JUDGMENT G. Balagangadharan Nair, J. 1. Appellant was the defendant in a suit instituted by the respondent for recovery of a small plot of 10 cents (item 1), the removal of a shed (item 2) standing on item 1 and for recovery of rent. The Trial Court granted plaintiff a decree for part of the arrears of rent claimed by her but disallowed the other two reliefs holding that the defendant is entitled to the protection of S.106, Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 ("the Act"). On appeal by the plaintiff the Additional Subordinate Judge granted the plaintiff the reliefs in respect of the land and shed as well and further allowed her the arrears of the rent which had been disallowed by the Munsiff on the ground of limitation. 2. By Ext. A1 dated September 6, 1961 DW 2 who is the defendant's son and one Joseph George who is the latter's brother inlaw took the land (item 1) fora term of 3 years with permission to erect a shed, instal machinery and carry on the business of a saw mill. By an endorsement Ext. A2 dated June 10, 1962 made on Ext. A1 DW 2 and Joseph George surrendered item 1 to ' the plaintiff, even though the term had not expired and assigned their rights in the building (shed) and machinery to the defendant and Varkey Joseph, the father of Joseph George. On the same day the defendant and Varkey Joseph executed a rent deed Ext. A3 taking item 1 for a period of three years. Thereafter the defendant obtained an assignment of the rights of Varkey Joseph in the shed and machinery. On July 15, 1965 the defendant executed a rent deed Ext. A4 to the plaintiff with a term of 3 years from June 10, 1965 when the terms of Ext. A3 expired. It recites that he has purchased the rights of Varkey Joseph in the machinery and shed, that the latter has vacated the premises and retired from the business and that the defendant was therefore executing the rent deed on his own responsibility. On August 21, 1969 the defendant executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff surrendering the adjacent 61/2 cents which was in his possession as a tenant and agreeing to continue the tenancy over item 1 for three years from June 10, 1968 when the term under Ext. On August 21, 1969 the defendant executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff surrendering the adjacent 61/2 cents which was in his possession as a tenant and agreeing to continue the tenancy over item 1 for three years from June 10, 1968 when the term under Ext. A4 expired and pay the proportionate rent. The plaintiff brought the suit in 1972 for the reliefs mentioned earlier, 3. The defendant resisted the suit contending that he was not liable to surrender the land or to remove the shed and machinery as he was entitled to the benefits under S.106 of the Act, that the amounts claimed in the plaint were not correct and that in any event part of the claim was barred by limitation. 4. The Munsiff upheld the defence under S.106 and found that part of the amounts claimed was barred by limitation. On these findings the plaintiff was given a decree for Rs. 911/- with future interest at 6%. On the appeal taken by the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge denied the defendant the protection of S.106, and found that the amounts disallowed by the Munsiff were not barred by limitation. He thus directed the defendant to remove item No. 2 and to surrender item No. 1 to the plaintiff within three months; in default, allowing the plaintiff to have the shed demolished through court and recover possession of item No. 1 with the incidental expenses. The plaintiff was also allowed to realise Rs. 2800.46 from the defendant on account of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, with interest at 6%. She was further allowed future rent at the rate of Rs. 60.60 per month from the date of the decree and one half of the costs of the suit. 5. The defendant has preferred the appeal challenging the decision of the appellate Judge against him and the plaintiff has filed a memorandum of cross objections claiming future rent with interest from the date of suit also. 6. The two questions involved in the appeal concern the defendant's claim to immunity from eviction under S.106 and the bar of limitation pleaded by him to part of the arrears of rent. Taking the latter point first as it admits of an easy answer, the plaintiff had sought recovery of arrears of rent from September 1967. 6. The two questions involved in the appeal concern the defendant's claim to immunity from eviction under S.106 and the bar of limitation pleaded by him to part of the arrears of rent. Taking the latter point first as it admits of an easy answer, the plaintiff had sought recovery of arrears of rent from September 1967. The suit was brought on August 28, 1972 when the court reopened after the Onam holidays. The appellate Judge has found that Ext. A5 the rent deed dated August 21, 1969 contains an explicit acknowledgement of the arrears of rent till then due and that when the limitation is reckoned from that date the suit is within the time as the courts were closed for the Onam holidays from August 18, 1972 to August 27, 1972. The learned Judge was clearly right in 'his conclusion and the defendant has no valid ground for complaint. 