Judgment : This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by a foreigner. It is to quash an order of deportation passed by the Central Government. The impugned order ordered him and all the other members of his family to leave the country forth with, bag and baggage. The petitioner’s contention is that this order is without jurisdiction and also mala fide in certain respects. 2. The Central Government have taker to heart this challenge to their order. They are fighting this writ petition as if it were a test case. Their stand is that orders of deportation are matters touching the sovereignty of the State. They are political acts. They may raise issues of international law; but the Courts of the land, even the superior Courts, are not competent to enter into the why and the wherefore of the orders of deportation. 3. These are the major contentions urged on behalf of the Central Government. They represent a familiar stance of the administration of any Government for that matter. Their point of view is quite understandable in cases where a pacifist or other conscientious objector challenges before Courts such acts of the State as the declaration of hostilities, the making of peace treaties, and the like. The objection to the Courts going in to questions of war and peace is apparently based on the principle that the powers and the prestige of the whole nation is at stake in such matters and Courts of the land must not stand in an ivory tower and presume to review those issues as if they were some superior kind of international tribunal. The fundamental question, however, is whether all cases where foreigners are involved must be dealt with in this spirit of egocentric nationalism. According to Mr. Vanamamalai, learned Counsel for the Central Government, the approach must be the same. whatever be the issue, be it war or peace, or be it the treatment of isolated foreigners. The point urged is that international law, whether public or private, is seldom administered satisfactorily by municipal Courts, however high they may be, Foreigners, it is said, are the exclusive business of the Government, not of the Courts. whatever be the issue, be it war or peace, or be it the treatment of isolated foreigners. The point urged is that international law, whether public or private, is seldom administered satisfactorily by municipal Courts, however high they may be, Foreigners, it is said, are the exclusive business of the Government, not of the Courts. It is urged that the treatment of aliens, even when we are not at war with their countries, is far too political, and even extra legal, on occasion, to brook judicial review in the accepted mores. 4. These sound like the voices of yesterday, of a bygone age. In olden times, the treatment or ill-treatment of aliens seldom bothered the judicial conscience. Those who presided over national Courts brought to bear the same mental attitudes and permitted themselves the same reflexes and collective reactions as the rest of the citizenry when it came to a question of treatment of non-citizens. So, when any foreigner happened to be illtreated in the country of his sojourn, he could entertain hopes for redress either by pulling local political wires, or by acting through diplomatic channels, and not by petitioning the nearby magistracy. This state of affairs sometimes tended to disturb even the comity of nations. The political power to which the alien owed his allegiance could and did, on occasions, sharplyre-act to his ill-treatment in another country, either by open war or by other sanctions, as happened in the well-known affair of the Jenkin’s Ear which we have read about in the history books. The general impression became firmly entrenched that controversies in which the status of aliens was involved were not for the Courts to enter into, an d must not be dealt with in the same way as disputes between one citizen and another and between a subject and the State. 5. These ideas, however, are changing. They have already changed a lot. Nations of the world have come together either in large numbers or in smaller groups in the United Nations, in the European Economic Community, in the Commonwealth, in the Arab League and so forth. Apart from these associations at the highest level of international politics, the entire humanity is being thought of nowadays as one world community. We have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights an d its continental edition, the European Declaration of Human Rights, as evidence of this new thin king. Apart from these associations at the highest level of international politics, the entire humanity is being thought of nowadays as one world community. We have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights an d its continental edition, the European Declaration of Human Rights, as evidence of this new thin king. The distinction between a citizen and an alien, in everything that matters, has now become archaic, at least in acceptable theory. All human beings who people this earth are regarded as individuals, first and last, having certain inalienable rights whichever country they may happen to find themselves in at the moment. 6. While many nations have subscribed to these changing patterns of thinking, their implementation in administrative terms is proceeding apace by fits and starts. It is also lopsided in different parts of the world. However, long before these ideas gained ground in international conventions, sovereign States, acting by individual initiative had introduced into the body of their laws legislation on aliens as an important chapter in their statute books. This trend in municipal law making was perhaps, born, not out of high idealism, but out of sheer practical necessity. The United States of America was amongst the first of the countries to draw up immigration laws to regulate the foreigners, paradoxically though it may seem for a people who, in their origins, were by no means natives of their own soil. In Britain, they had the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, which was not a self-contained enactment for a self-contained kingdom merely, but extended to the dominions beyond the seas. This statute has since yielded place to a new and bitterly controversial set of immigration laws. We in our country have been having a statute on aliens ever since 1864, with a latter day codification of it in the Foreigners Act, 1946. Allied laws on passports and visas have also become part of our Code on foreigners, as in many other counties. A legislation on passports was enacted in this country as early as in 1920. It has recently been rechristened, without substantial amendment, as the Passports (Entry into India) Act, 1920. The effect of this growth of statute law has been to transmute what were once problems of international law into issues of domestic concern under municipal statutes. A legislation on passports was enacted in this country as early as in 1920. It has recently been rechristened, without substantial amendment, as the Passports (Entry into India) Act, 1920. The effect of this growth of statute law has been to transmute what were once problems of international law into issues of domestic concern under municipal statutes. The nationalization, or municipalization of international law, if this process can be so described, produced another important consequence, which could hardly have been avoided, perhaps, even if it were not particularly welcome in certain quarters. When sovereign Legislatures drew up their Immigration Laws and their Foreigners Acts, they then and there laid the foundations of judicial review by the municipal Courts. Open to scrutiny, especially, were the orders and proceedings of the executive who in their real might overreach themselves every now and then in the administration, of these laws. It was the prerogative of the Courts of the land to seen to the proper administration of the laws of the realm, and it applied as much to the laws relating to foreigners as to laws relating to native citizens. The result was that the treatment of aliens under the country’s statutes no longer remained a political or non-judicial question. Nor it is now very much a legal question. And subject only to the Curbs found in the relevant statutes and to the effectiveness of those curbs, the Courts can proceed to hear foreigners’ cases, as they are won’t to hear any other case, without let or hindrance. In other words, the Foreigners Acts of every country confer on aliens not only a legal status, but also rights of some sort and remedies of some sort. Thus, in litigations in which the status of aliens is in issue, the question is not whether they have any rights at all, but what the limits of those rights are; the question is not whether the Courts have any jurisdiction at all in such cases, but what the limits of that jurisdiction are. 7. To foreigners in India, the relevant Code now is the Foreigners Act, 1946 (Central Act XXXI of 1946). The Act regards as foreigners all those who are rot citizens of India. The petitioner is not a citizen of India, but of Sri Lanka. He is, therefore, by definition, a foreigner. But, he is a foreigner only in a manner of speaking. The Act regards as foreigners all those who are rot citizens of India. The petitioner is not a citizen of India, but of Sri Lanka. He is, therefore, by definition, a foreigner. But, he is a foreigner only in a manner of speaking. He is, in law, foreigner with a difference. As I shall presently show, this important qualification has been missed in the present case in the treatment accorded to the petitioner. 