Kaushal Hari Narain v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Kanpur
1981-02-18
S.D.AGARWALA
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Sec. 16 (5) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. BRIEFLY, the facts giving rise to the present petition are as under : The accommodation in dipute is the ground floor of Premises No. 96/18, Colonelganj, Kanpur. Smt. Kanti Khanna, respondent no. 3, was the tenant of the said premises. Since respondent no. 3 did not reside in the disputed premises and had shifted to Sitapur where her husband was posted as Additional District Judge, many applications were made by persons for allotment of the said premises. The Rent Control Inspector inspected the premises and submitted a report that no one was residing in the premises in dispute for the last two years and that Sm. Kanti Khanna had shifted and was living with her husband at Sitapur. In view of the above report, the vacancy was notified on 23rd April, 1977, and, thereafter, the applications for allotment were considered and by an allotment order dated 16th May, 1977, the premises was allotted to the petitioner who took possession of the said premises thereafter. On 27th June, 1977 Smt. Kanti Khanna moved an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Sec. 16 (5) of the Act for reviewing the order of allotment on the ground that the disputed premises was not vacant and could not have been deemed to be vacant in the eye of law, as she had only temporarily gone to live with her husband, who was on a transferable post. It was further alleged that her son was taking training as a pleader in the Civil Court at Kanpur and, as such it was necessary for her to reside at Kanpur. The said review application was contested on the ground that in fact, Smt. Kanti Khanna was residing with her husband at Sitapur. Her son was also residing at Sitapur and was taking training at Sitapur and, as such, the premises was vacant and the allotment order, consequently, was a valid allotment order. The Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, by his order dated 11th January, 1979, rejected the review application and upheld the validity of the allotment order.
Her son was also residing at Sitapur and was taking training at Sitapur and, as such, the premises was vacant and the allotment order, consequently, was a valid allotment order. The Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, by his order dated 11th January, 1979, rejected the review application and upheld the validity of the allotment order. Aggrieved by the decision dated 11th January, 1979, Smt. Kanti Khanna filed a revision under Sec. 18 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Kanpur. The revision was, ultimately, allowed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Kanpur, by judgment dated 7th December, 1979. The petitioner has now challenged the order dated 7th December, 1979, by means of the present petition in this Court. 3. SRI S.N. Verma, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner, has urged that on the facts found by the Additional District Magistrate, which have not been reversed by the revisional Court, in law, it has to be held that Smt. Kanti Khanna has taken up residence elsewhere and, as such, the property has to be deemed vacant under Sec. 12 (1) (c) of the Act. 4. I have heard Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for respondent no. 3. It is significant to point out that Smt. Kanti Khanna did. not file any affidavit in support of the allegations which she had made in the review application. The Additional District Magistrate, after examining the evidence on the record, recorded a finding that Smt. Kanti Khanna and her son Peeyush Khanna are not residing at Kanpur and are residing with Sri. R. M. R. Khanna, the Additional District Judge at Sitapur, and, thereafter, they resided with him at his subsequent place of postings. It has been further found that the names of Smt. Khanna and her son Peeyush Khanna were included in the ration card issued first at Budaun and then at Sitapur. Smt. Khanna did not pay rent for the last two years to the landlord. She sent rent from Budaun for seven months, as she was not residing at Kanpur. Her ration card at Kanpur had been cancelled after due enquiry about her shifting to Kanpur. She did not pay electricity charges nor water dues for the accommodation in question.
Smt. Khanna did not pay rent for the last two years to the landlord. She sent rent from Budaun for seven months, as she was not residing at Kanpur. Her ration card at Kanpur had been cancelled after due enquiry about her shifting to Kanpur. She did not pay electricity charges nor water dues for the accommodation in question. He further found that Sri R. M. R. Khanna had charged T. A. and D. A. for his transfer from Kanpur and from other districts, including the charges for transporting the house hold effects. In view of these findings, the Additional District Magistrate came to the conclusion that the property would be deemed vacant under Sec. 12 of the Act, both on the ground that Smt. Kanti Khanna had removed her effects from the building as well as on the ground that she had taken up residence else where. 5. THE Additional District Judge, however, after considering the evidence on the record, has, however, reversed the findings, namely, that Smt. Kanti Khanna had not removed her effects substantially and, as such, there cannot be any deemed vacancy under Sec. 12 (1) (a) of the Act. On the basis of the other findings of fact, the Additional District Judge was of the view that since Sri R. M. R. Khanna was on a transferable post, even if Smt. Kanti Khanna was residing with Sri R. M. R. Khanna, it cannot be held that she had permanently taken up residence elsewhere and, as such, the case would not be covered by Sec. 12 (1) (c) of the Act and, therefore, could not be deemed vacant in the eye of law. 6. SEC. 12 (1) of the Act provides three contingencies in which the property would be deemed vacant. Even if the contingencies mentioned in SEC. 12 (1) (a) of the Act have not come into effect yet if the case would come under SEC. 12 (1)(c) of the Act, the property would be deemed vacant in the eye of law. Therefore, the question which has to be considered is as to what meaning has to be given to clause (c) of SEC. 12 (1) of the Act. The relevant portion of SEC. 12 (1) of the Act are as under : "12 (1).
