JUDGMENT - Gadgil B.C., J.:-The plaintiffs in regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 1962 of the file of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Akola, have preferred this appeal against the dismissal of that suit. That decision was confirmed by the Joint Judge, Akola, in Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1969. 2. The property in suit is the western portion of 4.20 acres out of S. No. 8 situate at Pimpalgaon, taluq Balapur. The entire S. No. 8 admeasures 24 acres 31 gunthas. At the stage of this second appeal, there is no dispute that this S. No. 8 was originally owned by Han and on his death, his widow Paryanbai inherited Hari's property including S. No. 8. Obviously she inherited widow's estate. On 8–7-1950, Paryanbai executed a will of the suit property in favour of the two plaintiffs and their brother Bhimarao. Paryanbai died on 6–7-1962. Bhimrao had pre-deceased her. The property is in possession of the defendant, who is the son of Paryanbai's sister. The plaintiffs claimed possession from the defendant. The defendant did not hand over possession. On the contrary, he started contending that he was the tenant of the land. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for possession and other consequential reliefs. 3. The defendant denied the execution of the will and contended that the will, even if proved, would not be valid as Paryanbai had only limited estate on the date on which the will was executed. It was also submitted that the defendant was a tenant of the land. 4. Necessary reference was made to the Tenancy Authorities and a finding was received that the defendant was not the tenant. The suit was then heard. The trial Court found that the will was properly executed by Paryanbai. However, the plaintiffs were non-suited on the ground that under the will the title to the property would not go to the plaintiffs as Paryanbai was having a widow's estate at the time of execution of the will. This view was upheld by the appellate Court. 5. I have already observed that the will is dated 8–7-1950. It is not in dispute that the property was in possession of Parayanbai on the date on which the Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956. As stated earlier Paryanibai died on 6–7-1962. Mr. This view was upheld by the appellate Court. 5. I have already observed that the will is dated 8–7-1950. It is not in dispute that the property was in possession of Parayanbai on the date on which the Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956. As stated earlier Paryanibai died on 6–7-1962. Mr. Kulkarni for the appellant-plaintiffs contended, that the fact that in 1950 Paryanbai was holding widow's estate in the property would be irrelevant inasmuch as she became full owner in 1956 and the will is to take effect in 1962 (i. e. on the death of Paryanbai). The learned Joint Judge has negatived this contention as he felt that section 57 and section 59 as also Schedule III of the Indian Succession Act would come in the plaintiffs' way. The net result of these provisions is that section 59 and restriction No. 1 in Schedule III would be relevant. The relevant portions read as follows:- “59. Every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by will. Explanation-1. A married woman may dispose by will of any property which she could alienate by her own act during her life. Explanation 2.-…………..“ Restriction No. 1 in Schedule III is: “1. Nothing therein contained shall authorise a testator to bequeath property which he could not have alienated inter vivos, or to deprive any persons of any right of maintenance of which, but for the application of these sections, he could not deprive them by will.” Relying upon these provisions, it was held that as Paryanbai was having only the widow's estate in 1950, the will executed by her on 8–7-1950 is void ab initio. 6. The term “will” has been defined in section 2 (h) as follows:- “Will” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.” There cannot be any dispute as to when the will operates as obviously it would operate only after the death of the testator. This has been so held also by the Nagpur High Court in (Tejmal v. Sawaji)1. At page 286, it is observed that the testamentary instrument comes into effect only after the testator's death. Similar view is also taken by the Allahabad High Court in (Shamblu Dayal v. Pt. Basdeo Sahai)2. This has been so held also by the Nagpur High Court in (Tejmal v. Sawaji)1. At page 286, it is observed that the testamentary instrument comes into effect only after the testator's death. Similar view is also taken by the Allahabad High Court in (Shamblu Dayal v. Pt. Basdeo Sahai)2. The Privy Council had an occasion to consider this aspect in (Krishnakumari Devi v. Rajendira Bahadur Singh Deo)3. The relevant head note reads as follows: “The will of a testator without any intimation there to be found of any contrary intention, must in relation to the property comprised in it be regarded as speaking from his death, and its validity with reference to the devise of any particular property thereby made must depend upon the testator's statutory or other lawful disposing power over that property at that time.” It is true that in the above mentioned case reported in 27 N L J 283, the learned Judge has observed that a will executed by a Hindu widow affecting property held by her as a widow's estate is void ab initio and can-not be validated by the concurrence of the next reversioners. In my opinion, these observations are to be read in the background of the facts of that case. There the Hindu widow continued to be the holder of a widow's estate at the time of her death and then the question arose whether