7. Turning to the other question, S.106, which starts with a non obstante clause provides, so far as material, that where on any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose, the lessee has constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 20th May 1967, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land, but shall be liable to pay rent under contract to tenancy, and such rent shall be liable to be varied every twelve years. The Explanation to the Section enacts by Clause (a) that 'lessee' includes a legal representative or an assignee of the lessee and by Clause (b) that 'building' means a permanent or a temporary building and includes a shed. Now the earliest lease deed Ext. A1 and the subsequent lease deeds are all for a commercial or industrial purpose. It is clear on the evidence and on the findings of the courts below that for such commercial or industrial purpose the tenants under Ext. A1 had constructed a building (item 2) on the land before the 20th May 1967. Here the agreement between the parties steps and disagreement begins. The disagreement is whether these circumstances qualify the defendant to immunity from eviction under S.106. Here again it is clear, on the terms of Section read with Clause (a) of the Explanation, that the defendant could successfully claim the protection of the Section only if he is an assignee of the lessee who constructed the building. The disagreement is whether these circumstances qualify the defendant to immunity from eviction under S.106. Here again it is clear, on the terms of Section read with Clause (a) of the Explanation, that the defendant could successfully claim the protection of the Section only if he is an assignee of the lessee who constructed the building. The contention strongly urged for the defendant is that he is such an assignee, a position contested for the plaintiff. 8. From a reference to the successive rent deeds it is obvious beyond doubt that Ext. A1 which was the rent deed by DW 2 and Joseph George came to an end before the term and that it was followed by a fresh lease, Ext. A3 executed by the defendant and Varkey Joseph. The two relevant features that stand set are that the tenants under Ext. A3 were only purchasers or assignees of the shed and machinery from the original tenants and that Ext. A3 was an entirely new tenancy. The position that it is a new tenancy is not affected by the circumstances that they took the assignment of the shed and machinery to continue the same business as is recited in Ext. A3. This tenancy itself came to end on June 9, 1965. The defendant who had taken assignment of the rights of his partner Varkey Joseph in the building and machinery executed Ext. A4 on July 15, 1965. Varkey Joseph retired from the business and vacated the premises and the defendant executed the rent deed on his own for a term of three years from June 10, 1965 fixing a new rate of rent. Ext. A4 is beyond doubt a new rental arrangement by one of the two tenants under Ext. A3. Then came Ext. A5, 'the last of the rent deeds dated August 21, 1969 executed by the defendant. After referring to Exts. A3 and A4 and surrendering an item of adjacent land covered by the earlier deeds, it provides that the defendant would continue as the tenant of item 1 for the purpose of the sawmill on payment of the proportionate rent. This lease is also for a term of three years. 9. After referring to Exts. A3 and A4 and surrendering an item of adjacent land covered by the earlier deeds, it provides that the defendant would continue as the tenant of item 1 for the purpose of the sawmill on payment of the proportionate rent. This lease is also for a term of three years. 9. The building, item 2 was constructed by the Original tenants DW 2 and Varkey Joseph before 28th May, 1967 for the purpose of running the saw mill, the purpose for which the lease was taken under Ext. A1 and if the defendant could qualify as their assignee he would be entitled to the protection of the Section. But what happened was that the defendant and Varkey Joseph took an assignment of only the building and machinery and not the lease from the original tenants. What is more they executed a fresh lease deed Ext. A3. After he became the sole owner of the building and machinery the defendant entered into fresh tenancies with the plaintiff under Exts. A4 and A5. Either Ext. A3 executed by him and Varkey Joseph nor Exts. A4 and A5 executed by the defendant are a continuation or renewal of the lease Ext. A1 pursuant to which the original tenants constructed the building for the purpose of the commercial or industrial purpose. They cannot also be either the one or the other as the tenants were not assignees of the original lessee. It is therefore impossible to held that the defendant is an assignee who could take advantage of the construction of the building by the original tenants. 10. Counsel for the defendant however submitted that the assignment of the building and machinery would clothe the defendant with the character of an assignee even though the assignment covered only a part of their interest and did not comprehend its totality. He submitted by way of analogy that they were in the position of a sub lessee or of a sub mortgagee who acquires a fractional share of the lessee's or mortgagee's interest. I find it entirely unable to accept the contention. The defendant and his partner Varkey Joseph did not obtain even a partial assignment of the lease, for what they did take was only an assignment of the building and machinery. The building and machinery belonged to the assigners and were not part of the leasehold. I find it entirely unable to accept the contention. The defendant and his partner Varkey Joseph did not obtain even a partial assignment of the lease, for what they did take was only an assignment of the building and machinery. The building and machinery belonged to the assigners and were not part of the leasehold. Clause (a) of the Explanation only brings a legal representative or an assignee of the lessee, in other words an assignee of the 'lease' within the ambit of the expression 'lessee' for the purpose of the Section and not anyone else. 11. Counsel for the defendant however sought support for his contention in Shawkath Ali v. Nafeesa Beevi 1973 KLT 808. In that case the tenant executed a release and sale deed in favour of the lessor surrendering the shop building which he had constructed but even thereafter continued in possession when Act 35 of 1969 came into force amending the Act. He claimed the benefit of S.106. The learned Judge held that in spite of the so called sale and surrender the tenant was entitled to the protection of the Section as he was a quondum tenant in possession. In my view, the principle of that decision has no application as the facts in the two cases are entirely different. 