8. Sri Lanka, of which the petitioner is a citizen, and India in which he has been staying now continuously for upwards of 8 years, are both members of the Commonwealth. This family of nations, with the British epithet dropped, emerged in its present form after our country became independent in 1947. A decision then was taken by leaders of our country that the connection with Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth was too precious to be surrendered, but deserved, but to be cherished and still further fostered. Our country accordingly decided to remain a member of the Commonwealth. What is more, in the general euphoria which the Commonwealth idea generated in the early years of our Republic, there was thinking at High level to bring about a Common wealth nationality. A citizen of the world-might be a dim and distant prospect, but Commonwealth citizenship seemed to be an easily attainable reality. In this respect we were even ahead of other Commonwealth countries. Parliament lost no time in translating this idea of a Commonwealth citizenship in statutory terms. When Parliament actually addressed itself to the question it made appropriate provision, symbolically enough, in the Citizenship Act, 1955, and not in the Foreigners Act, 1946 as who should say that Commonwealth people are not a special class of foreigners, but they are a special class of Indians. A provision in the Citizenship Act was inserted in this regard in section 11. The provision at once, and by its own force, conferred the gift of a new status on the nationals of other Commonwealth countries. What is more, the declaration was unilateral and unconditional. It did not wait for other Commonwealth countries to pass similar measures. What was the content of this new status which Parliament conferred on the citizens of other Commonwealth countries. What is more, the declaration was unilateral and unconditional. It did not wait for other Commonwealth countries to pass similar measures. What was the content of this new status which Parliament conferred on the citizens of other Commonwealth countries. That, cautiously enough was left by Parliament to be settled by the Central Government at the negotiating table on the principle of reciprocal concessions and adjustments with other Commonwealth countries. Sri Lanka is one of the Commonwealth countries specially mentioned by reference to its old name of Ceylon in the Chapter of the Citizenship Act, 1955 dealing with Commonwealth citizenship. The result is that right from 1955 onwards, the petitioner’s status in India is not that of a citizen of Ceylon, merely. He is a Commonwealth citizen within the meaning of section 11 of our Citizenship Act, 1955. 9. For years, we have been having good relations with Sri Lanka. However, it does not appear that reciprocal treaty regulations have been brought about in the two countries governing the status and movements of citizens in each other’s lands, as contemplated by section 12 of our Citizenship Act. This has been the case with other Commonwealth countries as well. Thus, although a citizen of Sri Lanka right from 1955 had come to possess a special Indian status, namely 10. The Foreigners Act, 1946 is a peculiar legislative enactment. The Act contains merely a skeleton of policy. It was left to the Central Government to provide its sinews, by means of statutory Orders. In Britain, Orders of the kind, (I may spell them with a capital ‘O’), would be called orders-in-council. The Act contemplated, in section 3 (1), three different varieties of Orders which the Central Government might pass to effectuate the purposes of the Act. At one end of the Scale are general Orders which apply to all foreigners generally without exception At the other end of the scale, the Central Government is empowered to pass individual orders against individual foreigners. In between the two lies a third category. Under this head are to be brought what I may describe as ‘Groupal Orders’ applicable to any distinct class of foreigners. Under this broad statutory scheme, it is quite conceivable that the Central Government might have thought fit to promulgate a special class of Orders, specially applicable to the particular category of foreigners who are citizens of Commonwealth countries. Under this head are to be brought what I may describe as ‘Groupal Orders’ applicable to any distinct class of foreigners. Under this broad statutory scheme, it is quite conceivable that the Central Government might have thought fit to promulgate a special class of Orders, specially applicable to the particular category of foreigners who are citizens of Commonwealth countries. If this had been attempted by the Central Government, at some time, such Orders would have called for, and yielded, the well-known approach to statutory construction which is signified by the rule, ‘the special excludes the general’. What happened, however, was that for nearly two years after the Citizenship Act, 1955, had created the special class of foreigners called Commonwealth citizens, the Central Government did not proceed to make any special provision for them in the exercise of their Order-making powers under the Foreigners Act. Citizens of Ceylon and other Commonwealth countries continued to be dealt with only under the general Orders which were in force. These general Orders had been promulgated by the Central Government as early as in 1948 and were called. ‘The Foreigners Order, 1948. They continued to govern the citizen of Ceylon in India, as they did all other foreigners in the land. 11. The position, however, changed when Parliament introduced, by way of amendment in 1957, a new provision in the Foreigners Act. This was section 3-A. The enactment of this section was an important landmark, if not more, in the treatment of aliens in this country as the creation in 1955 of Commonwealth citizenship under section 11 of the Citizenship Act, 1955. The new section 3-A of the Foreigners Act conferred a distinct power on the Central Government to exempt Commonwealth citizens from the purview of any general Order that might have been promulgated under the Act. The exemption power enabled the Central Government to exempt Commonwealth citizens even from the ambit of the parent Act. 12. In exercise of this newly conferred power of exemption under section 3-A, the Central Government promulgated the ‘Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957.‘ The coverage of this exemption included citizens of certain Commonwealth Countries. A list of those Commonwealth countries was set out prominently in the Exemption Order. Sri Lanka figures in that list in its former name of Ceylon. 12. In exercise of this newly conferred power of exemption under section 3-A, the Central Government promulgated the ‘Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957.‘ The coverage of this exemption included citizens of certain Commonwealth Countries. A list of those Commonwealth countries was set out prominently in the Exemption Order. Sri Lanka figures in that list in its former name of Ceylon. Citizens of Ceylon and other Commonwealth countries mentioned in the Exemption Order were expressly declared by Paragraph (1) of the Order to be exempt, not only from the general provisions of the Foreigners Order, 1948, but also from the provisions of the Act itself. The exact words used in this paragraph of the Exemption Order were ‘Shall not apply’. By another paragraph in the same Exemption Order, namely, Paragraph (3), some minimal regulations on Commonwealth Citizens were provided for. In view of the important part which this Paragraph of the Exemption Order would play in the further discussion of this case, it is, I think, advisable to refer to its full text that of a Commonwealth citizen, he still remained very much a foreigner, for all that. The Foreigners Act, 1946 and other laws applicable to foreigners in general equally applied to the citizens of Sri Lanka in India. "3. If the Central Government, is satisfied that with respect of any Citizens of any of the countries mentioned in para. 2, it is necessary to do so- (a) in the interests of the defence of India or the security of India; or (b) in the interests of friendly relations with any country outside India; or (c) in the interests of the general public of India or of any section thereof; it may notwithstanding anything contained in para. 2, make with respect to such citizen any such order under section 3 of the Act aforesaid as it thinks fit." The Scheme of paragraph 3 aforesaid in, the Foreigners (Exemption) Order is simple enough. It refers to section 3 of the Foreigners Act. and lays down that the various kinds of action which section 3 enables the Central Government to take against any other foreigner may also be taken against a Commonwealth Citizen, but subject, an important and inexorable qualification, namely, that the action against a Commonwealth citizen can be taken only if one or other of the three circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of that Paragraph exists in that case. 13. With Paragraph 1 of the Exemption Order, expressly declaring that the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners Order, 1948 shall not apply to Commonwealth citizens, Paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order emerges as the one and only operative provision, or Code, on the subject of treatment of Commonwealth citizens within our country’s borders. 