Judgment Punnayya, J. 1. Pujarla Sambaiah, who is a student of law, Law College, Osmania University, was taken into custody on 5th March, 1981 at Hyderabad under an order of detention dated 1st March, 1981, passed by the District Magistrate, Nalgonda, who is the first respondent herein, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 3 (3) of the National Security Act. The detenue was served with the grounds of detention on 6th March, 1981. The petitioner who is the father of the detenue, filed this petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus quashing the orders of detention and set Sambaiah at liberty forthwith. The grounds mentioned in the order of detention are four in number: 1. He is an active member of the extremist organisation called “Andhra Pradesh Reorganising Committee” wedded to violence by armed struggle and revolution, which committed 18 dacoities and 5 murders in Nalgonda District. 2. He has organised the radical Youth League and Raithu Cooli Sangham in Nalgonda in 1979-80 and instigated and misdirected the peasants and agricultural labourers to revolt against the land owners causing dislocation to agricultural economy. He also extracts money. He committed Crime No. 13 of 1979, under sections 395 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code of Vemulapalli Police Station against a land owner when he refused to pay money. 3. Purusant to the violent revolutionary policy he has participated in three extremists dacoities in Crime Nos. 19 and 20 of 1980 of Aravapalli Police Station and Crime No. 44 of 1980 of Suryapet Rural Police Station in which two guns, were snatched and properties looted. 4. He is adopt at obtaining illicit arms and country-made bombs to carry out his revolutionary policy. He was arrested in Crime No: 93 of 1980 of Chityal Police Station with a country-made revolver and bombs. 2. Mr. K.G. Kannabhiran, appearing for the detenue, assails all these grounds as vague, irrelevant and are not in accordance with the constitutional mandate envisaged in Articles 22 (5). He impugnes the first ground as vague and irrelevant. He contends that even if it is accepted, for argument sake that the detenue is a member of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganising Committee, no particulars are given in support of the ground to show that either the Committee or the Detenue committed the 18 docoities and 5 murders in Nalgonda District. He impugnes the first ground as vague and irrelevant. He contends that even if it is accepted, for argument sake that the detenue is a member of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganising Committee, no particulars are given in support of the ground to show that either the Committee or the Detenue committed the 18 docoities and 5 murders in Nalgonda District. He also contends that how can the Andhra Pradesh Re-organising Committee or the Detenue be held responsible for the dacoities and murders committed in the said District. He also contends that so far as the detenue is concerned, there is no material whatsoever to show that the detenue is in any way connected with the 18 dacoities and 5 murders in the Nalgonda District. He, therefore, contends that this ground is vague and irrelevant. 3. It is now well-settled that the grounds of detention must be precise but not vague, pertinent but not irrelevant, proximate but not stale. The object in requiring the detaining authority to furnish the detenue precise, definite and relevant grounds is to enable the detenue to make an effective representation. If the grounds are vague, indefinite or irrelevant, the detenue cannot have an opportunity to make an effective representation and the grounds cannot therefore, be said to be in accordance with the constitutional mandate as envisaged in Articles 22 (5). As early as in 1951, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in State of Bombay v. Atma Rani1 that the satisfaction of the Government must be based on some grounds. If the grounds furnished to the detenue are vague or indefinite, the grounds cannot be said to be in accordance with Articles 22 (5). 4. In Ram Krishan v. State of Delhi2, their Lordships held that preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. The petitioner has the right, under Articles 22 (5) to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of Article 22. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of Article 22. Where it has not oeen done in regard to one of the grounds mentioned in the statement of grounds the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be within the meaning of Article 21 and is, therefore, entitled to be released. 5. In Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar1 their Lordships held that the detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter. It must require the, closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the Courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others. Since the detenue is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention. 6. In Motilal v. State of Bihar2 their Lordships observed “that if the grounds are vague or irrelevant, there was no opportunity for the detenue to satisfy the Advisory Board and the detenue under those circumstances would be left to attack a shadow”. 7. In Mohd. Yousuf v. State of Jammu and Kashmir3 their Lordships held in para 20that if the grounds are irrelevant or vague, the detenue is entitled to be released. 8. In Shiv Prasad v. State of M.P.4 His Lordship Mr. Justice Chinnappa Reddy, speaking for the Bench observed “that the grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, stateness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention”. 9. Judged from these rulings we have to hold that the first ground has suffered from the vices of vagueness and irrelevance. Irrelevance, stateness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention”. 9. Judged from these rulings we have to hold that the first ground has suffered from the vices of vagueness and irrelevance. It is vague because it does not mention the basic facts and materials to show how the detenue is connected with the 18 dacoities and 5 n.urders that were committed in the Nalgonda District. If particulars showing the part played by the detenue in the alleged is dacoities and 5 murders with reference to the time place and charge-sheet or the number of Sessions Case against him in respect of each dacoity case or each murder case as the case may be, are not furnished, the allegation is of highly sweeping nature and it is therefore vague. It is also irrelevant because there is no material to show how the detenue is connected with them. If the 18 dacoities and 5 murders were committed in the Nalgonda District, how can the detenue be said to be responsible for or connected with them? Obviously, the detaining authority is influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. 