JUDGMENT - Chandurkar M.N. J. - The only question in this petition is whether in a suit filed by a tenant for injunction restraining an owner of the property which is in his possession from using the premises for non-residential purpose attracts the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay Rent Act and thus it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Court under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. 2. Facts in this case are not in dispute. The petitioner is an owner of a building in Colaba which has four floors including the ground floor. The third floor is let out to respondent-plaintiff and she is occupying it as a tenant. The ground floor and first floor are admittedly in exclusive possession of the petitioner as owner thereof and are not tenanted to anybody. Desiring to open a guest house on the ground floor, the petitioner got the necessary plans sanctioned and has obtained ail the necessary no objection certificates from the police, and from the Housing and Area Development Board. He has also obtained the commencement certificate from the Municipal Corporation. According to him, he has spent a large amount on furnishings and making necessary alterations on the ground floor. 3. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has, however, filed a declaratory suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay in which the substantive relief asked by the plaintiff is that she should be given a declaration that as a tenant of the property belonging to the petitioner she has a vested right created in her favour under the Rent Act, “that it will be unlawful for the landlord and,'or his agent to transfer a residential place into a non-residential one and that the defendant has no right to convert the flat in his occupation on the ground floor of his property named “Moti Mansion” situate at 10th Ormiston Road, Colaba, Bombay 39, to a non-residential one for running a Lodging House or a Guest House.” A permanent injunction was prayed in the suit restraining the defendant, his servants and agents from converting residential flat in the occupation and possession of the defendant into a non-residential place for opening and running a Lodging House or a Guest House. An interim injunction was also prayed. An interim injunction was also prayed. The petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to entertain the suit as, according to him, the suit is not a suit between a landlord and a tenant nor is any question arising out of the Rent Act or any of its provisions involved in the suit as contemplated by section 28 of the Rent Act. 4. Before considering the prayer for injunction, the Trial Court considered the question of jurisdiction and it seems to have taken the view that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the plaintiff's right of enjoyment of his own premises was likely to be affected by opening a lodging house on the ground floor which is not a ground on which the injunction has been sought. It appears that the petitioner filed an appeal against this order before the Appeal Bench of the Small Causes Court which was, however, dismissed summarily as not maintainable. The petitioner has now challenged the order of the trial Court in this petition. 5. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Bombay Rent Act is a law relating to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises and is essentially a law with regard to the rights and liabilities of the landlords and tenants and having regard to the definitions of 'premises' and 'landlord' in the Act, since there is no nexus between the plain-tiff and the premises in question, the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay Rent Act were not at all attracted in the case. Consequently, according to the learned counsel, there was no jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court to entertain the suit of the nature filed by the plaintiff-respondent. Mr. Gumaste appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has urged that section 25(1) is an absolute bar against all owners of properties whose premises have not been used for non-residential purpose on the date of the coming into operation of the Rent Act against either using those premises or allowing them to be used for a non-residential purpose. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that as a tenant of a portion of the building, the plaintiff has a right vested in her to see that no part of the building is allowed to be used for non-residential purpose. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that as a tenant of a portion of the building, the plaintiff has a right vested in her to see that no part of the building is allowed to be used for non-residential purpose. The learned counsel contended that when section 25(1) refers to landlord, it means owner of property irrespective of the fact that the tenant has any connection with it or not. 6. Now, the suit filed by the plaintiff is a declaratory suit. The averments in the plaint must, therefore, prima facie disclose the right in respect of which she seeks a declaration and the manner in which the petitioner-defendant is threatening to infringe that right. It has been conceded before me that the only right canvassed in the suit by the tenant of premises which are entirely different from the premises which the owner is seeking to convert into a guest house is under section 25 of the Rent Act and it, therefore, becomes necessary to consider the exact nature and scope of section 25(1) of the Rent Act. Section 25(1) reads as follows: A landlord shall not use or permit to be used for a non-residential purpose any premises which on the date of the coming into operation of this Act were used for a residential purpose. We are not concerned in this petition with the question as to whether the premises which are now sought to be converted by the owner to non-residential use were used for residential purpose on the date of the commencement of the Act, because there is no pleading with respect to that. If the plaint is properly read, the main grievance of the plaintiff appears to be that she is a tenant of the third floor of the building and the ground floor which is in the occupation of the owner is being converted to a non-residential use by using it as a guest house and this the owner must be prevented from doing. Unless, therefore, it is possible to hold, firstly, that any right is created in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the premises other than the one in her occupation and secondly that the bar of section 25(1) is attracted in the instant case, the exclusive jurisdiction under section 28 will not be attracted. 7. Unless, therefore, it is possible to hold, firstly, that any right is created in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the premises other than the one in her occupation and secondly that the bar of section 25(1) is attracted in the instant case, the exclusive jurisdiction under section 28 will not be attracted. 