Vithal Moreshwar Khandagale v. J. F. Riberio and another
1981-09-11
B.C.GADGIL, V.S.KOTWAL
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement KOTWAL, J. :- The petitioner himself a detenu has been served with the impugned order dt. Sept. 8, 1981 issued by the Commissioner of Police. Thane Region, presumably u/s. 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Ordinance (shortly stated as the Ordinance), inter alia alleging that it was essential to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The other details and allied aspects pertaining to his detention have been reflected in a separate order of even date. This was also found in the grounds communicated to the detenu on the same day. The gravamen of the said grounds pertaining to the so-called nefarious activities of the detenu pertains to a liquor den, which according to the detaining authority gets a label of bootlegging activities. 2. The said grounds contain several items. Before cataloguing the said items it is mentioned therein that the detenu has been dealing in the contraband liquor by storing and selling the same in the premises which are in his occupation and control and the second part also relates to his activities being conducted through hirelings. Then we have the details of the activities of the said hirelings. It is alleged that on 25-5-1981 when the said premises were raided one Antony P. Ramchandra was found physically present on the premises and illicit liquor was also found, for which a case has been lodged in the Court. The second ground pertains to a similar raid effected on 28-11-1980 when the same person was found with similar contraband liquor for which also a separate prosecution has been lodged. Item No. 3 pertains to the raid dt. 25-12-1980 with the same pattern except the persons found there were one Yaswant Jaywant Patil and Kashinath Jairam. A similar raid was effected on 25-1-1981 when the same person Jairam along with others was found along with contraband, for which also a separate prosecution has been lodged. The fifth item pertains to the raid dt. 8th July, 1981 when only the person has been substituted by one Jagan Babu while the pattern remained the same.
A similar raid was effected on 25-1-1981 when the same person Jairam along with others was found along with contraband, for which also a separate prosecution has been lodged. The fifth item pertains to the raid dt. 8th July, 1981 when only the person has been substituted by one Jagan Babu while the pattern remained the same. The sixth, 7th and 8th items pertain to the raids effected on 17th July, 21st July and 20th Aug, 1981 respectively when different persons were found with the contraband on the premises, for which separate prosecutions have been lodged. It is out of these eight items that the detaining authority alleged that on only one occasion the detenu was physically present along with others when apart from the contraband, certain glasses were also found, indicating that they might be indulging in the process of consuming liquor. It is further claimed that there are certain factory premises temples and school building in the vicinity. It is also alleged that the two persons by name Nivrutti Antade and Vilas Shinde tendered separate applications dt. 2-12-1980 alleging certain threats having been administered by the detenu to both of them. It is on these allegations and grounds that the detaining authority is presumed to have concluded at the fag-end of the grounds that the activities may tend to obstruct the public order. 3. It is this order along with other grounds that is being impugned in this petition on behalf of the detenu. 4. Shri Chitnis, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised multifold contentions. It is, however, not necessary to consider all the contentions in detail, since this petition can be disposed of on a short premise. It is contended inter alia that the impugned order which has been served on the detenu is in English whereas the petitioner does not understand the said language. It is then contended that there is a confusion with the detaining authority as to whether the petitioner was directly and himself indulging in the activities alleged against him or whether it was so done through the hirelings. For this purpose it was specifically contended that there was an indication in the grounds themselves that the detaining authority was satisfied that but for one, an all the occasions the petitioner was not physically present on the premises in question.
For this purpose it was specifically contended that there was an indication in the grounds themselves that the detaining authority was satisfied that but for one, an all the occasions the petitioner was not physically present on the premises in question. Shri Chitnis, the learned counsel, submitted that even ignoring all other features, the one that stands on the forefront would be that these so-called activities would not be embraced by the concept of public order as contemplated by the said Ordinance. Shri Solkar, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, submits that the activities by themselves have a potentiality of embracing that definition. 5. Even without having a detailed probe in the matter, the last contention raised by the learned counsel restricted to the circumstances in the instant case will have to be upheld. It is important to note that there is a stray reference in the grounds to the existence of the factory premises, temple and school building in the vicinity. The details of the said locations are not even inferentially indicated. This apart the exact nature of the activities and resultant impact of the same has also not been clarified and the record reveals that there was no adequate material before the detaining authority in that behalf. To put it in the other form, in the first instance there does not appear to be adequate material as to where those constructions and institutions were located. Further more, barring a bald statement that on the premises in question certain activities were being conducted in the liquor business, there was absolutely no material as to the impact and outcome of the said activities which could adversely affect the society in general or at least in one Section. The two applications tendered by the said two persons obviously refer to individual grievance and cannot be equated with having an adverse impact on the society as a whole. It would, therefore, be apparent that to embrace the rigour of the said Ordinance and in particular that contained in Clause 3(1), it is essential to have before the detaining authority the material on the basis of which it can be legitimately inferred that the public order was being affected. The said Ordinance unmistakably indicates that the qualifying clause of the further events would be that the activities should be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
The said Ordinance unmistakably indicates that the qualifying clause of the further events would be that the activities should be prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. This concept of public order has been further qualified vis-a-vis bootlegging activities by Item No. 2 wherein it is indicated that a person should be engaged in any of the activities as bootlegger which affects adversely or rather likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is further qualified and even circumscribed by the third item which is contained in the Explanation which makes the position quite clear when it is stipulated that in so far as the concept of the maintenance of public order to concerned, it can be deemed to have been affected adversely if any of the activities causes or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity amongst the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to public health is being caused. It is, therefore, rightly submitted that even accepting the allegations as reflected in the grounds as they stand, still there was no adequate material before the detaining authority that any of those activities would entail consequences as detailed in the said Explanation which in turn would amount to activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order. There was nothing before the detaining authority to infer that the activities indulged in by the detenu were such that notwithstanding the existence of certain institutions in the vicinity it was likely to have an adverse impact on the even tempo of the society vis-a-vis the various items mentioned in the said Explanation. It is not even suggested much less indicated that it was likely td harm or cause any danger to the life of public or generate a feeling of insecurity. 6. As stated earlier, all these items pertain to general public or any section of public, who cannot be restricted to only a couple of individuals, in which event it would merely become a question of law and order and not necessarily one of public order. In such matters it is absolutely essential to be alive to the real and distinct dividing line between the Concept of law and order and public order. One cannot be confused with the other.
