Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are the legal heirs of one deceased Kannan. They had filed O. S. No. 41 of 1965 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Badagara, for a charge decree on three items of properties claiming maintenance for themselves from the said Kannan, now deceased. That suit was disposed of by the judgment dated 28-6-1967 granting relief to the petitioners. The 3rd respondent herein was the 6th defendant in that suit She was made party to the suit as there appears to have been a contention that she was having a leasehold interest in respect of item 3 in the plaint schedule in that suit. 2. The 3rd respondent filed O A. No. 84 of 1976 on the file of the 2nd respondent, Land Tribunal, Badagara, under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 ('the Act') for purchasing the rights, title and interest of the petitioners. The 2nd respondent, Land Tribunal, dismissed the application holding that the application filed by the 3rd respondent was barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in the suit O S. No. 41 of 1965. Ext. P1 is the copy of the order in O. A No. 84 of 1976 dated 27-1-1977. Aggrieved by Ext. P1 order the 3rd respondent took up the matter in appeal, A. A. No. 778 of 1977, which was disposed of by the 1st respondent, the Appellate Authority (LR) Kozhikode, by judgment dated 28-1-1980 a true copy of which is Ext. P2. The Appellate Authority took the view that the Land Tribunal was in error in holding that the application was barred by the principles of res judicata by reason of the decision in O A. No 84 of 1976 and remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal setting aside Ext. PI order. 3. It is aggrieved by Ext. P2 judgment that the petitioners have come up to this Court with this writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Sri. R. Bhaskaran, the counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the reasoning of the Appellate Authority that no decision binding on the 3rd respondent herein was made in O S. No. 41 of 1965, and, therefore, the principles of res judicata would not apply to bar the application is patently wrong. 4. Sri. R. Bhaskaran, the counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the reasoning of the Appellate Authority that no decision binding on the 3rd respondent herein was made in O S. No. 41 of 1965, and, therefore, the principles of res judicata would not apply to bar the application is patently wrong. According to him the question as to whether the lease in favour of the 3rd respondent was a sham document or not was very much in issue before the court in the proceedings and therefore when the suit was decided in favour of the petitioners, repelling the contentions of the defendants, including the 6th defendant, (the 3rd respondent herein), it has to be held that there was already a decision binding on the parties in that suit with respect to title and possession of the property only. 5. Sri. Siby Mathew, the counsel for the 3rd respondent, submitted that there is no scope for interference with Ext. P2 judgment at all inasmuch as it has been rightly held in that judgment that the application of the principles of res judicata to the present case was wrong and the 2nd respondent, Tribunal, was actually in error in dismissing the application holding that the application was barred by principles of res judicata In an attempt to substantiate his contention Sri. Siby Mathew said that neither the issues framed nor the decision arrived at would warrant the reasoning that the application was barred by res judicata. Though the judgment in O. S. No.41 of 1965 has not been produced in this Court it is agreed between the parties before me that the two issues out of 12 issues framed in that suit relevant for our purpose are issues 7 and 11 which read as follows: "7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a charge on the plaint schedule properties for the plaint amount. 11. Are defendants 2 to 6 necessary parties to the suit ?" It is also agreed between the parties that the decision in the suit runs as follows: "It follows from the above discussion that the 1st defendant is deemed to be in actual possession and enjoyment of items 1 to 3 since the assignment Exhibits B-10 and B43 are sham transactions created with an ulterior motive to defeat the maintenance due to the plaintiffs. The 1st defendant is not entitled to any equity in this case. The 1st defendant is not entitled to any equity in this case. I would therefore bold under issue S that the assignment of item 1 of the plaint schedule property to the 2nd defendant is a sham transaction which has not been acted upon. Under issue 9,I hold the 1st defendant is not entitled to any equities. Under issue 11, I hold that defendants 2 to 6 are necessary parties to the suit " The submission made by Sri. Bhaskaran is that though no specific issue regarding the shamness or otherwise of the lease granted by the said Kannan in favour of the 3rd respondent herein was specifically raised, failure to raise an issue for trial by itself would not be a ground for holding that the principles of resjudicata need not be applied provided that the question was involved in the pleadings and it was actually decided by the court. In support of this contention he relied on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Rohini Nandan v. Jadunandan (AIR. 1926 Cal. 1022) and in Priombada Debi v. Johuri Lal (AIR. 1941 Cal. 574). He also submitted that merely for the reason that the 3rd respondent herein did not contest the suit O. S. No. 41 of 1965 would not matter inasmuch as even in the case of ex parte decrees, the decisions are to operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. In support of this contention Sri. Bhaskaran cited the decisions in Gouri Shankar v. Ram Banka (AIR. 1963 Patna 398), and Priombada Debi v. Johuri Lal (AIR.1941 Cal. 574). He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamati Sen (AIR. 3953 SC. 33) for the proposition that the general principles of res judicata will be applicable even to Tribunals where the earlier decision is by a Civil Court. 6. The submission made by Sri. Siby Mathew is that the pre-requisite for the application of the principles of res judicata are that it should arise directly and substantially, and it should have been decided by the court. In this case, according to him, neither the issues raised nor the decision rendered would go to show that the question regarding lease in favour of the 3rd respondent was either directly or substantially an issue or that question was finally decided. In this case, according to him, neither the issues raised nor the decision rendered would go to show that the question regarding lease in favour of the 3rd respondent was either directly or substantially an issue or that question was finally decided. No doubt there is a passing reference that the 3 respondent herein was not in possession of item No 3. Inasmuch as the lease by itself was not directly in issue, and that question has not been decided by the court, I am afraid, the passing observations made in the judgment in the earlier civil suit in regard to possession which did not directly and substantially arise for decision, or was not finally decided, could or would operate as resjudicata in the subsequent proceedings before the Land Tribunal between the same parties. All that has been decided against the 3rd respondent herein in the earlier suit is that respondents 2 to 6 were necessary parties, which by itself would be of no consequence in the later application before the Land Tribunal. It would have made all the difference if the question whether the lease set up by the 6th defendant in that suit was true and valid was raised as an issue for decision in that suit; and if that issue was fully and finally decided, which is not the case here, 7. For the foregoing reasons I find no ground to interfere with the judgment of the 1st respondent, Appellate Authority The Land Tribunal shall consider the case on merits on the basis of material already placed before it, and in the light of the evidence, if any, that might be adduced by the parties to substantiate their respective contentions, for which adequate opportunity would be allowed to them. The writ petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. A carbon copy of this judgment may be granted to the counsel for the petitioners, and the counsel for the 3rd respondent on usual terms, if applied for in that behalf.