JUDGMENT 1. :- A notice to show cause under Section 15 read with Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was given to Shri Om Prakash Bansal, an Editor, Printer and Publisher of the weekly newspaper "Prasant Jyoti" for the news item published in the said paper dated 30th Mar. 1981. In the opinion of the court, the news item as a whole was prima facie contemptuous of this court and of the subordinate courts. This news item scandalised the former judges and the present judges of the High Court of Rajasthan. It also scandalises 32 judicial officers mentioned in the said news item. The District Judge, Jaipur City, the District Judge, Jaipur District, the Additional District Judge of Court Nos. 4, 6 and 7 had made reference to this court complaining that the publication of the aforesaid news item constituted criminal contempt of Court. It was further mentioned that in the show cause notice that the portions marked A to B, C to D, E to F, and G to H were in our opinion prima facie sufficient to take cognizance of the criminal contempt committed by Shri Om Prakash Bansal. Thus taking cognizance of criminal contempt committed by Shri O.P. Bansal, a direction was given to issue a notice to Shri O.P. Bansal as to why he should not be punished for the contempt of this Court and the subordinate courts. Copies of the references made by the subordinate courts, copies of the news item published in 'Prasant Jyoti' dated 30th Mar. 1981, and copies of the portions marked A to B, C to D, E to F, and G to H were sent to the contemner Shri O.P. Bansal. In compliance to the show cause notice Shri Bansal appeared in this Court and filed a written reply. Arguments in this case were heard on 14th and 15th May, 1981. Shri Bhagirath Singh Shekhawat, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the contemner closed his arguments on 15th May, 1981 and at the close of arguments submitted an application praying that he may be given an opportunity to summon certain record and to produce witnesses, Arguments were heard on this application also and it was ordered that the application shall be decided along with the main order. At this stage Shri O.P. Bansal also moved an application praying to stay the contempt proceedings so that he may obtain transfer orders from the Supreme Court. This application was dismissed by us on the same day. 2. Before dealing with the merits of the case we deem it necessary to reproduce the news item as a whole published in "Prasant Jyoti" dated 30th Mar. 1981 with portions marked A to B, C to D. E to F, and G to H:- 3. In the reply to the show cause notice Shri Bansal raised several grounds, the substance of which is as under : (1) The procedure adopted before giving notice was not proper according to law. (2) The so-called references do not come within the purview of reference and even the name of the non-petitioner has not been mentioned in this reference and no action has been sought against the non-petitioner as such the proceedings are not maintainable against him. (3) The persons making references had not supported the same with affidavits. (4) The matter published in the Article does not relate with any proceedings pending in any court and in case the matter published is considered to be false and defamatory, no proceedings for contempt can be taken but the remedy lies for taking proceedings for defamation by the persons who are alleged to have been defamed. (5) The allegations made by the news item are the contents of representation given by 25 advocates of Jaipur in 1977 to the President of India, the copies of which were also given to other high signatories. In case any contempt has been committed of Hon'ble Judges it had already been committed on 5th Nov. 1977 by advocates of Jaipur and a proceeding for contempt of court after 31/2 years is barred under Section 20 of the Act. The advocates, who made the aforesaid representation are necessary parties in this case and in case the non-petitioner is held responsible and called upon to give a reply, in that case he wants to produce all the advocates who had signed the aforesaid representation, the President of India, the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India, the Prime Minister of India, Home Minister and Law Minister of the Central Government, and Hon'ble Justice P.N. Shinghal as his witnesses. (6) As regards portion marked A to B, the contents of which are true and its truthfulness can be ascertained from the record of the High Court. In this regard the then Registrar Vigilance, his inquiry report and the entire concerning record is necessary to be attached with these proceedings and in order to prove the aforesaid documents, the Vigilance Registrars holding such offence after 1977 shall be produced in defence. (7) As regards portions marked C to D, the contents are the same which were given in a representation by 16 Advocates of Bikaner to the Hon'ble Chief Minister. Rajasthan and which were widely circulated in October, 1978. The action sought to have been taken against the aforesaid 16 advocates at that time and not after 21/2 years against the contemner it is wrong and illegal to make it a basis for contempt of Court which is barred under Section 20 of the Act. In case any action is still taken against the non-petitioner then he may be granted an opportunity to produce the aforesaid 16 advocates the then Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, the then Registrar Vigilance and the then Administrative Judge in his defence. As regards E to F and G to H it is mentioned that these are the portions of the representation submitted by the Jaipur Advocates on 5th Nov. 1977 as mentioned above. (8) The reference made by the various officers of the subordinate court are the result of a pre-planned conspiracy and creation of the mind of one person as the language used in all the references is almost identical. The reference sent by S/Shri S.R. Kothari, Radhey Shyam Sharma and Vasudeo Vyas have been typed on one type machine and appears to be a reflection of some controversy having arisen after the elections of 1977-78 for the offence bearers of Rajasthan