K.S. SIDHU, J—This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of directions, orders or writs in the nature of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle I. Jaipur, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (Assessment)—I, Jaipur and the Union of India, respondents 1, 2 and 3 respectively, for bringing up the record of the proceedings of re-assessment of the petitioners income for the assessment year 1977-78, held under section 147, Income Tax Act, 1961 (herein after called the Act), and quashing (i) the re-assessment order, dated, February 12, 1981, made thereunder, (ii) the notice dated, April 11, 1980, issued under section 148 of the Act and (iii) three separate orders of provisional attachment, dated, August 11, 12 and 23, 1980, passed under section 281B of the Act, and also restraining the respondents from taking any action against the petitioner, or in relation to his property, to enforce these notices and orders. In addition to this multiple relief, the petitioner also prayed for a declaration that sections 147 and 148 of the Act and section 3, Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948, are unconstitutional and therefore null and void. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this writ petition may be shortly stated here. The petitioner, Vimal Chand Golecha, is carrying on the business of sale and purchase of precious stones. He filed a return of his income, for the assessment year 1977-78, on August 29, 1977. According to him, his total income chargeable to tax was Rs. 73 580/-. The I.T.O. made an assessment order on October 29, 1977, computing the total assessable income of the petitioner at Rs. 81,550/-. 3. The petitioners brother, Hem Chandra Golecha deceased, had been working for a firm, M/s Sales S.A. of Geneva, in 1969. In due course, he became General Manager of a firm called M/s. Ashlyn & Co. Frankfurt. He went to Brazil and disappeared there in 1976. He has not been heard of since July 7, 1976. The petitioner and his family suspected that Hem Chandra Golecha had been murdered and that John Ashlyn (of M/s. Ashlyn and Co. Frankfurt) had a hand in his murder. Frankfurt. He went to Brazil and disappeared there in 1976. He has not been heard of since July 7, 1976. The petitioner and his family suspected that Hem Chandra Golecha had been murdered and that John Ashlyn (of M/s. Ashlyn and Co. Frankfurt) had a hand in his murder. John Ashlyn caused a notice, dated, December 6, 1977, to be served on M/s Golecha Exports Private Ltd, of which the petitioner is a Director, demanding payment from the said company of a sum of one million dollars as damages for the alleged wrongful acts of the company and its officers. He is said to have supplied to the respondents photostat copies of certain documents, purporting to have been signed by the petitioner with a view to involving the petitioner in such proceedings as may be started on that basis by the authorities concerned in India. According to the petitioner, all these documents have been fabricated and forged by John Ashlyn to blackmail the petitioner in an attempt to stop him from taking action for solving the mystery of the disappearance of his brother, Hem Chandra Golecha in 1976. 4. The petitioners grievance is that acting on those fales and fabricated documents, the I.T.O. (respondent 1) served the impugned notice, dated, April 11, 1980. on him under section 148 of the Act, stating that he proposed to re-assess his income as he had "reason to believe that your income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 1977-78 has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961", and calling upon him to furnish a return of his income for the assessment year 1977-78. The petitioner sent a written reply to this notice on May 22, 1980, stating that the return originally filed by him which formed the basis of the assessment order, dated, October 29, 1977, may be treated as return filed in pursuance of this notice. The petitioner further requested the I.T.O. to let him know the reasons which made him believe that the petitioners income had escaped asssessment. 5. On August 21, 1980, respondent 2 wrote a letter (Ex. F) to the petitioner disclosing therein the information in his possession showing that the petitioner had been exporting precious stones from India to/through M/s Sales S.A.. Geneva, and that the books of the letter showed that a total amount of 821 514 92. 5. On August 21, 1980, respondent 2 wrote a letter (Ex. F) to the petitioner disclosing therein the information in his possession showing that the petitioner had been exporting precious stones from India to/through M/s Sales S.A.. Geneva, and that the books of the letter showed that a total amount of 821 514 92. Swiss francs had been credited to the petitioners account between May 7. 1976 and February 2,1977. He further told the petitioner that he had information in his possession that the petitioner had written in his own hand two letters showing that he had instructed his bankers in Switzerland to transfer $ 11000 and $ 1,20,000 to the account of M/s Sales S.A. Geneva and that the books of this firm showed that they had credited the amount of $ 1.20,000 to the account of the petitioner in their books. The petitioner was thus called upon to explain why his income from this business be not estimated in the assessment years, 1977-78 and 1978-79. 6. The petitioner made a written reply to the letter Ex. F mentioned above denying that he had written any such letter as alleged instructing the bankers in Switzerland to transfer any amount to the account of M/s Sales S.A. Geneva. He did not specifically deny that a sum of 8,21,814.92 Swiss Francs had been credited to his account. 