7. Now there is hardly any doubt that primarily the Bombay Rent Act was enacted with the object of controlling rents and repairs of certain premises as well as of controlling of rents of hotels and lodging houses and of evictions as will be clear from the Preamble to the Act, the material part of which reads as follows : “WHEREAS it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents, and repairs of certain premises, of rates of hotels and lodging houses and of evictions and also to control the charges for license of premises, etc................................” The Preamble therefore makes it clear that the law was intended to be applicable only to certain premises. In order to ascertain which were the premises contemplated for being brought within the provisions of the Act, the premises were identified with reference to the area or the region and with reference to the purpose for which they were used. The extent of the applicability of the Act with reference to the area or the region was provided for in section 2 of the Act and there is no doubt that under sub-section (1) of section 2, parts I and IV of the Act have been extended to the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra. The other provision, which becomes relevant in order to identify the premises to which the provisions of the Act are applicable, must be found in section 6 the main part of which alone is material and which reads as follows:“(1) In areas specified in Schedule I, this Part shall apply to premises let (or given on licence)for residence, education, business, trade (or) storage.” Section 6 appears in Part II and Part II consists of sections 6 to 31. In order that the provisions of sections 6 to 31 should apply to given premises, one of the essential conditions which have to be satisfied is that the premises must be “let or given on licence for residence”. 8. In order that the provisions of sections 6 to 31 should apply to given premises, one of the essential conditions which have to be satisfied is that the premises must be “let or given on licence for residence”. 8. So far as the area specified in Schedule I am concerned, there is no dispute that the building in question is situated in the City of Bombay. Mow it is significant to note that section 25 is included in part II of the Act. When section 6 (1) provides that this part, i.e. part II shall apply to premises let or given on license, section 25 having been included in Part II will only apply to premises let or given on license. Reading sections 6 and 25 thus together, if the premises in question i.e. the ground floor of the building owned by the petitioner are not premises let or given on license for residence, the provisions of section 25 or any part of Part II of the Bombay Rent Act will become wholly inapplicable. 9. There is another difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. The bar created by section 25 is firstly against a landlord and secondly it is in respect of a certain premises. Now both these terms have been defined in the Act itself. The use of these terms pre-supposes a relationship between landlord and tenanted premises. That is the concept which is given effect to in the definition which is exhaustive in section 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The term landlord is defined in so far as is material is as follows: “Landlord” means any person who is for the time being receiving, or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person ..................... who would .............................. be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant; ............................” The term landlord is defined in the context of premises, and the premises must be those in respect of which rent is being received or receivable by the landlord. Therefore, unless the premises are rented out, the owner cannot become a landlord for the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, unless the premises are rented out, the owner cannot become a landlord for the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act. Consistent with this definition and with the object of the Act, the word 'premises' has also been defined in section 8 as meaning, inter alias, “any building or part of a building let or given on license separately but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house”. The other part of the definition is not relevant. What is, however, important is that here again the definition of premises is an exhaustive definition; be-cause the word used is “means”. Therefore, before any house or accommodation can be called premises for the purposes of the Bombay Rent Act it must be a building or a part of a building let or given on license separately. This exhaustive definition of premises will, therefore, not include any premises in the possession of the owner and which are not let or given on license separately. 10. Now it is a known canon of construction of statutes that where the Act itself provides for a dictionary of the meaning of the words used in the Act, wherever those words are utilized in the different provisions of the law, those definitions must be substituted in those provisions. If we now thus read section 25, having regard to the definition of the words landlord and premises, it is obvious that section 25(1) will be attracted only where the premises which are let or given on license are allowed to be used or used by the landlord of the premises for a non-residential purpose if they were originally used for residential purpose. In other words, the disability created by section 25(1) fastens itself only on tented premises or premises given on license and the person subjected to the disability must satisfy the character of a landlord. Where none of these or any one of these conditions is not satisfied, it is obvious that section 25(1) will not be attracted at all. 11. Mr. Where none of these or any one of these conditions is not satisfied, it is obvious that section 25(1) will not be attracted at all. 11. Mr. Gumaste, however, contended that the definition in section5 opens with the words “unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context” and, therefore, according to the learned counsel, the word landlord in section 25(1) must be given a wider meaning and must take within it even an owner of a property which is not a subject of tenancy. It is difficult to accept this argument. Firstly, it is not pointed out by the learned counsel how there is anything repugnant to the subject or context in section 25 to justify the giving of a different meaning to the word landlord. Secondly, even generally understood the term landlord implies that there is a relation-ship of landlord and tenant in respect of certain premises, though a landlord would be an owner of a property. However, owner of a property will not be a 'landlord' as understood in the context of a law relating to landlord and tenant unless the premises are let out. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that section 25(1) is wholly irrelevant so far as the premises owned by the petitioner are concerned. The tenant in the instant case can have no right to challenge the user by the landlord of his other property. The averments in the plaint and the relief sought from the Small Causes Court show that the suit is founded wholly on the assumption that section 25(1) creates a right in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. In the view which I have taken, it is obvious that the suit does not relate to any question arising out of the provisions of the Rent Act and, apart from the fact, it is wholly misconceived. 12. The suit is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the provisions of section 25(1) and, as framed, the Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The petition is thus allowed. Rule is made absolute. Respondent No. 1 to pay costs of this petition. Petition allowed.