14. The full implications of the scope of Paragraph, 3 of the Exemption Order might be ascertained by instituting a comparison with the general provisions contained in the Foreigners Order, 1948. There are a number of restrictions against foreigners, in the matter of entry in to India, stay in India and departure from India. Foreigners cannot enter without permission. The civil authority has power to examine foreigners who wish to enter India. If Foreigners cannot enter the country without permission, they cannot leave it either without permission (see Paragraph 3 of the Foreigners Order, 1948). There are restrictions on the sojourns of foreigners who are in India as tourists or otherwise, (Paragraph 7 of the Order). There are areas which are out of bounds for foreigners (Paragraphs 8 and 9). There are restrictions on foreigners seeking employment in the country (Paragraph 10) restrictions on their movements from place to place (Paragraph 11), restrictions on certain activities in which they might engage themselves (Paragraph 11-A) such, for instance, as mountaineering expeditions (Paragraph 11-B). There are also taboos to keep foreigners out of certain clubs and restaurants (Paragraph 13). The provision, however, which has most relevance to the present case it is to be found in paragraph 7 (3) of that Order. This provision is to the effect that a foreigner to whom a permit for stay has been granted by the civil authority must depart from India at the expiry of the period of the permit, unless the Central Government grants a further extension. 15. The Preamble to the Foreigners Act indicates that the enacted, provisions would have their impact on foreigners in three respects, namely, their entry into India, their presence in India and the departure from India. The operative provision in section 3 (1) of the Act covers precisely these three aspects of the treatment of aliens. It says, shortly, that the Central Government may make appropriate provision for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their departure there from, or their presence or continued presence therein’. The operative provision in section 3 (1) of the Act covers precisely these three aspects of the treatment of aliens. It says, shortly, that the Central Government may make appropriate provision for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their departure there from, or their presence or continued presence therein’. The Foreigners Order, 1948, having been passed by the Central Government in exercise of this power under section 3 (1) thus cover the three vital subjects of immigration, sojourn and deportation in regard to all foreigners generally. One common characteristic of the provisions of the Foreigners Order, 1948 may be noted. It is that the powers, exercisable by the authority concerned under one or other of the Paragraphs are plenary in character. They are not, as a general rule, subject to any limitations whatever. Again generally speaking, there are no procedural safeguards, either, in any of the Paragraphs of the Foreigners Order, 1948. For instance, while under Paragraph 7 (3) a foreigner has to leave the country, the moment his stay period expires, it would seem that he cannot question the Central Government’s decision not to give further extension of time on any ground whatever. 16. In marked contrast, however, in Paragraph (3) of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957, which applies to Commonwealth citizens. As already indicated, the effect of this provision is that unless the Central Government is satisfied that a necessity has arisen to pass appropriate orders against a Commonwealth citizens: (i) in the interests of the defence of India or the security of India ; (ii) in the interests of friendly relations with any foreign country; and (iii) in the interests of the general public of India or of any section thereof, no such order could at all be passed. 17. The distinction between the treatment of foreigners under the Foreigners Order, 1948 and the treatment of Commonwealth citizens under the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 is thus plain enough. All other foreigners are at the mercy of the civil authority for entry into India, for stay in India and for departure from India. But Commonwealth citizen’s cannot be dealt with in this fashion. All other foreigners are at the mercy of the civil authority for entry into India, for stay in India and for departure from India. But Commonwealth citizen’s cannot be dealt with in this fashion. The Central Government can prohibit their entry in to India only if they are satisfied that it is necessary in the interests or the defence of India or the security of India of in the interests of friendly relations with any foreign country or in the interest of the general public of India or of any section thereof. Likewise, the Central Government cannot order the deportation or expulsion of any Commonwealth citizen from India unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interests of the defence of India or the security of India or in the interests of friendly relations with any foreign country or in the interests of the general public of India or of any section thereof. 18. One important result flows from (Paragraph 3) of the Exemption Order. This may again be illustrated by comparing and contrasting the position of Commonwealth citizens, on the one hand, and the rest of the foreigners, on the other. In the case of other foreigners, a deportation order, or expulsion order, can be passed for any reason or, perhaps, for no reason whatever. Since under the genera 1 provisions of the Foreigners Order 1948, the civil authority is not answerable to anyone for refusing to extend the stay or for making a deportation order against any foreigner, it may be fruitless for any foreigner to proceed to find out what were the underlying reasons for the order against him. This, however, is not the case with Commonwealth citizens, since under (Paragraph 3) of the Exempt ion Order a deportation order car. be parsed only, under certain circumstances and not otherwise. It world be necessary to know in individual cases what were the reasons which prompted the Central Government into making any order against any particular citizens of the Common wealth. If the reasons are not divulged it would be hard to know whether the order passed by the Central Government was within the limits of the powers exercisable under (Paragraph 3) of the Exemption Order. Hence it follows that there must not only exist reasons, but they must also be set down before any order is passed against a Commonwealth citizen. Hence it follows that there must not only exist reasons, but they must also be set down before any order is passed against a Commonwealth citizen. Since the requisite power under (Paragraph 3) is given to the Central Government alone and not to any other authority and since the Central Government can act only by record, it would seem that, as a matter of derivative principle, the grounds or reasons for passing any orders against a Commonwealth citizen under (paragraph 3) must invariably be recorded somewhere in writing by any officer or authority accredited to act for the Central Government. In the modern manner of transacting Government business, it cannot be maintained that the satisfaction of the Central Government may be gauged from their action or conduct, and they may keep their thoughts to themselves. It must, in my judgment be always a matter of record, as to what the grounds are for any and every action of the Government. 19. These are the implications (paragraph 3) of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957, as contrasted with paragraph 7(3) of the Foreigners Order, 1948. Mr. Selvaraj, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that having regard to the provisions (paragraph 3) of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, his client must have the means of finding out what made the Central Government pass the exportation order against him and against the other members of his family. Learned Counsel’s grievance was that no reasons at all were given in the communication made by the Chief Immigration Officer in which the petitioner was informed of the gist of the order of deportation. 