R. R. RASTOGI, J. ( 1 ) M/s. Agra University Press Paliwal Park, Agra, owns a printing press and supplies printed material like envelopes, examination papers, mark-sheets, certificates, etc. For the assessment year 1962-63 the assessee had disclosed its net turnover at Rs. 43,183. 77. For various reasons the assessing authority rejected the accounts and the disclosed turnover and determined the same at rs. 4,25,000. The assessee filed an appeal in which the gross turnover shown by it was accepted but it was held that the entire amount so disclosed was taxable. From that order revisions were filed both by the assessee and the department. The Additional Judge (Revisions) dismissed the revision of the department. The assessees contention before the Judge (Revisions) was that its main business was to print examination question papers for the Agra and various other universities and educational institutions in India. This entire work was of a confidential nature and utmost secrecy was required to be observed. Thus, the assessee had merely done a job-work or a works contract and the transactions did not amount to sale. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the assessee it was not liable to tax even in respect of the net turnover admitted by it before the assessing authority, that is, Rs. 43,183. 77. Reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee in support of this contention on a decision of this Court rendered in its own case for the assessment year 1972-73 Agra University Press Paliwal Park v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (printed at page 317 supra) 1979 UPTC 1270. It was held in that case that as secrecy had to be maintained regarding the contents of the printed examination papers, they had to be sent in sealed envelopes and the packing of the examination papers in envelopes was incidental to the contract for the supply of printed examination papers. Thus the contract could not be split up in two parts; one for the supply of paper, packing envelopes, etc. , and the other of labour or service, viz. , printing, despatch, etc. The entire contract being a composite contract was a works contract and the transaction did not involve any element of sale and there was no question of bringing any turnover to tax. Following this decision the learned Additional Judge (Revisions) accepted the assessees contention and declared it as non-taxable. , printing, despatch, etc. The entire contract being a composite contract was a works contract and the transaction did not involve any element of sale and there was no question of bringing any turnover to tax. Following this decision the learned Additional Judge (Revisions) accepted the assessees contention and declared it as non-taxable. Being aggrieved, the department has filed the present revision. ( 3 ) IT would be seen that the case stands squarely covered by the aforesaid decision given in the assessees own case and there is no substance in this revision. ( 4 ) THE revision hence fails and is dismissed with costs to the respondent assessee which are assessed at Rs. 200. . nt to the acquisition of estates, and added : the object was, therefore, to bring about a change in the agricultural economy but not to recognise or confer any title in the whole or a part of an estate on junior members of a family. This court has held in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 that the statement of objects and reasons is not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute. But we are referring to it only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time the Bill was introduced, and the purpose for which the amendment was made. ( 71 ) THUS, the stringent rule against reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons laid down in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 has been diluted by the decision given in the aforesaid case. ( 72 ) IN the case of S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam AIR 1972 SC 2284 the Supreme Court while construing Article 171 of the Constitution, observed in paragraph 13 as follows: 13. It may be possible to look for legislative intention in materials outside the four corners of a statute where its language is really ambiguous or conflicting. But, where no such difficulty arises, the mere fact that the intentions of the law-makers, sought to be demonstrated by what was said by some of them or by those advising them when the Constitution was on the anvil were really different from the result which clearly follows from the language used in the legislative provisions under consideration, could not authorise the use of such an exceptional mode of construction. it is well accepted, said Lord Morris (see Davies, Jenkins and Co. v. Davies [1967] 2 WLR 1139 at page 1156), that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame acts of Parliament cannot make the law. ( 73 ) AGAIN, in paragraph 19, the court observed as follows : we think that the view contained in the judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions, to the effect that the candidates from graduates constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the qualification to having graduated. This contravenes the rule of plain meaning or literal construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made (see Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn. , page 70 ). An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible : see e. g. , Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459 , British India general Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh [i960] 1 SCR 168 , R. G. Jacob v. Republic of india [1963] 3 SCR 800. Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity (see e. g. , State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. AIR 1967 SC 276 ). In Hira Devi v. District Board Shahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC 362 at 365 this court observed : no doubt it is the duty of the court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the court to stretch the words used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. ( 74 ) IN paragraph 20 of the judgment a passage from Crawfords "construction of Statutes" (1940 edn.), at page 269, was cited with approval by the court which ran as under : where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. ( 74 ) IN paragraph 20 of the judgment a passage from Crawfords "construction of Statutes" (1940 edn.), at page 269, was cited with approval by the court which ran as under : where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed, might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute. ( 75 ) THE opening part of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 provides that the expression "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" wherever it is used in the Constitution and for the purpose of any law passed or made, or purporting to have been passed or made, before the commencement of the amendment Act, shall be deemed to include, and always to have included, Clauses (a) and (b)thereof. ( 76 ) IT seems that the words "in pursuance" in Sub-section (1) qualifies the phrase "for the purposes of any law passed or made, or purporting to have been passed or made, before the commencement of this Act" under the provisions relating to "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" and to no other. ( 77 ) THE phrase "before the commencement of this Act" in Sub-section (1) does not mention any earlier date and is completely unqualified. It has been argued that it means a period anterior in time of the coming into force of the Constitution itself. On the other hand, the assessees urged that the phrase "before the commencement of this Act" referred to the point of time when the constitution itself came into force. ( 78 ) PRIOR to coming into force of the Constitution, the Government of India Act, 1935, under entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, authorised levy of taxes on sales of goods by the state Legislatures. The entry 48 ran as follows : 48. ( 78 ) PRIOR to coming into force of the Constitution, the Government of India Act, 1935, under entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, authorised levy of taxes on sales of goods by the state Legislatures. The entry 48 ran as follows : 48. Taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements. " Thus, the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, was enacted under entry 48 referred to above. That entry is not identical with entry 54 of List II of the seventh Schedule which runs as under : 54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92-A of List I. ( 79 ) THUS, the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, cannot be said to have been made in pursuance of the expression "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods" and consequently Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act can have no application to the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. ( 80 ) THE further argument of the learned standing counsel, Sri A. P. Misra, in this connection, is that the notifications imposing the taxes are post-Constitution notifications and the notification being law made subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution, Sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Amendment Act is attracted. ( 81 ) HE further argues that under entry 22 of the notification dated 31st March, 1976, referred to above, the legislature prescribed sales tax on the items mentioned therein including cooked food, etc. Thus, when cooked food was sold by a hotelier or in a restaurant, the provisions of Section 6, Sub-section (1), of the Amendment Act are attracted. ( 82 ) THE answer to this argument is that by virtue of Article 372, Clause (1), the U. P. Sales Tax act, 1948, continued in force and as it had been enacted under entry 48 of List II of the Seventh schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, it was not made in pursuance of the provision authorising imposition of "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods" and as such Section 6 of the amendment Act would not apply. Further the notifications referred to above were issued under a law made under entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, which continued in force under Article 372, clause 1 of the Constitution of India. ( 83 ) THE learned standing counsel, Sri A. P. Misra, has argued that the word "purporting" in sub-section (1) has been used to mean such laws of the State Legislatures which were ostensibly made under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule but on the basis of the interpretation of the word "sale" given by the Supreme Court in the cases of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 1131 and Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. AIR 1978 SC 1591 such laws would be ultra vires of the State Legislatures. ( 84 ) IN this connection, he has referred, to the case of Girdharilal v. Lalchand AIR 1970 Raj 145 wherein, in paragraph 14, it was observed as follows : 14. For the purposes of the case before me all that I have to decide is whether the act or omission alleged against accused Nos. 2 and 6, namely, Girdharilal Mahajan and Ramchander, is reasonably related to the discharge of their duty or omission of the discharge of their duty. I agree with the observations of the Punjab High Court that it is not a pretended or fanciful justification that should be taken into account but a connection close enough to bring the act or omission within the ambit of the official act done or purported to be done. The legislature has advisably used to expressions acting or purporting to act, the