10. The second ground is equally vague. Article 19 of the Constitution permits every citizen to form an association and hence the formation of the Radical Youth League and Rythu Cooli Sangham in Nalgonda District in 1979-80 by the detenue is not illegal nor can it be said to be prejudicial to public peace The allegation that the detenue instigated and misdirected the peasants and agricultural labourers to revolt against the land owners causing dislocation to the agricultural economy is undoubtedly a vague allegation as particulars regarding the date, place and in what connection the detenue had instigated and misdirected the peasants and agricultural labourers are not given and the particulars as to what sort of instigations the detenue had made are also not given. Even the allegation that he extracts money is again highly vague as particulars as to from whom and on what date he has extracted money are not given. Even the allegation that he extracts money is again highly vague as particulars as to from whom and on what date he has extracted money are not given. Further the allegation that he committed Crime No. 13 of 1979 under sections 395 and 427, Indian Penal Code of Vemulapalli P. S. against a land owner when he refused to pay money cannot form a valid ground for detention of the detenue, since it was the subject-matter of Sessions Case No. 15 of 1980, en the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nalgonda and the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the detenue and 22 others of all the charges holding that the instigating agency attempted to cook up material and even tampered the case records and that there was an attempt to cook up and foist recoveries supposed to be at the instance of A-2 and A-4. 11. Sri K.G. Kannabhiran, learned Counsel for the detenue, contends that when once the detenue, was taken as an accused in a criminal case and was acquitted of all the charges the detention is illegal, if it was made on the same grounds and the detention amounts to nullifying a judicial decision given by a criminal Court on merits after a full dressed trial. He also contends that there should not be detention on the same grounds, if the Sessions Court acquits the accused giving a finding that it is a false case. He further contends that the Supreme Court has deprecated such detentions. He contends that such a detention is opposed to the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 20 (2) and Article 21. He further contends that after the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 the horizon of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 is widened and if the legality and validity of the detention is scrutinised from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 the law propounded by the Supreme Court in certain decisions that the acquittal or failure of criminal charge does not debar the detention on the same grounds is no more a good law and such a detention amounts to double jeopardy and is, therefore, barred by Articles 20 and 21 and also the doctrine of issue estoppel. 12. 12. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand, contends that the Supreme Court did not disapprove the detention of a person who was acquitted in a criminal case if he was detained on the same grounds and this legal position is not changed even after the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 and the Supreme Court did not give such a ruling so far. 13. It is true that the Supreme Court held in several decisions that the acquittal of a person of a criminal charge or pendency of a criminal case did not preclude the District Magistrate from detaining the same person on the same grounds. But at the same time it is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court also held that there is difference between an acquittal on the technical ground and an acquittal on a positive finding that it is a false case and insists on the detaining authorities to observe this difference in such cases. 14. In M.S. Khan v. C.C. Bose2 their Lordships held that the mere fact that the petitioner was discharged in a criminal case rdating to certain incident does not mean that no valid order of detention could be passed against him in connection with those very incidents or that such an order can be characterised as mala fide. The detaining authorities might well feel that though there was not sufficient evidence for a conviction, the activities of that person, which they had been watching were of such a nature as to justify the detention order. 15. In Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal3 their Lordships held that if for any reason it is not possible to successfully try and secure the conviction and imprisonment of the persons concerned for their past activities, which are also relevant for the satisfaction of the detaining authority for considering it necessary that the detention order under section 3 be made for preventing such persons from acting in a prejudicial manner as contemplated by that section, then, the Act would indisputably be attracted and a detention order can appropriately be made. 16. Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal4 was a case where a detenue was prosecuted previously. But the criminal prosecution failed. Then he was taken as a detenue on the same grounds. 16. Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal4 was a case where a detenue was prosecuted previously. But the criminal prosecution failed. Then he was taken as a detenue on the same grounds. The detenue's representation mentions the cases challenged and the discharge of the detenue by the Court in regard to the very incident which pressed into service to found the detention order. The question, therefore, arose for consideration was whether the detention order was bad? Their lordships finally held that “we are not satisfied that there was foul exercise of power merely because the Courts have discharged the accused”. 17. But the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar1 drew distinction between an acquittal on a technical ground and an acquittal on a positive finding that it was false case and insisted upon the detaining authority to bear in mind this difference. Their Lordships observed as follows: “The appellant was tried for the offence and acquitted as far back as February, 1967. This ground discloses carelessness which is extremely disturbing. That the detaining authority does not know that the appellant was tried and acquitted months before, and considers the pendency of the case against him as one of the grounds of detention shows that due care and attention is not being paid to such serious matters as detention without trial. If the appellant was tried and acquitted, Government was required to study the judgment of acquittal to discover whether all the allegations had any basis in fact or not. One can understand the use of the case if the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be false.” 