20. Mr. Vanamamalai, learned Counsel for the Central Government, however, submitted that the order of deportation, even if it were one to be considered to fall within the purview of paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order, is not justiciable. He referred to the language of paragraph 3 and laid that, given the presence of conditions prescribed under that paragraph for the exercise of the power, the discretion of the Central Government is not subject to review by any other body, lease of all by the Courts. The words ‘as it thinks fit’ were underlined in argument. Added emphasis was sought to be derived from the words ‘if the Central Government is satisfied, and from the words ‘is necessary to do so’. The words ‘as it thinks fit’ were underlined in argument. Added emphasis was sought to be derived from the words ‘if the Central Government is satisfied, and from the words ‘is necessary to do so’. These words, it was urged, clearly indicated that the satisfaction spoken of by para graph 3 of the Exemption order most be the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government, and, being subjective, it was not reviewable by the Courts. The necessity to pass an order in given circumstances was again stated to be a matter absolutely within the subjective assessment of the Central Government. Mr. Vanamamalai, pointed out that there was no provision under the Exemption Order which provided for a prehearing of the Common wealth citizen concerned before any deportation order was to be passed against him. The absence of an express provision in that regard, according to learned Counsel, further implied that even the materials on which, and the method by which, the Central Government obtain their satisfaction are for the Central Government to determine. The argument, in short, was that being a Commonwealth citizen does not give an individual any right to demand a hearing before an order comes to be passed against him; neither could the Commonwealth citizen design to know, even after the event, the actual grounds on which he is being ordered to be deported. 21. A few reported decisions were cited in argument on either side, but they had no relevance to this case. There was no direct authority on the subject of the interpretation and the application of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957, particularly, the implications of paragraph 3 thereof. In my judgment, the paragraph has to be read and understood in a fair and reasonable manner, like any other power which the law confers on any authority. It seems to me that when once a statute or statutory instrument confers a power on an authority with a rider that it can be exercised only under certain circumstances and on certain grounds, a provision of that kind must be construed not only as a caution addressed to that authority that it should not act otherwise than in terms enacted or prescribed, but the provision must also be construed as a charter of rights and remedies to those who may be affected, by the exercise, or the non-exercise, or the misuse, of that power. To turn to paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, if it were not for the existence of the limited powers conferred on the Central Government by this paragraph, it would seem that a Commonwealth citizen might even insist on continuing his sojourn in India, subject only to other laws that might apply to him. Where, therefore, a Commonwealth citizen finds himself at the receiving end of an, order of deportation by the Central Government, it is only fair, and it is also within the contemplation of paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order, that he should know whether his being ordered out from the country is because the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary to expel him from the country either out of considerations of internal security or the defence of India, or out of considerations of foreign relations with friendly countries, or out of considerations for the interests of the general public in the country. The reasons behind the expulsion of a Commonwealth citizen must invariably be recorded and capable of being ascertained from the record. This is because, if no reasons are given or none of the grounds prescribed under paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order is known to be present, then the Central Government themselves cannot make and would not be making, an order of that kind. So, it is important to find out whether the conditions laid down for the exercise of the power of deportation exist in any given case. It is in this context that this writ petition becomes relevant. For, the only means for a Commonwealth citizen to know why the Central Government has taken action against him is to move a Court of law and find out the position for himself. As in this case. 22. I am not impressed with the argument of Mr. Vanamamalai based on the presence of such words as ‘is satisfied’, ‘as it thinks fit’ and the like, occurring in para graph 3 of the Exemption Order. Those words are addressed primarily to the Central Government so as to enable them to know the width of their powers. They cannot perse be regarded as having the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of this Court. Those words are addressed primarily to the Central Government so as to enable them to know the width of their powers. They cannot perse be regarded as having the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of this Court. Possibly, the jurisdiction of lesser courts might be barred, but the special jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India on this Court cannot be impaired to any extent either by words such as these or even by the categorical imperative of a downright bar of courts, couched in more express terms. I have earlier observed that what were once regarded as rules of international law have come to roost in the statute book of the land when the treatment of aliens was brought under so many provisions of the Foreigners Act and Orders passed there under. It is an accepted doctrine of constitutional law that any provision in any Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature or any rule or regulation promulgated under any such Act which either expressly or impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of courts will, however, be powerless to bar the jurisdiction of this is Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may well be that this Court may not like to exercise its discretion in any given case to interfere with a given order of the Central Government. But that is because writs or orders which are in the contemplation of Article 226 are not matters of right, or matters of courts but are matters of discretion with this Court. That however, is quite different from saying that this Court is barred from going into the validity of any order, of deportation passed by the Central Government under paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order. 23. Mr. Vanamamalai then submitted that the country’s defence, its internal security, friendly relations with other countries and public interest are all matters of high administrative or political policy. He suggested that courts which function within the limitations of their procedure and practice in adversary proceedings cannot deal with these issues of public policy as effectively or ever as fairly as the executive arm of the State can with the authority, with the facility and with the materials at its command. He suggested that courts which function within the limitations of their procedure and practice in adversary proceedings cannot deal with these issues of public policy as effectively or ever as fairly as the executive arm of the State can with the authority, with the facility and with the materials at its command. In any case, he submitted, the petitioner in this case is not entitled to pry into the records and find out the precise grounds on which the deportation order was made against him. Learned Counsel almost hinted that some very weighty reason was at the bottom of the petitioner’s deportation. Without divulging what it was, learned Counsel proceeded to submit, in a general way, that it is a question of privilege that the grounds of expulsion, whatever they are, should not be disclosed to the petitioner or any other foreigner in his position, either in Court or out of Court. 