ground or reason for permitting examination of any witness etc. As stated above, there is no such limitation or restriction on the power of the Court while exercising discretion under sub-rule (4) of Order XVIII R.2 of the Code and all that he has to see is if there is any valid ground or reason for permitting examination of any witness etc. So, even though the learned sub-Judge slipped into an error of law while construing the scope and ambit of sub-rule (4) no exception can be taken to his decision on the merits of the case. Surely further opportunity to the plaintiff for adducing his evidence cannot be granted merely because he will be highly prejudiced in his claim or because the opposite party can be compensated by way of costs. It will certainly amount to placing premium on the gross negligence and carelessness on the part of the plaintiff in not taking necessary steps to produce his evidence on any of the dates meant for the same. Thus, the plaintiff has to blame himself only for landing himself in this unfortunate situation and he must suffer the consequences. 6. To sum up, therefore, I find no merit in this revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed but no order is made as to costs.