7. On December 5, 1980, respondent 2 sent letter to the petitioner, giving further details of the information in this possession and of the material gathered on the basis the enquiry held by him and thus giving him an opportunity of being heard in respect of that material in accordance with the provisions of section 142(3) of the Act. 8. By his letter, dated, December 15, 1980, the petitioner made a lengthy reply (Ex H/2) to the aforementioned notice under sec. 142(3). He denied the allegations contained in the notice. Thereafter he wrote a few more letters (Ex. 1/1 dated, December 22, 1980, Ex. 1/2, dated December 27, 1980, Ex. 1/3, dated January 1, 1981, Ex. 1/4, dated, January 3, 1981, Ex. J. dated January 5, 1981 and Ex. 142(3). He denied the allegations contained in the notice. Thereafter he wrote a few more letters (Ex. 1/1 dated, December 22, 1980, Ex. 1/2, dated December 27, 1980, Ex. 1/3, dated January 1, 1981, Ex. 1/4, dated, January 3, 1981, Ex. J. dated January 5, 1981 and Ex. K, dated January 15, 1981), requesting respondent 2 for the supply, inter alia, of certified copies of his own statements, recorded during the enquiry under section 142 of the Act, photos copies of various documents shown to him during the enquiry and other documents on which the revenue wanted to rely. It appears that respondent 2 proceeded to make the impugned assessment order (Ex. L), dated, February 12, 1981, without supplying three copies to the petitioner. He re-assessed his income at Rs. 50,13,500 as against the original assessment of Rs. 81,550/- for the assessment year 1977-78. 9. Aggrieved by the aforementioned assessment order and other notices etc. issued earlier preparatory to the making of the said order, the assessee filed this writ petition on March 16, 1981. for various reliefs as mentioned at the out set of this judgment. He has challenged the assessment order and other orders and notices on the following grounds :— (1) Sections 147 and 148 of the Act on which the respondents rely to sustain the impugned orders and notices contain delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the I.T.O. to re-open an assessment and thus visit the assessee with drastic action entailing serious consequences. These sections are therefore unconstitutional, being inconsistent with the|provisions of Articles 14, 19 (g) and 21 of the Constitution. (2) In issuing the notices under section 148 and making the assessment order under section 147 of the Act, the respondents relied on photo copies of certain documents which purport to have been attested by one of the Indian Consular Officers abroad acting under section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. The said section 3 is violative of Article 14, 19 (g) and 21 of the Constitution. (3) The assessing authority passed the impugned order of assessment, dated, February 12, 1981, in violation of the principles of natural justice. The order is therefore illegal and invalid. 10. The said section 3 is violative of Article 14, 19 (g) and 21 of the Constitution. (3) The assessing authority passed the impugned order of assessment, dated, February 12, 1981, in violation of the principles of natural justice. The order is therefore illegal and invalid. 10. On notice of motion being served on the respondents, they entered appearance through their counsel and filed a counter-affidavit dealing one by one with all the averments in the writ petition and denying the material allegations contained therein. They pleaded that if the petitioner had any real and genuine grievance against the impugned order of re-assessment, he should be left to seek his remedy by way of appeal within the ambit of the Act and that the remedy provided by the Act is adequate and efficacious. They referred in this connection to the relevant provisions of the Act providing remedy against wrong assessment or re-assessment. They pleaded that the petitioner had already filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) challenging the order of re-assessment, dated, February 12, 1981, and that the said appeal is still subjudice. According to the respondents, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that adequate alternative remedy is available to the petitioner and he has in fact already approached the appellate authority for appropriate relief. 11. The respondents denied that sections 147 and 148 of the Act and section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 are violative in any manner of the provisions of Articles 14, 19(g) and 21 of the, Constitution. They further denied that respondent 2 had passed the impugned order in contravention of the principles of natural justice. They maintained that respondent 2 had recorded the statement of the petitioner on different dates and that, as the examination proceeded, the respondent had shown to the petitioner and his counsel the photostat copies of the various documents relied on by the department in the enquiry. They pleaded that in fact most of the documents were either in the petitioners own hand or written at his instance. They asserted that respondent 2 had supplied photo copies of all the documents to the petitioner and that the petitioner was thus afforded full opportunity of explaining those documents. They pleaded that in fact most of the documents were either in the petitioners own hand or written at his instance. They asserted that respondent 2 had supplied photo copies of all the documents to the petitioner and that the petitioner was thus afforded full opportunity of explaining those documents. The petitioner who was represented throughout the enquiry by a lawyer did not care to render any explanation or produce any evidence in rebuttal. Instead, he contented himself by making a blanket denial that all the documents in question, were forged and