JUDGMENT In this writ petition, the petitioners namely The Statesman Limited and its Managing Director Sri C.R. Irani challenge the alleged attempt on the part of the Central Government to control the newspapers in general and The Statesman in particular by controlling the revenue from advertisements of different newspapers particularly of The Statesman having three editions viz., (a) Calcutta edition, (b) Delhi edition and (c) Joint edition of Calcutta and Delhi. 2. According to the petitioners, such attempt to control the rates of advertisement is sought to be achieved by : i) denying the newspapers advertisements except at rates fixed by the Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publication, Government of India (hereinafter referred to as the DAVP) ; ii) requiring the Central Government and public undertakings, autonomous bodies and statutory bodies and statutory corporations to advertise in The Statesman only at rates purported to be fixed or not at all ; iii) the accreditation policy by which a pledge is taken from the advertising agencies to implement the Government's advertisement policy regarding the newspapers and periodicals in consolation with the DAVP. The purpose of accreditation is to apply the DAVP rates to newspapers approved by the DAVP on the advertisements issued by such accredited agencies handling accounts of public undertakings. 3. The petitioners contend that the fact that the DAVP is denying newspapers advertisements except at the rate fixed by the DAVP and requiring other advertisers to advertise in The Statesman only at such rates is well-established by a number of documents, set out in the writ petition and the affidavit-in-reply including the following :- i) A memorandum dated 23rd June, 1976 issued by Sri K.N. Prasad, the then Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (hereinafter referred to as the Prasad Memorandum)-Annexure 'I' at page 54 of the writ petition. ii) Communication of the Prasad Memorandum to the Chief Executives of Public Sector undertakings by letter dated 1st July, 1976 (Annexure 'I' at page 94) and 30th July, 1976 (Annexure 'III') at page 122). iii) The three secret circulars dated 5th August, 1976, 19th August, 1976 and 23rd August, 1976 (Annexure 'I' at pages 59, 60 and 61 respectively) issued to the Chief Executives of Public Sector undertakings publication of advertisements in The Statesman. iv) Letter dated 18th February, 1977 of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting fixing rates (Annexure 'III' at page 50). iii) The three secret circulars dated 5th August, 1976, 19th August, 1976 and 23rd August, 1976 (Annexure 'I' at pages 59, 60 and 61 respectively) issued to the Chief Executives of Public Sector undertakings publication of advertisements in The Statesman. iv) Letter dated 18th February, 1977 of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting fixing rates (Annexure 'III' at page 50). v) Letter dated 14th April, 1977 from the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting to the Public Sector undertaking informing the letter of the withdrawal of the ban by the said secret circulars but reiterating the existing Government order that public enterprises are required to get their media lists and advertisement tariffs approved by the DAVP. (Annexure 'I' at page 96). VI) Letter dated 3rd October, 1977 from the DAVP to the public enterprises reiterating that the DAVP is the final authority in the matter of selection of newspapers and advertisement rates. (Annexure 'I' at page 101). vii) The advertisement policy of November, 1977 (Annexure 'I' at page 29). viii) Letter dated 9th March, 1978 from the DAVP to the public sector advertisers enclosing list of newspapers whose rates had till then been settled for 1977-78 effective 1st May, 1977. (Annexure ‘I’ at page 102). The Statesman was not included in the said list as The Statesman's rates had not been fixed till then. ix) Letter dated 17th April, 1978 from The Statesman to the DAVP stating that it had no knowledge of any rate structure nor had any rate structure been disclosed in any official publication and that no rate structure can be evolved. It was further stated that there was no question of "offering rates" and the rate structure if evolved by the Government would be unjustified, illegal and unconstitutional (Annexure 'I' at page). x) Three letters dated 10th May, 1978 from the DAVP to The Statesman purporting to fix rates of advertisements for The Statesman DAVP's decision regarding rates alleged to be final (Annexure 'X' at pages 76 to 87). xi) Letter dated 24th May, 1978 from The Statesman to the DAVP charging that the rates fixed for The Statesman are unfair and demanding disclosure of basis. The long standing practice of DAVP accepting the lowest commercial rates reiterated and DAVP's role of influencing other advertisers to advertise only at the DAVP rates is criticised (Annexure 'I' at page 88). xi) Letter dated 24th May, 1978 from The Statesman to the DAVP charging that the rates fixed for The Statesman are unfair and demanding disclosure of basis. The long standing practice of DAVP accepting the lowest commercial rates reiterated and DAVP's role of influencing other advertisers to advertise only at the DAVP rates is criticised (Annexure 'I' at page 88). xii) Similar letter from The Statesman to the DAVP dated 2nd June, 1978. The Government has not disclosed the basis of the rates inspite of challenge (Annexure 'I' at page 90). xiii) The letters from the advertisers which show that DAVP is setting a trend with regard to advertisement rates (Annexure 'I' at pages 164 to 182 and Annexure 'III' at pages 141 to 150). 4. In support of the contention of the petitioners that the rate control was also sought to be achieved by the accreditation policy of DAVP by which a pledge is taken from the advertising agencies to implement the Government's advertising policy regarding the newspapers and periodicals in consolation with the DAVP, the petitioners contend that the DAVP maintains an accreditation list of private sector advertising agencies. The main advantage of being accredited by the DAVP is that the agency is permitted to handle the advertisements of public sector undertakings, but an agency not so accredited is not permitted to do so. The norms of accreditation require that if included in the DAVP panel, the agency must agree in writing to adhere to the policy laid down by the Government regarding the advertisements to newspapers/periodicals and to give a declaration to the effect that the agency will implement Govt.'s advertising policy regarding the newspapers and periodicals in consultation with the DAVP. In this, connection, the petitioners refer to the answer of the DAVP to the Estimates Committees of the Parliament to the following effect :- "............3. To apply the rates of the newspapers approve by DAVP on the advertisements issued by such accreditated agencies handling accounts of public undertakings." (The said answer can be found from the document sent to the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court from the Lok Sabha). 5. To apply the rates of the newspapers approve by DAVP on the advertisements issued by such accreditated agencies handling accounts of public undertakings." (The said answer can be found from the document sent to the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court from the Lok Sabha). 5. The petitioners contend that although the Prasad Memorandum was withdrawn in August, 1978, but the Government has taken the stand that till the date of such withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum on 21st August, the conditions and/or directions contained in the said Memorandum will remain effective. The petitioners further contend that although the said Prasad Memorandum has been withdrawn, the whole object of the Prasad Memorandum, namely, to fix advertisement rates for newspapers and to influence other advertisers to follow the DAVP rates is sought to be continued through the accreditation policy and the subsequent rate advices. The current advertisement policy of the Government (of November, 1977) includes the provision that the rate structure will be based on the policy. The petitioners contend that the demand of adherence to the advertisement policy on the part of the advertising agencies seeking accreditation means a pledge from the advertising agencies to apply only the DAVP rates to the public sector advertising. The petitioners contend that the effect of such accreditation is the same as if the said Prasad Memorandum has been in force. The petitioners also contend that although the Central Government has withdrawn the Prasad Memorandum obviously for the reason that the directions contained therein were unreasonable, the Government is unjustly seeking to achieve the same purpose through the accreditation policy. It is further contended by the petitioners that from other documents also it can be well-established that the DAVP even after withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum had issued and is still issuing rate advices intending that such rates and/or rate advices should be followed. It is further contended by the petitioners that from other documents also it can be well-established that the DAVP even after withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum had issued and is still issuing rate advices intending that such rates and/or rate advices should be followed. For the said contention, the petitioners refer to (i) Rate Advice No. 3/80-81 dated 13th May, 1980 for the year commencing from 1st April, 1980 wherefrom it will appear that the DAVP sought to enforce the rates fixed by the DAVP for a period after the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum on 21st August, 1978, (ii) Letter dated 15/18th April, 1980 from the National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. (a public sector undertaking) to The Statesman requiring The Statesman to furnish a certificate that the rates charge for an advertisement bill dated 5th March, 1980 are the same as fixed by the DAVP and as applicable to other Government departments to enable the Corporation to release payment, (iii) letter dated 29th May, 1980 from the Chief Public Relations Officer of the Western Railway to The Statesman refusing payment of old outstanding bills on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and also on the ground that since 1977 onwards the DAVP rates had not been accepted by The Statesman till date. It may be noted in this connection that in paragraph 11 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on 2nd May, 1979 to the further application for interim order made by the petitioners, the respondents have contended that no rate advices has been issued after the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum. The petitioners, however, contend that such contention in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents is clearly incorrect. The petitioners contend that by letter dated 22nd January, 1979 from the DAVP to the Steel Authority of India Limited (a public sector undertaking), it has been stated by the DAVP that according to the Prasad Memorandum the DAVP rates are binding on the Steel Authority of India Limited upto 21st August, 1978, namely, upto the date of formal withdrawal of the said Prasad Memorandum. Beyond the said rate, the directions contained in the said Prasad Memorandum are not binding and the Steel Authority was free to accept the DAVP rates in case it finds them in the interest of the organization. Beyond the said rate, the directions contained in the said Prasad Memorandum are not binding and the Steel Authority was free to accept the DAVP rates in case it finds them in the interest of the organization. According to the petitioners, the obvious motive of the Government by issuing such rate advices was to influence and induce public sector advertisers to follow the DAVP rates. The petitioners contend that the whole purpose, motive and object of the Government in fixing rates for advertisement are to set a trend for all advertisers to follow. The petitioners further contend that such rate control on the advertisement was sought to be achieved by mere executive action, without any rational basis whatsoever and without any legal authority. The petitioners submit that an executive action, which operates to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of law to support it. For this contention, a reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (1) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh reported in AIR 1967 SC page 1170. 6. The petitioners further contend that the advertisement rate control by the executive action and without any authority of law has caused a serious prejudice to the petitioners and such advertisement rate control by the executive action is mala fide, illegal and void because it offends Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that the Government's power to carry on trade flows from Article 298 of the Constitution, which provide that the executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business. The trading activity of the Union is also a part of the executive action and, therefore, in order to be valid it must not infringe any fundamental right. If the substance and practical result of the act of the State or the effect of the purported government trading activity can be shown to affect any fundamental right, including the right of the freedom of the press, then the same has to be struck down. In support of the said contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioners refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (2) Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1973 SC page 106. In support of the said contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioners refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (2) Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1973 SC page 106. The learned Counsel in this connection refers to paragraphs 39 and 42 of the said decision of the Supreme Court wherein the Supreme Court has observed to the effect that tests of pith and substance of the subject-matter and of direct and incidental effect of legislation, though relevant to the question of legislative competence is irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamental rights. The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. The direct effect on the freedom of speech would go to the quality or character of the effect and not the subject-matter. The object of the law or executive action is irrelevant when it establishes the petitioner's content on about fundamental right. The effect approach should be to enquire what is substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions. The learned Counsel further submits that the same principle has again been laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution and the decision made in the case of (3) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India reported in AIR 1979 SC page 1628. The learned Counsel refers to paragraphs 10 and 12 of the said decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention. The petitioners contend that the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) includes the freedom of the press and the freedom of the press includes the freedom to publish a newspaper of any size and to circulate it to any number of persons. The circulation of the newspapers and periodicals is essential to the freedom of the press. The petitioners contend that the said freedom to obtain advertisements and to publish the same. According to the petitioners, in order to be able to exercise the freedom effectively, the newspapers must have revenue and the revenue, the most important and essential item for the existence of a newspaper, is obtained from two sources, namely, (a) sale of newspapers and (b) advertisements. According to the petitioners, in order to be able to exercise the freedom effectively, the newspapers must have revenue and the revenue, the most important and essential item for the existence of a newspaper, is obtained from two sources, namely, (a) sale of newspapers and (b) advertisements. Advertisements constitute the main source of revenue of newspapers. In this connection, the petitioners refer to the official report of the Registrar of Newspaper for India-'Press in India, 1977'. It appears from page 5 of the said report that a study was made of the income from advertisements for 418 dailies in the year 1976. It transpires that 32 dailies realised 75% of their total income from advertisements alone. Advertisement revenue ragging between 50 and 74 percent of the total revenue was realised by 162 daily newspapers, while another 183 got advertisement revenue between 25 and 49 per cent. The petitioners have given the audited report of The Statesman Ltd. wherefrom it appears that in the case of The Statesman; advertisements constitute about 70% of the total revenue. The petitioners, therefore, contend that there is a direct relationship between advertisement revenue and the fundamental right of freedom of press. Therefore, the loss on advertisements or any interference with the revenue earned therefore may not only effect the circulation and thereby impinge on the freedom of speech and expression but may entail even closing down the press. The petitioners have given a break up of its revenue earnings from different sources at pages 184 and 185 of the writ petition and it appears that so far as The Statesman is concerned, 27.71% of its total revenue is from DAVP and public sector sources out of which DAVP source constitutes only 2.2%. The advertisement revenue from DAVP and public sector source constitute 19.68% of the total advertisement and sales revenue of the newspapers. This