24. The necessity for going into the legal aspect of privilege has not arisen in this case. The gist of the Central Government’s order which was communicated to the petitioner by the Chief Immigration Officer, Madras, did not divulge the reason for the deportation. Nor did it occur to me, in the course of the hearing, to ask to be allowed to leaf through the confidential official records, in this case, even in strict privacy, in order to get at the background to the deportation order, when learned Counsel for the Central Government did not think fit to volunteer any offer to place the files before me. Besides, I agreed upto a point with the submission of Vanamamalai that it would be unthinkable for any Court to insist upon disclosure of the grounds of deportation in cases where the security of India or the defence of India might have prompted the issuance of the order. For, the position has never been doubted that the sovereign. Government of a State have every right to expel an alien cm the ground that his continued stay would be a threat to the nation’s security. It is quite evident that in such cases there can be no question whatever of the alien being given a hearing. Nor would any Court of law think of interfering with an expulsion order if it were satisfied that the foreigners’ presence would undermine the very safety of the State and the tranquility of its people. It is quite evident that in such cases there can be no question whatever of the alien being given a hearing. Nor would any Court of law think of interfering with an expulsion order if it were satisfied that the foreigners’ presence would undermine the very safety of the State and the tranquility of its people. The European Common Market is as liberal a conglomeration of peoples of different Nation States as it is possible to bring together under a common legal system. And yet the literature of the Tribunals of the Common Market shows instances where they have refused to interfere with deportation orders passed by a member country against the citizen, of another member country on grounds of internal security. It is, however, unnecessary in the present case to go into these doctrinal matters, since those who have filed pleadings on behalf of the Central Government in this case in answer to the writ petition, have either by accident or by design, disclosed ample materials before this Court as to the grounds on which the deportation order has been made against the petitioner. When these materials are thus already before this Court in black and white, as it were, it would be too much for anyone of urge that the Court must shut eyes to them and allow the deportation order to have its way without an examination of the reasons adduced there for in the affidavits filed on behalf of the Government. 25. 25. The reasons for the order of deportation as found from the affidavit sworn to by a Deputy Secretary to the Central Government are as under: (i) "The Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, C.I.D. (Intelligence) and the State Registration Officer, Madras, had not recommended the grant of extension of stay in India: (ii) "The second respondent (State Government) agreed with the view of the Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, C.I.D. (Intelligence) in their letter to the first respondent (Central Government), dated 26th November, 1980." (iii) "The first respondent did not think fit to grant the request for citizenship by the petition and rejected his application for the same in January, 1981." (iv) "In the mean time there was also a complaint from the residents of Besant Nagar, Madras, against the petitioner and his family complaining of activity not in the interests of the neighbouring residents." (v) "The petitioner and his family had come to the adverse notice of the police Department." It is difficult to see how any of the circumstances stressed by the Deputy Secretary in his counter-affidavit as grounds for the petitioner’s deportation can at all fit in with considerations of the defence of India or the security of India or would come in the way of friendly relations between India and other countries or would be detrimental to the interests of the general public of India or of any section thereof. 26. Mr. Vanamamalai called to my attention paragraph 3 (c) of the Exemption Order and pointed out that the provision therein contained empowers the Central Government to pass deportation orders against a Commonwealth citizen if it is in the interest of any section of the general’ public of India. Learned Counsel said that the continued presence of the petitioner and his family was not in the interests of a section of the Indian general public, to wit, the residents of Besant Nagar, Madras, who were the petitioner’s neighbours in residence. Learned Counsel said that Besant Nagar, however small it may be, as a section or cross-section of our population, might yet have to be brought within the category of "a section of the general public of India". Strictly, as a matter of dry English grammar or lexicography, a section of the general public might include even a microscopic segment of the Indian population. But,. Strictly, as a matter of dry English grammar or lexicography, a section of the general public might include even a microscopic segment of the Indian population. But,. I do not think the context of paragraph 3 (c) of the Exemption Order permits minimising the expression ‘Section’ to this infinitesimal extent. 27. The petitioner came to this country as a Theosophist. It is quite likely that certain recent events might have driven him to the oblivion of a non-practising. Theosophist. But, his affidavits show that he still espouses the Christian faith. As a true Christian he ought not be violating the biblical tenet, “Love thy neighbour”; even though he is a foreigner and his neighbours may be Indian. But there is nothing which I can find either in the Foreigners’ (Exemption) Order or even in the operative provisions of the Foreigners Act which provides the extreme penalty of deportation to a foreigner merely because his relations with his neighbours were not particularly cordial. 28. Mr. Vanamamalai referred me to a subsequent affidavit field by the Chief Immigration Officer in which it was said that the continuance of stay of this foreign national is prejudicial to the interests of the country’. This Officer did not, however, elaborate in which way the prejudice had been caused. I, therefore, take it that the prejudicial conduct referred to in this subsequent affidavit has got to be spelled out from the reasons divulged in the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary. I have reproduced those reasons verbatim and tried to make sense out of them. At the end of my labours, I am unable to see how the security of this country would be affected merely because residents in Besant Nagar regard the presence of a Commonwealth citizen in their midst as unwelcome. The petitioner and his family have been in Madras for 8 years and more. They have had their dwelling either in Adyar or in some locality nearby, all these years. There is scarcely a residential neighbourhood in Madras City which can be regarded nowadays as perfectly peaceful and tranquil. And there would hardly be a householder who, if asked, would not be prepared to put the blame on his neighbours for. the deplorable state of the locality. Relations even between enlightened neighbours have a tendency to become abrasive at times at the slightest provocation. And there would hardly be a householder who, if asked, would not be prepared to put the blame on his neighbours for. the deplorable state of the locality. Relations even between enlightened neighbours have a tendency to become abrasive at times at the slightest provocation. I should therefore, dismiss the vague complaint levelled against the petitioner about unneighbourly conduct as too ordinary to be deserving of any particular attention, or special action, from the large point of view of the security of India or of public peace. I hold fast to the conviction that serious notice has to be taken of the carryings on of even a Commonwealth citizen when never his acts or omissions bring him within the mischief of one or the other of the conditions prescribed in paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order. But short of any such act or omission found against him, he cannot be proceeded against. In any case, a deportation order can never do service as the wages for unneighboutly behaviour. 29. Paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order provides that the Central Government may pass any order under section 3 of the Act ‘as it thinks fit’. Mr. Vanamamalai laid stress on these words of discretion and said that this Court cannot sit in judgment over the kind of order with which an erring foreigner may be visited in any given case. According to learned Counsel, be the offending act ever so little, the Central Government may yet ask him to leave the country. I do not think this interpretation can be correct. In my view, it is implicit in paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order that any order which the Central Government thinks fit must really fit in with the realities of the situation. This is what is meant by the words ‘think fit’. Section 3(c) of the Foreigners Act enumerates the different directions in which the Central Government may pass orders against a foreigner. Deportation is not the only order the Central Government car, pass against an. erring foreigner. Under section 3(2)(d) of the Act, the Central Government may very well require a foreigner to stay put in a particular place in India, or remove himself from a particular place and go and reside in another place, or bar him from remainning in any given area. erring foreigner. Under section 3(2)(d) of the Act, the Central Government may very well require a foreigner to stay put in a particular place in India, or remove himself from a particular place and go and reside in another place, or bar him from remainning in any given area. If really the petitioner was making himself a terrible nuisance to Besant Nagar residents, the Central Government might remove the cause of their displeasure by asking the petitioner to live in another place where he may be neither seen or heard by the sensitive souls of Besant Nagar. 