JUDGMENT - Deshpande D.B., J.- One Babu Pawar, who died on 2-1-1959, left behind him his widow Hiranbai and five daughters (l)Hnabai, (2) Tarubai, (3) Babi, (4) Muktabai and (5) Sushilabai. Tarubai is the original applicant and is also appellant before this Court in this second appeal. Other four daughters are respondents Nos. 2 to 5 in this appeal and they were original opponents Nos. 2 to 5. Bhiku, Original opponent No. 1 and present respondent No. 1 is the husband of one of the sisters, by name, Hirabai. Admittedly, Hiranbai died on 26-12-1967, but, prior to her death on 5-9-1967, Hiranbai and two daughters Hirabai and Sushilabai sold the entire property left by Babu Pawar to Bhiku by a registered sale-deed. 2. In the year 1968, the present appellant Tarubai filed a suit in the Civil Court contending that the sale-deed executed by Hiranbai, Hirabai and Sushilabai was not binding vis-a-vis her share in the property and she claimed partition and separate possession of her share in the property left by Babu. This suit was ultimately withdrawn on 8-10-1969 by Tarubai with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. In the meanwhile, on 16-6-1969, one of the daughters Muktabai gave her consent to the sale-deed executed by Hiranbai and others to Bhiku opponent No. 1 and on 23-8-1971, Babi executed a deed of consent to the sale-deed Exh. 32 executed by Hiranbai, Hirabai and Sushilabai in favour of Bhiku opponent No. I. It is also significant to note that on 20-8-1969, appellant Tarubai also sold her share to Krishna and Raghunath Pawar but on 1-2-1971, these purchasers Pawars re-sold that property to appellant Tarubai admitting therein that the earlier sale-deed dated 20-8-1969 by Tarubai in their favour was in the nature of a mortgage. Although Tarubai withdrew the earlier Suit No. 111/68 on 8-10-1969, it does not appear that she filed any other suit, but, on 22-9-1972, she filed an appli­cation in the trial Court under section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act to enforce her right of pre-emption in respect of sale in favour of Bhiku, the opponent and present respondent No. 1. 3. This application was resisted by opponent respondent No. 1 Bhiku, inter alia, on the grounds that such application under section 22 of the said Act is not maintainable. 3. This application was resisted by opponent respondent No. 1 Bhiku, inter alia, on the grounds that such application under section 22 of the said Act is not maintainable. He contended also that the application is barred by limitation and he contended further that the applicant Tarubai has no right to file this application in view of the fact that she herself had sold her share in the property to Krishna and Raghunath Pawar. 4. Before the trial Court, submissions were made and after hearing all the submissions before him, the learned trial Judge held that this application was tenable in view of section 22 of the said Act. He held that the provisions of Limitation Act were not applicable to an application under this section and therefore, according to him, the application was not barred by limitation. Similarly, he held that the applicant was not estopped from filing this appli­cation. He held that the withdrawal of earlier suit had no effect on this application and consequently, he allowed the application and fixed the price and directed the applicant to deposit the amount in the Court and passed incidental orders. 5. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, Bhiku and Hirabai, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 preferred an appeal to the District Court at Satara and the appeal was heard by the learned District Judge, Satara, Before the learned District Judge, reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants i. e. Bhiku and Hirabai, on a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court and on behalf of the present appellant, reliance was placed on the decision of Orissa High Court. After considering the statutory provisions and after considering both the rulings on this point, the learned District Judge felt that the decision of the Kerala High Court was more consistent with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and so, he preferred to follow that decision and he held that such an application under section 22 of the said Act was not maintainable. Similarly, he held that the residuary Article 137 of Indian Limitation Act was applicable to the application made in this case and according to the learned Judge, the application was barred by limitation. Similarly, he held that the residuary Article 137 of Indian Limitation Act was applicable to the application made in this case and according to the learned Judge, the application was barred by limitation. However, he held that the transaction between appellant Tarubai and Pawars being in the nature of a mortgage, the apparent sale by Tarubai in favour of Pawars on 20-8-1969 did not prevent Tarubai from filing this application. Consequently, consistent with his earlier view, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the application as not tenable. 6. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, the original applicant Tarubai has preferred this second appeal before this Court. 7. The first question that arises for consideration is whether Tarubai can ask for this relief by way of an application under section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. As already stated the Courts below have taken contradictory view and I have also pointed out that the appellate Court relied upon a deci­ sion of the Kerala High Court in preference to that of the Orissa High Court. Mr. Abhyankar appearing for respondent No. 1 did not dispute that Tarubai has a remedy in this respect but according to him, the remedy is by way of a separate suit and not by way of an application under section 22 of the said Act. According to Shri Mohite, appearing for the appellant, such an appli­cation was tenable under section 22 of the said Act and he placed implicit reliance on the decision of the Orissa High Court. 8. First of all, let us proceed to per use the two decisions on which reliance is placed by the parties. The decision of the Kera'a High Court is V. Sreedevl Amma v. Subhadra Devi1. Now, it is not disputed before me that the transfer by four daughters and mother in favour of Bhiku respondent No. 1 is not void but voidable at the option of Tarubai. The decision of the Kera'a High Court is V. Sreedevl Amma v. Subhadra Devi1. Now, it is not disputed before me that the transfer by four daughters and mother in favour of Bhiku respondent No. 1 is not void but voidable at the option of Tarubai. