JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition, under section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 401, Cr.P.C, is directed against the order, dated the 3rd February, 1981 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, i.e. the trial Court, in Cr. Case No. 14/1980. 2. A report was lodged at Police Station Khetri, District Jhunjhunu by one Shri Balwant Singh, Tehsildar, Khetri, on which a first information report was registered under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (hereinafter the Act). As a result of the investigation, the final report was submitted to the trial court. This report has been extracted in the impugned order, dated the 3rd February, 1981. 3. The substance of this report is that by investigation it has been found to be correct that the petitioner, Mahesh Chand of Khetri having licence No. 1975, obtained cement from the District supply Officer, Jhunjhunu and sold 75 bags of cement on August 15, 1973 in black by charging Rs. 38/-per bag of cement. This sale was made without permit to Mangilal, Jaggu, and Sumer Singh, thus he committed an offence under Section 3/7 of the Act. On account of this result of investigation the District Supply Officer, Jhunjhunu had been asked to cancel the licence, however, at the end, it was mentioned that the witnesses, namely Sumer Singh, Mangelal, and Jaggu, had joined hands with the petitioner Mahesh Chandra. When the above report was filed before the trial court, the trial court took cognizance and summoned the petitioner Mahesh Chandra. 4. The petitioner-accused objected to the above, on the ground that under Section 11 of the Act, the cognizance could not be taken because it can only be done on report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by the person, who is public servant, who comes within the definition provided under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Since the police submitted final report there was no such report as contemplated under sec. 11 of the Act. This objection was rejected by the trial Court on 3rd February, 1981. The trial court was of the view that the report submitted by the police expressly mentions the facts constituting the offence and all that section 11 of the Act requires, is that the report of the public servant should contain the facts constituting such offence. 5. Mr. This objection was rejected by the trial Court on 3rd February, 1981. The trial court was of the view that the report submitted by the police expressly mentions the facts constituting the offence and all that section 11 of the Act requires, is that the report of the public servant should contain the facts constituting such offence. 5. Mr. N.L. Tibrewal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that since the final report has been given by the police, the cognizance could not have been taken. Mr. Tibrewal relied upon the decision of the Patna High Court in Lakhan Prased Gupta v. State of Bihar, 1980 Cr.LJ. 537 in which their Lordships of the Patna High Court observed as under:- "It is well settled that a report submitted by the public servant under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act must contain the facts constituting the offence. If that provision of Section 11 is not complied with, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance. The satisfaction of the public servant is essential and if that satisfaction itself is absent then the Court is precluded to substitute its own satisfaction for that of the public servant. The Court, therefore, can only examine what is filed before it and if the report by public servant indicates that the public servant is satisfied that any offence has been made out then the Court cannot invoke the provisions of Section 190 (1)(a) and (b). To that extent S. 190(1) (a) and (b) is restricted by the provisions of Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act. " 6. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Satan and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961 AIR SC 928 (E&A) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- "The report under Section 11 is required to contain the only" a statement of facts constituting the offence" and its function is not to serve as a charge-sheet against the accused. The function or purpose of the second of the three requirements of Section 11 is to eliminate private individuals such as civil traders or the general public from initiating a prosecution and for this purpose before cognizance is taken the complaint is required to emanate from" a public servant". The function or purpose of the second of the three requirements of Section 11 is to eliminate private individuals such as civil traders or the general public from initiating a prosecution and for this purpose before cognizance is taken the complaint is required to emanate from" a public servant". The two further requirements, viz, that the report should be in writing and regarding the contents of the report, are to ensure that there shall be a record that the public servant is satisfied that a contravention in question is sufficiently designated in the report, the requirements of the section are satisfied. The details which would be necessary to be proved to bring some the guilt to the accused, such as (a) the date when the alleged sales took place, (b) the quantity sold, (c) the person in question who was the buyer and who paid the excess over the controlled price, (d) the class or category of iron and steel which was the subject of the sale, (e) the precise maximum price which had been fixed for such variety, (f) the amount which the sellers were alleged to have received in excess will be details which would emerge at later stage when after notice to the sellers a charge is framed against them, and of course at the stage of the trial. They would all be matters of evidence and Section 11 does not require the report to be or to contain either the charge-sheet or the evidence in support of the charge, its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case." 7. It would thus be seen that as observed by the Supreme Court, the following requirements are necessary for the purpose of taking cognizance of an offence under the provisions of the Essential Suppliers powers Act : (a) the report should be in writing; (b) the public servant should be satisfied with a contravention of law has taken