fabricated. According to the respondents the petitioners grievance that he was prejudiced in his defence in the absence of the original documents being shown to him is artificial and insincere for, as they further stated, the original documents would not have made any difference in view of the fact that the petitioner had described those documents, on seeing their photo copies, as having been forged and fabricated by or at the instance of John Ashlyn. Respondent 2 pleaded that he was fully satisfied on evidence that the documents in question were genuine and that some of them were even in the band of the petitioner himself. The respondents defended the impugned order of re assessment pleading that it had been passed on evidence and in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice 12. After hearing the petitioners counsel at length, we find no substance at all in the petitioners challenge to the constitutionality of sections 147 and 148 of the Act and section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. It is obvious on a plain reading of the writ petition that its draftsman was himself not so sure that the aforementioned statutory provisions violated in any manner the petitioners right to equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It appears that the petitioner knew it too well that, but for such a challenge, there would be nothing in the petition on the basis of which he could reasonably hope to get this petition admitted. We are of the considered opinion that these statutory provisions are perfectly constitutional. We may now give our reasons briefly. 13. It appears that the petitioner knew it too well that, but for such a challenge, there would be nothing in the petition on the basis of which he could reasonably hope to get this petition admitted. We are of the considered opinion that these statutory provisions are perfectly constitutional. We may now give our reasons briefly. 13. Section 147, excluding the two explanations appended to it, which are not relevant for our present purpose and section 148 of the Act, which are under challenge, may be reproduced here tor convenience of reference. They read as under :— 147. Income escaping assessment. If- (a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or (b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in clause(a) on the part of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer has in consequence of information in his possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year). 148. Issue of notice where income has escaped assesment. (1) Before making the assessment, re-assessment or re-com- putation under section 147, the Income Tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 139; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section. (2) The Income-tax Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so. 14. It will be seen that section 147 empowers the I.T.O. inter alia to reassess the income which has escaped assessment in the relevant assessment year due to the concealment of income by the assessee. (2) The Income-tax Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so. 14. It will be seen that section 147 empowers the I.T.O. inter alia to reassess the income which has escaped assessment in the relevant assessment year due to the concealment of income by the assessee. Section 148 prescribes the procedure for initiation of the proceedings of re-assessment. Sub-section (1) of section 148 lays down that before making the re-assessment the I.T.O. shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish a return of his income in the prescribed form. It is, noteworthy that sub-section 2 of section 148 further enjoins the I.T.O. to record his reasons in every case before issuing a notice under sub-section 1. Section 149 prescribes the time limit within which notice under section 148(1) may be issued. Section 151 lays down that no notice under section 148(1) shall be issued after the expiry of four years from the end of relevant assessment year, unless the Commissioner is satisfied on the reasons recorded by the I.T.O. under section 148(2) that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice. It further lays down that if such notice is to be issued after the expiry of 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, it would require the prior sanction at a higher level i.e., of the Central Board of Direct Taxes instead of the Commissioner. Section 153(2) provides another safeguard in that it requires that such re-assessment must be made within four years from the end of the assessment year in which notice under section 148(1) was served. 15. The setting of sub-section 2 of section 148 in the group of section (i.e. sections 147 to 153) clearly indicates that the reasons behind the requirement in this sub-section enjoining the I.T.O. to record his reasons for initiating action for re-assessment is purely administrative in character, so as to enable the higher administrative authorities, i.e., the Commissioner and the Central Board of Direct Taxes, to exercise proper control and supervision of such action by the I.T.O. and to restrain it, if necessary, in appropriate cases. That is why the Madras High Court while dealing with section 34, Income Tax Act, 1922, which was in similar terms as sections 147 and 148 of the Act, held in Presidency Talkies Ltd. v. First Additional Income Tax Officer (1) that reasons recorded by the I.T.O. for initiating action for re assessment need not be communicated to the assessee and that the only object of the requirement as to the recording of reasons is to safeguard the interest of the assessee against any hasty action on the part of the I T.O. or action without any justification. The Supreme Court approved this ruling in S. Narayanappa v. Income Tax Commissioner (2), repeating that there is no requirement in any of the provisions of the Act that reasons recorded under section 148(2) must be communicated to the assessee as a condition for the initiation of action against him for re-assessment of his income. 