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1981 DIGILAW 227 (BOM)

Balkisan Govindlal Purwar and another v. Dnyandeo Totaram Gawande Patil

1981-09-04

M.R.WAIKAR

body1981
JUDGMENT - Waikar M.R., J - Dnyandeo, the present respondent, who claimed to be the tenant of the premises consisting of 3 rooms, filed Civil Suit No. 289 of 1965 against his landlords (the present appellants) for perpetual and mandatory injunction. The mandatory injunction was claimed in respect of the southern room on the first floor alleging that while he was in possession of the said room, it was temporarily vacated by him on the representation made by the appellants that it was to be white-washed. Thereafter without restoring possession of the said room, they put their own lock to this room. An interim mandatory injunction was prayed for after the filing of the suit and the same was granted and the appellants were directed to remove the lock from the said room. 2. The suit of Dnyandeo was, however, dismissed by all the Courts on the ground that the contract of tenancy was void and illegal and as such he was not entitled to claim any injunction. 3. The present application under section 144 of the Code of. Civil Procedure was then filed by the present appellants praying for restoration of possession of the southern room, the possession of which was required to be delivered by them to Dnyandeo under the interim order passed in the said suit. 4. This application for restitution was dismissed by both the Courts below. The learned Assistant Judge placing reliance on Lala Bhagwandas v. Lala Kisan1, observed that 'granting restitution to the appellants as claimed, would amount to giving them an unfair advantage and to aid them to retain what they had obtained by practising fraud and on the contrary, if the restitution is not granted, the appellants would lose nothing'. He further observed that the respondent would not derive any advantage to which he was not entitled. 5. In this second appeal Shri Kalele, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that even before the plaintiff filed the suit, the southern room in question had the lock of the defendants and hence the relief of mandatory injunction was prayed for in the suit directing the defendants to remove the said lock and an interim mandatory injunction was prayed by him and the trial Court was pleased to grant the same. The lock was, there- fore, removed and the plaintiff was able to secure possession of the said southern room. The lock was, there- fore, removed and the plaintiff was able to secure possession of the said southern room. When the suit was ultimately dismissed, when the relief for mandatory injunction in particular was also negatived, the defendants were entitled to have the status-quo ante restored. He further submitted that even assuming that previously the plaintiff was in possession of the room and that the defendants temporarily got possession of it on the pretext that the suit room had to be white-washed and that after getting possession they locked it, even so when the relief of mandatory injunction as claimed in the suit was ultimately negatived, the defendants were entitled to have the possession restored to them by putting their own lock as was the position on the date of filing of the suit. 6. Now the doctrine of restitution under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is based on the principle that the acts of the Courts should not be allowed to work injury to the suitors. When a person has received the benefit on the basis of an erroneous judgment, the Code raises an obligation on that party to make restitution to the other party of what he has lost. All the same the Courts have to pass an order consistent with justice to both the parties which necessarily must depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine of restitution being based on equitable principles it would not be applied in case where it conflicts with the other rules of equity. 7. Now, what are the facts here? There were three rooms of which the plaintiff claimed to be the tenant. The southern room on the first floor had a lock of the defendants. It was alleged that on the representation that the room was to be white-washed, the plaintiff only temporarily vacated it, but the defendants played him false and without restoring possession they put their lock to this room. Therefore, he filed the suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the lock of that room and for perpetual injunction restraining them from interfering with his lawful and peaceful possession of the tenanted premises. 8. An interim ex-parte mandatory injunction was obtained by the plaintiff and the lock of the defendants from the southern room was removed and possession was restored to the plaintiff. 9. 8. An interim ex-parte mandatory injunction was obtained by the plaintiff and the lock of the defendants from the southern room was removed and possession was restored to the plaintiff. 9. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed and also the two appeals preferred by him. The dismissal was solely on the ground that it was a void contract of tenancy and no relief of injunction to such a contract was claimable or enforceable. 10. It is pertinent to note that the contention of the plaintiff that the southern room was also rented out to him, was in his occupation and that he was deprived of possession and enjoyment of it by the alleged fraudulent act of the defendants was upheld throughout in the said litigation. All the same the contract of tenancy being void no relief of injunction either perpetual or mandatory as prayed was granted. 11. When Shri Kalele urges that on dismissal of the main relief of mandatory injunction as claimed in the suit, restitution must be granted and statusquo ante must be restored, what precisely would be the nature of restitution? The defendants are to be assisted by the Court in putting their lock as before to the southern room after directing the plaintiff to vacate it. Now when the act of putting of the lock by the defendants had been held in the suit as a fraudulent and deceitful act on their part, the Court in a way would be granting restitution of a deceitful and a fraudulent act. 12. Suppose, the defendants-landlords were to post their ferocious dog at the main gate as to prevent the entry of the plaintiff inside the gate and thus deny him peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the tenanted premises. In the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory injunction, if by an interim mandatory injunction this obstruction is caused to be removed and the plaintiff is permitted to resume his peaceful occupation till the disposal of the suit and if it is held as a fact that the suit premises were in possession of the plaintiff as a tenant, but the suit is ultimately dismissed as the agreement of tenancy is found to be illegal and void, what is the restitution that the Court is obliged to sanction? It is the ceremonious posting at the gate of the same ferocious dog that must be sanctioned so as to prevent entry of the plaintiff as before the suit, in the teeth of a finding that the peaceful enjoyment and occupation of the premises by the plaintiff though under a void agreement of tenancy was sought to be disturbed by such high handed behaviour of the landlords? The posting of the dog or the putting up of a lock to the premises as here are acts having their setting in dishonesty, deceit and foul play. The equitable principle under section 144 can never be resorted to by the Courts in order to restore misdeeds and fraudulent acts. The plain reason for not granting restitution is that under the circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the said interim order that was passed during the trial was rendered erroneous on the dismissal of the suit. In fact even with the dismissal of the suit, the impugned order is compatible still. May be that the plaintiff could not claim to be the lawful tenant but apart from his legal status as the tenant, he had a right to remain in undisturbed possession of the premises and viewed in the sense, it cannot be said that the impugned order was really set aside or rendered erroneous by the ultimate decision in the suit. 13. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, the equitable relief of restitution if granted would be in conflict with other equitable principles namely, that he who seeks equity must do equity and one who seeks equity must come with clean hands. If weighed by these considerations, the two Courts below rejected the application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said that they acted unjustly. The two Courts below considered the position of both the parties which they were entitled to consider while ordering restitution and passed the order which was just and fair to both the sides. To allow restitution was to put a premium on fraudulent act of the appellants and to perpetuate dishonesty and deceit 14. The two Courts below considered the position of both the parties which they were entitled to consider while ordering restitution and passed the order which was just and fair to both the sides. To allow restitution was to put a premium on fraudulent act of the appellants and to perpetuate dishonesty and deceit 14. The interim mandatory injunction that was granted during the pendency of the suit, though stood vacated by the final disposal of the suit, the defendants may force the entry or put their lock on their own because the contract of tenancy has been declared void but under the circumstances of the present case, they cannot claim restitution as prayed for in the application. 15. In the result, this second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. ----