latter expression means that even if the action may be somewhat beyond the scope of official duty, but was done under the colour of office, the protection can in a given case be considered. Having regard to these principles, in my opinion, the accused Nos. 2 and 6, namely, Girdharilal Mahajan and Ramchander, are alleged to have ordered the collection of refuse and omitted to cause its removal from the road and they have thereby committed the public nuisance. Both these are directly related to their duties as municipal Administrator and the Municipal Commissioner and they cannot in my opinion be prosecuted without the sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, the case against them cannot be proceeded with. Both these are directly related to their duties as municipal Administrator and the Municipal Commissioner and they cannot in my opinion be prosecuted without the sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, the case against them cannot be proceeded with. ( 85 ) THE learned standing counsel has also referred to a decision in the case of Asimunnissa v. Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Properties, Deoria AIR 1961 SC 365 wherein, in paragraph 20, it was observed as follows: 20. The word purport has many shades of meaning. It means fictitious, what appears on the face of the instrument; the apparent and not the legal import and therefore any act which purports to be done in exercise of a power is to be deemed to be done within that power notwithstanding that the power is not exercisable : Dicker v. Angerstein (1876) 3 Ch D 600 at page 603. Purporting is therefore indicative of what appears on the face of it or is apparent even though in law it may not be so. This means that at the time when the Act purported to vest the property in dispute in the custodian even though the power was not exercisable, Section 8 (2-A) by giving a retrospective effect to Section 8 (2) of the Act makes the vesting as if it was vesting under Section 8 (2) of the act and therefore the attack on the ground of invalidity cannot be sustained. By Section 5 of U. P. Ordinance 1 of 1949 the property of Khatoon Bibi who became an evacuee under Section 2 (c) and her property evacuee property under Section 2 (d) was vested in the Custodian of evacuee Property of the Province of U. P. That Ordinance was allowed to lapse. By Central ordinance 12 of 1949 as subsequently amended the vesting of evacuee property was deemed to be under that Ordinance, which in its turn was repealed under Section 65 of Ordinance 27 of 1949 which was a valid piece of legislation. By Section 8 (2) of that Ordinance the vesting under the previous Ordinance was deemed to be under that Ordinance as if it was in force on the date of the; vesting. By Section 8 (2) of that Ordinance the vesting under the previous Ordinance was deemed to be under that Ordinance as if it was in force on the date of the; vesting. Ordinance 27 of 1949 was repealed by the Act which contained provisions as to vesting in Section 8 (2), which was similarly worded as the corresponding provision of the ordinance and therefore by a fiction of law the original vesting was to be treated as if the Act was in force when the first vesting took place. The High Court of Allahabad in Azizunnisas case (S) AIR 1957 All 561 held the vesting to be invalid because up to the time of Ordinance 12 of 1949 and even Ordinance 20 of 1949 legislative competence was lacking, and even by the deeming provisions in Sections 8 (2) of Ordinance 27 of 1949 or Act 31 of 1950 there was no valid vesting, because the original vesting was bad. We think it unnecessary to decide as to whether the deeming provision of Section 8 (2) of the Act or of Ordinance 27 of 1949 was sufficient to give validity to the vesting. Section 8 (2-A) as introduced into the Act, in our opinion, makes the vesting valid, because it gives validity to the vesting which purported to have taken place as a result of Ordinance 27 of 1949 even though it was only apparently so and was not so in law, because that is what purport implies. ( 86 ) THE learned standing counsel has then referred to the Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th edition, Vol. 4, at page 2213, where the word "purport" has been defined as follows : when validity is given to anything purporting to be done in pursuance of a power, a thing done under it may have validity though done at a time when the power would not be really exercisable : Dicker v. Angerstein (1876) 3 Ch D 600. In that case it was held that the proviso, following conditional power of sale in a mortgage, that a sale purporting to be made in pursuance of the powers shall be valid as to confer a good title on a bonafide purchaser even though the security be satisfied. In the corresponding proviso, in the statutory power of sale, the phrase for purporting is professed exercise. In the corresponding proviso, in the statutory power of sale, the phrase for purporting is professed exercise. ( 87 ) IN reply, Sri Bharatji Agrawal referred to a decision in the case of Balaghat Municipality v. Meghraj AIR 1966 MP 104 in which case it was held that the word "purport" will not include that which is ultra vires and accordingly, Sri Bharatji Agrawal submitted that the State legislature could not purport to levy taxes which were outside its legislative competence. ( 88 ) HAVING considered the matter carefully, I am of the view that the word "purporting" in the context in which it is placed in Section 6, Sub-section (1), of the Amendment Act, covers those cases where the legislature enacted the law relating to sales tax within the scope of its legislative competence under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule but which because of judicial interpretation turned out to be in excess of power as otherwise the word would have no meaning where it