In such matters it is absolutely essential to be alive to the real and distinct dividing line between the Concept of law and order and public order. One cannot be confused with the other. The mere existence of certain landmarks in the area as also the mere existence of the alleged nefarious activities by themselves may not be enough to embrace the concept of public order which, however, can be effectively styled and covered by the concept of law and order, in which event extreme measure of preventive detention can never be attracted as also can never be encouraged. Furthermore the Ordinance contains an inbuilt and self contained code, further defining and circumscribing the field of operation vis-a-vis the concept of public order, and the impact of the alleged activities and various attendant features must firmly establish a legitimate and rational nexus so as to make its entry in the said well-defined and qualified field of operation. Any other item on a more spacious or general ground has no admission in that field. 7. The term 'bootlegger' is defined in Section 2(b). The activities which would bestow that capacity are also detailed therein. Section 2(a)(ii) defines the process of acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order vis-a-vis a bootlegger when it is made manifest that the said activities must be indulged in as a bootlegger. The Explanation thereto prescribes the nature and character of various such activities which would get a label of adversely affecting public order. The combined reading would enunciate that a person who assumes the capacity as a bootlegger has to indulge in certain activities qua the said capacity and further those activities should effectively answer the requirement of their impact adversely affecting public order, which concept is also further placed in a well defined and restricted field and it is only then that the said activities may come under the clutches of the said provisions contained in Section 3. The scheme is clear and self-contained. Even on the general premise, the distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" has been well-highlighted in several judicial pronouncements.
The scheme is clear and self-contained. Even on the general premise, the distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" has been well-highlighted in several judicial pronouncements. The ratio in Ram Ranjan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 609 : (1975 Cri LJ 588) in effect enunciates that it is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, whereas if the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, then it would raise a problem of law and order. It is further observed therein that these concentric concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' may have a common epicenter, but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular exception of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order.' Looked at from any angle, therefore, it is necessary to be alive to the demarcating line, subtle though not diffused, but clear and firm in itself, between the concept of 'law and order' and 'public order', since the resultant consequences travel on different tracks. In the former, there can be a regular criminal proceeding in a court of law whereas in the latter, there is deviation when the liberty is snatched without a regular trial. An inevitable question that is bound to stare in the face in such cases would be whether can the alleged activities and in particular filing of criminal prosecutions under the Bombay Prohibition Act not be legitimately, precisely and fully covered by the concept of law and order. To say the least, in a given case the circumstances, glaring as they may be, may embrace the concept of public order and the requirement of law in that field justifying the resultant action, where, however, in the instant case, there is no adequate material on record to conclude likewise. As has been oft enunciated, personal liberty is extremely precious and must be preserved; any invasion or restraint has got to be strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and should be examined on the touchstone of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.
As has been oft enunciated, personal liberty is extremely precious and must be preserved; any invasion or restraint has got to be strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and should be examined on the touchstone of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Since procedural safeguards are the only effective safety-valves, no allowance can be permitted in that behalf. Having regard to all these features, we are inclined to hold that there was no adequate material before the detaining authority to come to the said conclusion. In fact, there was no adequate material about the very basis, viz., about the existence of certain institutions in the vicinity and even assuming otherwise, the nexus must be so obvious that the activities must have or at least are reasonably, rationally and necessarily likely to have an impact and that too as stipulated and prescribed under the said provisions, so as to adversely affect the public order on the members of public with reference to the said institutions. Shri Chitnis, the learned counsel, has also rightly brought to our notice that in spite of specific contention raised in the petition and additional affidavit vis-a-vis the absence of maintenance of public order, the detaining authority, who has filed an affidavit, has not categorically dented the same nor has he clarified the position nor has he categorically stated that it was so affecting the members of the public. Restricting to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the minimum that can be said is that in the instant case, as the record stands, there was no adequate material before the detaining authority to hold the applicability of the provisions of the said Ordinance. 8. In mew of these glaring features, it is not really necessary to have a further probe in the other aspects canvassed on behalf of the detenu. The consequences would be that the impugned order is obviously unjustified and untenable. 9. In the result, Rule is made absolute. 10. The impugned order dated 8-9-81 passed by the Commissioner of Police. Thane is quashed and the petitioner detenu Shri Vithal Moreshwar Khandagale is directed to be released forthwith, if not required for any other purpose. Petition allowed.