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court observed as follows: - “Where one of the coheirs transfers his interest in immovable property in violation of section 22(1), the remedy of the other coheirs to enforce their preferential right under section 22(1) to acquire the transferred interest is by way of a regular civil suit before a competent Civil Court and not by way of an application under section 22(2).” Thus, this is a direct authority of a Division Bench on this point. If we turn to the decision of the Orissa High Court it will be seen that a learned Single Judge of that Court in (Ganesh Chandra v. Rukmani)2, Mishra, J. held that relief can be granted under section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Mishra, J. made a reference to the various principles of interpretation of Statutes and ultimately came to the conclusion that unless such an interpretation was given, the preferential right contemplated by section 22(1) of the said Act would be an airy one and the true legislative intent cannot be given effect to. Mishra, J. went to the length of observing that when the transferror wants to transfer his interest, the transferror heir must propose or notify his intention to transfer to the other class I co-heirs and he went on to observe that a transfer made without following that procedure would be vulnerable even if it is completed. Mr. Abhyankar has no quarrel with the right to challenge the transaction but according to him, the right must be enforced by a separate suit. 9. Now, let us turn to the wording of section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Mr. Abhyankar has no quarrel with the right to challenge the transaction but according to him, the right must be enforced by a separate suit. 9. Now, let us turn to the wording of section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. Sub-section (1) of section 22 of the said Act runs as follows : - “22(1) Where, after the commencement of this Act, an interest in any immovable property of an intestate, or in any business carried on by him or her, whether solely or in conjunction with others, devolves upon two ox more heirs specified in class I of the schedule, and any one of such heirs proposes to transfer him or her interest in the property or business, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the interest pro­posed to be transferred.” It is, therefore, apparent that sub-section (1) confers upon one co-heir a pre­ferential right to purchase the property of the other co-heirs. As observed in a decision of this Court in Pandurang v. Saraswatibai3, this right under sec tion 22 of the said Act is similar to the one for exercise of the right of pre-emption under Order 20, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code and the provisions ihereof will be attracted. It will, therefore, be seen that this is a right which for all practical purposes, is a right of pre-emption. Now, let us turn to the provisions of section 22 (2) of the said Act:- “22 (2). The consideration for which any interest in the property of the deceased may be transferred under this section shall, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, be determined by the Court on applica­tion being made to it in this behalf, and if any person proposing to acquire the interest is not willing to acquire it for the consideration so determined, such person shall be liable to pay all costs of or incident to the application.” It is quite clear that sub-section (2) of section 22 of the said Act supports the recital that the consideration shall, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, be determined by the Court on application being made to it in this behalf. Hence, according to Mr. Abhyankar, the only scope of sub-sec­tion (2) is to determine the price in case there is a divergence of opinion between the parties about the price. Hence, according to Mr. Hence, according to Mr. Abhyankar, the only scope of sub-sec­tion (2) is to determine the price in case there is a divergence of opinion between the parties about the price. Hence, according to Mr. Abhyankar, the only power of the Court under sub-section (2) is, in the absence of un-animity of price between the parties, to determine the price. Now, in the instant case, the property is already transferred by some co-heirs to a stranger. In this case, let us not be guided by the fact that purchaser Bhiku is the husband of one of the sisters. The fact remains that the other co-heirs sold their shares to Bhiiku, respondent No. 1 and hence, the rights of a stranger are involved in this transaction. It is open to Bhiku to raise several other contentions which he might raise as a legal defence to the action started by appellant Tarubai. The real question for consideration is whether the Court acting under section 22 (2) of the said Act gets all these powers to adjudicate upon the rights of the purchaser from the other co-heirs. Mr. Mohite does not dispute that in the interpretation of statutes the Court cannot import anything in the section if there is nothing of the kind contained in the sec­tion itself. In this case, if the Court proceeds to adjudicate upon the defence raised by Bhiku, the Court would be naturally adjudicating upon several other contentions which may possibly be raised by Bhiku and as already pointed out, the only scope of section 22(2) of the said Act is to empower the Court to determine the price on an application being made to it by the parties. In my opinion, this provision postulates only one circumstance and, that is, that there must be divergence of opinion about the quantum of price to be paid by one co-heir to the other co-heirs. It is only in this circum stance, that an application can be made under section 22 (2) and the Court can fix the price on such an application being made to it. 10. This is a special power that is conferred upon the Courts in respect of the shares of co-heirs and the statute conferring this special power must be strictly construed. 