source of revenue is an existing source on the basis of the lowest commercial rate of the newspaper and such lowest commercial rate is established by various factors in the market. The petitioners contend that the rates of advertisements in The Statesman are on an uniform basis for all advertisers similarly placed. This source of revenue is an existing source on the basis of the lowest commercial rate of the newspaper and such lowest commercial rate is established by various factors in the market. The petitioners contend that the rates of advertisements in The Statesman are on an uniform basis for all advertisers similarly placed. It will not be fair or justified if The Statesman charges different rates from different advertisers similarly placed, The DAVP rates have the effect of setting a trend, not only for the public sector advertisers to follow, but also private sector advertisers. Accordingly to the petitioners, the object of the DAVP is to ensure that The Statesman is unable to obtain any advertisements from any quarter at any rate other than the one fixed by the DAVP. The petitioners have given a statement of the estimated loss of revenue if advertisements from DAVP, Railways, Central/ State Governments, statutory corporations, autonomous bodies, public sector undertakings and other semi and quasi Government organisations are published at the DAPV rates. The said estimated loss of revenue will appear from pages 203 and 204 of the writ petition. It appears that if The Statesman accepts the DAVP rates for advertisement of all the advertisers, then the loss of revenue will be more than Rs. 40 lakhs. The petitioners contend that such estimated loss is not on any imaginary basis, but figures have been worked out by applying the impugned DAVP rates on total Government and public sector advertisements which The Statesman is getting at present The petitioners contend that as a matter of fact when a total ban on advertisements was imposed on The Statesman by DAVP in August, 1976, The Statesman suffered a loss of revenue to the tune of Rs. 70 lakhs. The petitioners submit that the retically such loss of revenue can be met up by (i) reducing the number of pages, or (ii) by reducing the circulation, or (iii) by increasing the selling price. The petitioners contend that increase of the selling price even by one paisa in order to maintain the newspaper size is bound to affect the circulation adversely. For this contention, a reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (4) Sakol Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1962 SC page 305. For this contention, a reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (4) Sakol Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1962 SC page 305. The learned Counsel for the petitioners in this connection has drawn the attention of this Court to the observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of Bennett Coleman (Supra), therein the Supreme Court has observed to the effect that the weakening of the link of financial strength of a newspaper which was acquired from advertisements results in infringement of the freedom of speech and expression, as such weakening may not only entail the closing down but may also affect the circulation. The Supreme Court has also observed that the freedom of the press is violated by placing restrictions upon something which is an essential part of the freedom. A restraint on the number of pages or a restraint on circulation or a restraint on advertisements will affect the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution on the aspects of propagation, publication and circulation. The learned Counsel also refers to paragraphs 65 and 67 of the said judgment wherein the Supreme Court has observed to the effect that the main source of the income for the newspapers is also from advertisements and the loss of revenue because of the cut in page level in the said case was several lakhs of rupees. The newspaper has a built-in mechanism. Advertisements are not only the source of revenue but also one of the factors for circulation. If as a result of reduction in pages, the newspapers will have to depend on advertisements as their main source of income, they will be denied of the dissemination of news and views. That will also deprive them of their freedom of speech and expression. If as a result of page restriction, the newspapers will have to sacrifice advertisements and thus weaken the link of financial strength, the organisation may crumble. The loss on advertisements may not only entail the closing down but may also affect the circulation and thereby impinge on freedom of speech and expression. 8. The petitioners contend the weakening of the link of financial strength of the newspapers may be caused either by denying advertisements or giving advertisements at a reduced rate. The effect in either case will be the same. 8. The petitioners contend the weakening of the link of financial strength of the newspapers may be caused either by denying advertisements or giving advertisements at a reduced rate. The effect in either case will be the same. Since advertisement revenue is the main source of revenue of newspaper, earning such revenue is an essential part of it; freedom and any constraint put upon on it, by whatever method, is an unauthorised encroachment on this freedom. Referring to the estimated loss of revenue in the event of enforcing the DAVP rates of advertisement, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that The Statesman suffers the direct effect of putting constraints on the existing 27.71% of the total advertisement revenue now being earned from DAVP and public sector sources. It has the effect of imposing a ban on the public sector advertisers not to advertise in The Statesman except at DAVP rates. The Statesman is found to the position of either doing without 27.71% of its revenue or accepting the DAVP rates. If The Statesman does not accept the DAVP rates it would loss 27.71% of its total advertisement revenue and advertisements, particularly Government and public sector advertisements are essential factors controlling circulation as noted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 65 of the judgment in Bennett Coleman's case. The learned Counsel submits that enforcement of a rate of advertisement is not the some as the operation of the working Journalists Act or Wage Board Awards by which burdens are put on the revenue of a newspaper, but no restrictions are placed in the matter of earning of revenue. The burden on the revenue such a various taxes, Wage Board Awards, etc. unless they are oppressive or motivated or selective in their operation, can be made up by increasing the advertising rates, but any restrictions on the advertisements cannot be made good except by reducing the pages on the circulation, either of which offends the freedom of the press. 9. In support of the contention that the said rate control policy of the DAVP has also offended the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution, the petitioners contend that the rates purported to have been fixed by the DAVP for The Statesman are completely arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. 9. In support of the contention that the said rate control policy of the DAVP has also offended the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution, the petitioners contend that the rates purported to have been fixed by the DAVP for The Statesman are completely arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. The petitioners contend that there is no principle or basis for such rates and there are no materials on which the DAVP could have fixed such rates on any rational or intelligible basis. The petitioners contend that The Statesman in the various correspondences exchanged before the filling of the instant writ petition had demanded disclosure of the basis of the purported rates and challenged the same as arbitrary and unreasonable. In this connection, reference was made to letters dated 24th May, 1978, 2nd June, 1978, and 9th June, 1978. Annexure 'I' collectively at pages 88, 90 and 210. The petitioners contend that in spite of such challenges and demands, no disclosure was made by the Government. The petitioners contend that in the affidavit-in-opposition there is no disclosure of the basis of the rates or the manner in which it has been arrived at. The only statement which has been made in the affidavit-in-opposition is to the following effect :- "The rate for Government advertisements is determined according to a rational rate structure. The rate structure is in the nature of guidelines from the Government of India in the light of which the rates are offered to individual newspapers. The basic principles have been laid down on the basis of a study by a group of experts Including the Chief Cost Accounts Officer of the Ministry of Finance which went into all relevant factors including newsprint cost, other production costs and circulation of various categories of newspapers as well as a reasonable margin of profit." (A/O paragraph 5) The petitioners contend that inspite of the specific challenge being thrown in the petition that there is no reasonable basis for fixing the rates for advertisement, the materials alleged to have been taken into consideration have not been disclosed. The petitioners contend that in fact, the DAVP have refused to disclose any relevant material and the allegations made in the affidavit-in-opposition are of the vaguest possible nature and do not amount to disclosure of materials demonstrating the reasonableness of the DAVP rates for The Statesman. The petitioners contend that in fact, the DAVP have refused to disclose any relevant material and the allegations made in the affidavit-in-opposition are of the vaguest possible nature and do not amount to disclosure of materials demonstrating the reasonableness of the DAVP rates for The Statesman. In the absence of such disclosure on the face of the challenge being thrown in the writ petition the DAVP rates must be held to be unreasonable and struck down. For this contention, the learned Counsel refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (5) Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board reported in AIR 1967 SC page 295. The learned Counsel draws attention to paragraph 27 of the said decision wherein the Supreme Court has observed to the following effect : "It is not sufficient (for the Government) to assert that the circumstances exist and give no clue to what they are because the circumstances must be such as to lead to conclusions of certain definiteness." Reference is also made to another decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (6) Rohtas Industries Ltd. S.D. Agarwal reported in AIR 1969 SC page 707. The learned Counsel draws the attention of the Court to the observation of the Supreme Court at page 719 of the said decision which is to the following effect :- "If the existence of those conditions is challenged, the Courts are entitled to examine whether those circumstances were existing when the order was made. In other words, the existence of the circumstances in question is open to judicial review though the opinion formed by the Government is not amenable to review by the Courts." The learned Counsel for the petitioners also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the International Airport Authority's case (Supra). The Court's attention is drawn to the observation of the Supreme Court made in paragraphs 10 to 11 of the said decision. It has been observed by the Supreme Court at page 1638 in the said report that "action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can he shown by the departure was not arbitrary but was based on some valid principle which is itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory". It has been observed by the Supreme Court at page 1638 in the said report that "action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can he shown by the departure was not arbitrary but was based on some valid principle which is itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory". The petitioners contend that the lowest commercial rate of The Statesman is not at all unreasonable because the said rate is well-established in the market and the Government had accepted such lowest Commercial rate of The Statesman from 1947 till April, 1973. It is also contended that the private advertisers and public sector undertakings have always accepted and are still accepting the said lowest commercial rate of The Statesman. The Government itself reiterated in Parliament on 30th May, 1967 with regard to rates for advertisements released through the DAVP that "Newspapers are free to fix their own advertisement rates. DAVP will make use of such organs whose rates are suitable and acceptable to him from the point of view of publicity requirement". The petitioners also contend that with regard to duty and obligation of the Government in not acting arbitrarily but to act reasonably and fairly in its dealings with citizens. The Supreme Court has also laid down the principles in the International Airport Authority's case. In this connection, reference was made to paragraphs 10 and 12 of the said decision which runs to the following effect that with tremendous expension of welfare and social service functions increasing control of material and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and commercial activities by the State, the power of the executive government to affect the lives of the people is steadily growing. This renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege. Where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. 10. The learned Counsel relying on the aforesaid decision submits that it is thus quite clear that (a) the attack of arbitrariness of Government is not limited to those cases where the Government departs from norms or standards laid down but also extends to the cases where the standards and norms are themselves arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable, (b) the principle also applies to cases of privileges or grants or contracts by the Government and (c) the onus is on the Government to show that its actions are not arbitrary or unreasonable. The learned Counsel further submits that the Govt. acts through human agencies. The so-called 'expert bodies' which framed the alleged rate structure are agents or the Govt. and their actions are actions of the Govt. It cannot therefore, be argued that the Government's action is not arbitrary because expert bodies set up by the Government have evolved a rate structure. The onus is on the Government to establish reasonableness when its action is challenged as arbitrary. It is also contended by the petitioners that the refusal of DAVP to advertise except at their own rates without establishing that such rates are reasonable is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel submits that in the instant case, not only the DAVP have failed to disclose the relevant materials demonstrating that their rate for The Statesman are reasonable but they have deliberately refused to disclose. The learned Counsel submits that in the instant case, not only the DAVP have failed to disclose the relevant materials demonstrating that their rate for The Statesman are reasonable but they have deliberately refused to disclose. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that on the principles laid down in the International Airport Authority’s case, the DAVP cannot refuse to release advertisement to The Statesman unless it can be demonstrated to the Court that such refusal is not arbitrary and the rates framed by the DAVP are reasonable rates. Referring to the contention as to the violation of Article 301 of the Constitution, the petitioners contend that under Article 301 of the Constitution, trade commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India are declared free. Such freedom is declared in the widest terms and applies to all forms or trade, commerce and intercourse. But such freedom is subject to certain restrictions under Articles 302 to 305. It is also contended that such restrictions can only be imposed by law and not by executive action. In support of the said contention, the learned Counsel refers to the decision of (7) District Collector of Hyderabad v. Ibrahim & Co. reported in AIR 1970 SC page 2275, page 12. The petitioners contend that in the instant case the most important elements of trade, namely, the rate for publication of advertisements and the newspaper's right to approach and obtain advertisements from public sector. Advertisers at its own rates are sought to be controlled by executive action without authority of law. The freedom of trade with third parties, namely, public sector advertisers is, in any event, infringed and there is no legal authority for such infringement. There can be no question of any restriction valid under Articles 302 to 305 of the Constitution as there is no law imposing such restrictions. Article 301 is offended by the fixation of advertisement rates by the Government. Referring to the contention as to infringement of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the petitioners contend that under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, all citizens have the right to practice any profession or to carryon any occupation, trade or business. Reasonable restrictions on such fundamental rights can be imposed under Article 19(6), provided such restriction is imposed by law but no restriction can be imposed by executive action. Reasonable restrictions on such fundamental rights can be imposed under Article 19(6), provided such restriction is imposed by law but no restriction can be imposed by executive action. Individuals affected by the violation of the guarantees under Article 301 can also complain at the same time of infringement of their rights guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, as ordinarily a breach of Article 301 also involves violation of Article 19(1)(g). In support of his contention, the learned Counsel refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (8) Syed Ahmed Aga v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1975 SC page 1443. The Petitioner No.2 Sri C.R. Irani, is a shareholder of the Petitioner No. 1, The Statesman Ltd. and he is also a citizen of India. He carries on business through the agency and instrumentality of the company and as such he is entitled to complain of the breach of his fundamental rights including the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). This principle to the petitioners, is well-established and has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the decision made in the case of (9) R.C. Cooper v. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC page 564. 11. The petitioners also contended that the DAVP cannot fix advertisement rate its newspapers. The petitioners contended that it is not possible for the DAVP to determine the advertisement rates for a newspaper. Every newspaper determines its own advertisement rates on the basis various subjective elements, e.g., market potential purchasing power of its readership, standard of production pulling power etc. The subjective factors materially contribute to the fixation of the advertisement rates of individual newspapers keeping in view the market demand for the space and competition with other newspapers. These factors which differ from newspaper to newspaper are 50 subjective and peculiar to individual newspapers that an objective evaluation of the advertisement rates of a newspaper by the Government is not possible. Referring to paragraph 1.31 of the 173rd Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the Fifth Lok Sabha (1974-75), the petitioners contended that the committee records that it had asked whether the DAVP could not fix rates in such a way that there was no complaint of discrimination and that the Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting on behalf of the DAVP had stated that "It cannot happen. The rates of different newspapers will vary and we are not dispensing advertisements as gifts. We work on behalf of our clients who are interested in reaching particular targets. I have a complaint from one of the Ministers they said that the advertisements that they gave to the DAVP did not appear in Hindusthan Times and The Statesman. But they did not accept our rates and so they refused to accept the advertisement. And the problem is that the clients do not want to mise these papers......It is only to small newspapers that we can dictate our tams". In this connection paragraph 1.14 of the 50th Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the Sixth Lok Sabha (1977-78) has also been referred to by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. It has been recorded in the Report that explaining the factors which dominate the matter of determination of advertisement rates, the Government has stated in reply to paragraph 1.48 that : "Rates of advertisements in the newspapers are fixed by the publishers keeping in view the market demand for the space for their publications and the rate that they can change in competition with other newspapers. The following facts dominate in the matter of determining rates :- i) Circulation: It is the most important element particularly because the number of copies sold (which can be easily verified) determine the reach of the advertisement. ii) The market potention of the area covered. iii) The purchasing power of its readership. iv) Standard production. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to paragraph 1.28 of the said report of the Public Accounts Committee. The public Accounts Committee has recorded that in their reply dated 15th July, 1976 on the question of fixation of uniform mille rates (rate per centimetre per 1000 circulation) for newspapers and periodicals, the Government had staled that :- "Circulation is not the sole criterion for fixation of advertisement rates. Newspapers coming from the same place, in the same language with almost the same circulation do have different rates because of readership, contents, standard and cost of production and pulling power, etc. Some examples are given in Appendix X." The petitioners submit that uniformity of mille rates which is a derivation from advertisement rates of a newspaper is an absurdity. Newspapers coming from the same place, in the same language with almost the same circulation do have different rates because of readership, contents, standard and cost of production and pulling power, etc. Some examples are given in Appendix X." The petitioners submit that uniformity of mille rates which is a derivation from advertisement rates of a newspaper is an absurdity. Even the Indian Society of Advertisers with their well-known interest in Keeping advertisement rate as low as possible has stated in its Memorandum submitted to the Fact Finding Committee that each newspapers has its own mille rates and that there can be no such thing as uniformity of mille rates between different newspapers. It may be noted that the said Memorandum has been made an Annexure in this writ petition. The petitioners contend that uniformity of mill rates is not possible and the said impossibility of uniform mille rates is also borne out by the mille rates for different newspapers in the United Kingdom, some of which are given in Annexure 'DD' to the affidavit-in-reply at page 87. It will appear from the said annexure that the mille rate for The Times of London is 5d. and that of Daily Express is 1.10d., even though the circulation of The Times is 3 lakhs and that of Daily Express is 24 lakhs. The Financial Times, having a circulation of 1,80,00 has a mille rate of 7.77d. which is the highest. The Guardian, with a circulation of 2,65,000 has a mille rate of 4.52d. The petitioner that the aforesaid facts unmistaken-ably show that the advertisement rates of newspapers are a matter for their own decision and that the mille rates vary from newspaper to newspaper and that no uniformity can be aimed at and mille rates are only me factor and very often not the most important factor in the selection of newspapers for a particular advertising campaign. According to the petitioners the advertisement rates of a newspaper are individualistic rate for each newspaper as fixed by it having regard to various factors which include several objective-elements which cannot be assessed or evaluated by a third party such as the DAVP. 12. The petitioners also contend that there are inherence contradictions and confusions in the advertisement policy of the Government and of the DAVP. 12. The petitioners also contend that there are inherence contradictions and confusions in the advertisement policy of the Government and of the DAVP. It is alleged that "the primary objective of Government advertising is to secure the widest possible publicity coverage" and that "Government advertisements are not intended to be a measure of financial assistance". It is further alleged in the said advertisement policy of the Government that in pursuance of broader social objectives of the Government, however, weightage consideration will be given to small medium, language, specialised technical paper or papers being published specially in backward, remote or border areas and to "any other category which Government may consider appropriate for special and bona fide reasons". The rate structure for Government advertisements will be based of the above principles. The petitioners submit that the idea of "weightage or consideration" does not harmonies with the primary objectives of the Government viz., (a) to secure the widest possible publicity coverage, and (b) not to release advertisements as a measure of financial assistance. Although under the policy the "weight-age or consideration" is sought to be given "in pursuance of broader sum objectives of Government", no definition of such "broader social objectives" has been given and the expression is mush too vague. Further, the expression does not also indicate how the "broader social objectives" secure the policy of widest possible publicity coverage. It is also submitted that the said policy has recommended weightage or consideration to be given to small and language papers, specialised journals, etc., without indicating even broadly the nature and extent of weightage or consideration that should be given to them. Weightage may be in the form of :- i) selection of newspapers for release of Government advertisements, or ii) in the allocation of advertisement space, or iii) in the matter of rates. The petitioners contend that by the said advertisement policy an unregulated discretion is left in the hands of the DAVP or the officers in Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and such unregulated discretion is likely to be misused. The petitioners further contend that under the said policy, weightage or consideration was given to, amongst others, "any other category which government may consider appropriate for special and bona fide reasons". The other category is undefined and the said expression is too vague. The petitioners further contend that under the said policy, weightage or consideration was given to, amongst others, "any other category which government may consider appropriate for special and bona fide reasons". The other category is undefined and the said expression is too vague. In the Policy itself, newspapers have already been categorised into small, medium, large, specialised, technical and language. Similarly the expression "special" is also vague and undefined. Thus there is also another case of unregulated discretion in the hands of the DAVP and the officers of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting which is likely to he misused very often. The petitioners contend that the policy that weightage will to given to small and medium newspapers irrespective of language and language newspapers irrespective of size is of hostile discrimination against large English Dailies for which there is no rational basis disclosed. Thus the thrust of the said policy is to exclude big English newspapers from the "weightage" which can be in the from of selection of newspapers, or allocation of advertisement rates or space. Hence the said policy also offends Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. The petitioners contended that the rate structure is alleged to have been based on the principles of the said advertisement policy of the Government, but the said rate structure is illegal and had because : (a) Fixation of rates by the government without the support of any valid law to the prejudice of the newspaper is bad. (b) In the policy itself, how the rate structure is to be fixed on the basis of the policy itself, is not demonstrable nor has it been demonstrated in the affidavit-in-opposition. (c) Ordinarily, selling price of commodity includes some element of profit whereas in the case of newspapers selling price does not cover the cost of production, for less any amount profit. (d) Normally, the only means of covering the cost of production and ensuring a reasonable return is through advertisement revenue. (e) Advertisement rates according to the newspapers is on the basis of rate per single column centemetre, which is an individualistic rate for each newspaper as fixed by it. (d) Normally, the only means of covering the cost of production and ensuring a reasonable return is through advertisement revenue. (e) Advertisement rates according to the newspapers is on the basis of rate per single column centemetre, which is an individualistic rate for each newspaper as fixed by it. (f) From the 50th Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the (6th Lok Sabha) it is evident that the elements for fixation of rates of advertisements, excepting portions of cost of production and circulation are subjective, e.g., market potential, purchasing power, standard of production, pulling power etc. (g) The subjective factors materially contributed to the fixation of the advertisement rates of individual newspapers, keeping in view of the market demand for the space and competition with other newspapers. (h) These factors which differ from newspaper to newspaper are so subjective and peculiar to individual newspapers that an objective evaluation of the advertisement rates of a newspaper by the Government is not possible, and the Government has also admitted the said fact in paragraph 1.31 of 173rd Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the Fifth Lok Sabha and paragraphs 1.14 and 1.28 of the 50th Report of the Public Accounts Committee of the Sixth Lok Sabha. (i) The last para of the Policy regarding rate structure in wholly irrational and arbitrary as the rate structure cannot be fixed by anybody (including the Government) except the newspaper concerned, on the basis of factors mentioned in the policy. The petitioners therefore, contend that on the basis of the above policy with its inherent contradictions, confusions and deficiencies, advertisements cannot be refused or cause to be refused to, inter alia, The Statesman. Further, such refused cannot be on the basis of the alleged rate structure, the reasonableness of which is not demonstrable and in fact has not been demonstrated in the affidavit. 14. The petitioners also contend that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice in fixing the said alleged rate structure. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the said point as to the breach of the principles of natural justice has been specifically taken in Ground No. XI of the writ petition. The learned Counsel submits that the Supreme Court after considering various authorities has held in the decision of (10) Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Onion of India and Anr. The learned Counsel submits that the Supreme Court after considering various authorities has held in the decision of (10) Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Onion of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1978 SC page 597, paragraph 61 of the following effect :- "The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well-settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." The petitioners contend that for a period of 25 years, it was the invariable practice of the DAVP to accept the lowest commercial rate of The Statesman. There were 11 changes about the lowest commercial rate of The Statesman during this period, but each time the increased commercial rate was accepted. A dispute was raised about the rates of The Statesman in April, 1973, but such dispute was raised for extraneous and collateral purposes and The Statesman's position was vindicated a year later when the DAVP in effect accepted the lowest commercial rate of The Statesman. There was no announcement that the Government was changing its policy on the subject of acceptance of the lowest commercial rates of a newspaper and no opportunity was given to The Statesman to advance reasons against the change. Principles of natural justice require that The Statesman should be given this opportunity. The purported rates fixed by the DAVP undoubtedly affect The Statesman in various ways and it was obligatory on the part of the DAVP before issuing the impugned circulars, to comply with the principles of natural justice and to give the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. The petitioners therefore contend that the said advertisement policy and/or the rates relating to The Statesman as framed by the DAVP should be held to be illegal and violative of provision of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution of India and the said policy and/or rate structure for the advertisement in The Statesman should be quashed and the respondents should be restrained by appropriate writs is not implementing the said policy and the rate structure to The Statesman Ltd. 15. The respondents, however, dispute the aforesaid contentions and/or submissions on behalf of the petitioners. The respondents, however, dispute the aforesaid contentions and/or submissions on behalf of the petitioners. The respondents contend that in the writ petition the petitioners have challenged (i) The Prasad Memorandum dated June 23, 1976, (ii) The orders, directives and/or circulars referred to in paragraph 17 of the writ petition (some of which are Annexure 'F' to the writ petition), (iii) All other similar orders, directives and/or circulars if issued, (iv) The Government advertisement policy (referred to in paragraph 35 of the writ petition) and (v) The DAVP advertisement rates for the period 1st May, 1977 to 31st March, 1978 as referred to in paragraph 16 of the writ petition. The respondents contend that the Prasad Memorandum has been withdrawn by the Government and the copy of the said order withdrawing the said Prasad Memorandum has been made Annexure 'B' to the affidavit-in-opposition dated May 2, 1979 With the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum, all circulars and instructions issued in pursuance of the said memorandum also stand rescinded with effect from August 21, 1978. The respondents contend that with the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum the subject-matter of challenge under Item Nos. (i), (ii) and (iii) as indicated above has disappeared and the only thing that remains in dispute as indicated in the prayer made in the writ petition is the Government advertisement policy announced in the Rajya Sabha on 17th November, 1977 and the DAVP advertisement rates for the period 1st May, 1977 