16. Now, as already stated, the attack on the constitutionality of sections 147 and 148 of the Act is based on the argument that they vest the I.T.O. with uncontrolled and arbitrary power to re-open an assessment once made according to law, and thus visit the assessee with drastic action entailing serious consequences to him. It is argued that dispensing with the communication of reasons, recorded under section 148f2). to the assessee is a serious matter affecting the rights of the assessee and that for this reason alone this section must be struck down as unconstitutional. It is further submitted that sections 147 and 148 suffer from another vice in that they enable the I.T.O. to make up his mind and thus decide to re-open an assessment without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard in that behalf. 17. All these arguments in our opinion, are wholly devoid of force. We have already surveyed the provisions of the Act relating to re-assessment in order to highlight the fact that there is nothing arbitrary about any of these provisions and that rigorous checks and controls have been provided by Parliament on the exercise of power by the I.T.O. to initiate action for re-assessment. In the fore-front of these checks and controls is the requirement of section 148(2) enjoining the I.T.O. to record reasons for initiating action for reassessment. In the fore-front of these checks and controls is the requirement of section 148(2) enjoining the I.T.O. to record reasons for initiating action for reassessment. Such reasons can be scrutinized by the higher administrative authorities to ascertain if the action initiated is justified or not Since at the stage of initiating action for re-assessment, the assessee is not a party to the proceedings, the Supreme Court held in S. Narayanappas Case (supra) that reasons recorded for initiating such action need not be communicated to the assessee The assessee becomes a party to the proceedings so ruled the Supreme Court in that case, only after service of the notice under sec. 148(1) is effected on him. In other words, there is no finality about the reasons recorded under sec 148 (2) so far as the assessee is concerned. Sec 148(1) itself provided that for making a valid order of re-assessment, the assessing authority shall have to comply with all the requirements of the Act relating to the making of an order of assessment. One of the requirements of making an order of assessment is the holding of enquiry in accordance with the provisions of sec. 142. Sub section 3 of sec 142 lays down that the assessee shall be given an opportunity of being heard in respect of any material gathered on the basis of any enquiry held under that section. 18. It will thus be seen that section 148 of the Act contains a built-in safeguard for the assessee in that it makes it obligatory on the assessing authority to disclose to the assessee the material on the basis of which it proposes to re-assess his income and then give him an opportunity of being heard and explaining that material. The other checks and controls on the power of the assessing authority are enacted in section 149 to 158 of the Act. We cannot therefore, accept the argument that sections 147 and 149 contain delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the I.T.O. to re-open an assessment without any reason. The other checks and controls on the power of the assessing authority are enacted in section 149 to 158 of the Act. We cannot therefore, accept the argument that sections 147 and 149 contain delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the I.T.O. to re-open an assessment without any reason. 19 Though sections 147 and 148 of the Act contain all the necessary safeguards ensuring fair play to an assessee, we are not unmindful of a situation wherein an I.T.O. if he is determined to act in an arbitrary manner, may record reasons which are no reasons in the eye of law and thus issue notice to the assessee initiating action for assessment of his income. Now, if that be so, one cannot condemn the statute as unconstitutional merely because the I T.O. has ignored the principles enacted therein for regulating the exercise of his discretion. What should be struck down in such a situation is the action of the I.T.O. rather than the statute which he ignored in taking an illegal action. 20. The challenge to the constitutionality of sections 147 and 148 of the Act therefore, fails. 21. Similarly, there is no force in the argument that section 3, Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oath and Fees) Act, 1948, is unconstitutional. Section 3(1) confers power on Indian Diplomatic and Consular Officers in foreign coun-tries to administer any oath and do any material act which any Notery Public may do within a State and every oath so administered and material act so done shall be as effectual as if duly administered or done by any lawful authority in a State. Sec. 3(2) lays down that a document purrorting to have been authenticated in the manner prescribed and bearing a seal of such Diplomatic or Consular Officer shall be admitted in evidence without proof of the seal or signature of the officer concerned or of the official character of that person. Counsel for the petitioner attacked the constitutionality of this section mainly on the ground that it arbitrarily dispenses with the formal proof of a document, as required by the Indian Evidence Act and thus enables a court to admit an unproved document merely on the strength that it bears the authenticating seal and signatures of a Diplomatic or Consular Officer. We find no force in this argument. We find no force in this argument. Sec. 3 does not dispense with the proof of a document according to law if it is to be send as evidence in a Court of law. All that the section does is to enable a court to dispense with the proof of the genuineness of the seal and signatures of a Diplomatic or Consular Officer on a particular document. If the document is otherwise relevant and proved according to law, its photo copy can be admitted in evidence provided such copy is duly authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. 