Judicial Service. (9) In the aforesaid reference different dates i.e. 9, 10, 13 and 15th April, have been mentioned and no action could be taken by amalgamating all such reference in one. (10) The non-petitioner had no concern with Shri M.R. Mitruka District Judge nor he got any information through him before publishing the news item in question. (9) In the aforesaid reference different dates i.e. 9, 10, 13 and 15th April, have been mentioned and no action could be taken by amalgamating all such reference in one. (10) The non-petitioner had no concern with Shri M.R. Mitruka District Judge nor he got any information through him before publishing the news item in question. Whatever information has been derived by the non-petitioner it is on the basis of representations and other matters already published and from the advocates for which it would not be proper to implicate Shri Mitruka with whom the non-petitioner had no acquaintance. (11) The subject matter of the news item cannot be said to be a civil contempt nor a criminal contempt. The reference were not addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice but only addressed to Registrar High Court. (12) The show cause notice should be discharged on the basis of the preliminary objections and in case this proceeding is not dismissed on preliminary objections in that the non-petitioner can bring other facts on record including the record of this Court for which proper opportunity may be granted. 4. Mr. Bhagirath Singh during the course of arguments pressed the following points : The proceedings are barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Act as they relate to a period of 1977-78 and being beyond one year, no proceedings for contempt can now be taken. In this regard it is contended that the matter contained in portion marked C to D relates to the representation made by advocates of Bikaner in 1978 and the portion contained in E to F relates to the representation made by the Jaipur Advocates in 1977, Reliance is placed on the language of Section 20 of the Act and also Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrishna Mishra, C.J. of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2255 : (1970 Cri LJ 1) . 5. We find no force in this contention of Mr. Bhagirath Singh. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. The terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. Bhagirath Singh. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. The terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. It is not in dispute that the present news item has been published by the non-petitioner in the weekly newspaper 'Prasant Jyoti' dated 30th Mar. 1981 and the proceedings for contempt have been initiated by this Court on 4th May, 1981. Though there is nothing on the record to hold that the non-petitioner only published the contents of the representations made by the Jaipur Advocates in 1977 or Bikaner Advocates in 1978, but that apart every publication itself gives a fresh ground for taking proceedings for contempt and the present proceedings cannot be held to be barred by limitation even though the news item might relate to the same subject matter which were given in the representation of 1977 and 1978 as alleged by Shri Bansal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra) has observed that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt whether suo motu, or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus-a-quo for a period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. In our view the above observations do not render any assistance to the arguments advanced by Mr. Bhagirath Singh as regards limitation. It was next contended by Mr. Bhagirath Singh that no proceeding for contempt could be initiated as no case or proceeding were pending before any court and the news item did not make any comment with regard to a pending proceeding or cases for hampered the course of justice in any manner. There is no force at all in this submission of the learned counsel. It is not necessary that in order to make a criminal contempt, the act of publication should be in relation to a pending proceeding or case in the court. There is no force at all in this submission of the learned counsel. It is not necessary that in order to make a criminal contempt, the act of publication should be in relation to a pending proceeding or case in the court. Clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act defines criminal contempt as under:- "Criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in and other manner"; A bare perusal of the above definition shows that a publication whether by words, spoken or written, of any matter or the doing of any other act whatever which scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court also amounts to criminal contempt in the above definition. 6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for contemner that the news item in question could only amount to defamation of the judges named in it and the proper course could have been of taking defamatory proceedings against the non-petitioner and not the proceeding for contempt of court. It is contended that the offence of defamation under the Indian Penal Code was punishable with a higher penalty than the contempt of Court and in case the non-petitioner had committed any offence of defamation he is ready to face the higher penalty. It is further argued that the proceedings for contempt of court are of summary nature and the non-petitioner has been put to a disadvantage and in case proceedings for defamation are launched against him he would be able to bring forth the oral and documentary evidence to show the correctness and the truthfulness of the allegations published in the news item. There is a difference between the law of libel and contempt of court. 7. We are not at all impressed by the aforesaid argument advanced by Shri Bhagirath Singh. It is correct that not all defamatory matter can amount to contempt of court. There is a difference between the law of libel and contempt of court. 