JUDGMENT : B.N. Misra, J. - In this revision the Petitioner has prayed that the order dated 23-4-1979 taking cognizance against him in case No. I.C.C. 116 of 1977 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Cuttack should be quashed. 2. On 1-11-1975 the opposite party filed a complaint petition in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack against the Petitioner and eleven others. The complainant (opposite party) inter alia alleged that the Petitioner had accepted him as a tenant in respect of "My Desire Restaurant" with effect from 5-5-1975, but on the night 7-5-1975 the Petitioner along with his associates dispossessed the opposite party from the tenanted premises and forcibly occupied the same. The opposite party sent First Information Report to the Police Station on the same night but the Police did not take any action. It is further alleged that several applications filed by the opposite party before the City Magistrate were also not duly processed. Accordingly the opposite party filed his complaint petition before the learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack and prayed that cognizance should be taken against the Petitioner and other accused persons and that documents, etc. in G.R. Case No. 980/75 should be called for proper appreciation of the evidence. On 1-11-1975 the Court posted the case to 12-12-1975 awaiting submission of police report. The police were also directed to submit a report regarding the stage at which the investigation was then pending. After several adjournments on 17-6-1976 the Court noted that the police had submitted a final report treating the case as mistake of fact. The case was directed to be put up on 12-7-1976 along with the case diary. Thereafter the case suffered many adjournments. On several dates either the opposite party was not present or he did not take any steps and on other dates the order's of the Court had not been complied with. On 3-3-1977 the Court decided that an inquiry should be held u/s 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was further decided that another complaint case filed by the opposite party on 9-9-1976 was to be clubbed together with the present case. On 24-6-1977 the statement of the opposite party was recorded in part. On 30-6-1977 the opposite party was further examined in part. On 6-7-1977 the opposite party was again further examined in part. On 24-6-1977 the statement of the opposite party was recorded in part. On 30-6-1977 the opposite party was further examined in part. On 6-7-1977 the opposite party was again further examined in part. On 11-7-1977 the opposite party was further examined and the documentary evidence adduced by him were also marked. The case thereafter suffered several adjournments mostly on account of non--receipt of documents called for from the police. It is seen that on several dates the opposite party himself was also absent on account of which the case had to be adjourned. On 23-4-1979 the learned S.D.J.M. passed the following order: In view of the order of the C.J.M. that the Petitioner should have moved to the regular Civil Court by filing a complaint to take action against opposite party No. 1 u/s 17 of the Act, instead of filing the petition before this Court and further it has been held that the Petitioner has been inducted as a tenant in respect of the case house by the landlord opposite party No. 1 and forcibly dispossessed by the latter. In view of the finding of the C.J.M. have no alternative, but to take cognizance u/s 17 of H.R.C. Act against accused Subhash Chandra Mohapatra. Issue summons to accused Subash Chandra Mohapatra. Requisites by 2-5-1979. This order of the learned S.D.J.M. is under challenge in this revision. 3. The main point urged on behalf of the Petitioner is that the statutory period of limitation having already expired, the learned Magistrate acted illegally in taking cognizance against him u/s 17 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the O.H.R.C. Act). The penalty prescribed u/s 17 of the O.H.R.C. Act is imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or fine which may extend to two hundred rupees or both. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) provides that if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, the period of limitation shall be one year and according to Section 469 of the Code the period of limitation in relation to an offender, shall commence on the date of the offence. In the present case according to the opposite party, the offence took place on the night of 7-5-1975. In the present case according to the opposite party, the offence took place on the night of 7-5-1975. Therefore the period of limitation for taking cognizance u/s 17 of the O.H.R.C. Act expired on 6-5-1976. Of course, Section 473 of the Code empowers the Court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation provided it is steadied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that It is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. In the present case the opposite party had not filed any petition before the Court for condonation of delay. In its order dated 23-4-1979 the Court has not recorded its satisfaction that in the facts and circumstances of the case the delay had been properly explained or that it was necessary to condone the delay in the interests of justice. On the contrary, the aforesaid order indicates that the Court was not at all alive to the question of limitation. The opposite party has submitted that the justification for condonation of delay has been indicated by the learned S.D.J.M. in his order dated 17-9-1979 passed on a review petition filed by the Petitioner after cognizance had been taken against him. In his order dated 17-9-1979 the Court has observed that it was not the laches of the opposite party which delayed the taking of cognizance but it was the Court which had delayed the matter, that the opposite party should not suffer on account of the fault of the Court and that therefore Section 473 should have full application and the delay if any could be condoned. This order is clearly illegal and the learned Magistrate acted in excess of his jurisdiction in condoning the delay retrospectively on 17-9-1979 after having taken cognizance on 23-4-1979. In the case of Venkappa v. Regional Transport Officer and Anr. 1978 (2) Kar. L.J. 457 it was observed: When the provisions of Sections 468 and 473 are read together, it is plain that when it is apparent that the period of limitation has expired the Magistrate loses his power to take cognizance and he secures that power back only after extending the period of limitation for the reasons mentioned in Section 473, Code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot much later after taking cognizance rectify the illegality by passing an order u/s 473, Code of Criminal Procedure and stating that it operates retrospectively. The law has been correctly stated in the aforesaid decision. Section 473 of the Code does not warrant retrospective condonation of delay. The learned Magistrate clearly acted illegally in taking cognizance on 23-4-1979 without condoning the delay and thereafter retrospectively condoning the delay on 17-9-1979. 