12 (1)(c) of the Act, the property would be deemed vacant in the eye of law. Therefore, the question which has to be considered is as to what meaning has to be given to clause (c) of SEC. 12 (1) of the Act. The relevant portion of SEC. 12 (1) of the Act are as under : "12 (1). A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a)........ (b)................ (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere." The expression, which requires interpretation, therefore, is what meaning has to be given to the expression "not being temporary residence." At the very outset, it may be stated that the word 'temporary' used in this clause is not in relation to the vocation of a person. It does not contemplate that in case of a post being a transferable post, the word 'temporary' has to be interpreted in that light. In fact, the word 'temporary' here means 'temporary residence'. What has to be examined, therefore, is what would be called a 'temporary residence'. The word temporary used here is not in contradistinction to the word 'permanent'. The word 'temporary' has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, volume II, meaning "lasting for a limited period, transient or made to supply a passing need". In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 5, Fourth Edition, the word 'temporary' has been defined as under :- "The ordinary meaning of 'temporary' purpose is, casual purposes as distinguished from the case of a person who is here in the pursuance of his regular habits of life...............'temporary' does not mean the negation of perpetuity, but means that it is casual or transitory residence as distinguished from a residence for which there may be more than one which is habitual or permanent." 7. IN my opinion, the definition, as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary would appropriately apply to the case in question. Here, as I have already stated above, the word 'temporary' has not been used as contradistinction to 'permanent', but it means only a casual or a transitory residence.
IN my opinion, the definition, as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary would appropriately apply to the case in question. Here, as I have already stated above, the word 'temporary' has not been used as contradistinction to 'permanent', but it means only a casual or a transitory residence. It may be a case where a person goes to stay, either with his relations or friends only casually, not with an idea of not returning back or stays in some hotel or a place where he does not have a regular or habitual residence. The nature of the residence has to be examined in order to test whether clause (c) of Section 12 (1) of the Act would apply or not. IN the instant case, it has been found that Sri R. M. R. Khanna has been transferred from place to place and, therefore, he did have his own residence, not in the sense of perpetual residence, but residence till he is posted there, namely, a regular place of residence. The residence is neither casual nor transitory. It cannot, therefore, be said that Smt. Kanti Khanna, respondent No. 3, when she stayed with her husband, who has a regular place of residence, was only occupying a temporary residence. The view taken by the revisional court, therefore, that merely because the post of Sri R.M.R. Khanna is transferable, the residence with Sri. R.M.R. Khanna would only be a temporary residence, is, in my opinion, a view manifestly erroneous in law. 8. LEARNED counsel for the respondent has relied upon few cases of this Court. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel is Smt. Durga Deri v. The District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun, 1976 AWC 661 . In that case, while interpreting Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, it was observed by K. C. Agrawal, J. as under : "This provision, therefore, will apply only to a case where residence has been taken up by a tenant and also by his or her family members on a permanent basis. A temporary or casual visit by a tenant or his or her family members will not attract the aforesaid clause." The principle laid down in this case in not anything contrary to the view which I have taken above.
A temporary or casual visit by a tenant or his or her family members will not attract the aforesaid clause." The principle laid down in this case in not anything contrary to the view which I have taken above. The words "permanent basis" have not been explained in this case at all and, as such, no assistance can be drawn by the learned counsel for the respondent from this decision. 9. THE second case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Dr. S. N. Ghosh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1975 AWC 568. Hon. K. N. Singh, J. while examining the provisions of the Act, has only laid down that clause (c) of Section 12 (1) of the Act would apply only to a person if the occupation by such a person is intended to be of a permanent nature and that only then the vacancy would occur in law. K. N. Singh, J. has not examined the scope as to what meaning has to be given to the expression 'permanent nature'. He was not called upon to decide this question. This case, therefore, also, in my opinion, does not help the respondent no. 3. 10. THE third case relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent no. 3 is a Full Bench decision of this Court in Khubi Singh Yadav v. THE District Judge, Allahabad, 1980 AWC 97 . THE only words relied upon are as under :- "Under this very Act, clause (c) of Section 12 (1) created a vacancy in the case of a residential building if the tenant as well as members of his family have taken up residence elsewhere. In other words, allotment or release can only be when the tenant as well as members of his family have shifted the residence some where else." In this Full Bench also, the Full Bench was not called upon to interpret as to what is the exact scope of sub-clause (c) of section 12 (1) of the Act. The Full Bench only quoted the contents of the said clause. The last case, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel is Smt. Sarma Chatter ji v. The District Judge, Varanasi, 1978 UP RCC 297.
The Full Bench only quoted the contents of the said clause. The last case, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel is Smt. Sarma Chatter ji v. The District Judge, Varanasi, 1978 UP RCC 297. Hon. K. C. Agrawal, J. took the view that when a landlady had gone to visit her son at Calcutta and the care taker was in charge of the house, it could not be held that the visit of the landlandy was of a permanent nature and, as such, the house could not be deemed vacant under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act. This case is on its own facts. If the visit of the landlady was of a casual nature and there was an intention to return to her original residence, naturally, it could not have been held that the landlady had taken up her residence elsewhere. The fact, that she had gone to visit her son casually itself indicates that there was an intention not to shift her residence, but to come back. In the circumstances, this case also, in my opinion, does not help the respondent no. 3. 11. IN view of the above, I am of the opinion that on the facts found in this case, the revisional court has taken a wholly erroneous view of the law that under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act, the property could not have been deemed vacant. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, in my opinion, well founded. 12. THE petition is, accordingly, allowed. THE order of the revisional court dated 7th December, 1979, is quashed and that of the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, dated 11th January, 1979, is restored. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this petition. Petition allowed.