place; (c) it should contain a statement of facts constituting the offence. According to the Supreme Court, if the contravention in question is sufficiently designated in the report, the requirements of the Section are satisfied. According to the Supreme Court, if the contravention in question is sufficiently designated in the report, the requirements of the Section are satisfied. The Supreme Court has also observed in this decision, that the details would be necessary to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused may emerge at a later stage when after notice to the sellers a charge is framed against them and at the stage of the trial. Section 11 does not require the report to be or to contain either the charge-sheet or the evidence in support of the charges, its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case. 8. It would thus be seen that the above authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court expressly clinches the issue that the evidence or availability of the evidence need not be mentioned in the report under Section 11 of the Act. 9. I am convinced that in the instant case, all the three requirements mentioned above are contained in the report. The public servant concerned has even recorded satisfaction that the offence of black marketing of cement is made out against the accused and due to that, a report has been sent to the District Supply Officer concerned for cancellation of his licence. 10. In my considered view, the availability or non-availability of evidence for proving the offence, is not an essential part of a report as required by Section 11 of the Act. That being so, the entire submission of Mr. Tribrewal that because witnesses have become hostile and are in collusion with the accused,the report mentioning the same is not a report under section 11 of the Act, on which the cognizance can be taken, cannot be accepted. The trial Court was correct in holding that the final report fulfills the requirement of section 11 of the Act and, therefore, the trial Court can take cognizance of the offence. The trial Court was correct in holding that the final report fulfills the requirement of section 11 of the Act and, therefore, the trial Court can take cognizance of the offence. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in above case, the evidence is not a part of the report and therefore, the availability or non-availability of the evidence which may have bearing and relevancy for recording conviction of the accused has got no relevancy for the report contemplated by Section 11 of the Act.Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have further made it clear that the object of Section 11 is to eliminate private individuals such as rival traders or general public from initiating a prosecution and for this purpose before a cognizance is taken, complaint is required to emanate from public servant. 11. Mr. Tribrewal, during the arguments, submitted that in an identical case, this Court has quashed the proceedings in S. B. Criminal Revision Pet. No. 77 of 1978, Govind Narain v. State of Rajasthan, decided on July 31, 1979. This contention is also devoid of any force, because the facts of Govind Narains case are absolutely different. In that case, while the case was pending under Section 3/7 of the Act for contravention of the best control order a private party moved an application praying that the cognizance should also be taken against Govind Narain father of both the accused Jagdish Prasad and Rameshwar lal. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Sikar rejected the application on the ground that a private party was not entitled to move the Court. In revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Sikar, took the view that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could have taken the cognizance of an offence on the report of the private party also, and reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in A.K. Jain and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 267 . In revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Sikar, took the view that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could have taken the cognizance of an offence on the report of the private party also, and reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in A.K. Jain and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 267 . This Court placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Saran and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (Supra) and observed that the function and purpose of a report under Section 11 of the Act is to eliminate private individual such as rival traders or general public from initiating the proceedings and prosecution, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge, Sikar was not correct in quashing the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate refusing to take cognizance against the additional accused on the complaint of the private individuals. This Court, therefore, quashed that judgment of the learned Session Judge Sikar and upheld the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Sikar. 12. It would thus be seen that this judgment cannot provide any guidance for quashing the proceedings of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the instant case, because no private party has initiated the prosecution and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has treated the final report as a report under Section 11 of the Act. Undoubtedly, this report is a report by a public servant and since it contains all the necessary ingredients, it could have been relied upon for initiating the proceedings and taking cognizance under Section 3/7 of the Act. 13. The net result of the above discussion is that the report submitted in the instant case which was in the nature of the final report fulfills all the conditions of a report required by Section 11 of the Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was, therefore, fully empowered to take cognizance of the offence even though in the opinion of the public servant the offence, though committed by the accused, was not likely to be proved because of the witnesses collusion with the accused. There is thus no ground for interference in this revision petition. 14. The result is, that this revision petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.Revision Dismissed. *******