to 31st March, 1978 as stated in paragraph 16 of the writ petition. The respondents contend that both the said matters are not justiciable in court. The respondents contend that general Government policy is not justiciable in a court of law. Only such policy which culminates into any statutory order or notification can be challenged in appropriate cases before a court of law. The DAVP advertisement rates as mentioned in paragraph 16 of the writ petition is prima facie not open to any challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the following reasons :- a) The rates concerned were admittedly for the period of 1st May, 1977 to 31st March, 1978 and the said period had expired before the writ petition was filed. During the relevant period the DAVP agreed to release the advertisements to The Statesman "subject to settlement of rates." Any dispute between the petitioners and the Government in respect of the advertisements released during the said period will be a matter of contract for which the petitioners can file a suit, but the instant writ petition is not maintainable in law. b) The rates calculated by DAVP were only for the offer which DAVP intended to make for advertisement to be offered by DAVP. c) There was no computation for The Statesman to accept either the rates offered by DAVP or any advertisement from DAVP. d) The rates offered by DAVP had been worked-out as per the rate structure formula which was evolved by an expert body including the Chief Cost Accounts Officer, Ministry of Finance and the said expert body went into all relevant factors including newsprint costs, other production costs and circulation of various categories of newspapers as well as a reasonable margin of profit. The said rate structure was not, therefore, made arbitrarily or capriciously without any objective consideration. e) The rates offered by the DAVP on the basis of a rational rate structure have been accepted by over 2000 newspapers and periodicals throughout the country excepting a few including The Statesman and Ananda Bazar group of papers. The respondents further contend that the petitioners have been trying to create an impression as if that the Prasad Memorandum is the Government policy and the DAVP is fixing the rates of advertisement for The Statesman but it must be noted that the Prasad Memorandum itself is not the Government policy and the DAVP is not also fixing any rate for The Statesman which The Statesman must accept. It should be noted that the relationship between The Statesman and the Government in the matter of publication of advertisement is that of a Publisher and its customers. Like an ordinary Publisher having a right to quote its own rate for advertisement, the Government and/or the DAVP has the same right to offer its own rate for the advertisement to be published in The Statesman. There is no compulsion to accept the rate offered by a customer by the newspaper. Like an ordinary Publisher having a right to quote its own rate for advertisement, the Government and/or the DAVP has the same right to offer its own rate for the advertisement to be published in The Statesman. There is no compulsion to accept the rate offered by a customer by the newspaper. The respondents contend that The Statesman has its right to carry son its business, but the freedom to carry on the said business certainly does not mean the freedom and/or right to compel any customer including the Government and/or the DAVP to give advertisement at the rate to be dictated by The Statesman. The Counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of the Court to the extracts from the "Report of the Fact Finding Committee on Newspapers Economics" which is Annexure 'D' to the affidavit-in-opposition. In paragraph 9.19. of the said Report, dealing with unfair practice, it has been held that several unfair practices reported to be adopted by the newspapers specially in view of the Sellers’ market in advertisement space following acute newsprint shortage, have been referred to by the Indian Society of Advertisers in its Memorandum before the Committee. They are :- i) Creating "special positions" out of "ordinary positions" practice "being resorted to by some leading dailies". ii) Demanding a surcharge amounting to as much as 20 to 50 percent for publishing an advertisement on a particular date, otherwise the advertiser would have to stand in a queue. "This condition is not put in black and white" the ISA adds. iii) Introduction of the "appointments page" and increasing the number of columns in these pages which is a national waste of scare newsprint, apart from being an indirect rate increase. iv) Pressurising advertisers to take space in other publications, of a group having little advertising value, to enable them to get space in their topline publications, This the Society "consider an unfair and unethical practice". v) Pressurising advertisers to take space in supplements issued on the "slightest pretext". Many advertisers had to reluctantly participate in the supplements as their com-petitioners were using them the ISA Memorandum pointed out. The advertisers attached no great advertising value to the supplements. v) Pressurising advertisers to take space in supplements issued on the "slightest pretext". Many advertisers had to reluctantly participate in the supplements as their com-petitioners were using them the ISA Memorandum pointed out. The advertisers attached no great advertising value to the supplements. The respondents submit that the petitioners are complaining that the rate structure of the Government and/or the DAVP has infringed the petitioners fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, but the said contention is completely misconceived. The DAVP and/or the Government has not in any way prevented the petitioners from carrying on their business of publishing the newspapers. No fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution to carry on the trade or business has been infringed by the Government and/or the DAVP in framing the rate structure for advertisement in different newspapers including The Statesman, The DAVP has only offered its rate for publishing advertisements in different newspapers including The Statesman and The Statesman is quite free to accept such advertisements at the same rate or not. Hence, here, is no occasion to infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. For the same reason, the contention as to the violation of the guarantees under Article 19(1)(g) and also the contention that there has been infringement of right under Article 301 and the Constitution are also misconceived. The respondents contended that the DAVP functions as the Central Organisation of the Government of India for the execution of its advertisement and visual publicity requirements. In October, 1955, the DAVP came into existence as attached office of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Prior to 19th October, 1955, a Branch had been in-existence first in Simla and later in Delhi. In October, 1955, the functions relating to the Advertising Consultant's Branch including all advertising works on behalf of the Government of India (except the Railways), was entrusted with the DAVP along with allied functions like visual publicity through pamphlets, posters etc. outdoor publicity through headings, bus panels and exhibitions. The history of formation of DAVP and the nature of work being performed by the DAVP appears from Annexure 'A' to the in-opposition. The learned Counsel of the respondent also refers to a Government letter dated September 30, 1955 which is Annexure 'B' to the affidavit-in opposition. outdoor publicity through headings, bus panels and exhibitions. The history of formation of DAVP and the nature of work being performed by the DAVP appears from Annexure 'A' to the in-opposition. The learned Counsel of the respondent also refers to a Government letter dated September 30, 1955 which is Annexure 'B' to the affidavit-in opposition. The learned Counsel also refers to 23rd Report of the Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha wherein the historical background and the function and responsibility of DAVP have been stated in Chapter 1 under heading 'A' & 'B'. The respondents further contend that in respect of public undertakings and a statutory bodies and/or corporations, the Government has a vital responsibility in their proper and smooth functioning. The Government is also vitally interested in their economic stability. The respondents contend that ever since independence, the Government is gradually embarking on industrial and trading activities. For various reasons the Government involvement in public sector has been increasing and large number of statutory corporations and public undertakings have come up in course of years. If corporate veil of these public enterprises are torn, it will be found that each of such corporate bodies and/or public undertakings is, in effect, controlled by one or the other of the Ministries of the Government. Since public funds flow into these public sectors, vigilance by the Government is essentially necessary. The Companies Act contains various specific provisions relating to Government Companies and a Government Company has been defined under section 617 of the Companies Act to mean any Company in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid up share is held by the Central Government or by any State Government or Governments or partly by Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments and includes a Company which is a subsidiary of a Government Company. Sections 616 to 620 of the Companies Act deal specifically with the Government Companies where the Central Government is a member of a Government Company. It is the duty of the Central Government to cause annual report on the working and affairs of the Company to be prepared find laid down before both the House of Parliament under section 619A of the Companies Act. It is the duty of the Central Government to cause annual report on the working and affairs of the Company to be prepared find laid down before both the House of Parliament under section 619A of the Companies Act. The rules and procedure and conduct of business in Lok Sabha made under Article 118 of the Constitution provides for the specific provisions for the following Committees to scrutinise the expenditure of public funds:- a) Committee on Public Accounts; b) Committee on Estimates; c) Committee on Public Undertakings. Since large amount of public fund is invested in the Government Companies and Public Undertakings, concerned Ministries are accountable to the Parliamentary Committees in respect of the expenditures made by the Public Undertakings and Government Companies. Expenses on advertisement is one of the major expenses of the public undertakings and Government companies. It is, therefore, essential that appropriate direction should be given by the Government to the public undertakings and the public companies in the matter of advertisements from time to time so as to ensure that the public funds are not wasted. It is quite logical that the Government Companies and public undertakings will seek advice from the concerned Ministries on broad policy matters and they will consult such Ministries whenever necessary. At the present moment, the DAVP only handles advertisements for the Government departments excepting the Railways. The DAVP also handles advertisements of such autonomous bodies, statutory bodies and public undertakings which voluntarily entrust their advertising works to the DAVP. The respondents state that the DAVP after the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum has not given any directive to the public undertakings and/or the Government Companies to follow the DAVP rates for their advertisements in the newspapers including The Statesman. It is the specific case of the respondents that the public undertakings and/or the Government Companies and other autonomous and statutory bodies are quite free to choose the rates of advertisements offered by the DAVP and/or to quote their own rates for advertisements. The respondents further submit that the action of the Government and/or the DAVP is not arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair as contended by the petitioners. It is contended by the petitioners that the Central Government and/or DAVP has exercised its power arbitrarily, unreasonably and unfairly. These allegations made by the petitioners are wholly unfounded and contrary to the facts. The respondents further submit that the action of the Government and/or the DAVP is not arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair as contended by the petitioners. It is contended by the petitioners that the Central Government and/or DAVP has exercised its power arbitrarily, unreasonably and unfairly. These allegations made by the petitioners are wholly unfounded and contrary to the facts. The respondents contend that it will appear from the various reports of the Parliamentary Committees since referred to by the petitioners that the said Committee over the last several years had been commenting repeatedly on the flow of public fund by way of advertisement expenditures incurred by the public undertakings and autonomous bodies. These Committees have repeatedly and strongly recommended the Central Government to take positive action regarding the rates at which the Central Government, public sector undertakings and autonomous bodies should offer for their advertisements. The Public Accounts Committee in their 173rd Report recommended that the Government should examine the entire question of fixing the mille rate keeping in view the size of newspapers/ periodicals with reference to its circulation, language, place of publication and the impact it had on public mind. In the light of these recommendations by the Parliamentary Committees and following the persistent demands by newspapers for a general increase in their rates for advertisement, the Government had to constitute a Rate Structure Committee in 1976 to formulate a rate structure. The Committee consisted of the Joint Secretary (Finance), Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Chief Accounts Officer, Ministry of Finance and the Director of the DAVP. The Rate Structure Committee made certain recommendations and the said rates which were first enforced in February, 1977 but were modified subsequently were again enforced from May, 1977. The said modified rate structure is in force at the present. The respondents contended that the DAVP has not therefore, acted arbitrarily or capriciously but in the offered a rate structure found on objective basis. The DAVP has offered the said rate structure to various newspapers and periodicals and such newspapers and periodicals are quite free to accept the said rates and/or to reject the same. The respondents also contend that the Government had also constituted a Fact Finding Committee, Newspapers economy and the said committee submitted a Report which revealed that there was no uniformity of mille rates charged by different newspapers or advertisement space. The respondents also contend that the Government had also constituted a Fact Finding Committee, Newspapers economy and the said committee submitted a Report which revealed that there was no uniformity of mille rates charged by different newspapers or advertisement space. It also appears from the report of the said Fact Finding Committee that:- "Dailies such as the Times of India of Bombay, The Statesman of Calcutta, the Hindusthan Times of Delhi, and the Hindu of Madras were obviously monopolies so far as the advertisement rates were concerned and their rates were relatively high. Each of these dailies presumably fixed its rate based on what the 'traffic will bear'. There was no evidence to show that these rates were based on reasonable cost of production and distribution and a fair rate of return. In the case of a few other local monopolies also, high advertisement rates appear to have been similarly fixed." The respondents contend that all the aforesaid facts will unmistakably show that the Government actions and the decisions regarding the formulation of a rate structure by the DAVP and offer of such rate to the petitioners were not done mala fide or arbitrarily but such action was done in view of the recommendation of the Public Accounts Committee and also in view of the Report of the said Fact Finding Committee on Newspapers economy. The advertisement rates offered by the DAVP have been prased after due consideration and deliberation by the said reasonable Committee taking into account of the relevant factors. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits the said Report of the Fact Finding Committee clearly points out that some of the local dailies including The Statesman was presumably fixed their rates based on the principle what the 'traffic will bear' and even during the pendency of the writ petitioner before this Court. The Statesman has pushed up their rate of advertisement regarding the Calcutta edition by 28.5 persent and the combined edition for Calcutta and Delhi by 85.9 persent. The respondents dispute the contention made by the petitioners that the Rate Structure Committee of the DAVP had fixed the rate structure arbitrarily. Capriciously and without any reasonable basis and/or the said Committee and/or DAVP had failed to take into consideration the details of profit and loss of The Statesman before offering the rate of advertisement. The respondents dispute the contention made by the petitioners that the Rate Structure Committee of the DAVP had fixed the rate structure arbitrarily. Capriciously and without any reasonable basis and/or the said Committee and/or DAVP had failed to take into consideration the details of profit and loss of The Statesman before offering the rate of advertisement. The respondents contend that the said contentions of the petitioners are untenable and baseless on the following reasons :- (a) The Rate Structure Committee had invited views from Newspapers Associations including the Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society (IENS) of which The Statesman is a member. Nothing prevented The Statesman to give the details of their cost structure or the profit and loss account to the Rate structure Committee. Even after DAVP had made its offer of advertisement rate to The Statesman, The Statesman could have given the details of their cost structure and the profit and loss account to DAVP with a request to DAVP to reconsider its offer. According to the respondents, the petitioners although clamouring for suffering alleged loss in the event the Government and/or the public sector undertakings advertisements are accepted at DAVP rate, the petitioners have not disclosed even before this Court the details and basis of the Commercial rate and the profit and loss account to justify the bona fide of the allegations made by the petitioners. (b) The Fact Finding Committee, as indicated hereinbefore, had come to the finding that some of the big dailies including The Statesman had presumably fixed their rates based on the principle what the 'traffic will bear'. The petitioners have not only disclosed the basis of its lowest Commercial rate, but have also not demonstrated the actual loss suffered by The Statesman. Profit and loss are a part of business in which risks are always involved. The Statesman is to lay its own plan for reducing its losses and increasing profit like all business concerns. By accepting the rates claimed by The Statesman, the Government will have to spend a lot of more money ultimately coming from the tax payers of the country. The Statesman has no fundamental right to compel the Government to publish its Advertisements at the rates claimed by The Statesman. (c) The offer by DAVP is also based on circulation of newspaper media and the said offer equally applies for all newspapers/periodicals having the same circulation throughout India. The Statesman has no fundamental right to compel the Government to publish its Advertisements at the rates claimed by The Statesman. (c) The offer by DAVP is also based on circulation of newspaper media and the said offer equally applies for all newspapers/periodicals having the same circulation throughout India. Accordingly, the rate structure on the basis of the circulation of newspapers cannot be held to be discriminatory or arbitrary. The respondents contend that at least 6000 newspapers/periodicals have accepted the DAVP rate without complaint and only a small group of newspapers having monopolies so far as advertisement rates were concerned, are making complaints about the DAVP rates and The Statesman is one of such newspapers. (d) The allegations made by the petitioners are vague and the entire case of the petitioners is speculative and baseless. (e) The rate structure cannot be held to be arbitrary and illegal simply because such rate structure may cause hardship. The Writ Court can only consider as to whether or not the Governmental action in fixing the rate structure is wholly arbitrary and capricious, but it will not be the function of the Writ Court to make calculation on the basis of the Rate Structure to determine whether any hardship has been caused to a party. (f) The Governmental action in framing the rate structure has no direct effect on any fundamental or legal right of the petitioners. Freedom of Press does not include right to get advertisement at the rates claimed by newspapers. The learned Counsel for the respondents in this connection submits that even Mahatma Gandhi had deplored the cravings for advertisement for newspapers and periodicals and had expressed the view that it would be better to refuse advertisement in the journals published by his Ashram so that the freedom of press could be maintained properly. (g) There is no provision in the constitution nor there is any provision in any law that a newspaper has any fundamental or legal right to receive advertisement at the rate fixed by it. Freedom of press means freedom to publish news in the form of news items without any restraint, freedom to publish the proprietors or editors views in the perform of editorial and also to publish columns written by the staff members and others and to publish letters written by the readers. Freedom of press means freedom to publish news in the form of news items without any restraint, freedom to publish the proprietors or editors views in the perform of editorial and also to publish columns written by the staff members and others and to publish letters written by the readers. There is no allegation and it is also not a fact that such freedom has been curtailed or curbed by the DAVP in any manner whatsoever. The freedom of the press also includes the freedom to collect news from various sources including Governmental source. Such freedom has not been curbed or curtailed by any action of the respondents. Advertisements, on the other hand, are purely commercial dealings. If the advertisements are completely denied to The Statesman by the respondents, even when The Statesman are agreeable to publish the advertisements at the rates agreed upon by the respondents, there may be a case of infringing the freedom of press and/or a case of discrimination against The Statesman. But such case has neither been alleged nor established in the instant case. (h) Advertisement rates are matters of complex business transactions. The term ‘lowest commercial rate’ necessarily implies that there is a highest commercial rate also. In actual practice also there is a casual rate and regular contract rate. There are also special rates for appointments pages and for sponsored supplements and special features. If the contentions of the petitioners are accepted then the petitioners will have the freedom to increase their rates of advertisement according to their, likings and compel the Government and/or other advertisers to publish the required advertisement at the rate dictated by them even when such rates are unreasonable very high. This alleged right, if accepted, on the plea of freedom of press will lead to a disastrous and pernicious result. (i) The respondents have also their legal right to publish advertisement at the rates calculated to be reasonable by the plea of freedom of press, the petitioners cannot have any right to dictate the respondents to give advertisements in The Statesman at the rates claimed by them and thereby infringing the legal right of the respondents to publish their advertisements on the rates calculated by them as reasonable. 16. 16. In reply to the contentions made by the petitioners regarding the Prasad Memorandum, the respondents contend that the circumstances under which the Prasad Memorandum was issued have been explained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition. The Prasad Memorandum was issued on the basis of a Cabinet decision and the said Memorandum was nothing but directives and/or instructions given to different Ministries of the Government of India and such directives and/or instructions had no statutory force. Such directives and/or instructions were to be applied uniformly to all concerns and the said directives and/or instructions were not meant to be applied to The Statesman or to any particular newspaper. It was specifically stated in the Prasad Memorandum that this communication is being used in pursuance of the decision taken by the Cabinet that a directive be issued to all Ministries, departments, undertakings and/or organisations under the Central Government, to comply with the instructions contained in paragraphs 2-3 above. All Ministries are requested to convey the directive to the public sector undertakings and other organisations under their control. "The Prasad Memorandum was circulated to the Secretaries of all the Ministries under the Government of India and also to the Chairman, Bureau of Public Enterprises, New Delhi. No public sector undertakings had ever protested against the said directives and no public sector undertakings have also challenged the authority to issue such directives. The Government, later on, thought it expedient to withdraw the directives contained in the Prasad Memorandum and as such Prasad Memorandum was withdrawn with effect from August 21, 1978 and all circulation and/or instructions issued in pursuance to the said Prasad Memorandum also stood rescinded from the said date. The Central Government had every right to give instructions to the ministries and the departments under such ministries and also the public sector undertakings under the control of such ministries to publish advertisement at the rate in the manner the Government desire and it cannot be contended that the said Memorandum was illegal, invalid and/or beyond the competence of the Government. 17. In reply to the contentions made by the petitioners on the accreditations of advertising agencies, the respondents contend that the petitioners have been wrongly contending that the advertising agencies are sought to be used by the Government for controlling the rates of the newspapers through the policy of accreditation. 17. In reply to the contentions made by the petitioners on the accreditations of advertising agencies, the respondents contend that the petitioners have been wrongly contending that the advertising agencies are sought to be used by the Government for controlling the rates of the newspapers through the policy of accreditation. In the affidavit-in-opposition, in paragraph 34, it has been contended by the respondents that neither The Statesman Ltd. nor its Managing Director, Sri C.R. Irani, is an advertising agency. They have also not disclosed any interest in the business of advertising agencies. None of the accreditated advertising agencies totaling a bout 110, has approached the court for any relief against enforcement of the said accreditation policy. The respondents contend that, in circumstances, the petitioners are only trying to buttress their unfounded charges against the respondents with recourse to political propaganda and opinions rather than on facts and law. It is contended in the affidavit of the respondents (paragraph 34) that the accreditation of advertising agencies is done with a view to ensure that the public sector undertakings are able to obtain the services of professionably competent and financially sound agencies which adhere to ethical business practices. The procedure for making a list of accredited advertising agencies available to public sector undertakings was introduced as far back in 1956. Such list of accredited advertising agencies was made in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Rajya Sabha on May 4, 1956 and the, recommendations made by the Estimate Committee of the First Lok Sabha in its Sixteenth Report that the public sector undertaking should be use only Indian Owned Advertising Agencies. This was done in the context of foreign owned advertising agencies dominating the advertising agency business in India at the time. The DAVP was asked to maintain list of the accredited advertising agencies and accordingly rules and/or principles were framed for their empanelment and/or to determine the financial viability and professional competence and to judge their performances in relation to different categories of newspapers. Ever, since 1956, it has been the practice for the public sector undertakings to engage one of the agencies accredited by the DAVP. The agencies are not directed by the DAVP as to which newspapers they should use or that rate they should follow. There is no mention in the norms for accreditation requiring agencies to follow the DAVP's rates or media list. The agencies are not directed by the DAVP as to which newspapers they should use or that rate they should follow. There is no mention in the norms for accreditation requiring agencies to follow the DAVP's rates or media list. In the Prasad Memorandum, however, there was direction that the accredited agencies should publish at the rates approved by the DAVP, but the Prasad Memorandum has since been withdrawn and there is no occasion for the petitioners to feel aggrieved any further for the said accreditation of the advertising agencies. Pursuant to the directions contained in the Prasad Memorandum, the public sector undertakings had to ask the accredited advertising agencies to ensure that their advertisements would be released at the DAVP rates. It was in that context that WR 59 relating to 'Accreditation of Advertising Agencies' furnished to the Estimate Committee of the 6th Lok Sabha made mention regarding 'applying the rates of newspapers approved by DAVP on the Advertisements issued by such accredited agencies handling accounts of public sector undertakings. The said WR 59 was furnished to the Estimate Committee by the Government while the Prasad Memorandum was in force containing the directions and/or instructions on the basis of Cabinet decision. It may be mentioned that the hearing of the Government representatives by the Estimate Committee had taken place in July-August, 1978 when the said WR 59 was furnished. Shortly there after, on August 21, 1978 the said Prasad Memorandum was withdrawn. 18. Even assuming that any accredited advertising agency on a public sector undertaking had approached the newspaper on insisted for accepting a particular rate of advertisement the Government cannot be held responsible or answerable for such action. Every advertiser is free to quote his own rate and the DAVP has no direct or vicarious responsibility in the matter of publishing advertisements by the public sector undertakings at any particular rate. The learned Counsel for the respondents also refers to paragraph 34 of the affidavit-in-opposition where from it appears that the I.E.N.S. member newspapers being largely big and influential papers are able to secure better terms from advertising agencies than other newspapers and it is, therefore, necessary that such agencies as are discriminating between one group of newspapers and another are not utilised by the public sector undertakings. "This has a reference to the Governments advertising policy in regard to proper utilisation of small and medium newspapers, and Indian language newspapers which art ignored by the advertising agencies having preference for being English papers. Some of the agencies charge higher commission from the small and medium papers and Indian language papers while applying a uniform 15 per cent agency commission in the case of big English papers which dominate the I.E.N.S. In the backdrop of all the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there cannot be any valid objection if the accredited agency is asked to ensure an uniform commission and a non discriminatory policy and also proper use of language papers, small and medium papers. There is no evidence whatsoever that after the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum, the accredited agencies have been asked to enforce the DAVP rate in the matter of publication of advertisement for public sector undertakings. The respondents point out that the Petitioner No. 2 Sri. C.R. Irani, was a distinguished member of the I.E.N.S. and was a past President of I.E.N.S. and I.E.N.S. required advertising agencies to follow its rules and regulations before such agency is accredited by the Society. If such agency is not accredited by the I.E.N.S. it is not entitled to 15 per cent commission from I.E.N.S. members. In the event of it the accreditation is not grantee or even in the case when accreditation is pending decision. The advertising agency gets from the I.E.N.S. members a commission of only 6 and 1/4 per cent to 10 per cent. 19. The respondents also contend that advertising at the rate claimed by the Statesman cannot have any relation with the petitioners freedom of press. The respondents have not fixed the advertisement rates of The Statesman. The Government and/or the DAVP has only fixed its own rate of advertisement and has offered such rates to The Statesman and The Statesman is quite free either to accept or reject such offer. The respondents point out that even when the rates for Calcutta Edition and the combined edition for Delhi and Calcutta of The Statesman offered by the DAVP were not accepted by The Statesman, the rates offered for the Delhi Edition of the Statesman by the DAVP had been accepted by The Statesman and publication of advertisement was also made. 20. The respondents point out that even when the rates for Calcutta Edition and the combined edition for Delhi and Calcutta of The Statesman offered by the DAVP were not accepted by The Statesman, the rates offered for the Delhi Edition of the Statesman by the DAVP had been accepted by The Statesman and publication of advertisement was also made. 20. So far the Government policy regarding advertisement in newspapers and periodicals is concerned, the respondents contend that such policy is a matter concerning the executive in the Government administration. The Government is answerable to the legislature in the matter of justification of a particular policy followed by the Government but the Government policy is not a justiciable in a court of law. The Government advertisement rates have been worked out on the basis of the rate structure formula prepared by an expert group. The Public Accounts Committee had also suggested earlier that a rate structure should be evolved. The Rate Structure Committee consisted of responsible members including the Chief Accounts Officer of the Ministry of Finance who is a principle Adviser of the Government on the question of costs. The Committee studied all relevant factors including the report of the Fact Finding Committee, Newspapers Economic and balance sheet of several newspapers. The Committee had also met representatives of I.E.N.S. and other bodies, studied production costs, circulation dates and had also taken into account a reasonable margin •of profit in the rate structure recommended by it. The respondents contend that the Rate Structure Committee cannot study the unit cost of all the newspapers totalling about 2000. In a study of this nature, only the industry wise costs are studied and such industry wise costs have been studied on taking into consideration of various relevant factors. Even assuming that the rate structure had contained certain errors it cannot be contended that such rate structure were framed capriciously, arbitrarily or without any reasonable basis whatsoever. The respondents contend that some bans had been imposed on some newspapers including The Statesman earlier, but subsequently the Government had withdrawn such bans. Even assuming that the rate structure had contained certain errors it cannot be contended that such rate structure were framed capriciously, arbitrarily or without any reasonable basis whatsoever. The respondents contend that some bans had been imposed on some newspapers including The Statesman earlier, but subsequently the Government had withdrawn such bans. Accordingly, the prejudice suffered by The Statesman on earlier occasion because of the bans imposed on The States man cannot have any ground for action in the instant writ petition until and unless the petitioners have proved that the Government is still harbouring the hostile attitude towards The Statesman and has been following a discriminatory policy towards The Statesman. There is no evidence to show that Statesman and/or a few Newspapers have been singled out in the matter of following the rate structure evolved by the DAVP and the rate structures have been made applicable to all newspapers. Accordingly no interference is called for in the constitutional writ jurisdiction of this Court and the Rule must be discharged. 