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1981 DIGILAW 228 (CAL)

Bidhu Bhusan Masanta v. Kiriti Bhusan Masanta

1981-07-02

ANIL KUMAR SEN, BHABES CHANDRA CHAKRABARTI

body1981
JUDGMENT Sen, J. This is a revisional application at the instance of defendant No.1 directed against an order, dated January 29, 1981 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Midnapore, in Title Suit No.21 of 1976. By the order impugned the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of an objection as to sufficiency of the court fee paid by the plaintiff on the plaint preferred by the defendant-petitioner. This revisional application has been heard as a contested application on notice to the plaintiff/opposite party. 2. The plaintiff instituted the above suit praying for a declaration that an earlier compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 74 of 1947 between the plaintiff and the principal defendant is unjust, illegal, inoperative, null and void and the same is not binding on the plaintiff and for a decree for partition in respect of suit 'properties on a claim of one-third share therein. The previous decree was a decree for partition and the plaintiff claimed the said decree to be void and inoperative on grounds pleaded in the plaint. Plaintiff valued the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 91,200/- and paid a fixed Court fee of Rs. 15/- for partition and Rs. 20/- for declaration. 3. The plaintiff later amended the plaint and incorporated a prayer for reopening the previous partition in the event it is held that there was such a partition obviously in terms of the decree in the earlier suit. 4. Such a prayer being incorporated an objection was raised on behalf of the defendant-petitioner to the effect that the plaintiff must pay ad valorem court fee and he cannot proceed with the suit by paying fixed court fee as paid by him. This objection has been disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge by the order impugned. 5. In disposing of this objection, the learned Subordinate Judge took the view that since the Solenama decree which was subsequently registered bears no valuation, no valuation regarding the properties covered by that Solenama can be put. He, however, took the view that since by the amendment, the plaintiff has introduced another claim of declaration, the plaintiff must pay another amount of court fee of Rs. 20/- for such added declaration and he directed accordingly. 6. Mr. Roychowdhury appearing in support of this revisional application has challenged the correctness of the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. According to Mr. 20/- for such added declaration and he directed accordingly. 6. Mr. Roychowdhury appearing in support of this revisional application has challenged the correctness of the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned Subordinate Judge failed to consider the relevant point, viz., whether the plaintiff is to pay ad valorem court fee or he can proceed with the suit by merely paying fixed court fees. Here, after the amendment, Mr. Roychowdury contends, there can be no doubt about the position that plaintiff was really seeking a relief of setting aside a previous partition in respect of properties which had been valued by the plaintiff himself at Rs. 91,200/- even if the decree sought for be a decree of declaration a consequential relief had been incorporated by the amendment when the plaintiff wanted the previous partition to be reopened. In such a case according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury the plaintiff is bound to pay ad valorem court fee. Reliance is placed by Mr. Roychowdhury on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of (1) Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prosad, AIR 1973 SC 2384 . 7. Mr. Sahu appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party has contested the point thus raised by Mr. Roychowdhury and he has raised a further objection to the effect that the defendant is not entitled to challenge the order in revision when the issue decided involves the question of sufficiency of the court fee and not the jurisdiction of the Court. Reliance is placed by him on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Rathnavaramaraja v. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 . 8. Having carefully considered the respective contentions put forward before us, we are of the view that though there may be some substance on the merits of the objection raised by the defendant and put forward before us by Mr. Roychowdhury, yet the plea of bar to the maintainability of the present revisional application raised by Mr. Sahu must prevail. 9. In the decision relied on by Mr. Roychowdhury, yet the plea of bar to the maintainability of the present revisional application raised by Mr. Sahu must prevail. 9. In the decision relied on by Mr. Sahu which was later re-affirmed and explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Shamhser Singh v. Rajinder Prosad (supra) it has been clearly held that no revision on question of sufficiency or otherwise of court fees lay at the instance of a defendant where no question of jurisdiction is involved because the question as to whether proper court fee has been paid or not is a question primarily between the plaintiff and the State and the defendants have no right to move the superior Court in revision against the order adjudging payment of court fee payable on the plaint. In the case of (3) M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379 the Supreme Court observed : "an immunity from a litigation unless the requisite court fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant" and strongly relying upon this observation, it has been contended by Mr. Roychowdury that the defendant is entitled to challenge the propriety or correctness of an order adjudging the court fee payable on a plaint since that order affects the defendant's valuable right if the court fee adjudged as payable is not the proper court fee. But this observation of the Supreme Court must be read in the context in which it was made. That was a case where the Supreme Court was considering the position and right of the defendant in an enquiry into pauperism under Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the provision of Rules 6 and 9 of the Order 33, it was held that an enquiry into the question whether the plaintiff is a pauper or not is not exclusively a matter between the plaintiff and the State ; a defendant is equally entitled to show and establish that the plaintiff is not a pauper and as such he cannot go on with the suit without paying the proper court fee payable in the plaint. It is only in that context that the above observation now relied on by Mr. Roychowdhury was made. It is only in that context that the above observation now relied on by Mr. Roychowdhury was made. This observation, however, cannot be read as an authority for a proposition that the defendant can maintain a revisional application challenging an order adjudging the court fee payable on a plaint or disposing of any objection raised by the defendant in that regard. A proposition just to the contrary was expressly laid down in the decision relied on by Mr. Sahu and which again was re-affirmed in Shamsher Singh’s case a decision later in point of time than the one relied on by Mr. Roychowdhury. In the result, we hold that the revisional application is not maintainable and, as such, it is dismissed on contest without, however, any order for costs. Chakrabarti, J.: I agree.