7. We are not at all impressed by the aforesaid argument advanced by Shri Bhagirath Singh. It is correct that not all defamatory matter can amount to contempt of court. Whether defamatory matter amounts to contempt of court in any particular case is a question of fact or degree and of circumstances. The defamatory statement scandalising a judge in his official capacity calls for an action in contempt. But of the impugned article attacks the judge personally and not on account of any of his official actions, it can only be questioned by libel action. However, venomous and sarcastic an article may be, if it is only an attack on the judge in his personal capacity and not in the capacity of a judge, there is no contempt. But if the impugned article attacked the judge a scribing to him favouritism in his judicial or official capacity, it is contempt. Criticism of judges is always welcome within legitimate limits. As Frank Further, J. Puts in Pennekemp v. Florida (1946) 90 Law Ed 1295 at p. 1313 as follows : "If men including judges and journalists were angels there would be no problems of contempt of court. Angelic Judges would be undisturbed by extraneous influences and angelic journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for contempt as a means of safeguarding Judges in deciding on behalf of the, community as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide is not a privilege accorded to judges. The power to punish for contempt of court is a safeguard not for judges as persons but for the function which they exercise. It is a condition of that function indispensable for a free society that in a particular controversy pending before a Court and awaiting judgement, human beings however strong should not be torn from their moorings of impartiality by the under tow of extraneous influence." It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 Supreme Court 10 : (1954 Cri LJ 238) that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by 'scandalising' the court itself. In the first place the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duty would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the fight of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of Justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should he taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt. Thus, in our opinion, it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that action alone can be taken by proceeding in libel and no action can by taken for contempt of court even though the action scandalises the action of a judge in his official or judicial capacity. Keeping the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in mind we shall examine at appropriate place whether the news item in question amounts to contempt of court or not. 8. It was contended by Mr. Bhagirath Singh that the reference made by the various judicial officers were addressed to the Registrar and not to the Chief Justice. No reasons have been given by Hon'ble the Chief Justice as to why action should be taken against Om Prakash Bansal alone. It is vehemently urged that copy of office note put by the Registrar before the Hon'ble Chief Justice has not been supplied to the contemner and in any case such office note should be called by the court for its perusal. In our opinion addresses in official communication by the lower officers of the judiciary are addressed to the Registrar and not to Hon'ble the Chief Justice directly. There is noting wrong if the reference were addressed to the Registrar and the same were subsequently brought to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice by the Registrar. The Chief Justice only constituted a bench according to the Rules of this Court and sent the matter for its consideration. There is noting wrong if the reference were addressed to the Registrar and the same were subsequently brought to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice by the Registrar. The Chief Justice only constituted a bench according to the Rules of this Court and sent the matter for its consideration. The court after going through the news item in question was satisfied that prima facie a case of contempt of Court was made out against the non-petitioner and after taking cognizance issued a notice to show cause. In our view it is a case of taking cognizance on a news item which has been brought to the notice of the Court and the Court is satisfied to take cognizance. It is immaterial who made the references and what procedure was followed before taking cognizance. The Court is entitled to take cognizance either suo motu or on motion or on a reference. It is only under Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or in relation to a Union Territory by such Law officer as the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette specify this behalf. In this case on the basis of the contents published in the news item this Court was satisfied prima facie that it scandalises the former judges and the present judges of the Rajasthan High Court. The court before taking cognizance was also satisfied that it also scandalises 32 judicial officers mentioned in the said news item for which reference were made to the Court. We thus hardly find, any irregularity or illegality in taking cognizance of criminal contempt against Shri Bansal on account of the news item published by him in weekly newspapers 'Prasant Jyoti' dated 30.3.1981. In our view, the note put up by the Registrar placing reference before the Chief Justice has hardly any relevance in the matter of taking cognizance by the Court. We thus do not find it necessary to call the office note and place it on record or to peruse it. We may further mention that in the matter of procedure to be followed in taking proceeding for contempt of court no particular procedure has been prescribed. We thus do not find it necessary to call the office note and place it on record or to peruse it. We may further mention that in the matter of procedure to be followed in taking proceeding for contempt of court no particular procedure has been prescribed. The court is guided by its own procedure to be followed in the facts and circumstances of such