is placed in Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act. The Amendment Act was enacted to justify such levies, and therefore, the word "purporting" must cover those taxes. ( 89 ) AN argument of the learned counsel for the assessee, Sri S. O. P. Agrawal and Sri Bharatji agrawal, here has to be noticed. They argue that the notification under which the tax has been imposed, was issued under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 3-A which provides that the turnover of goods shall be liable to tax at such rate as the State Government may by notification prescribe. ( 90 ) SECTION 2 (h) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, defines "sale" and Section 2 (i) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, defines "turnover". ( 91 ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the assessees is that the definitions given in the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, have not been altered by Parliament under the Amendment Act. ( 92 ) IT is further Urged that the definitions given in Article 366 of the Constitution of India are meant for construing the provisions of the Constitution of India itself and it cannot be imported for the purpose of interpreting an Act. ( 92 ) IT is further Urged that the definitions given in Article 366 of the Constitution of India are meant for construing the provisions of the Constitution of India itself and it cannot be imported for the purpose of interpreting an Act. ( 93 ) IN this connection, reference is made to a decision of a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo Kakatiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 Nag 86 (FB) wherein it was held that the definition of "ruler" contained in Clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution could not be applied to other laws. The relevant observation contained in paragraph 9 of the judgment, is reproduced hereunder : the next question is whether the petitioner who claims to be the Ruler is outside the definition. The term ruler is defined thus in Clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution. ruler in relation to an Indian State means the Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in Clause (1) of Article 291 was entered into and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler. according to this definition and also under the agreement which was entered into with the government of India the petitioner is entitled to be called a Ruler. Since that is so and since the definition in the Act refers to an ex-Ruler it is contended that the petitioner cannot fall within that definition. In our opinion, the definition of a Ruler contained in the Constitution is plainly artificial and is therefore applicable only for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. It cannot be applied for interpreting other Acts. The meaning of the word ruler and of the word ex-Ruler must, on the other hand, be ascertained from the dictionary as the Act in question does not define these words. ( 94 ) IT is urged that under Section 3 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, which is the charging section, a tax is imposed on the sales and purchases of a dealer. It only contemplates such sale as were taxable under the Government of India Act, 1935. ( 94 ) IT is urged that under Section 3 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, which is the charging section, a tax is imposed on the sales and purchases of a dealer. It only contemplates such sale as were taxable under the Government of India Act, 1935. Sales by a dealer where the dominant object was service, have been held by the Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 113 and Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. AIR 1978 SC 1591 to be not taxable. Thus, the legislature must be deemed to have excluded such sales when it imposed taxes on the sales and purchases of goods within the meaning of Section 3 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. ( 95 ) ON this basis, it is argued that as the definition of the word "sale" in Section 2 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, having not been altered by the Amendment Act, the original definition stands and under the original definition sales tax cannot be imposed on sales by a hotelier and in a restaurant where the dominant object of the hotelier or the restaurant owner when he effected the supply, was service. ( 96 ) CLAUSE (1) read with its sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act, by its own force, incorporated a definition of the word "sale" in the State Sales Tax Acts and is, in effect, an amendment of the definition. In this view of the matter if Sub-section (1) of Section 6 is attracted to a particular statute, the definition of the term "sale" must be deemed to have stood altered. ( 97 ) HOWEVER, as I have already held that Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act is not attracted to the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the original definition stands and on that basis the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee must be accepted. ( 97 ) HOWEVER, as I have already held that Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act is not attracted to the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the original definition stands and on that basis the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee must be accepted. ( 98 ) IF Section 6, Sub-section (1), of the Amendment Act were to be construed as applying to the u. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, then whenever the turnover of a dealer is to be worked out for the purposes of assessment, his turnover would have to be worked out on the basis of sales which are deemed to be sales within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amendment Act, and the tax would be assessed accordingly. ( 99 ) IN the end, I now take up the argument of Sri S. O. P. Agrawal that Section 6 was not enacted by Parliament under its constituent powers. He argued that Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the amendment Act incorporated amendments of the Constitution and have been made, by parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution. ( 100 ) HE, however, submits that Section 6 of the Amendment Act is not enacted by Parliament in its constituent powers. He has further argued that it is only a clause validating the laws made by the State Legislatures. . ( 101 ) HE points out that under the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1952. Section 4 thereof added Article 31a and Section 5 added Article 31b to the Constitution. ( 102 ) THEN he points out that under the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Section 2 thereof substituted in Article 31 of the Constitution for existing Clause (2) a new sub-clause and by Section 3 in Article 31a of the Constitution for the existing Clause (1) a new clause was substituted and was always deemed to have been substituted. ( 102 ) THEN he points out that under the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Section 2 thereof substituted in Article 31 of the Constitution for existing Clause (2) a new sub-clause and by Section 3 in Article 31a of the Constitution for the existing Clause (1) a new clause was substituted and was always deemed to have been substituted. ( 103 ) THEREAFTER by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, in Article 3 of the constitution for the existing proviso, a new proviso was substituted and by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, in the Union List, after the existing entry 92, a new entry 92-A was added and in the State List, the existing entry 54 was substituted by a new entry, by Section 3 a new clause in Article 269 of the Constitution was added, and in Article 286 of the constitution the explanation to Clause (1) was omitted and for existing Clauses (2) and (3) new clauses (2) and (3) were substituted. In this way, he referred to me to a large number of the constitutional Amendment Acts. ( 104 ) HE submits that the constituent powers are exercised when the text of the Constitution is amended by way of addition, variation or repeal of any provision of the Constitution. ( 105 ) HE points out, in his interesting argument, that Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the amendment Act did not amend any provision of the Constitution and as such Section 6 is not enacted by Parliament under its constituent power under Article 368 of the Constitution. ( 106 ) AS I have already held that Section 6 does not apply to the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the notifications issued thereunder, I need not decide on the correctness or otherwise of this argument. ( 107 ) IN the end, I would like to express my great appreciation of the way in which Sri. S. O. P. Agrawal, Sri Bharatji Agrawal and Sri J. C. Bhardwaj have argued and placed the case on behalf of the assessees with great ability and persuasiveness as also of Sri A. P. Misra, the learned standing counsel, who represented the Commissioner of Sales Tax, who has argued the case with great ability. S. O. P. Agrawal, Sri Bharatji Agrawal and Sri J. C. Bhardwaj have argued and placed the case on behalf of the assessees with great ability and persuasiveness as also of Sri A. P. Misra, the learned standing counsel, who represented the Commissioner of Sales Tax, who has argued the case with great ability. ( 108 ) NOW coming to the individual cases, I find that in Sales Tax Revision No. 350 of 1982 the order of remand made by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) has been upheld by the Tribunal because it held that the facts necessary to be proved by the assessee so that he could get the benefit of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. AIR 1978 SC 1591 required further investigation by the assessing authority. ( 109 ) WHEN the last court of fact, i. e. , the Tribunal, found that the circumstances of the case required further investigation, this Court cannot substitute its judgment and record a finding in its place. The order of remand, therefore, calls for no interference. ( 110 ) THE revision is accordingly dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. ( 111 ) IN Sales Tax Revision No. 398 of 1982, the Tribunal was not prepared to give the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case AIR 1978 SC 1591 . The Tribunal found that there was no evidence to show that the customers could not take away the food served to them from the premises of the assessee. In view of these findings the assessee could not be given any benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case AIR 1978 SC 1591 . ( 112 ) THE assessee did not maintain any account and the turnover and the tax liability had to be estimated. I do not find any such defect in determination of the turnover that would call for interference in revision. ( 113 ) IN the result, the revision is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. ( 114 ) IN Sales Tax Revisions Nos. I do not find any such defect in determination of the turnover that would call for interference in revision. ( 113 ) IN the result, the revision is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. ( 114 ) IN Sales Tax Revisions Nos. 423 and 424 of 1982, the Tribunal found that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case AIR 1978 SC 1591 in respect of a part of his turnover. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case AIR 1973 SC 1591 covers the case of the assessee. The Commissioner cannot get the benefit of Section 6 of the amendment Act. ( 115 ) THE revisions are accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. .