JUDGMENT : U.L. Bhat, J. Respondents 1 and 3 (owner and insurer respectively) in O.P. (M.V.) 9 of 1977 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge) Tellicherry, have preferred this appeal, aggrieved by the award of compensation by the Tribunal to Respondents 1 to 5 herein. 2. On 29.10.1976 at about 10 p.m. while the now deceased Ibrayin (husband of the 1st Respondent herein and father of Respondents 2 to 5 herein) was walking on the western side of the trunk road between Valapatnam and Cannanore at Puthiya Theru bazaar, the 6th Respondent herein drove car K.L.C. 6747 (owned by the 1st Appellant and insured with the 2nd Appellant) from Valapatnam side to Cannanore side, that is from north to south and the car hit a dog in the road and swerved to the western side and hit Ibrayin who was thrown off 10 yards away and then the car ran over him and proceeded without stopping. The occurrence was witnessed by P.Ws. 2 and 3 who ran to the scene and found Ibrayin dead on account of the injuries. It appears the driver was prosecuted in a criminal court. Result of the case is not known. Respondents 1 to 5 herein, widow and children of Ibrayin, preferred a claim before the Tribunal claiming a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation. They contended that Ibrayin was earning about 50/- rupees per day by dealing in old utensils, bottles and newspapers, etc. and would have lived for about 20 years more and they were solely depending on him. 3. The driver and the owner filed separate statement admitting the main facts in the case but denying that the car was driven in a rash or negligent way and asserting that the car was being driven with due care and caution. According to them, Ibrayin suddenly ran across the road and the same resulted in an inevitable accident for which the driver cannot be held responsible. They also contended that at the time of the occurrence, Ibrayin was 70 years old and not capable of doing any work or earning any money, that he was not maintaining the claimants and they were not dependent on him for their livelihood. The insurer filed a counter reciting similar contentions. 4. The widow of Ibrayin was examined as P.W.1. Two independent witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3. The insurer filed a counter reciting similar contentions. 4. The widow of Ibrayin was examined as P.W.1. Two independent witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3. No rebuttal evidence was provided. The Tribunal held that Ibrayin died on account of being hit by the car belonging to the 1st Appellant and driven by the 6th Respondent in a rash and negligent manner and awarded Rs. 20,160/- as compensation to the claimants. The insurer was directed to pay the amount. 5. On behalf of the 1st Appellant it is contended that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the impact occurred on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. On behalf of the insurer it is contended that the amount awarded is excessive. There is no dispute regarding the identity of the car or the driver. 6. There is no dispute that on 29.10.1976 at about 10 p.m. at Puthiya Theru bazaar car K.L.C 6747 struck Ibrayin and caused injuries leading to his death. The dispute centres round the question whether the impact took place on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver or whether it was an inevitable accident caused by Ibrayin suddenly running across the road. P.Ws. 2 and 3 are persons who reside near the place. The scene is near Puthiya Theru bazaar where there are hotels and shops. P.Ws 2 and 3 had gone to a hotel to take tea. They came out and stood chatting in front of the hotel. It was then the car came from Valapatnam side (north). They have uniformly deposed that the car was driven at a very high speed without sounding horn. First it came along the middle of the road and thereafter the car swerved to the west (wrong side) and hit Ibrayin who was walking along the extreme western side of the road. Car proceeded without stopping. There were street lights as well as lights in the hotel. Of course they were not able to identify the driver. It was suggested to them that Ibrayin suddenly crossed the road; they denied the suggestion. It is significant to note that the driver was not examined and no rebuttal evidence was attempted. P.Ws. 2 and 3 have been questioned by the police. P.W. 3 claimed that he gave information to the police. It was suggested to them that Ibrayin suddenly crossed the road; they denied the suggestion. It is significant to note that the driver was not examined and no rebuttal evidence was attempted. P.Ws. 2 and 3 have been questioned by the police. P.W. 3 claimed that he gave information to the police. He was also examined in the criminal Court. They have given a uniform and cogent version of the occurrence. Their version that the car was driven at an excessive speed, appears probable. There is no suggestion put to them that the road is not straight or there is no visibility for the driver of the car. Yet he hit the dog and then the car swerved to the wrong side and hit Ibrayin. The witnesses stood cross-examination well. Nothing is elicited in their cross-examination to cast any doubt about their presence at the scene or about their veracity. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence or circumstances to probabilities that Ibrayin suddenly crossed the road. The inference is obvious that the car was driven at an excessive and uncontrollable speed. Obviously, even while approaching the bazaar, driver did not take any precautions. He did not slow down the car. There is also no suggestion that the car had any mechanical defect. It is sufficiently proved that the car suddenly swerved to the wrong side and hit Ibrayin. That could have been caused only by the excessive and uncontrollable speed of the cat. 7. It is proved that the car swerved to the wrong side and hit Ibrayin who was walking along the western side of the road. In the circumstances of the case, it is possible to rely on the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur'. The thing speaks for itself. Negligence has to be inferred from proved circumstances, appreciated in the light of our understanding of common course of events. Court has to infer the logical probability from the proved circumstances-where the circumstances are eloquent of the negligence of the person who brought about the state of things complained of, nothing more is necessary to infer negligence. This method of approach is all the more justified since a stranger or a pedestrian cannot always be expected to prove the exact act of rashness and negligence. It must necessarily be capable of deduction from proved circumstances as a matter of probability. This method of approach is all the more justified since a stranger or a pedestrian cannot always be expected to prove the exact act of rashness and negligence. It must necessarily be capable of deduction from proved circumstances as a matter of probability. Where the claimants are able to say what happened at the time and that is inconsistent with due care and caution having been exercised by the driver or it is consistent with rashness or negligence on his part, a finding of culpable negligence can certainly be arrived at. In such a case, it is for the other side to show why or how the occurrence took place. 