individual case and to see that the contemner is getting full opportunity to make his defence and no principle of natural justice is violated in following such procedure. In our opinion, if a copy of the note put by the Registrar, bringing the reference to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, is not supplied to the contemner, it does not prejudice the defence of the contemner in the facts of this case. 9. Mr. Bhagirath Singh next contended that in the reference made by the lower judicial officers no name was mentioned of Om Prakash Bansal as a contemner and the references were not supported by any affidavit, learned counsel in this regard placed reliance on Piara Singh v. State AIR 1958 Punjab 141 : (1958 Cri LJ 673) in which it was observed as under (Para 13):- "It is an accepted proposition of law that when a contempt committed in the presence of the court, it is within the competence of the Court to act on what it sees and hears and on that evidence alone to punish the offender without trial or issue and without other proof than its actual knowledge of what occurred. But it is equally well settled that where the contempt does not occur in the presence and hearing of the Court it must be brought to the attention of the Court by affidavits or sworn statements of the facts by persons who witnessed them or have knowledge of them. The affidavit which is a necessary pre-requisite to the issue of a rule must specify the acts and in such a way as prima facie to show the commission of a contempt." We do not find any substance in the above contention raised by Mr. Bhagirath Singh, Firstly, there is no requirement under any law that reference made by a subordinate Court to the High Court in case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, such reference should be supported by an affidavit. Bhagirath Singh, Firstly, there is no requirement under any law that reference made by a subordinate Court to the High Court in case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, such reference should be supported by an affidavit. In the Punjab case referred to above it only lays down that where the contempt does not occur in the presence and hearing of the Court it must be brought to the attention of the Court by affidavits or sworn statements of the facts by persons who witnessed them or have knowledge of them. The case had arisen on a petition under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The petitioner has prayed that Sardar Partap Singh Kairon Chief Minister Punjab should be committed for contempt of Court for interfering with a judicial inquiry pending before a Magistrate of the 1st Class at Karnal. It was contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Punjab and for the Chief Minister that although the petition was supported by an affidavit of the petitioner who could have no personal knowledge of the facts stated therein, more particularly those stated in paras. 2, 4, 17 and 18, it was unsupported by the affidavit of any person who had direct knowledge of the facts. In the background of these circumstances their Lordships of the Punjab High Court made observations as reproduced above. In our view, no reference sent by the lower judicial officers in the present case were required to be supported by any affidavit as they had no personal knowledge and merely wanted to bring the news item in question to the notice of the High Court as being contemptuous and scandalises the judiciary. We may further observe that in a matter of any publication of a news item in a newspaper, a defence of truth or justification is not available in proceedings for contempt of Court. Whatever facts have been mentioned by the officers of the lower Courts in the references made by them, are hardly relevant for the purpose of determination of the question whether the contents of the news item amount to criminal contempt or not. This Court after having gone through the news item was prima facie satisfied to take cognizance under Section 15 of the Act and the only thing to be seen is whether such publication amounts to contempt of court or not. This Court after having gone through the news item was prima facie satisfied to take cognizance under Section 15 of the Act and the only thing to be seen is whether such publication amounts to contempt of court or not. 10. Another case in this regard relied upon by Shri Bhagirath Singh in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bihar v. Murali Manohar Prasad, AIR 1941 Patna 185 : ((1941) 42 Cri LJ 225) . In this case an article appeared in "Searchlight" newspaper. Learned Advocate General, who appeared for Legal Remembrancer urged that the articles in question clearly amounted to contempt of the lower courts as they contained matter which tend to interfere with the due course of justice. It created an atmosphere of prejudice against Private Barney and tend to prejudice his case in the minds of the public generally. The Advocate General conceded that the editor had no deliberate intention of interfering with the order of obstructing due course of justice; but contended that such intention was immaterial. If the Articles tend to interfere with the due course of justice and are likely so to do then the editor was guilty whether he intended such result or not. The opposite party. Mr. Murali Manohar Prasad admitted that he was the editor of the "Searchlight" newspaper and admitted the publication of the articles complained of. On his behalf a preliminary point was taken that the court should not entertain the application because it has not been properly made on behalf of the executive authority, namely, the Government. Then the Court dealing with the case observed concerning the affidavit which was filed in support of the petition. "The petition was made by the legal remembrancer and was presented in this court, by the Advocate General, yet I find that the affidavit was sworn by a clerk. Unfortunately, the facts in this case are all derived from the articles complained of, but even so the affidavit should, in my opinion, have been sworn to by some responsible officer. It is not proper that an