22. Before concluding discussion on this point, we may add that in making assessment, the I.T.O does not act merely on what is technically described as "evidence" in the Indian Evidence Act. It will be seen from sections 142 and 143 of the Act that he may also act on "the material gathered" by him. The word "material" clearly shows that the I.T.O. is not fettered by the technical rules of evidence and the like and that he may act on material which may not strictly speaking be accepted an evidence in a court of law. 23. Thus, the challenge to the constitutionality of section 3, Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948, also fails. 24. Lastly, we take up the petitioners plea to the effect that the impugned order of assessment was made by the assessing authority in violation of the principles of natural justice. We have carefully examined the material on record and find that this plea is groundless. We have seen the reasons recorded by the I T.O. under sec. 148 (2) of the Act for initiation of the proceedings of re-assess-ment.We find that the reasons recorded are relevant, and, if correct, could, lead to the legitimate inference that the assessees income had excepted assessment by reason of its concealment by him. The substance of these reasons was communicated to the assessee during the enquiry, vied detailed letter Ex. F. dated, Aug. 21, 1980, from respondent 2 to the petitioner. The petitioner made a detailed reply, Ex.G. dated, Sept. 1, 1980, to the said communication. The substance of these reasons was communicated to the assessee during the enquiry, vied detailed letter Ex. F. dated, Aug. 21, 1980, from respondent 2 to the petitioner. The petitioner made a detailed reply, Ex.G. dated, Sept. 1, 1980, to the said communication. Thereafter, the entire material gathered by the assessing authority on the basis of his enquiry and which was proposed to be utilised for the purpose of assessment was disclosed to the assessee, vide letter, Ex.M dated, December 5, 1980, with a view to giving him an opportunity of being heard in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 142(3) of the Act. The assessing authority (i.e. respondent 2) has sworn an affidavit to the effect that photo copies of all the documents required by the petitioner were supplied to him during the enquiry and that he was thus afforded an opportunity of explaining those documents It is true that the original documents of which photocopies were supplied to the petitioner, were not shown to the petitioner at any stage of the enquiry. They could not possibly be shown to him for the simple reason that the assessing authority was himself not in possession of the original documents. 25. It will thus be seen on the facts, as established on record, that the petitioner was afforded full opportunity of being heard before the impugned order of assessment was made. Natural justice which is said to have been violated is not so rigid and inflexible a concept as to insist invariably that the person concerned must be shown the original documents which are required to be explained by him. It is well settled that the requirements of natural justice depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry the statute under which the tribunal is acting and the subject matter to be dealt with. We are satisfied that in the context of the Act the nature of the enquiry under Sec. 142 and the fact that the original documents are said to be in possession of a foreigner residing in a foreign country, the demands of natural justice were fully met by supplying the assessee with photo copies of the documents in possession of the assessing authority. He denied the genuineness and correctness of these documents by seeing the photo copies. He denied the genuineness and correctness of these documents by seeing the photo copies. Had he seen the originals, he could have done so better then denying their genuineness and correctness. What is the value of these photo copies as "material" for the reassessment of the petitioners income is a question which had better been left at this stage to the professional judgment of a hierarchy of income tax authorities with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at the apart. As stated earlier, the petitioner has already filed an appeal against the order of re-assessment, which is pending. If still not satisfied, he could be entitled to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. If the decision of the Appellate Tribunal also fails to satisfy him, he would be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for reference on questions of law to the High Court. If the Tribunal refuses to make a reference, he would be entitled to apply directly to the High Court for an order to the Tribunal directing it to state a case. This was the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Firm S.B. Hatbawala vs. Income Tax Commissioner (3). We entirely agree and see no-reason to entertain this writ petition at this stage. 26. For all these reasons, this writ petition is wholly unsustainable, and is, therefore, dismissed in limine.