18. They observations received the approval of their Lordships in Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal2 Their Lordships observed as follows: “After all, however well-meaning Government may be, detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the ordinary law would take care of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in Court is unfair abuse. To detain a person after a Court has held the charge false is to expose on self to the criticism of absence of due care and of rational material for subjective satisfaction. To detain a person after a Court has held the charge false is to expose on self to the criticism of absence of due care and of rational material for subjective satisfaction. After all, the responsible officer, aware of the value of Civil liberty even for undesirable persons, must make a credible prediction of the species of prejudicial activity in section 1 before shutting up a person. It may perilously hover around illegality, if a single act of theft or threat for which a prosecution was launched but failed, is seized upon after, say, a year or so, for detaining the accused out of pique. The potential executive tendency to shy at Courts for prosecution of ordinary offences and to rely generously on the easier strategy of subjective satisfaction is a danger to the democratic way of life. The large number of habeas corpus petitions and the more or less sterotyped grounds of detention and inaction by way of prosecution, induce us to voice this deeper concern.” 19. In the light of the observations made in Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar1 and also in Bhut Nath v.State of West Bengal,2 the legal position is now clear that where an accused is acquitted by a criminal Court on a positive finding that the charge is false he cannot be detained on the same ground and such detention should be treated as illegal. 20. Sri K.G. Kannabhiran argued at length in the light of the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India3 that the detention is hit by Articles 20 and 21, when once the detenue was acquitted by a competent criminal Court on merits after trial. We unhesitatingly say that in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India3 Bhasrwati, J., speaking for the majority has widened the horizon of personal liberty with unprecedented dimensions. While interpreting the scope and ambit of Article 21, his Lordship observed at para 54: “It is not a valid argument to say that the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 must be so interpreted as to avoid overlapping between that Article and Articles 19 (1). While interpreting the scope and ambit of Article 21, his Lordship observed at para 54: “It is not a valid argument to say that the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 must be so interpreted as to avoid overlapping between that Article and Articles 19 (1). The expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct of fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19…… It will be seen atonce from the language of Article 21, that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not ‘supported by law’ and law here means ‘enacted law’ or ‘State Law’. Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure. Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable.” In para 65, His Lordship also observed: “If a law depriving a person of ‘personal liberty’ and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 , which may be applicable in a given situation, ex-hypothesis it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.” In para. 56, His Lordship observed: “The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be ‘right and just and fair’ and not arbitrary fanciful or oppressive: otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.” In para. 57, His Lordship observed: “Although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice.” In para. 57, His Lordship observed: “Although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice.” In para. 58, His Lordship also observed: “Natural Justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The inquiry must, always be does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” In para. 61, His Lordship also observed: “The law must now be taken to be settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.” In para. 77, His Lordship further observed: “Even if a right is not specifically named in Articles 19 (1), it may still be a fundamental right covered by some clause of that Article if it is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Every activity which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. What is necessary to be seen is, and that is the test which must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right.” 21. That it is manifest that the ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 has widened the dimensions of personal liberty. That it is manifest that the ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1 has widened the dimensions of personal liberty. But on that account this Court being bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court has no power to say that the decisions of the Supreme Court in M.S. Khan v. C.C. Bose2, Mohd. Subrati and Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal4 need not be followed and say that the detaining authority has no power to take a person as a detenue on the same grounds when he was once tried and acquitted of a criminal charge. The authorities continue to hold the field till the Supreme Court extends the broad based interpretation given to liberty in Maneha Gandhi's case1, even to the detenue who was acquitted by a competent Court after a full dressed trial but was taken into custody on the same ground, under an order of detention. 22. In view of the same difficulty we find it not necessary to answer the question whether the principle of issue estoppel will apply to the detenue who was acquitted by a competent Court after trial when he was taken into custody on the same ground. 23. Sri Kannabhiran contends that even the above cited rulings continue to be in force, the detention of the detenue in the case on hand is bad in view of the mandate given by their Lordships in Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar5Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal4 and We find that this contention is well-founded. In Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar5 and Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal3 the Supreme Court held that the detention of a person whom, the Sessions Judge acauitted giving a positive finding that the case in which he was involved is a false one, is illegal. 24. The detenue. in the case on hand, was acquitted by the Sessions Judge in S.C. No. 13 of 1980 and the learned Sessions Judge held that the evidence was cooked up and the case was false. In view of such a finding the idtenue is entitled to take the benefit of the mandate of the Supreme Court given in the above cited two decisions. Hence we held that the detention of the detenue on the same ground is illegal. 25. The third and fourth grounds make it abundantly clear that only Crime Nos. In view of such a finding the idtenue is entitled to take the benefit of the mandate of the Supreme Court given in the above cited two decisions. Hence we held that the detention of the detenue on the same ground is illegal. 25. The third and fourth grounds make it abundantly clear that only Crime Nos. 19 and 20 of 1980 of Aravapalli Police Station. Crime No. 44 of 1980 of Suryapet Police Station and Crime No. 93 of 1980 of Chityal Police Station were mentioned and the detenue was not supplied with any material documents relating to these crime numbers. 