21. The learned Counsel for the respondents in support of the aforesaid contentions had cited a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts including this Court. The decision made in the case of (11) C.K. Achuthan v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1959 SC page 490 was cited for the proposition that there is no discrimination became it is perfectly open to the Government, even as it is private party to choose a person to their liking to fulfil contracts which they wish to be performed. When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved person cannot claim protection under Article 14 because the choice of a person to fulfil a contract must be left to the Government. When one person is chosen rather than another, the aggrieved person cannot claim protection under Article 14 because the choice of a person to fulfil a contract must be left to the Government. Reference has also been made to the decisions of the Supreme Court made in the case of (12) P.R. Qucnin v. M.K. Tandal reported in AIR 1971 SC page 651 and (13) State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal reported in AIR 1972 SC page 1816 and (14) Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1977 SC page 1496 The learned Counsel for the Respondents also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (15) Prag Rice and Oil Mils v. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC page 1296 for the proposition that the petitioners have come too early and without establishing the actual loss suffered by The Statesman. Reference has also been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (16) Sukdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram reported in AIR 1975 SC page 1331 for the proposition that the statutory corporations are instrumentalities and agencies of the Government and therefore, Government has a right to communicate the DAVP rates to such statutory corporations. The learned Counsel for the respondents also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (17) Hamdard Dwokhana's case reported in AIR 1960 SC page 554 for the proposition that commercial advertisements which form an element of trade or commerce do not form part of the freedom of speech. Referring to International Airport Authority's case the learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the facts and circumstances of the said case were entirely different. It was found in the facts of the said case that the standard or norm laid down by International Airport Authority was not uniformly followed but deviation of the norm was made discriminatorily. The learned Counsel also contends that the decision in International Airport Authority's case must be read in the context of the facts of the case and in this context he refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (18) State of Orissa v. S. S. Misra reported in AIR 1968 SC page 647 for the proposition that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. The decision of the Supreme Court made in the (19) Barium Chemical's case reported in AIR 1967 SC page 295 has also been cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents for the proposition that disclosure by the Government about its satisfaction requiring to take certain course of action applies only when the Government exercises a statutory power. In the said case the Government was required to exercise a statutory power under section 37 of the Companies Act but in the instant case, in the matter of fixation of rates of advertisement, no statutory power is exercised. Hence, the Government is not required to disclose the basis of rate structure, in any event. The learned Counsel for the respondents also submits that the decision made in the International Airport Authority's case does not help the petitioners in any way. On the contrary, the said decision really supports the case of the respondents inasmuch as the respondents are not following different principles for advertisements for different newspapers and the rates for advertisement to be offered by the DAVP are being made applicable uniformly to different classes of newspapers conforming to the categories specified in the rate structure. Reference has also been made to the decision of this Court made in the case of (20) I.T.C. v. M.R.T.P Commission reported in 1975(2) Calcutta Law Journal, page 274. In the said decision, the notice issued by M.R.T.P. Commission under section 37 of the M.R.T.P. Act for investigation into certain restrictive trade practices by the I.T.C. was considered and the Court found the said notice valid on the ground that the notice was not such that nobody could find the basis of the said notice as absolutely unreasonable or perverse. The learned Counsel contends that the rate structure for the advertisement to be published by the DAVP was also formed on consideration of relevant materials and it cannot be contended that there is no basis whatsoever for such rate and/or the entire rate structure is absolutely perverse. 22. The learned Counsel contends that the rate structure for the advertisement to be published by the DAVP was also formed on consideration of relevant materials and it cannot be contended that there is no basis whatsoever for such rate and/or the entire rate structure is absolutely perverse. 22. In reply to the aforesaid contentions of the respondents, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the activities of the public sector undertakings and autonomous bodies are not activities of the Government and it must be noted that the public sector undertakings and autonomous bodies on their own accord have not offered any rate to The Statesman, The learned Counsel also submits that the case of the respondents is the Central Government and/or the DAVP can legitimately offer its own rate of advertisement and every newspaper may or may not accept such offer of rates if the concerned newspaper thinks it unprofitable to publish the advertisement at the said rates. The Counsel for the petitioners contends that the trading activity of the Government must be referable to Article 298 of the Constitution and such trading activity cannot have the same freedom as the trading activity of an individual. The Government action even in the field of trade must not violate the provisions of the Constitution. If the trading activity of the Government has the object to give preference and/or such activity leads to the preference of one citizen to another, the trading activity in that case must be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. This principle has been amply reiterated in the International Airport Authority's case. If the trading activity of the Government regarding issuance of advertisements is with the object and purpose or has the effect of weakening the link of financial base of newspapers including The Statesman, which is essential for exercising and maintaining the freedom of press protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, such trading activity cannot be held to be legitimate trading activity. The learned Counsel further submits that the theory of offer and acceptance of the rates of advertisement between the DAVP and the newspaper concerned is also not tenable. The Government has fixed the advertisement rates in order to a set a trend for all advertisers including public sector advertisers to follow as will appear from the Prasad Memorandum. The learned Counsel further submits that the theory of offer and acceptance of the rates of advertisement between the DAVP and the newspaper concerned is also not tenable. The Government has fixed the advertisement rates in order to a set a trend for all advertisers including public sector advertisers to follow as will appear from the Prasad Memorandum. It should be kept in mind that the Governments offer is not negotiable but is only an unilateral offer coming from an authority having substantial control in the matter of advertisement in the newspapers. In the instant case it has been made clear by the respondents that the Government will continue to make offers and also make such offers known to other advertisers in the public sector undertakings etc. 23. Replying to the contentions of the respondents that the accreditation policy of the advertising agencies of the DAVP is quite fair and reasonable, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondents have contended that if the IENS can have its own accreditation rules then the DAVP may also have its own accreditation rules. But such contention is fallacious because it overlooks the fact that IENS accreditation rules do not refer to rates for advertisement, where as the accreditation policy of the DAVP read with advertising policy of the Government, to which adherence is sought, does so. 24. Replying to the contention of the respondents that the DAVP has acted reasonably in framing the rate structure for advertisement on the advice of the Parliamentary Committees and Ex parte and the DAVP's action cannot be challenged as arbitrary, whimsical or malicious offending Article 14 of the Constitution, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the Government cannot hide behind the advice of bureaucrats when the reasonableness of governmental action is challenged. The Government must show that their action is reasonable and the mere assertion that alleged experts had gone into the rate structure and had determined the advertisement rates for The Statesman without disclosing either the rate structure or the materials on which it is said to be based or the method adopted for their computation does not automatically establish that the rates are not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court is not bound to accept the rates as reasonable fixed by the alleged experts of the Government who merely function within the brief given to them by the Government. The Court is not bound to accept the rates as reasonable fixed by the alleged experts of the Government who merely function within the brief given to them by the Government. In this connection, the learned Counsel refers to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (21) M.A. Pasheed & Others v. The State of Kerala reported in AIR 1974 SC page 2249. The observations of the Supreme Court have been made in the context of statutory powers and they apply with greater force in the case of governmental action which do not have any statutory backing as in the instant case. The learned Counsel in this context also refers to the Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (22) Mrinal Kanti Das Burman v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1976(1) Calcutta Law Journal, page 571 and the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Barium Chemical v. Company Law Board reported in AIR 1967 SC page 295. Referring to the 23rd Report of the Estimates Committee (1978-79) since relied on by the respondents to show that there were materials on which the DAVP rates were fixed, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that it was observed in the said Report that there was no means with DAVP or any other organisation to satisfy themselves whether the rate quoted by newspapers was the lowest. Therefore, the Rate Structure Committee felt that the DAVP needed some guidance on a rational basis. The learned Counsel submits that the said Report of the Estimates Committee is nothing but appreciation of the evidence given by the Government before the Estimates Committee, but the said report is not a disclosure to the Court the material to justify the reasonableness of the DAVP rates. The learned Counsel further submits that if for justification of the reasonableness of the rate structure concerning. The Statesman, a full disclosure is necessary, the Government is bound to disclose the basis even if such disclosure may require similar disclosure for other newspapers. The learned Counsel contends that there can be no administrative inconvenience of disclosing the alleged basis of the rates to Court when the Government has allegedly taken the trouble of fixing the rates for 2000 newspapers. 25. The learned Counsel contends that there can be no administrative inconvenience of disclosing the alleged basis of the rates to Court when the Government has allegedly taken the trouble of fixing the rates for 2000 newspapers. 25. Replying to the contention of the respondents that the policy of the Government and/or the advertisement policy cannot be challenged in the abstract, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the said contention is misconceived because the policy of the Government and/or the advertising policy has not been challenged in the abstract, but the discrimination meted out to The Statesman for enforcing the said arbitrary and unreasonable rate structure alleged to have been framed on account of the said policy has been challenged in the writ petition. The learned Counsel also contends that the advertising policy was also criticised by the Estimates Committee in its 23rd Report presented to the Sixth Lok Sabha on 22nd December, 1978. The Estimates Committee in the said report noted that in recommending weightage or consideration to small and medium newspapers and language newspapers the policy had not indicated the exact nature and extent of weightage or consideration that should be given to them. Whether weightage should be in the selection of newspapers for release of Government advertisement or in the allocation of advertisement space or in the matter of rates was left to be determined by DAVP or the officer of the Ministry in their discretion. The committee noted that advertising policy of the Government left many loopholes and contained ambiguous and conflicting statements. The Committee recommended that the advertising policy should be spelt out in comprehensive and clear terms and the nature, extent and range of weightage laid down in precise language so as to guard any possibility of any misinterpretation or distortion at implementation stage. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that The Statesman is publishing private sector advertisements as much as it can procure and it cannot be reasonably contended that if the public sector undertakings do not give advertisements, the space which could have been covered by such public sector advertisements can be easily utilised by publishing private sector advertisements. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that The Statesman is publishing private sector advertisements as much as it can procure and it cannot be reasonably contended that if the public sector undertakings do not give advertisements, the space which could have been covered by such public sector advertisements can be easily utilised by publishing private sector advertisements. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that the contention of the respondents and a large number of newspapers have accepted the DAVP rates is also not tenable firstly because if the rate structure is unreasonable, it is immaterial whether or not some other newspapers/periodicals have accepted such rates. There may be various factors inducing such newspapers to accept such rate and the rate structure may be even higher than the rates that can be commanded by such newspapers and periodicals in the market. Secondly, a number of established newspapers have not accepted the rate structure of the DAVP because the said rate structure is quite below their lowest commercial rates. 26. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submits that advertisements particularly public sector advertisements, have also news value. Referring to an issue of The Statesman of a particular date produced before the Court, the learned Counsel contends that some public sector advertisements are not mere advertisements for publicity but they have news value relating to (a) education (e.g. advertisement from various educational institutes like Birla Institute of Technology, Indian Institute of Technology, Indian Institute of Management), (b) public notice advertisements containing information to the public (e.g. company notices, legal notices requesting the public to pay income tax and wealth tax in time), (c) Gainful information for public (e.g. advertisement for fixed deposits in Banks, Life Insurance Corporations advertisements, Tender notices of various companies), (d) Public Service advertisements (e.g. advertisement by Railways not to pull the chain, throw any lighted cigarettes in the compartment, create any fire hazard). The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of U.S.A. made in the case of (23) Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council INC reported in 425 US page 748. The Supreme Court has observed at page 757 that if there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising and it may be asserted by the appellees namely Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Supreme Court has observed at page 757 that if there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising and it may be asserted by the appellees namely Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The subject-matter of challenge in the said case was a statute declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed Pharmacist to advertise the price of prescription drugs. The Supreme Court of U.S. held that the said Statute offended the protection of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the Constitution and as such the Statute was invalid. 27. Considering the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears to me that the main challenge of the petitioners in the instant Rule is the attempt on the part of the Central Government and/or the DAVP to control the newspapers by controlling its revenue and such control, according to the petitioners, is sought to be effected by introducing advertisement rate control by the DAVP and requiring other advertisers to advertise only at such rates and to ensure advertisement at the rates fixed by the DAVP by the advertising agencies through the accreditation policy by which pledge is taken from the advertising agencies to implement the Governments advertise only at such rates and to ensure advertisement at the rates fixed by the DAVP by the advertising agencies through the accreditation policy by which pledge is taken from the advertising agencies to implement the Governments advertisement policy regarding the newspapers and periodicals in consultation with the DAVP. In the Rule, the petitioners have also challenged the legality and/or validity of the Prasad Memorandum. The said Prasad Memorandum was withdrawn with effect from 21st August, 1978 by the Central Government during the pendency of the Rule. The petitioners however contend that although the Prasad Memorandum has been withdrawn, the policy and/or directions contained in the Prasad Memorandum are still being followed and in any event, the public sector undertakings and the autonomous bodies, statutory corporations etc., have been clearly directed by the DAVP that prior to the withdrawal of the said Prasad Memorandum. All directions contained in the said Prasad Memorandum are to be strictly followed. All directions contained in the said Prasad Memorandum are to be strictly followed. Accordingly, the petitioners contend that even inspite of the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum it is still necessary for the court to consider the legality and validity of the said Prasad Memorandum to that there may not be any occasion for enforcing the directions contained in the said Prasad Memorandum in setting the rates of advertisements by the public sector undertakings etc., upto August 21, 1978. The respondents have, however, seriously contended that the policy of the Central Government and/or DAVP in the matter of advertisements cannot be questioned in a court of law and the governmental policy is not a justificable issued. For this contention, the respondents have referred to and relied on the observation of the Supreme Court made in the Bennett Coleman's case (Supra). The Supreme Court has observed in the said decision that the court should not probe into the policy of the Government regarding import of the newsprint and such probe into governmental policy will lead to propelling into the uncharted occasion of Government policy. The respondents contend that every Government has a right to frame its own policy and the wisdom of such policy cannot be questioned in a court of law. In a Parliamentary democracy, Government is only answerable for the success and failure of its policy to the legislature. As a proposition of law, the said contentions of the respondents are absolutely correct. There can be no manner of doubt that the abstract policy of the Government is not to be questioned in a court of law and for success of a democratic state the three organs of the State, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, must confine to their respective sphere of activity without encroaching upon, the others sphere. It is to be remembered that all the said three organs do exist for one common goal, namely, the welfare and progress of the State and until and unless there is mutual independence and respect, the democracy is bound to fail. But when a Government policy is translated into action and such action has either affected or is likely to affect any legal or constitutional right of a citizen, such policy no longer remains in the realm of abstract policy but the same becomes a justiciable issue. But when a Government policy is translated into action and such action has either affected or is likely to affect any legal or constitutional right of a citizen, such policy no longer remains in the realm of abstract policy but the same becomes a justiciable issue. In the instant case, as a follow up measure of the Governmental policy of advertisement, some concrete steps have been taken by the Central Government and/or the DAVP and the rates for advertisement in newspapers and periodicals have been framed and such rates have been given effect to affecting the revenue to be earned by a newspaper in publishing the DAVP advertisement. In such circumstances the petitioners can challenge the validity of the said policy and consequential rate structure. There can be no manner of doubt that revenue from the advertisements is one of the most important source of revenue for all newspapers and periodicals. The Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman's case has noted in paragraph 65 of the judgment that the main source of income of the newspapers is from advertisement and the newspaper has a built in mechanism. Advertisements are not only the source of revenue but also one of the factors for circulation. Once the circulation is lost, it will be very difficult to regain the old level. The petitioners have given the break up of its earnings from different sources viz., sale of newspapers, advertisement from private sectors, advertisement from public undertakings autonomous bodies, public companies etc. and advertisement by the Government. It appears that 27.71 per cent of the total advertisement revenue of The Statesman is from DAVP and public sector sources and from DAVP alone the total revenue income is 2.2 per cent and the advertisement revenue from DAVP and public sector sources constitute 19.68 per cent of the total advertisement and sales revenue of the newspapers. The Statesman has also given an estimated loss of revenue if the advertisement of Government and/or public sector undertakings etc. are not made in The Statesman and the petitioners have further contended that such loss of revenue cannot be compensated either by reducing the number of pages or by reducing the circulation or increasing the selling price. The Statesman has also given an estimated loss of revenue if the advertisement of Government and/or public sector undertakings etc. are not made in The Statesman and the petitioners have further contended that such loss of revenue cannot be compensated either by reducing the number of pages or by reducing the circulation or increasing the selling price. The estimated earnings from advertisements from different sources and the percentage of such earning to the total revenue earned by The Statesman have been calculated on the basis of audited accounts and the said figures cannot be held to be imaginary. In my view, the estimated loss of revenue on account of non-publication of the advertisements in The Statesman by DAVP and other public sector undertakings etc. are only arithmetical calculations and it cannot be held that such calculation is only hypothetical or imaginary. The petitioners, in my view, are justified in their contention that any increase in the selling price of the newspapers even by one paisa is likely to affect the circulation adversely. In Sakal Paper's case AIR 1962 SC page 305 the Supreme Court has also noted such adverse effect on circulation if the selling price is increased even by one paisa. Accordingly the loss of revenue from advertisement on account of non-publishing the advertisements made by the DAVP and/or the Central Government and the public undertakings etc., cannot be underestimated and such loss of revenue cannot but have a tremendous impact on the standard of the newspaper and even on its survival. If, therefore, the Revenue of a newspaper is controlled arbitrarily, capriciously and thereby the financial stability is weakened a newspaper so affected may certainly move the writ court and challenge that such control is an infringement of the freedom of press or discriminatory offending Article 14 of the Constitution. In my view, in such circumstances, the respondents cannot take refuse on the plea of immunity of a governmental policy in the court of law. The respondents have also contended in this case that the offer of rate by the DAVP is only a commercial dealing and in the said commercial dealing, like a private individual, the Government and/or the DAVP has every right to offer its own rate for advertisement and Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution are not attracted. The respondents have also contended in this case that the offer of rate by the DAVP is only a commercial dealing and in the said commercial dealing, like a private individual, the Government and/or the DAVP has every right to offer its own rate for advertisement and Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution are not attracted. It has been contended by the respondents that it is entirely for The Statesman to accept or not to accept such rate. The respondents contend that by offering a rate or advertisement by the DAVP there is no encroachment on the newspapers freedom to follow its own policy of publication and/or to publish matters and/or advertisements of its choice. The respondents have also contended that if for non-publishing the advertisements by the DAVP and/or other public sector undertakings because of non-acceptance of the rate offered by such public sector undertakings of the DAVP a newspaper suffers loss of revenue and such loss of revenue even if causes an adverse effect on the revenue of the newspaper. It cannot be contended that such offer of a rate for advertisements having ultimate bearing on the revenue is a direct control or curtailment of the freedom of press. The respondents contend that if an action indirectly or remotely leads to a result causing loss of revenue of a newspaper and thereby weakening of the link of financial strength, then such indirect result cannot be held to be the infringement of the freedom of press. The action to constitute an infringement of the freedom of press or right to trade must have a direct link with the object achieved. I am, however, unable to accept the said contention of the respondents and in my view, an infringement of the freedom of press may be caused either by a direct action or by an indirect action. The Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman's case has laid down that the tests of pith and substance of the subject-matter and of direct and incidental effect of the legislation are relevant to questions of legislative competence but they are irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamental rights. The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. It is the substance and the practical result of the act of State that should be considered rather than the legal form. The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. It is the substance and the practical result of the act of State that should be considered rather than the legal form. It also appears to me that the Government has no right to claim freedom in its dealing with the citizens and/or organisations in the State like an individual, unless illegal or unconstitutional an individual has every right to follow his course of action and in that respect, he is completely independent but even in administrative and executive functions, the Government always remains a Government and the Government cannot take arbitrary or capricious action in its dealings with its subject and/or citizens of the State. The Supreme Court has observed in International Airport Authority’s case AIR 1970 SC page 1628 that the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory". In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Supreme Court has also observed 'Today with tremendous expansion of welfare and social service functions increasing control of material and economic resources and large scale assumption of industrial and commercial activities by the State, the power of the executive Government to affect the lives of the people is steadily growing. The attainment of socio economic justice being a conscious and of State policy, there is a vast and initiable increase in the frequency with which ordinary citizens come into relationship of direct encounter with State powers holders. This renders it necessary to structure and restrict the power of the executive Government so as to prevent its arbitrary application or exercise. It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess on arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the Executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its here minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege’. Every action of the Executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its here minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege’. It has also been observed in the said decision in paragraph 12 that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licence or licences or granting other forms of larges the Government it must be taken to be the law cannot act arbitrarily at its weet will and, like a private individual deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with the standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant." It is, therefore, write evident that even in the matter of offering rates for advertisements in the newspapers or periodicals, the Government cannot claim absolute freedom like an ordinary individual but every offer of the Government must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Govt. would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. I am, therefore, of the view that rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP is justiciable in this proceeding and unless and until it can be shown by the respondents that such rate structure was not made irrationally or discriminatorily or the departure, in any, from the standard or norm in any particular case or cases, was not made arbitrarily but was based on some valid principles which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory the rate structure is bound to be struck down. It, therefore, becomes necessary to consider as to whether or not the rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP is wholly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable and such rate was based on some principle which is in itself irrational, unreasonable and discriminatory. It, therefore, becomes necessary to consider as to whether or not the rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP is wholly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable and such rate was based on some principle which is in itself irrational, unreasonable and discriminatory. I am, therefore, of the view that rate of advertisement as framed by the DAVP is justiciable in this proceeding and unless and until it can be shown by the respondents that such rate structure was not made irrationally or discriminatorily or the departure, in any, from the standard or norm in any particular, case or cases, was not made arbitrarily but was based on some valid principles which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory the rate structure is bound to be struck down. It, therefore, becomes necessary to consider as to whether or not the rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP is wholly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable and such rate was based on some principle which is in itself irrational, unreasonable and discriminatory. It has been seriously contended by the petitioners that although a challenge was thrown specifically that the rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP for The Statesman was absolutely unreasonable, irrational and without any basis, the respondents failed to disclose the reasons on the plea that detailed disclosure as to why the said rate was offered to The Statesman cannot be made because there