30. It may be that when once the conditions prescribed under paragraph 3 of the Exemption Order are found satisfied in the case of any Common wealth citizen, the further question as to how he should be suitably dealt with under the law is entirely within the discretion of the Central Government to decide. But, the Courts assume, and everybody assumes that the Central Government will act in a manner which befits their statute, and not in eccentric or whimsical way. I must say I find it quite odd that they should seek to make the world safe for Besant Nagar residents by driving the petitioner beyond the gulf of Mannar. 31. I am satisfied that on the materials placed before this Court by the Officers of the Central Government, this deportation order is not one which falls within the terms of paragraph 3of the Exemption Order. If it does not fall within the terms of that paragraph, it cannot be made at all. The deportation order must, therefore, be quashed as being without jurisdiction. 32. Mr. Vanamamalai, however submitted that the present order of deportation does not really bear on paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, but has to be examined for its validity under quite a different provision. He relied on rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950. 33. The reliance placed by learned Counsel on this particular statutory rule can be better understood in the light of certain back-ground facts. The petitioner arrived in India for the first time in November, 1972 under a valid Ceylon passport. The members of his family who came to India also hold similar passports. They were given visas, both for entry into India and for stay in the country for a limited period. The petitioner arrived in India for the first time in November, 1972 under a valid Ceylon passport. The members of his family who came to India also hold similar passports. They were given visas, both for entry into India and for stay in the country for a limited period. The visas for stay were thereafter being extended for periods of one year or so, at a time on successive occasions. No one, not even the petitioner, would appear to have given thought to his position as a Commonwealth citizen under the Citizenship Act, 19.55. Nor could it have occurred to anyone to examine whether this status of commonwealth citizenship would entitle the petitioner to claim any immunities from the general law under the foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957. The petitioner had been producing his passport for extensions of the stay visa as regularly as they were being granted by the Chief Immigration Officer, Madras; There were quite a number of such extensions right from 1973. Little or no difficulty was encountered by the petitioner to get renewals of the stay permits. Only on the last occasion there were problems But the petitioner was able to tide over them when he brought to bear influence which some of his well-wishers had with people in high authority. The last application by the petitioner for extension of the stay visa was on 27th September, 1980. His request on that occasion was that his period of stay might be extended for a period of one year from 3rd October, 1980. The Chief Immigration Officer at first expressed his inability to grant the request, but later announced that the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, had granted extension of stay to the petitioner and his family but, limited it to a period of six months from 14th March, 1981.The decision of the Central Government to this effect was passed on to the petitioner by an official communication, dated 12th March, 1981 sent by the Chief Immigration Officer. Barely a couple of days thereafter, on 16th March , 1981, the Officer sent another communication informing the petitioner that the Central Government had since issued revised orders cancelling the extension of stay earlier ordered. Barely a couple of days thereafter, on 16th March , 1981, the Officer sent another communication informing the petitioner that the Central Government had since issued revised orders cancelling the extension of stay earlier ordered. The petitioner was further informed, that not only was the earlier order cancelled, but the Central Government had further directed that the petitioner must leave the country, forth with, taking with him the members of his family. 34. It is in this back-ground of facts that the applicability of rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950, relied on by Mr. Vanamamalai, bears examination. Rule 5-A is couched in brutally simple terms. Under that rule, any passport authority may, at any time, and without assigning any reason, make an order against anyone who is the holder of a foreign passport that the endorsement made therein by way of visa shall be of no effect. Since the Visa endorsement constitutes the permit for the continued presence in India of the holder of a foreign passport, an order of the kind contemplated by rule-5Aand passed by the concerned authority cuts at the very root the foreigner’s existence in the Indian soil, 35. The Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950 are statutory rules framed under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920. A comparative study of this Act and its Rules might yield the position that in certain respects an d to a certain extent they tend to overlap the providers of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Orders made by the Central Government. Mr. Vanamamalai referred, in this context, to section 16 of the Foreigners Act and urged that where there is overlapping between the provisions of the Foreigners Act and the Provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, then it is the Foreigners Act within must give way to the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920. I do not think section 16 of the Foreigners Act bears the interpretation suggested. In my judgment, the provision does not contemplate, much less provide for, overlapping between the provisions of the two enactments. Nor does the section lay down that in the event of a common coverage of the provisions in the two Acts, a Court of construction should regard the provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, as having overriding force. Section 16 no doubt, contains a cautionary rule of construction. Nor does the section lay down that in the event of a common coverage of the provisions in the two Acts, a Court of construction should regard the provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, as having overriding force. Section 16 no doubt, contains a cautionary rule of construction. It does not, however, presume to decide the question, which provision in which Act is to be the master, when there are competing claims between them for application to a given situation. All that the section says is that the Foreigners Act has not the effect of bringing about an implied repeal of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 but must be regarded as a co-existing statute, supplementing the provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920. There are other laws too which are found mentioned , in the same vein, section 16, as though all of them belonged to a joint family of statutes to be dealt with as such. Where, therefore, a particular order or proceeding relating to a foreigner, is under examination, the inquiry must be to find out to which Act the said order or proceeding properly belongs. When once that is settled, the further endeavour must be to find out if the order or proceeding can be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the relevant power conferred on the authority concerned by the appropriate statute or a statutory instrument. In the present case, the petitioner has not doubt been in the habit of tendering his passports for endorsement of extensions of stay in the country and of getting permits for further stay Presumably, these things have turned out quite in the manner provided for under the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1.950. It is unnecessary to consider whether subsequent to the premulgation of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order in 1957 the petitioners a commonwealth citizen could, at all, be required to pass through the rigmarole of getting the passport endorsed with visas of extensions of stay as a condition precedent to his continuance in India. In the view I. have taken of section 16 of the Foreigners Act, it is a moot question whether the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 has such an overriding effect as to render the provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Rubs, 1950 nugatory in so far as Commonwealth citizens are concerned. In the view I. have taken of section 16 of the Foreigners Act, it is a moot question whether the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 has such an overriding effect as to render the provisions of the Passport (Entry into India) Rubs, 1950 nugatory in so far as Commonwealth citizens are concerned. The opposite view-point, however, is also not entirely unarguable. But the necessity to answer this question does not arise in the present context for, the limited question, which arises in this case is, first to determine what the order against the petitioner is and the source of power from which it