26. Mere mentioning of crime numbers cannot be accepted to have satisfied the constitutional requirement of Articles 22 (5) in the absence of particulars relating to those crime numbers. Furnishing of all particulars in support of the grounds is intended, to facilitate the detenue to make an effective representation. Failure to give the particulars or the details relating to the crime numbers given in the grounds will give rise to the conclusion that the said grounds have suffered from the infirmity of vagueness. 27. It is now admitted, that material documents relating to these grounds are not supplied at all. section 8 of the National Security Act which merely re-enacts the constitutional requirement of Articles 22 (5) of the Constitution that the grounds must be supplied within 5 days and in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing not less than 10 days from the date of detention. 28. Their Lordships explained in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal6 that the grounds under Articles 22 (5) mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is based. Their Lordships, therefore, exhorted that nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention must be communicated to the detenue. Their Lordships insisted upon the Courts to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. Their Lordships insisted upon the Courts to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. Their Lordships also declared that “the judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though some other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. 29. Their Lordships went further to declare in Ramachandra A. Kamat v. Union of India1 that the copies of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention should also be supplied to the detenue in order to enable him to make an effective representation. Their Lordships also held that if there is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention, the right to make effective representation is denied and the detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law. 30. The principles laid down in the above cited two decisions are reiterated by their Lordships in Ganga v. Government of Maharashtra2 Their Lordships observed that “the mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenue are elaborate, does not absolve the detaining authority from its constitutional responsibility to supply all the basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenue”. 31. Their Lordships in Icchu Devi v. Union of India3 insisted categorically on the supply of documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention to the detenue within the time prescribed in the statute and declared that it would not be sufficient to communicate to the detenue a bare recital of the grounds of detention. Their Lordships observed: “When clause (5) of Article 22 and sub section (3) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grotinds of detention should be communicated to the detenue within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenue. Their Lordships observed: “When clause (5) of Article 22 and sub section (3) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grotinds of detention should be communicated to the detenue within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenue. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenue, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenue cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenue a bare recital of the grounds of detention, bat copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenue within the prescribed time subject of course to clause (6) of Article 22 in order to constitute compliance with clause (3), sub- section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act. If this requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 read with section 3, sub- section (3) is not satisfied the continued detention of the detenue would be illegal and void.” 32. Again in Shalini Soni v. Union of India4 their Lordships declared that.the supply of documents form part of grounds and the failure to do so vitiates the detention. Speaking, for the Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed: “‘Grounds’ in Articles 22 (5) do not inean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The ‘grounds’ must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. Therefore, copies of documents to which a reference is made in the ‘grounds’ must be supplied to the detenue as a part of grotinds. Failure to communicate the factual material as a part of the grounds would amount to non-communication of grounds on which the order of detention has been made and thus would vitiate Articles 22 (5).” 33. In the latest decision in Kamala v. State of Maharashtra5 their Lordships reiterated and incorporated all these principles and held unequivocally that the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention form the integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenue pari-passu. the grounds of detention. In the latest decision in Kamala v. State of Maharashtra5 their Lordships reiterated and incorporated all these principles and held unequivocally that the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention form the integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenue pari-passu. the grounds of detention. If the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detenue is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the older of detention. Before an order of detention can be supported, the constitutional safeguards must be strictly observed. 34. From a careful reading of the above rulings, it is abundantly clear that a bare recital of the grounds of detention would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Article 22 (S). It is incumbent on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention to the detenue within the time prescribed in the statute in order to constitute compliance with clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. Failure to communicate the factual material consisting of the statements and documents on any other material within the time prescribed would deprive the detenue of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention and thus would vitiate the constitutional mandate provided in Articles 22 (5). 35. Judged from these principles the mere recitals of crime numbers in the grounds without furnishing the copies of documents, statements and other materials relating to them cannot be held to constitute sufficient compliance with the wholesome provision of section 8 of the National Security Act, which is the replica of Articles 22 (5). It should, therefore be concluded that there is no compliance with section 8 of the National Security Act. 36. Having regard to our discussion and findings in respect of each of the grounds, we have no hesitation to hold that all the grounds are vitiated and hence the detention order is wholly illegal and it is, therefore quashed. The detenue shall be set at liberty forthwith. 37. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250. Writ petition allowed.