4. The opposite party has further urged that he is entitled to the benefit of exclusion of time under Sub-section (1) of Section 470 of the Code. The said Sub-section is extracted hereunder: 470. Exclusion of time in certain cases. - (1) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded: Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. In his affidavit dated 17-11-1981 the opposite party has stated that he was prosecuting the following other prosecutions in the Court of first instance: (a) Mangalabag P.S. Case No. 276 of 1975 (G.R. Case No. 980 of 1975) arising out of 1 C.C. 370 A/75. (b) Mangalabag P.S. Case No. 275 of 1975 (G.R. Case No. 979 of 1975) arising out of 1 C.C. 370 A/75. (c) Mangalabag P.S. Case No. 483 of 1976 (G.R. Case No. 1829 of 1976) arising out of 1 C.C. 116 of 1977. According to the affidavit, items (a) and (b) arise out of Case No. 1 C.C. 370 A/75. It is further stated therein that finally the number 370A/75 was scored through and the first complaint was treated as 1 C.C. 116 of 1977 by the said Court which is the present case. Item (c) is the present case. Therefore, the opposite party cannot be said to have been prosecuting "another prosecution" as the two cases listed in items (a) and (b) relate to the present case and item (c) is the present case itself. The opposite party referred to a decision reported in Ganpat Pujari Vs. Kanaiyalal Marwari but there is nothing in that decision which assists him in the present case. The opposite party referred to a decision reported in Ganpat Pujari Vs. Kanaiyalal Marwari but there is nothing in that decision which assists him in the present case. The case before the Patna High Court related to Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The other decision cited by the opposite party is (1975) 1 S.C. 81. The page given by the opposite party is perhaps a mistake for page 76. Shri Umed Vs. Raj Singh and Others relates to an election matter and does not have any application to this case. For the reasons stated above it must be held that the learned S.D.J.M. acted illegally and in excess of his jurisdiction in taking cognizance on 23-4-1979 against the Petitioner u/s 17 of the O.H.R.C. Act without condoning the delay. 5. Although the impugned order is dated 23-4-1979, the present revision was filed in this Court on 15-10-1979 after the period of limitation had expired. The Petitioner has filed a petition for condonation of delay mainly on the ground that he had no know ledge a bout the illegal order of cognizance passed against him on 23-4-1979 and that as soon as he came to know about the said order he filed a review petition before the Court which was disposed of on 17-9-1979. The opposite party in his counter has denied the allegation of the Petitioner regarding lack of knowledge about the impugned order. According to the opposite party, the revision should not be entertained as it is barred by limitation. In course of hearing the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that instead of moving the High Court in revision the Petitioner filed a review petition before the lower Court on mistaken advice of his counsel. This contention of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted as, according to him, the petition for review was filed by the Petitioner on 29-8-1979 and by that date the period of limitation for filing the revision was already over. The plea of the Petitioner that he had no knowledge about the order dated 23-4-1979 till after the expiry of the period of limitation cannot be accepted as it has not at all been substantiated. The present revision application filed by the Petitioner must be held to be barred by limitation. 6. The plea of the Petitioner that he had no knowledge about the order dated 23-4-1979 till after the expiry of the period of limitation cannot be accepted as it has not at all been substantiated. The present revision application filed by the Petitioner must be held to be barred by limitation. 6. The further question to be examined is whether the illegal order dated 23-4-1979 passed by the learned S.D.J.M. should be allowed to stand on the ground that the present revision application is barred by limitation. In this context reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court, Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilal Sapuru and Others, where it was observed: It however, appears that the Respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition (sic) was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted that limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriages of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore, it is revisable u/s 397(1), Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. I f in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. I f in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We, however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whisper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate. In the present case also non-interference would result in the perpetuation of a glaring illegality and miscarriage of justice. This is a fit case where suo motu powers of revision must be exercised and in exercise of the said powers, the order dated 23-4-1979 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack must be and is hereby quashed. This revision is disposed of accordingly. Final Result : Allowed