has emanated. If, on examination it is found that the order is not one passed under rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, then it would be to no purpose to examine whether Commonwealth citizens also can be brought under the rule. 36. One remarkable feature of this case is that the record before the Court does not contain, or even reproduce anywhere the precise text of the impugned order. We only know what the order is like and who passed the order by what was disclosed by the Chief Immigration Officer in the communication addressed by him to the petitioner. Proceeding on the assumption, which. I think is justified, that the Chief Immigration Officer must know what he was talking about, the order of deportation against the petitioner could have emanated only from the Central Government, and from no other source of authority, even as the previous order granting the petitioner an extension of stay for a further period of six months from 14th March, 1981, also was an order from the same source. In his letter, dated16th March, 1981, the Chief Immigration Officer stated that: “The Government have now ordered that you and your family should not be allowed any further extension of stay beyond 14th March, 1981 and that yourself and your family should be asked to leave the country forthwith.” It is clear, therefore, that the direction requiring the petitioner to leave the country forthwith along with the members of his family is an order passed by the Central Government. It is not passed by any other authority. 37. It is not passed by any other authority. 37. It may be that the procedure prescribed under rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950, if properly invoked by the appropriate authority having jurisdiction to do so, might yield the same result against a foreigner as a regular order of deportation or expulsion passed by the Central Government. For, a foreigner can be driven out of the country either by a positive deportation order or by the simple expedient of rejecting his application for further extension to be endorsed in his visa for stay in the Passport. It stands to reason that when an extension asked for is refused of the period or stay already endorsed in the passport is curtailed, the foreigner concerned is robbed of the very means of continuing to remain in this country. On this account, however, we cannot confuse the proceedings, that may be taken under rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950, with a substantive order passed by the Central Government expelling the foreigner from his country. Nor can we obliterate the distinction between the two kinds of proceedings merely because both may end up in the same result. For, the procedures are different in vital respects, such as, the source of power, the authority invested with jurisdiction, the nature of the proceedings. An expulsion order, properly so-called, cannot be made under the Passport (Entry in to India) Act, 1920, or the Rules made there under, but can be made under the Foreigners Act. The Expulsion order can only be made by the Central Government and not by the passport authorities. An expulsion order becomes effective the moment it is made or signed. But a proceeding under rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950 can only be put through or effectuated by cancellation of the endorsement on the passport by the appropriate authority, and it is also presupposes that the authority concerned must call for the passport so as to make the requisite endorsement. Over and above all these differences, there exists a vital distinction between an order of deportation passed by the Central Government on the one hand, and an order of cancellation by a passport authority of an endorsement in foreigner’s visa for stay, on the other. Over and above all these differences, there exists a vital distinction between an order of deportation passed by the Central Government on the one hand, and an order of cancellation by a passport authority of an endorsement in foreigner’s visa for stay, on the other. In the one case, the Central Government’s order of deportation operates by its own force to expel a foreigner. In the other case, a foreigner may contravene the endorsement made by the passport authority by overstaying in the country, in which event alone the order of the passport authority would need to he followed up by an order of expulsion. In other words, the expulsion order is the very operative order in the one case, whereas it is only a method of execution in the other. 38. These are weighty reasons why it becomes necessary in every case to determine first what the nature of the order is and what the source of authority for the issuance of that order is, as against a foreigner. I have already explained how it can be gathered from the record that the impugned order in this case was one passed by the Central Government and how that order avowedly operates as a deportation or expulsion of the petitioner. The Foreigners Act scrupulously avoids the use of the expression ‘expulsion’ and ‘deportation’, and prefers to employ amilder expression ‘departure’. But the rigour of the order is the same whether it goes by the name of ‘expulsion’ or by the euphemism ‘departure’. The order in the present case is stated to have directed the petitioner to ‘leave’ the country forthwith, an expression apparently employed under the etiquette of the statutory vocabulary. But the fact remains that it is an order passed by the Central Government ordering the expulsion of the petitioner and his family which can only be done under the Foreigners Act. The order can by no means be regarded as traceable to rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950. It is true that the Chief Immigration Officer had called for the passports of the petitioner and other members of his family; but that was not for the purpose of passing an order under rule 5-Aof the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950. It was only to register the order of expulsion already passed by the Central Government, by posting the necessary entries in the passports. It was only to register the order of expulsion already passed by the Central Government, by posting the necessary entries in the passports. This is quite clear from the concluding part of the letter of the Chief Immigration Officer, dated 16th March, 1981. After informing the petitioner of the gist of the Central Government’s Order of deportation, the Chief Immigration Officer concludes his communication in the following words: “You are therefore requested to make immediate arrangement to leave the country along with your family. You are also requested to call at this office immediately with all passports so that necessary endorsement on them to facilitate your departure to Sri Lanka could be made and returned to you.” 39. In the event that happened, there is no scope whatever in this case for invoking the provisions of rule 5-A of the Passport (Entry in to India) Rules, 1950. This order against the petitioner must stand or fall purely on the results of an examination of that order as one issued under the Foreigners Act. I have already given my reasons as to why an order of this kind cannot be passed by the Central Government against the petitioner in valid exercise of their powers under paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957. I have also shown how the reasons which have been disclosed to this Court as the grounds of expulsion are not grounds on which it is open to the Central Government to deport the petitioner as a commonwealth citizen belonging to Sri Lanka. 40. Mr. Selvaraj, in the course of his arguments, made a point of the petitioner’s not having been given a hearing before the expulsion order was passed against him. This argument was met by Mr. Vanamamalai by saying that there is nothing in paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, which confers on any Commonwealth citizen the right or the privilege of insisting upon a hearing before the Central Government passes an order against him. Paragraph3 of the Exemption order is silent on this point. According to Mr. Selvaraj, if the provision is silent, then the rules of natural justice must be read into the provision, as a matter of construction. Mr. Paragraph3 of the Exemption order is silent on this point. According to Mr. Selvaraj, if the provision is silent, then the rules of natural justice must be read into the provision, as a matter of construction. Mr. Vanamamalai, on the other hand, submitted that if the intention of the rule-making authority were that there should be hearing by the Central Government before a Commonwealth citizen is made the subject of an order under paragraph 3, they would have thought of making express provisions to that effect. The fact that no such provision is expressly included in the paragraph must, according to Mr. Vanamamalai, be an indication that a hearing is wholly out of the question. 