N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) MR. J. S. Bhatt the learned Advocate for the petitioner firstly urged that the letter of resignation Annexure D was not tendered to the competent authority and therefore the first part of sec. 46 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1962 was not complied with and so the resignation letter was no resignation letter at all. Under sec. 46 (1) the Sarpanch may resign from his office by tendering his resignation in writing to the competent authority. This means and must mean that the man must deliver either personally or through any agent like post office the letter of resignation intending it to reach the addressee. Letters of resignations are to be construed very strictly. ( 2 ) A case analogous to the one on hand had arisen before the Division Bench of this Court in the Special Civil Application No. 487 of 1963 decided on 6-9-63 by the Division Bench consisting of Miabhoy and Mehta JJ. as they then were. In that case the letter of resignation was addressed by the one-time president of the Ranpur Municipality to the Commissioner and a copy was endorsed to the municipality by him. As far as the resignation as the President was concerned the Commissioner purported to accept the same but with respect to his resignation as a councillor of the Municipality the Commissioner thought that the matter lay within the powers of the President. A question arose as to whether the said letter of resignation copy of which was endorsed by this President in his capacity as the member to the municipality and not to the President of the municipality was valid resignation or not. The Division Bench in this connection states as follows :in our judgment the Prescription contained in that section must also be strictly complied with (It is to be noted that at the relevant. time the municipality bad come to be substituted by interim gram panchayat) It is the resignation of his membership of the interim gram panchayat that will severe the connection of a member as a member with the interim gram panchayat and not the resignation of any other offices. If Narottamdas was intending to sever his tie with the extinct municipality then in our judgment. having regard of the fact that the municipality was already extinct such an attempt on his part was futile and ineffective. . If Narottamdas was intending to sever his tie with the extinct municipality then in our judgment. having regard of the fact that the municipality was already extinct such an attempt on his part was futile and ineffective. . . . . The essence of sec. 46 sub-see. (3) of the panchayat Act is that the member in order to sever his connection with the interim gram panchayat must tender his resignation of that office. In our judgment on the facts of the present case such an event has not taken place. ( 3 ) MR. Qureshi the learned Advocate for the contending respondents nos. 1 to 3 urged that in the routine course the letter of resignation Annexure A was channelled by the respondent no. 5 to the respondent 6 who was the competent authority but when the law requires that the letter of resignation must be tendered to the competent authority it is implicit that the same should tender either personally or through some agency to the competent authority. Had the letter Annexure A been containing a stipulation that if the Taluka Development Office is not the competent authority. he may hand over the letter of resignation to the competent authority the matter perhaps would have been different. Here the petitioner submitted the letter Annexure A to the Taluka Development Officer thinking that he is the person competent to accept his resignation. Is this view of the matter the impugned order Annexure D cannot be allowed to stand. ( 4 ) THERE is another reason also why the petition should be allowed. Under sec. 46 (4) of the Act if any dispute regarding any resignation arises it shall be referred for decision to such officer as the State Government may by general or special order appoint in that behalf and the decision of such officer Shall be final. The respondent no. 5 as the authority acting under sec. 46 (4) gave a decision and the Legislature has called it final. What is the import of the word final in a situation like the one on hand ? We have got the Full Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Madhaji Lakhiram v. Mashrubhai Mahadevbhai Rabari and Ors. 3 G. L. R. 438. The Full Bench of this Court in that case held of course in a case arising under sec. We have got the Full Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Madhaji Lakhiram v. Mashrubhai Mahadevbhai Rabari and Ors. 3 G. L. R. 438. The Full Bench of this Court in that case held of course in a case arising under sec. 88 C of the Bombay Tenancy Act that the word final meant not subject to appeal and not being subject to revision. The decision under sec. 46 (4) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act is a judicial decision as would be the decision under sec. 88 C of the Bombay Tenancy Act. When in a piece of legislation like the one on hand the Legislature says that a particular decision shall be final it is to be understood to mean that for the purposes of that Act it is to be treated as a closed chapter and it cannot be interfered with by any authority normally competent to exercise revisional or appellate jurisdiction. ( 5 ) MR. Takwani the learned Asstt. Government Pleader in this connection invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court where according to him a different note has been struck. It is the case of Everest Apartments Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Bombay v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1449. Even in that case the Supreme Court stated as follows :the word final in this context means that the order is not subject to an ordinary appeal or revision. . . It however held that sec. 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act which gives an overall power to the Government for the purpose of superintendence was not intended to be hit by the provision of finality. This judgment of the Supreme Court therefore can be referred to in support of this conclusion of mine but to the extent it purports to support the submission of Mr. Takwani and also Mr. Qureshi it is treated as peculiar to the purpose of that Act. ( 6 ) IN above view of the matter and on the two grounds set out above the impugned order Annexure D is set aside and the order Annexure C is restored. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. .