affidavit in case of this kind should be the affidavit of a clerk. The Court while dealing with the preliminary objection then held "even assuming that the Legal Remembrancer is not a person who can properly represent the executive nevertheless information of an alleged contempt was brought to the attention of the Court by the application. The Court while dealing with the preliminary objection then held "even assuming that the Legal Remembrancer is not a person who can properly represent the executive nevertheless information of an alleged contempt was brought to the attention of the Court by the application. Even if it was not a properly constituted application, this court could take notice of the contempt alleged and of its own motion issue the rule which it did. In my judgement the Legal Remembrancer could in this case file the present application; but even he could not, the court has still jurisdiction to entertain the matter. As the Court could issue a rule of its own motion, the rule would be effective even of the reason for its issue was an application filed by a person not entitled to file it. However, the matter is regarded. I am satisfied, that this court has full jurisdiction to deal with this matter, and I would therefore, overrule the preliminary objection." Thus, it is clear that while dealing with the petition made by the Legal Remembrancer it was observed that the affidavit should have been sworn by some responsible officer and not a clerk. In case in hand it is not disputed that the references are made by the District Judges and Additional District Judges and in our view there is no question of the same being supported by any affidavit in a case of contempt arising on the basis of a news item published in "Prasant Jyoti". It was not at all necessary to name Om Prakash Bansal in the reference. In the references it was requested that proceedings may be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act and in the nature of disciplinary proceedings against the delinquents. As already mentioned above this Court took cognizance against Shri Om Prakash Bansal, Editor, Printer, and Publisher of the above mentioned newspaper "Prasant Jyoti" and we find no irregularity at all in taking cognizance in such a case. Mr. Bhagirath Singh also contended that in a case of contempt of a subordinate court cognizance by the High Court can only be taken under Section 15(2) of the Act either by a reference by the subordinate Court, or there must be a motion by the Advocate General High Court cannot suo motu initiate action in regard to the contempt of subordinate courts. In the present case the action was initiated by the High Court of its own motion on taking notice of the news item in "Prasant Jyoti" under Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Act as in its opinion it amounted to a contempt of the present and past judges of this Court. That apart, even if it be taken as a case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court also, the reference have been made to it by the subordinate courts and there is no illegality in taking action on the basis of references made by the subordinate Courts. 11. During the course of arguments Mr. Bhagirath Singh also argued that the persons who had made the references could only be represented through the Advocate General and Government Advocate had no right to represent them. However, when R.324 of the High Court Rules which lays down for giving a notice to the Government Advocate was brought to his notice, learned counsel frankly conceded not to press this point. 12. Mr. Bhagirath Singh next contended that Shri Om Prakash Bansal is a small person being a printer, publisher and editor of a small paper like "Prasant Jyoti" and other delinquent persons are necessary parties in the case. Such delinquent persons are necessary parties as these proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and in the absence of such persons Om Prakash Bansal alone could not be held guilty for contempt. We are unable to understand the logic of this argument. The non-petitioner in his reply has not named any person being the author of such article and we are unable to understand for whom he was hinting as the main delinquent persons. In any case it is not denied by him that he is the printer, publisher and editor of the news item in question and as such there is no question of impleading any other person as a party in the case. In our opinion the plea of non-impleading necessary parties is not at all available to the non-petitioner. 13. Mr. Bhagirath Singh lastly contended that the article in question did not amount to contempt of court as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamurti Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1494 : (1967 Cri LJ 1380) . 13. Mr. Bhagirath Singh lastly contended that the article in question did not amount to contempt of court as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamurti Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1494 : (1967 Cri LJ 1380) . Learned counsel placed reliance on the following observations made in the above case (para 26):- "Generally speaking "any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their business during their litigation amounts to contempt of court : see Oswald on Contempt's P.6. In order that courts should be able to dispense justice without fear or favour affection or ill will it is essential that litigants who resort to courts should so conduct themselves as not to bring the authority and the administration of law into disrespect or disregard. Neither should they exceed the limits of fair criticism or use language casting aspersions on the probity of the courts or questioning the bonafides of their judgements. This applies equally to all judges and all litigants irrespective on the status of the judge, i.e., whether he occupies one of the highest judicial in the land or is the presiding officer of a court of very limited jurisdiction. It is in the interest of justice and administration of law that litigants should show the same respect to a court, no matter whether it is highest in the land or whether it is one of inferior jurisdiction only. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, does not define 'contempt' or 'courts' and in the interest of justice any conduct of the kind mentioned above towards any person who can be called a 'Court' should be amenable to the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952." The above observations were made in the context of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, however, we shall keep the above observations in mind while dealing with the merits of the case. The object and purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to upheld the majesty and dignity of law Courts and their majesty in the minds of the public and that this is in no way whittled down. The object and purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to upheld the majesty and dignity of law Courts and their majesty in the minds of the public and that this is in no way whittled down. If by contumacious words or writing the common man is led to lose his respect for the judge acting in the discharge of his judicial duties then the confidence reposed in course of justice is rudely shaken and the offender must need be punished. In essence the law of contempt is the protector of the seat of justice more than a person of the judge sitting in that seat. The law of contempt of court is not the law for the protection of judges or to place them in a position of immunity from criticism. It is a law for the protection of the freedom of individuals. Everyone in a well versed community is entitled to the protection of a free and independent administration of justice. It is for the press to enlighten the public on what has been done in the branch of Government fairly and firmly, to criticise, what has been done where criticism appears to be warranted, but never attempt to influence the course of justice or to undermine the faith of those who live under the protection of the law and the impartial authority of the Courts. The press is justified in making free and fair criticism. The hall of justice is not a cloistered virtue. In fact, for justice to shine with its pristine lustre, it must be bold, free and subject to public scrutiny. So if the press does criticise some public aspects of a judgement e.g. in the realm of interpretation of law, severity, of sentence, etc., it cannot be contempt. But if there is an attack on the integrity of judges by imputing motive, dishonesty or incompetence, arbitrariness or want of independence to a judge it would be exceeding free and fair criticism by the press. 14. But if there is an attack on the integrity of judges by imputing motive, dishonesty or incompetence, arbitrariness or want of independence to a judge it would be exceeding free and fair criticism by the press. 14. The Article in question bears a caption.In the portion marked A to B it has been mentioned that a report of misconduct after making inquiries was submitted by Shri Mitruka, Registrar, Vigilance, Rajasthan High Court against certain judicial officers, but the inquiry report was dubbed on account of the protection of one or the other High Court judges to each one of them and no proceeding has been taken thereafter against such delinquent judicial officers. The above report clearly makes an aspersion on the High Court Judge of this Court that they have granted protection to such delinquent officers and on account of their influence no action has been taken against the judicial officers named in it. In our opinion it clearly scandalises the judges of this Court as if they were granting protection to corrupt judicial officers in the lower hierarchy. This, in our opinion is a publication scandalising and tending to scandalising the authority of this court. It also lowers down or tends to lower down the authority of this court. The non-petitioner with regard to the contents of the portion marked A to B has taken the plea in his reply that the contents were true and its truthfulness could be ascertained from the record of the High Court. He also mentioned in the reply that in this regard the then Registrar Vigilance, his inquiry report and the entire concerned record was necessary to be attached with these proceedings and in order to prove the aforesaid documents, Vigilance Registrars holding such office after 1977 should be produced in defence. We hardly find that such plea is at all valid defence to the allegations made in this portion A to B that the inquiry report was dubbed on account of the protections available to such persons by one or the other of the Judges of this Court. 15. We hardly find that such plea is at all valid defence to the allegations made in this portion A to B that the inquiry report was dubbed on account of the protections available to such persons by one or the other of the Judges of this Court. 15. In the portion marked C to D it has been mentioned that on a complaint made by 16 Advocates of Bikaner against Shri Bhansali, Shri Mitruka after an enquiry had given a report about the corruption of Shri Bhansali but before the completion of such inquiry S/Shri Lodha and M.L. Joshi in order to save him appointed Shri Milap Chandra Jain for re-starting the inquiry. It has been reliably learnt that Shri Jasraj Chopra, the then District Judge, Bikaner did not allow any witness to be produced and got the statements of such touts who were the agents of Shri Bhansali. Similarly in the case of senior Judicial Officer Shri D.C. Hajela being a favourite of a High Court Judge. A complaint was lodged through Shri Bhansai against Mitruka' to the effect that Shri Mitruka told Shri Bhansali and Shri Vedpal Tyagi to be corrupt in a meeting of the lawyers. The above contents make a clear aspersion on the integrity and character of Shri Lodha and Shri M.L. Joshi ex-Chief Justice of this Court that they appointed Shri Milap Chandra Jain who is a present Hon'ble Judge of this Court in order to save Shri Bhansali. This sort of allegation against ex-Chief Justice Shri Lodha and Shri M.L. Joshi that they had appointed Shri Milap Chandra Jain in order to save Shri Bhansali, is in our opinion scandalising the ex-Chief Justices of this Court. It has further been mentioned that a complaint was got lodged by Shri Bhansali against Shri Mitruka in respect of an inquiry against Shri D.C. Hajela, a senior Judicial Officer as he was a favourite of a High Court Judge. This sort of aspersion that because Shri Hajela was a favourite of a High Court Judge as such a complaint was got lodged through Shri Bhansali against Mitruka also tantamounts to an aspersion on a Judge of this Court. Thus, the aforesaid portion C to D also contains matter which scandalises the past Chief Justices and Judge of this Court. 