8. The circumstances of the case would clearly establish failure of the driver to exercise the degree of care and caution required of a driver of a motor vehicle in a highway near a bazaar. In this view, it is for the other side to explain why or how the occurrence took place. No such explanation has been sought to be established. The Tribunal was justified in holding that negligent driving of the car caused the occurrence. There is no dispute that the impact caused injuries leading to death. 9. The next question relates to the quantum of compensation awarded. P.W. 1 has deposed that her husband was dealing in bottles and newspapers, etc. and earning Rs. 50/- per day. There is no rebuttal evidence. It is well-known that hawking bottles, newspapers, old utensils, etc., is a fairly remunerative occupation. Yet the Tribunal fixed his daily income only at Rs. 12/- per day. If at all, this errs on the low side; it cannot be said to be excessive. 10. P.W. 1 deposed that her husband died at the age of 58 and he was not sickly. The neighbours examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3 deposed that the deceased was aged about 55 years. The Appellants took the stand that he was 70 years old but failed to adduce any evidence. The Tribunal was therefore justified in accepting his age at the time of death as 58 years. The Tribunal also estimated that he would have continued to earn till the age of 65 years. This also appears to be a conservative estimate. The Appellants took the stand that he was 70 years old but failed to adduce any evidence. The Tribunal was therefore justified in accepting his age at the time of death as 58 years. The Tribunal also estimated that he would have continued to earn till the age of 65 years. This also appears to be a conservative estimate. It would have been reasonable to fix the life span at anything between 65 and 70 years under conditions existing in the country at present and in the absence of any evidence affecting the probable longevity or life span in the particular case. No such evidence has been attempted in this case. 11. The claimants took the stand that all of them have been solely dependent on the earnings of Ibrayin. Claimants 2 and 3 are adult sons of Ibrayin, of them 3rd claimant is sickly. The 4th claimant is married daughter and the 5th claimant is a minor child of Ibrayin. P.W. 1 has deposed that she and her children have no other means of livelihood, that none of the children has any job, that they were studying when the father was alive but not since then and he was the sole breadwinner of the family. In cross-examination, it was elicited that the 2nd claimant used to catch fish and earn some petty amount and has not been paying anything for household expenses. The Tribunal computed that Ibrayin would have spent Rs. 4/- out of Rs. 12/- for himself and the balance, about Rs. 8/- would have been spent on the dependents. On this basis, it was estimated that he would have spent Rs. 240/- per mensem or Rs. 2,880/- per year on the dependents and taking seven years multiple the compensation was arrived at Rs. 20,160/-. 12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that claimants 2 to 4 cannot be said to be dependents of Ibrayin as two sons are adults and the daughter is married. But this argument cannot be accepted in view of the uncontroverted testimony of P.W. 1. The Tribunal accepted her evidence and we are not persuaded to hold that the same ought not to have been accepted. Even taking the view that the 2nd claimant is regularly employed, it must follow that the other four claimants were dependents of Ibrayin. But this argument cannot be accepted in view of the uncontroverted testimony of P.W. 1. The Tribunal accepted her evidence and we are not persuaded to hold that the same ought not to have been accepted. Even taking the view that the 2nd claimant is regularly employed, it must follow that the other four claimants were dependents of Ibrayin. Even on that basis, we are not persuaded to hold that the amount awarded is excessive. 13. Ibrayin was the head of the family consisting of himself wife and children. In the normal course he could be expected to maintain and look after the members of his family. Out of his earnings he would have normally spent on himself only so much amount as would leave a sufficient amount from out of which the members of the family could be maintained. This is consistent with normal course of events and human conduct. It could be reasonably expected that the income would be shared equally between the, members of the family as normally no special treatment would be shown to anyone. Of course in cases of sickness or other special circumstances, special treatment may be shown. The evidence in this case is that the third claimant is a sick person. There is nothing unreasonable in the finding of the Tribunal that out of Rs. 12/- per day Rs. 8/- per day would have been spent on the Defendants. Even if the 2nd claimant is ignored it is not unreasonable to hold that the other claimants would have shared equally the balance amount of Rs. 8/-. In fact, it would have been more reasonable to hold that Rs. 9/- would have been so spent. 14. It is argued by learned Counsel for Appellants that since the income of seven years is being paid in a lump sum, a percentage has to be deducted from the lump sum. The Tribunal allowed no deduction because compensation was arrived at by adopting a multiple of only seven. 15. It is true that when compensation is paid in lump payment is accelerated and allowance may have to be made on account of such acceleration depending on facts and circumstances of each case. The Tribunal allowed no deduction because compensation was arrived at by adopting a multiple of only seven. 15. It is true that when compensation is paid in lump payment is accelerated and allowance may have to be made on account of such acceleration depending on facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has to consider if the total amount awarded will be utilised by the number of contemplated years and if during the period the dependents will have used up the capital and also the income or interest from the investment. The approach has to be based on a broad and general appreciation of circumstances and not a minute calculation: of anticipated interest etcetera. In arriving at a conclusion, regard must also be had to possible fluctuation in expenditure of the dependents, the rising trend in cost of living, the effect of spiralling inflation, etc. Generally speaking, in these days a deduction will be made out of lump sum granted in cases where the lump sum is arrived at on the basis of multiplying the annual amount by a multiple of over ten. It is unnecessary to make such a deduction if the amount is arrived at by taking multiple as ten or less than ten. In this case, the multiple is seven and we do not find any reason for making any deduction. 16. We do not find any reason to interfere with the amount awarded by the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed with costs of Respondents 1 to 5.