41. Courts would normally be inclined to read into a provision the principles of natural justice unless; the legislative intent to exclude the adoption of those principles is clearly discernible either from the language or by reference to the subject or context. The question therefore, is whether in a matter concerning foreigners, even foreigners of a preferred category like the Commonwealth citizens, rules of natural justice have any place. Under the exemption order, the Central Government is asked to have regard for such important policy considerations as the security of India, the defence of India, good, relations with foreign countries and the interests of the general public in India. It is a matter for consideration whether it is legitimate for a court of construction to read into a provision of this kind, by implication, she customary rules of natural justice. Such a construe ion, if it is to be favoured has to be adopted in every case, as applicable to every proceedings, against every foreigner, whatever the circumstances may be. It is a matter for serious thought whether in some cases at least such for instance, as foreign spies or undercover agents, exceptions should not be introduced to the applicability of rules of natural justice. And, if we have to have exceptions in the administration of the rules of natural justice, the task of construction of the provisions would become uncertain. The meaning to be given to the provisions will not also be uniform. Besides, the categories of exception may never get closed. The reading of rules of justice into the provisions might also tend to vary according to the chancellor’s foot. This cannot be quite a good standard, even for judicial law-mating. 42. The meaning to be given to the provisions will not also be uniform. Besides, the categories of exception may never get closed. The reading of rules of justice into the provisions might also tend to vary according to the chancellor’s foot. This cannot be quite a good standard, even for judicial law-mating. 42. One of the grounds put forward by the petitioner in his writ petition for impugning the order of deportation is that it was mala fide. The plea as to mala fides was sought to be supported on certain allegations levelled by the petitioner against the fourth respondent. The principal allegation was that the fourth respondent has her own personal reasons to see the petitioner and his wife and children ordered out of Indian territory. The petitioner’s affidavit went into great detail in the narrative. The fourth respondent occupies no official position either in the Central Government or in the State Government, although she has, undoubtedly, a place in the community as a public figure. Quite naturally, therefore, the petitioner’s charge against her, of complicity brought forth aspirated repudiation in her counter-affidavit. While this was the stage of the pleadings, by the time the case came up for final arguments, however, it became clear that the petitioner preferred to rest his case of mala fides against the Government without the slightest reference to the allegations made by him against the fourth respondent. Short of actually giving up these allegations by means of an endorsement on the docket, it was quite clear that the petitioner had abandoned, for goods, the very idea which prompted them. Learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent had, at an earlier stage, applied to this Court for expunging the offending allegations against his client. But, I have avoided this task since expurgation must necessarily involve a recital of the allegations followed by a recital of the counter allegations, an exercise which I thought was not particularly called for, having regard to the final stand taken by the petitioner on the issue of mala fides. It might have been all to the good if allegations of this kind had been avoided in the first place, especially when they were going to be given up at the final hearing. It might have been all to the good if allegations of this kind had been avoided in the first place, especially when they were going to be given up at the final hearing. It is however, unnecessary to dwell further on this aspect excepting to observe that at the end of the hearing the fourth respondent leaves the case without a blot on her character and without a blemish being proved. 43. The mala fide argument, however, was not altogether given up as a ground for the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner advanced the argument on another basis. He said that before the ink on the previous order of extension was hardly dry, the Central Government came out with the order of expulsion. This hustling, according to learned counsel, was an indication of legal mala fides. 44. I do not, however, agree with the basis of his contention. In Governmental action of the kind for which provision is made under the Foreigners Act and the Orders made there under, it is easy for the Courts to be dogmatic about the motives of the Government. I do not, however propose to assume, without any evidence there for, that the Central Government in this case had any malice towards the petitioner. Mr. Vanamamlai stated that the authorities discovered they had committed a mistake in granting a further extension of stay to the petitioner, and it was this mistake they subsequently rectified. I am prepared to accept that the Government, according to their lights, might have regarded the earlier order as a mistake. If that were so, it is not the business of this Court to find fault with the Government and call their action mala fide, not because the mistake was committed, but because the mistake was rectified. When a mistake occurs, the sooner it is rectified the better for all concerned. The mere fact, therefore, that within two days of an order, another order was passed cancelling it cannot be evidence of mala fides. The Central Government certainly erred in asking the petitioner to leave the country for all or any of the reasons which have now been adduced-But, that is quite a different kind of objection based on the un-tenability of the grounds for expulsion. The Central Government certainly erred in asking the petitioner to leave the country for all or any of the reasons which have now been adduced-But, that is quite a different kind of objection based on the un-tenability of the grounds for expulsion. And merely because those grounds may not pass master under the statute, it cannot be said that the Central Government were acting with a bad motive. They might well be acting under an error of judgment. 45. I believe the superior Courts of this country exist to set right errors of judgment of this sort which may not be ruled out in the administration of the laws relating to aliens. Our country is not?, closed system. Outsiders enter our country for a variety of reasons. Tourism is only the last of them. So also the opportunity for sport and pastime. Many young men and women from abroad, especially from South East Asia, are quite seriously attracted to educational institutions in India, Trades-people beyond the seas would seem to like having business deals with some of our industrialists. What may be called the Indian way of life beckons to our country a particular set of foreigners, those who are disheartened by the more hectic civilizations at home. They make their way to our land to adopt it as their spiritual home. It is true that among our foreign visitors there may be individuals who are not particularly good specimens of humanity. But, by and large, foreigners are not here to stay with oblique motives. A sound administration of the laws concerning them cannot, in any event, be carried on by treating the exceptional foreigner as the standard type. Mistakes in treatment of foreigners may thus occur either because of a wrong general approach or because of a mistaken understanding of in dividable fact situations. In either event, the Courts must be in a position to correct them excepting in very rare cases touching the security of our nation where the publicity attendant on a Court hearing would itself spoil the whole issue of right and wrong. The position of the Courts in matters such as there is thus peculiar. Their constituency, even as that of the Central Government, is world opinion. The position of the Courts in matters such as there is thus peculiar. Their constituency, even as that of the Central Government, is world opinion. Whatever might be the standard by which Judges in this country are judged by their fellow-men, foreigners at any rate, are apt to accept or reject the end-results of a case concerning them purely on their merits, with cut making any distinction between those who run the Government and those who run the Courts. The impact of the administration of laws concerning foreigners is thus the joint responsibility both of the executive arm of the State, and of its judiciary. My examination and application of the relevant provisions of the Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 1957 reflects, I hope, the true intention of those who framed those exemptions. The whole purpose of these proceedings would have been lost if I had misunderstood their import, 46. Be that as it may, for the reasons, I have earlier stated, the order of expulsion against the petitioner and the members of his family cannot be allowed to stand. This writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is quashed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed; order quashed.