16. Thus, the aforesaid portion C to D also contains matter which scandalises the past Chief Justices and Judge of this Court. 16. In portion marked E to F it has been mentioned that Shri Mitruka has demanded an inquiry regarding corruption against 32 judges who have been named in portions G, H of this article. It has been further mentioned that against 29 judges lawyers of the High Court at Jaipur have also submitted a complaint before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. In the aforesaid complaint a list of 13 important cases decided by the ex-Chief Justice Shri Vedpal Tyagi was given and that advocate Shri S.M. Mehta who was son-in-law of the ex-Chief Justice Shri Bafna (deceased), has remained junior of Shri. Vedpal Tyagi. It has further been mentioned that in order to given advantage to Shri Mehta, Shri Tyagi had been deciding cases in favour of Shri Mehta in respect of cases conducted by Shri Mehta. A list of certain cases has also been given. It has further been mentioned that Shri Tyagi acting as Officiating Governor also gave advantage in the case of Shri Anandi Lal Verma Munsif. The above allegations are clear aspersions on the honesty and integrity of the late Chief Justice Shri Vedpal Tyagi of this Court. There is a clear allegation that he decided cases in favour of Shri Mehta who had remained his junior. This sort of allegation clearly scandalises an ex-Chief Justice of this Court, who is no longer alive and certainly brings down the Rajasthan High Court to disrepute. In this regard the non-petitioner has taken the plea that there are the portions of the representation submitted by the Jaipur Advocates on 5th Nov., 1977 to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India. Even if for arguments sake it may by admitted that such complaint was filed by the Jaipur advocates and given to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in Nov. 1977, there is hardly a justification for publishing it in the newspaper after a lapse of 31/2 years. The lawyers might have given such representation to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India and we presume that he might have taken a suitable action on such representation during this period but the act of Shri Bansal in publishing it in his paper on 30th Mar. 1981 calls for no justification. The lawyers might have given such representation to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India and we presume that he might have taken a suitable action on such representation during this period but the act of Shri Bansal in publishing it in his paper on 30th Mar. 1981 calls for no justification. He cannot take the defence that as the same were the contents of a representation made by the Advocates of Jaipur as such he was justified in publishing the same in his newspaper "Prasant Jyoti". In our opinion the affect of publishing such article can be no other than to scandalise and malign an ex-Chief Justice of this Court and thus to lower down the prestige of the Rajasthan High Court in the eyes of the public at large. 17. In portion marked G to M after mentioning the names of 32 judicial officers it has been further mentioned that in the mind of the litigating public of criminal cases there is a firm opinion for Rajasthan High Court that in order to win a case one should engage a counsel according to the Judge. It has further been mentioned that it was surprising that those who follow this principle succeed 99 per cent in their aim. What more dismal picture can be of imparting justice where in order to seek justice not the counsel's ability but his approach to a Judge and caste is seen. The above matter makes clear aspersion on the integrity, honesty and independence of the entire Judges of the Rajasthan High Court. Whoever will read the above portion of this article will get an impression that particular lawyers are favoured by the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court. It also shows that Lawyers have approached with the Judges who have a caste bias and a litigant can win his case by having faith in such principle and by adopting the method suggested in the Article. This sort of criticism can hardly come within the purview of free and fair criticism by the press. The contemner by publishing this Article has defiled and petrified the stream of justice. We fail to understand what benefit the contemner wants to achieve by publishing such article which brings the highest court of this State into disrepute and lowering in the estimation of the litigating public as well as the public at large. The contemner by publishing this Article has defiled and petrified the stream of justice. We fail to understand what benefit the contemner wants to achieve by publishing such article which brings the highest court of this State into disrepute and lowering in the estimation of the litigating public as well as the public at large. Such publication thus certainly amounts to scandalising or lowering the authority of the Rajasthan High Court and amounts to criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c)(i) of the Act. Judiciary is the bed-rock and handmade of democracy. If people would loose faith in justice imparted by the highest court of State the entire democratic set up would crumble down. It is the duty of the press to uphold the dignity and majesty of the seat of justice and not try to wilfully and contaminate the imparting of justice by suggesting methods to the litigants which are based on dishonesty, unfairness and favouritism done by the Judges. It has to be mentioned that courts are necessarily presided over by Judges who like other man, are liable to err. It is, therefore, no offence to subject their decisions to fair, honest and reasonable criticism. Indeed, such criticism may be couched in strong, perhaps even extravagant language but to ascribe their decisions not to error but to improper motives is to bring the Judge himself and the whole court into contempt and under mine the confidence of the public in all judicial pronouncements and determinations. We strongly deprecate such act committed by any member of the public. 