Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, while he was working as Inspector of Police in the Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Madurai South district, was served with an order, dated 13th October, 1977 compulsorily retiring him from service under R. 3 (2) of the Madras Liberalised Pension Rules. 1960—The order runs as follows— “Thiru P. Kruppiah, whose date of birth is 1st July, 1924 and who was enlisted as a police constable in this department on 30th September, 1944, was promoted to officiate as Inspector of Police with effect from 1st August, 1975, A.N. He is now working as Inspector of Police in the Prohibition Enforcement wing, Madurai South district. He has completed 50 years of age and put 25 years of qualifying service on date. He has accumulated a number of punishments and his general record of service has been unsat isfactory. He has ceased to be an efficient and useful member of the police force and is therefore fit to be retired compulsorily under R. 3 (2) M.L.P.R. 1960, 2. I, Thiru K, V, Subramanian, I.P.C. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Madras, who is the competent authority to retire him from service, do hereby order that he be compulsorily retired with effect from 31st October, 1977, A.N. in the above circumstances, He is informed that three months salary due to him will be drawn and paid by the Superintendent of Police, Madurai South district, which he can receive on 31st October, 1977, A.N. 3. He will please acknowledge receipt of this proceeding.’ The said order was passed by the second respondent. There was an appeal by the petitioner to the first respondent as against this order and the first respondent, by order, dated 4th July, 1978 rejected the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner challenges the orders of the respondents in the present writ petition. 2. The main ground of challenge that has been projected by Mr. There was an appeal by the petitioner to the first respondent as against this order and the first respondent, by order, dated 4th July, 1978 rejected the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner challenges the orders of the respondents in the present writ petition. 2. The main ground of challenge that has been projected by Mr. K.T. Paulpandian, learned counsel for the petitioner and which ground, in my view, has got to be sustained is that though the order passed by the second respondent on 12th October, 1977 apparently reads as an order of compulsory retirement in accordance with the rules, yet, it would amount to dismissal or removal from service on charges of misconduct and negligence and hence Art. 311 of the Constitution of India is attracted and in as much as the requirements of the said Article have not been complied with, the order is liable to be quashed. 3. Compulsory retirement of a Government servant on proportionate pension before the age of superannuation but on completion of service for the prescribed number of years according to the rules in this regard or on attainment of the prescribed age as per the said rules, would not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311, although such compulsory retirement necessarily means termination of service of the Government servant. But where the order, though described as an order of compulsory retirement, is apparently based on charges of misconduct or inefficiency and the like, it would amount to a punishment and hence removal from service. 4. In P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India 1, the Supreme Court observed as follows— “The position may therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 4. In P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India 1, the Supreme Court observed as follows— “The position may therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish-chander v. Union of India 2, Likewise, the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art, 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shaymlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 3 in either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule; nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contractor the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is as Chagla, C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India 1 wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contractor the service rules, then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted. But, even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, neverth eless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to he founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.” 5. Two tests have been recognized by judicial precedents to find out as to whether an order of compulsory retirement would tantamount to punishment. Two tests have been recognized by judicial precedents to find out as to whether an order of compulsory retirement would tantamount to punishment. The first is whether the action is by way of punishment and to find that out, it is necessary that a charge of imputation against the officer is made the condition of the exercise of the power; the second is whether by compulsory retirement the officer is toting the benefit he has already earned by the dismissal or removal. In this connection, Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madan Mohan Nagar 2 and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Venkataraman and Krishnaswamy Reddy, JJ. in Shankar Rao v. Government of India. 3 6. In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madan Mohan Nagar 4 the order of retirement stated that the officer had outlived his utility. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the reason that the officer had outlived his utility did not show that the order of compulsory retirement amounted to an order of dismissal or removal, because in every case of compulsory retirement it was implied that the person had outlived his usefulness. The Supreme Court held that in that case the order in question did cast a stigma on the officer. 7. It is now settled that where there are no express words in the order of compulsory retirement itself which would throw a stigma on the Government servant, the court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. This proposition has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh 5 as well as in State of U.P. v. Ramchandra. 6 Pronouncements to the same effect have also been made by Mohan, J. one in Lakshminarayana v. Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu 7 and another in R. Srinivasan v. Government of Tamil Nadu. 8 The learned Judge, in the earlier case, laid down that stigma must stem from the order itself and not be drawn out by a speculative process by reading into the order any innuendo from other circumstances or possibilities or suspicions. 8. 8 The learned Judge, in the earlier case, laid down that stigma must stem from the order itself and not be drawn out by a speculative process by reading into the order any innuendo from other circumstances or possibilities or suspicions. 8. In the present case, there is no necessity to delve into the Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. The words used in the impugned order are explicit and leave no room for ambiguity. It is categorically stated that the petitioner has accumulated a number of punishments and his general record of service has been unsatisfactory and he has ceased to be an efficient and useful member of the police force. These expressions definitely cast a stigma on the petitioner and the order in question would amount to a punishment and his removal from service so as to attract Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. In this view, as stated above, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be sustained. In as much as the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India have not been complied with, I am obliged to interfere in writ proceedings. 9. Mr. A. Sivaji, learned counsel representing the respondents, would draw my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in N.R. Singh v. Chief Commissioner, Manipur 9, But, that is of no avail to the respondents, because the order dealt with in that decision is one of compulsory retirement without casting any stigma as in the instant case. The learned counsel would also draw my attention to another judgment of the Supreme Court in Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan . 1 There again, the order in question did not contain any stigma against the petitioner therein so as to attract the applicability of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the said circumstances, the writ petition has got to be allowed and the same is allowed and the orders of the respondents are quashed. But, there will be no order as to costs in the writ petition.