10. This is a special power that is conferred upon the Courts in respect of the shares of co-heirs and the statute conferring this special power must be strictly construed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the only remedy that was open to the present appellant Tarubai was to file a suit and she could not have recourse to an application under section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. With respects I am unable to agree with the decision of the learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court and I am in respectful agree­ment with the Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court. I am, therefore, satisfied that the only remedy, the appellant had, was by way of a separate suit and not by way of an application under section 22 of the said Act. Mr. Mohite urged that even on an application under section 22 of the said Act, co-lateral issues can be decided. In the first place, I am unable to agree with Mr. Mohite that the other issues are co-lateral issues. In fact, it may so happen in some cases that the other issues may only be the principal issues between the parties and there is no scope for saying that the other issues are co-lateral issues and can be decided in an application under section 22 of the said Act. The other co-heirs have already sold their shares to Bhiku and therefore, the remedy open to Tarubai was to file a suit. Mr. Abyankar does not dispute that Tarubai had a right to challenge those transfers, but according to him, the only remedy open to Tarubai was to file a suit and in my opinion, he is right in this submission. I am, therefore, satisfied that the lower appellate Court was right in taking this view. 11. The next question for consideration is about limitation. It must be said in fairness to Mr. Mohite that he did not go to the length of saying that the provisions of Limitation Act were not at all applicable to such an application. The trial Court has gone to the length of saying that the provi­ sions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to such an application. It must be said in fairness to Mr. Mohite that he did not go to the length of saying that the provisions of Limitation Act were not at all applicable to such an application. The trial Court has gone to the length of saying that the provi­ sions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to such an application. If that is considered to be the real position, certain transactions can be challenged in the Courts of law even after the lapse of 50 years if the co-heir who wants to challenge such transaction is alive for such a long period. I do not think that such a position is ever contemplated whenever any legal right is conferred upon a party. Whenever a legal right is conferred upon a party, that right has got to be enforced within a period of limitation and it is not disputed that the only article that is applicable is the residuary Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation is 3 years and normally, it would run from the date of transaction, that is, from 5-9-1967 in the instant case. Even if we assume that Tarubai was not aware of the sale-deed the limitation would start to begin from the date she got knowledge of the sale and I do not find that she averred that she got knowledge of the sale on a certain date though it appears that she had knowledge prior to 1968 because she had filed a regular Civil Suit No. 111/68 for a declaration that the sale was not binding on her share. So, at any rate, when she filed the said suit in 1968, she was aware of the transfer by Hiranbai, Hirabai and Sushilabai and this application is filed by her on 22-9-1972 and it is obviously, barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court was, therefore, right on this point also. 12. The next contention of Mr. Abhyankar is that Tarubai herself had transferred her share in the property to Krishna and Raghunath Pawar and therefore, she has no right to file such an application. It is true that the Pawars re-sold the property to appellant Tarubai on 1-2-I971. Mr. Abhyankar urged that this preferential right which is given to a co-heir is always a personal right and according to Mr. It is true that the Pawars re-sold the property to appellant Tarubai on 1-2-I971. Mr. Abhyankar urged that this preferential right which is given to a co-heir is always a personal right and according to Mr. Abhyankar, appellant Tarubai sold this right to the purchasers and therefore, the purchasers did not get this right and hence, according to Mr. Abhyankar, even the re-sale by Pawars to Tarubai would not re-confer the right upon her because in the strict sense of the term, she became purchaser of the purchasers; but both the Courts below have held against respondent No. 1 in this respect, holding that the earlier transaction dated 20-8-1969, between Tarubai and Pawars was a transaction of mortgage though in the form of sale. There is a specific admission to this effect in the deed of re-conveyance executed by Pawars in favour of Tarubai. Mr. Abhyan-kar urged that there is no condition of re-conveyance embodied in the sale-deed Exh. 35 dated 20-8-1969 as contemplated by section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that there is no such provision of re-conveyance in Exh. 35, but, its absence does not preclude the parties from admitting that the transfer is in the nature of a mortgage. If the purchasers have admitted that their transaction was in the nature of mortgage and, therefore, they have re-sold the property back to Tarubai, there is nothing unbelievable in it. Hence, this ground would not go against Tarubai in starting an action. 13. Lastly, Mr. Mohite urged that it would be now too much to force Tarubai to file a civil suit and especially after taking into consideration the provisions of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, appellant Tarubai was required to make out a case to seek benefit of that section. Whatever that may be, Tarubai can legitimately take shelter under section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act and if that plea is permissible to her, she may take shelter under that section and may start an action. I for one cannot do anything in this matter which has come to this Court by way of a second appeal. 14. The result is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, there will however, be no order as to the costs of this appeal in this Court. Appeal dismissed.