are large number of newspapers and periodicals and it is not possible to make disclosure individually to such newspapers and periodicals and once a disclosure in detail is made for The Statesman, it is likely that other newspapers and periodicals may ask for such disclosure and such detailed disclosure in all cases becomes impracticable. The petitioners contend that simply because other newspapers and periodicals may also ask for similar disclosure, the respondents have no right to refuse such disclosure when a challenge has been thrown by the petitioners in the instant Rule that the rate structure is absolutely irrational and without any basis. It is true that if an issue is justiciable in a court of law then the parties are bound to satisfy the court about the justification of the action challenged and the plea of expediency must be held to be a very weak plea. It is true that if an issue is justiciable in a court of law then the parties are bound to satisfy the court about the justification of the action challenged and the plea of expediency must be held to be a very weak plea. In the instant case, however, the basic outlines of the policy in forming the rate of advertisements have been indicated and it is necessary to examine the said outlines and also the materials disclosed before the court for coming to a finding as to whether or not the respondents have proceeded bona fide in the matter of framing the rate structure for advertisement by the DAVP and whether or not relevant consideration was made for framing the rate structure. It appears that the Government had been anxiously considering for quite some time past for proper utilisation of small and medium newspapers and Indian language newspapers which were generally ignored by the advertising agencies who had only preferred the big English newspapers. The Parliamentary Committees referred to hereinbefore had also indicated the need for a broad based national policy of advertisements by the Government and/or the DAVP. The Estimate Committees from time to time had also taken into consideration the impact of revenue on advertisements made by the Government and the public sector undertakings and the control exercised by some big newspapers including The Statesman in basing their rates of advertisement on the principle as the "traffic will bear". The public Accounts Committee in their 173rd Report recommended that the Government should examine the entire question or giving the mille rate keeping in view the size of newspapers periodicals with reference to its circulation, language, place or publication and the impact it had in the public mind. A Fact Finding Committee on newspaper economy was also constituted by the Government and the said Fact Finding Committee submitted report which revealed that there was no uniformity of mille rates charged by different newspapers or advertisement space. The said Fact Finding Committee had also commented that "dailies such as the Times of India of Bombay, The Statesman of Calcutta, The Hindusthan Times of Delhi and The Hindu of Madras were obviously monopolies so far as the advertisement rates are concerned and their rates are relatively high. The said Fact Finding Committee had also commented that "dailies such as the Times of India of Bombay, The Statesman of Calcutta, The Hindusthan Times of Delhi and The Hindu of Madras were obviously monopolies so far as the advertisement rates are concerned and their rates are relatively high. Each of these Dailies presumably fix its rate based on what the "traffic will bear." There is no evidence to show that these rates were based on reasonable cost of production and distribution and a fair rate of return. The respondents contended that in the backdrop of the aforesaid findings made by the Parliamentary Committees and the said Fact Finding Committee and in the genuine anxiety of the Government to frame a rational rate structure for the advertisements by the DAVP, the Government constituted a Rate Structure Committee consisting of the Secretary (Finance) Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, The Chief Accounts Officer, Ministry of Finance and the Director of the DAVP. These responsible and high officials had invited the views of various newspapers association including the I.E.N.S. of which The Statesman was a member. The Committee took into consideration the relevant factors including newspaper cost, other production cost and circulation of various categories of newspapers as well as reasonable margin of profit. It is contended by the respondents that as there are large number of newspapers/periodicals in the country it was not possible to frame advertisement rate for individual newspaper and periodical but an industry-wise study was made and a broad based rate structure has been framed for large, medium and small scale newspaper, language newspapers etc. and the rate structure has been framed after taking into account of the said relevant factors. The petitioners have however contended that the commercial rate of advertisement of the newspaper is fixed on the inter action of various factors and it is impossible for a third party like the DAVP to frame the rate structure for advertisements in newspapers. The petitioners have also contended that a newspaper determines its own advertisement rate on the basis of various subjective-elements, e.g. market potential, purchasing power of its readership, standard of production, pulling power etc. These subjective-factors materially contribute to the fixation of the advertisement rates of individual newspapers keeping in view the market demand for the space and competition with other newspapers. These subjective-factors materially contribute to the fixation of the advertisement rates of individual newspapers keeping in view the market demand for the space and competition with other newspapers. The factors are so subjective and peculiar and they differ so much from newspaper to newspaper that an objective evaluation of the advertisement rates of a newspaper by the Government is an impossibility. The petitioners have also referred to 173rd Report of the Public Accounts Committee of toe Fifth Lok Sabha wherein it has been observed that the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on behalf of the DAVP had admitted that the DAVP could not fix rates because the rates of different ......... newspapers would vary and the Government was not dispensing advertisements as gifts. The Government would give advertisement so as to reach particular targets. It was admitted by the Secretary before the Public Accounts Committee that for not giving advertisement in Hindusthan Times and The Statesman, a complaint from one of the Ministries came. The petitioners also contend that the said Rate Structure Committee did not invite The Statesman to place its case before framing the rate of advertisement so far as the advertisement is concerned. The petitioners further contend that Government acts through human agencies and the so-called expert bodies which framed the alleged rate structure are agents of the Government and they have, in any event, acted on the basis of the information given to them by the Government. In this connection, reference may be made to paragraph 3.15 of the 23rd Report of the Estimates Committee of 1978-79. The Estimates Committee has noted that there is no means with DAVP or any other organisation to satisfy themselves whether the rate quoted by a newspaper was the lowest. Therefore, the Rate Structure Committee felt that the DAVP needed some guidance on a rational basis. The Committee went into the question whether the newspapers who quote rates for a particular paper do earn a reasonable profit and whether it is commensurate with the cost of producing the service. They brake down the cost elements of rendering the service. Obviously, the major element was the newsprint cost. They examined a representative number of daily newspapers to find out what is the relationship between the newsprint cost and all other costs. They brake down the cost elements of rendering the service. Obviously, the major element was the newsprint cost. They examined a representative number of daily newspapers to find out what is the relationship between the newsprint cost and all other costs. From the information available from published records and from the office of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, they worked out the relationship between the newsprint costs and all other costs that were incurred by individual papers and then summarised them into averages for each group of newspapers. It was found that in the case of language newspapers, the other costs expressed in terms of the percentage of newsprint costs were 50 per cent, of those in the case of English language papers. Over and above this, they provided for a 10 per cent margin of profit. The rate structure further provided weightage of 250 per c. cm. to all small and medium newspapers and a 15 per cent additional weightage to all Indian Language newspapers upto a circulation of one lakh. It was added that the rate structure laid down by the Committee was meant to be only a guidance to the DAVP to judge whether the rate quoted by a newspaper was reasonable or not. On the basis of these guide-lines, the DAVP has worked out the rates for individual newspapers. It thus appears that the Rate Structure Committee did not frame the rate structure out of nothing or it proceeded to frame a rate structure for the advertisements in different classes of newspapers wholly capriciously or arbitrarily and/or the said Committee had deviated from the accepted norm or standard without any reasonable basis. It may be quite likely that in framing the rate structure, there has been some errors or omissions and the rates offered to some of the newspapers including The Statesman have been low compared to fair and reasonable rate of advertisement to be claimed by such newspapers. But even assuming that the rate structure has failed to take note of the special and the subjective-features of some newspapers including The Statesman and even assuming that a better rate structure could or should have been framed, it does not appear to me that the Rate Structure Committee acted arbitrarily, capriciously or maliciously and/or they framed the rate structure without any rational basis whatsoever. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the action of the DAVP in offering the said rates to The Statesman has violated the fundamental and other rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India and as such, the rate structure should be struck down as per so bad and unconstitutional. At the same time, it should not be lost sight of that the Estimate Committee in its 23rd Report (1978-79) has noted that the rate structure laid down by the said Committee was meant only a guidance to the DAVP to judge whether the rate quoted by the newspaper was reasonable or not. It is, therefore, evident that the said rate structure is only tentative and further probe or review in individual cases can reasonably be expected if an aggrieved party makes a representation for review of the rate offered to it on furnishing relevant materials. It may be noted in this connection that the respondents definite case is that The Statesman Ltd. has not yet furnished Relevant materials for review of the rate structure of the DAVP concerning The Statesman. The rate of advertisement of a newspaper depends on inter action of various factors, some of which are highly subjective and as such no inflexible rate structure to suit all the newspapers can be made and only a tentative rate structure on broad based lines can be framed and the Estimate Committee of the Lok Sabha has clearly indicated that such tentative rate advices have been framed as a guide line to the DAVP to judge whether the rate of advertisement quoted by a news paper is just and fair. 28. So far as the accreditation policy of the DAVP is concerned, in my view, there is nothing wrong in the said accreditation policy. The Government and/or the DAVP can legitimately and reasonably ask for accreditation from the newspaper agencies authorised to handle the advertisement of the public sector undertakings and/or the Government in order to see that the newspaper agencies follow some standard or norm in implementing the policy of the Government. After the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum, there is no material before this Court from which it can be held that the undertaking now being taken by the Government from the newspaper agencies by way of accreditation is per as offensive and/or such undertaking leads or may lead to discrimination or arbitrariness. After the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum, there is no material before this Court from which it can be held that the undertaking now being taken by the Government from the newspaper agencies by way of accreditation is per as offensive and/or such undertaking leads or may lead to discrimination or arbitrariness. It should be born in mind that the wisdom of a Government policy cannot be questioned in a court of law and such wisdom must be left to the executive and to the legislature to whom the Government is answerable. Hence, even if the Government policy of advertisement contains various loopholes and some of the directions are likely to be misused by the Government officials, the Court should not consider the efficiency of the Government policy. It appears to me that the rate of advertisement of a newspaper depends on various variable factors and it is an extremely an extremely difficult task to determine a correct rate of advertisement by any outsider. Although the rate of advertisement framed by the DAVP for advertisement in The Statesman cannot be struck down on the ground that the said rate is wholly unreasonable, malicious, capricious and has been made without any rational basis whatsoever, there is, however enough force in the contention of the petitioners that the said rate is likely to cause serious prejudice to The Statesman because it is extremely difficult to take into account the various factors that constituted its rate of advertisement in the market. I have already indicated that the rate advices of the DAVP as per the finding of the Estimate Committee, is only a guide-line to judge the correctness or reasonableness of the lowest commercial rate of a newspaper including The Statesman and it is, therefore, reasonably expected that if a proper representation is made by The Statesman asking the Central Govt. and/or the DAVP to review the rate of advertisement so far as The Statesman is concerned on furnishing relevant materials, the Government and/or the DAVP will give its anxious consideration in the matter and review its rate structure in the light of the materials to be disclosed and/or discussions to be held between the parties. and/or the DAVP to review the rate of advertisement so far as The Statesman is concerned on furnishing relevant materials, the Government and/or the DAVP will give its anxious consideration in the matter and review its rate structure in the light of the materials to be disclosed and/or discussions to be held between the parties. It may be noted in this connection that in the written arguments submitted by the respondents before this Court and also in their submissions made at the hearing of the Rule it has been specifically submitted before the Court on behalf of the respondents that the rate offered by the DAVP is only meant for Government advertisements excluding the Railways and after the withdrawal of the Prasad Memorandum, the said rate is not binding on any of the public sector undertakings, autonomous bodies etc. and such bodies are quite free to choose their own rates. In view of such positive case made out by the respondents, it is not necessary to consider any further as to whether or not the respondents can indicate their rates on the public sector undertakings autonomous bodies, statutory corporation etc. and as such the said question has nor been taken into consideration. So far as the Prasad Memorandum is concerned, it is to be noted that the Prasad Memorandum was withdrawn by the Government with effect from August 21, 1978. It however appears from the letters and/or circulars disclosed by the petitioners that the Government and/or DAVP had instructed the public sector undertakings, corporate bodies etc. that till the withdrawal of the said Prasad Memorandum the directions contained in the said Memorandum were binding on them. No material whatsoever has been placed before this Court by the respondents to satisfy that the rates of advertisement alleged to have been fixed earlier as referred to in the Prasad Memorandum or the said circulars so far as The Statesman is concerned, was made after taking into consideration of relevant materials. Accordingly, in any event, it cannot be held that the said rate offered to The Statesman had a rational basis and there was no arbitrariness in such rate. In the circumstances, the respondents cannot ask for enforcement of the rate structure for The Statesman by the public sector undertakings, autonomous bodies etc., for the period when the Prasad Memorandum was in force. In the circumstances, the respondents cannot ask for enforcement of the rate structure for The Statesman by the public sector undertakings, autonomous bodies etc., for the period when the Prasad Memorandum was in force. As in the absence of proper materials, the rate of advertisement fixed by the DAVP during the continuance of the Prasad Memorandum can not be held to be rational and free from arbitrariness, the public sector undertakings etc. and the news agencies are not bound by such rate advices. The Rule is accordingly disposed of but there will be no order as to costs.