12. As against this decision counsel for the respondent brought to my notice the unreported Bench decision, T. V. Ramaswami v. Sadananda Pai S.A. No. 957 of 1973. In that case pursuant to the permission under a lease deed Ext. P5 of 1093 the tenant constructed shop building in the land leased. The rights of the tenant were acquired by defendants 1 to 3. In 1109 defendants 1 to 3 executed a fresh lease deed Ext. P6 to the landlord and later they assigned their rights to defendant 4. In the suit for eviction brought by the plaintiff who had purchased the property from the landlord defendant 4 claimed protection of S.106 on the strength of the building which had been constructed by the original tenant whose rights had come to vest in him. Poti J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the Bench discussed at length the impact of the lease deed Ext. P6 on the original lease deed Ext. Poti J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the Bench discussed at length the impact of the lease deed Ext. P6 on the original lease deed Ext. P5 pursuant to which the shop building had been constructed and held: "The lessee can construct a building in the character of the lessee only after the lease. If the building was already in existence constructed by some other person it cannot be said to have been constructed by a lessee. Earlier construction by a prior lessee of the same property under a lease which had terminated is not a construction by a lessee within the meaning of S.106(1) of the Act. For the purpose of the Section the construction must be pursuant to the lease and if it was already in existence it cannot be said to have been constructed by a lessee, though historically speaking, it might have been constructed by former lessee at some point of time. The construction by some person prior to the commencement of the lease or prior to the creation of the lease with which we are concerned could not satisfy the requirement of S.106." The learned Judges held that by virtue of the lease deed Ext. P6 there was an entirely new arrangement and it was not open to the 4th defendant to invoke S.106 by virtue of the construction of the building pursuant to the lease deed Ext. P5 which had been superseded. The petition in the present case is similar and the same principle must apply. 13. I might also refer to Pasmore v. Whitbread & Co. Ltd. 1953 (1) All E.R. 361, a decision of the Court of Appeal cited by counsel for the respondent. One Fordham carried on the business of a garage in certain premises from early in 1946 until the beginning of October, 1949. He surrendered his tenancy and the tenant bought the business from Fordham and took a new tenancy from the landlord in October 1949. Thereafter he carried on the business until November 1951 when the landlord gave him three months' notice to quit expiring in February 1952. The tenant thereupon claimed compensation for the good will of the business under S.4(1), Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. Thereafter he carried on the business until November 1951 when the landlord gave him three months' notice to quit expiring in February 1952. The tenant thereupon claimed compensation for the good will of the business under S.4(1), Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. Under this sub-section a tenant must prove that by reason of the carrying on by him or his predecessors in title at the premises of a trade or business for a period of not less than five years goodwill has become attached to them. The question arose whether Fordham was the predecessor in title of the tenant so as to entitle the latter to claim relief under the sub-section. The Court of Appeal held that he was not. In explaining the meaning of the expression 'predecessor in title' Denning L. J. who pronounced the main judgment observed: "So, also, in relation to the tenant it must mean, and its natural meaning is, predecessor in title to the property and to the legal interest which the tenant holds" and "It seems to me that there is no escape from the plain meaning of the phrase "predecessor in title,' which is the predecessors in title to the interest of the tenant in the premises. If Mr. Fordham had assigned his tenancy to the tenant, but, as he did not assign his tenancy, but surrendered it in order that the landlord should grand a new tenancy to the tenant, he was not the tenant's 'predecessor in title." Ultimately it was concluded: "The effect is that the previous tenant is not the predecessor in title of the new tenant and the Act does not operate unless the new tenant is himself there for five years." The learned Lord Justice recognised that the result would be very hard on the tenant who had paid a very substantial sum for goodwill, but he held that there was no escape from the wording of the Act. The tenant was denied relief and his appeal was dismissed. The position here is converse but the principle of the decision squarely applies. The defendant in the present case cannot be treated as an assignee and his claim to protection of S.106 was rightly refused. 14. On the memorandum of cross objections the plaintiff's claim for future rent from the date of suit and interest thereon is quite justified. The decree requires to be modified to this extent. The defendant in the present case cannot be treated as an assignee and his claim to protection of S.106 was rightly refused. 14. On the memorandum of cross objections the plaintiff's claim for future rent from the date of suit and interest thereon is quite justified. The decree requires to be modified to this extent. Subject to the modification that the plaintiff would get future rent from the date of suit with interest at 6% the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are confirmed. The appeal is thus dismissed and the memorandum of cross objections allowed. In the circumstances parties will suffer their costs in the appeal and memorandum of cross objections.