the concurrence of the next reversioners would make the will valid. In the present case, the position is quite reverse. After the execution of the will in 1950, the Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956 and in accordance with the provisions of section 14 of that Act, the widow's estate was enlarged to an absolute estate. Consequently, in 1956, Paryanibai became the full and absolute owner of the property. The question is as to whether in such contingency can it be said that the will was inoperative simply because the will was executed by Paryanibai when she was having a limited interest in the property. In my opinion, the relevant time for considering the validity of the will in the background of this type of controversy would be the date on which the will becomes operative, i.e. the date of death of Paryanibai. Thus, one has to find out as to what was the position in 1962. In my opinion, the relevant time for considering the validity of the will in the background of this type of controversy would be the date on which the will becomes operative, i.e. the date of death of Paryanibai. Thus, one has to find out as to what was the position in 1962. Was Paryanibai full and absolute owner at the time with a disposing capacity over that property ? Obviously, as discussed above, she had such a disposing capacity. The effect of the intervening factor viz. the coming into operation of the Hindu Succession Act has much relevancy. In 1962, Paryanibai became the full owner. The will operates after the death in 1962 and under the will, the said absolute property of Paryanibai has been bequeathed to the plaintiffs and their brother. Para 291 of the Halsbury's Laws of England (Second Edition) Volume XXXIV would also be relevant while considering this aspect. It reads as follows: - “291. A will unless a contrary intention appears therein must be construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, and as if the condition of things to which it refers in this respect is that existing immediately before his death.” Explanation I to section 59 of the Indian Succession Act only states that a married woman may dispose by will of any property which she could alienate by her own act during her life. It does not lay down that the execution of the will with respect to a limited estate would be void. All that can be said is that the will not become operative as the testator would cease to have any interest in the property immediately after the death. I, therefore, think that in the present case, the will cannot be said to be void simply because Paryanibai was a limited owner on the date of the execution of the will. Of course, this will could not have any effect if she would have continued to hold the property as limited owner at the time of her death. I, therefore, think that in the present case, the will cannot be said to be void simply because Paryanibai was a limited owner on the date of the execution of the will. Of course, this will could not have any effect if she would have continued to hold the property as limited owner at the time of her death. Enlargement of her limited ownership into absolute ownership would make all the change and after such enlargement, the will, though executed in 1950, will have a binding force so as to convey the property as per bequest made in that will. This very question has also arisen before the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Smt. Sunderdevi and another v. Manakchand and others4. The relevant head note reads as under: “Where a Hindu widow, who had executed a will of her widow's estate (in her husband's property) in her possession before the Act of of 1956 came into force, dies after the Act came into force, the will can-not be held to be invalid simply because it was made at a time when the widow had no right to bequeath her widow's estate, the reason being that the will speaks at the death of the testator and not at the time of its execution. The restriction which the Hindu Law imposed on her right to dispose of widow's estate was not absolute. And whatever incapacity was imposed by the Hindu Law on her right to dispose of her widow's estate possessed by her was removed before her death by the Act of 1956. That Act made her absolute owner of all such property which was inherited by her on the death of her husband and was in her possession. The property, which a person does not possess or own or has no power to dispose of bequeathed and such a will would be valid provided the testator happened to be the owner at the time of his death.” Similar view is also taken by the Punjab High Court in (Shiv Dass and others v. Smt. Devki and others)5. It would thus be clear that the plaintiffs got full title to the property in question under the will of Paryanibai. Consequently, the plaintiffs' suit deserves to be decreed. 7. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed with costs throughout. It would thus be clear that the plaintiffs got full title to the property in question under the will of Paryanibai. Consequently, the plaintiffs' suit deserves to be decreed. 7. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The decrees passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 1962 and in Regular Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1969 are set aside and in its place a decree for possession of the suit property is passed in their favour. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession from the defendant in terms of this decree. As far as future mesne profits are concerned, an enquiry under Order 20, rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure should be made from the date of suit till delivery of possession. Appeal allowed. -----