18. The contemner had submitted an application on 15th of May, 1981, praying that the office note submitted by the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court to Hon'ble the Chief Justice may be placed on court record. It is stated that neither the original nor the copy of the note had been placed on record of the court file nor copy has been furnished to the contemner due to which he has been deprived of an opportunity to put his proper defence. He has further prayed that the representation of 25 Advocates dated 5th Nov. It is stated that neither the original nor the copy of the note had been placed on record of the court file nor copy has been furnished to the contemner due to which he has been deprived of an opportunity to put his proper defence. He has further prayed that the representation of 25 Advocates dated 5th Nov. 1977 of Jaipur addressed to the President of India and a copy of which was handed over to, the then Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court, the extracts of which are contained in portions marked E to F and G to H in the article may Kindly be called for from the record of Registrar Vigilance or Administrative Judge of the High Court and similarly the complaint of corruption submitted by 16 advocates of Bikaner dated 17th Oct. 1978, which was submitted to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court be also summoned and placed on record. If in any case the representations in High Court record are not traceable then time may be granted. to collect them so as to place them on record. It has further been prayed that the facts mentioned in portion marked A to B, is a fact known through reliable sources which cannot be compelled to discharge (sic) and the same can be proved by the record of the Hon'ble High Court and hence for appreciating the real facts, the relevant record of the Vigilance Registrar be summoned. It has further been prayed that as per reply of the contemner the news has been published in good faith so as to request the concerned to protect the prestige of the judiciary and in this respect the alleged contemner will like to call Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri C. Honniah and their Lordship Chief Justice of Supreme Court. Shri Chandrachud, who has said in Jodhpur that judiciary has become worse than police department and also that Rajasthan judiciary is badly suffering from caste, discase (sic)", and further his Lordship told that "That I can't tolerate the rubbery (sic) of justice." The contemner thus requested to call in witness box the above named two Chief Justice. In the application it has been further prayed that a report by Shri Gorwala was submitted to Government of India regarding corruption and secondly another book written by Mr. In the application it has been further prayed that a report by Shri Gorwala was submitted to Government of India regarding corruption and secondly another book written by Mr. P.D. Sharma, Reader in Political Science, Rajasthan University, "Indian judiciary is worse than police" are the publication which speak much more on corruption than this weekly paper of the contemner and hence they are to be referred in defence. Lastly, it has been prayed that as regards the reality of the whole state of affairs the alleged contemner bases its opinions on several other sources and publications for which an opportunity to afford time is requested to be given. 19. Firstly, it may be mentioned that arguments in the case commenced on 14th May, 1981 and the learned counsel for the contemner was heard for about half the time of the court hours. Thereafter again the case was heard on 15th May, 1981 for the whole day and it was only at the close of the arguments that this application was filed before us. It may be also mentioned that by the time this application was filed even the arguments of the learned Government Advocate had been finished and Mr. Bhagirath Singh appearing for the contemner had also finished his reply arguments. In the aforesaid circumstances we had given a direction that this application shall be decided along with the main order. The contemner by this application has mainly sought to bring on record the note submitted by the Registrar to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court for which we have already dealt with that such note has neither any relevance nor any importance in the determination of the case. He has further sought to produce the representations of 25 Advocates of Jaipur on 5th Nov. 1977 and 16 Advocate of Bikaner dated 17th Oct. 1978. We hardly find it necessary to summon or produce these representations as even if such representations might be containing the matter which is now published by the contemner, it can hardly give a right to the contemner to raise any defence on this ground. The contemner their has prayed for calling Shri C. Honniah, Ex-Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court and Hon'ble Shri Chandrachud, the present Chief Justice of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case we hardly find it necessary to allow the contemner to call them in the witness-box. The contemner their has prayed for calling Shri C. Honniah, Ex-Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court and Hon'ble Shri Chandrachud, the present Chief Justice of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case we hardly find it necessary to allow the contemner to call them in the witness-box. Lastly, the non-petitioner has prayed for making references to a report by Shri Gorwala and a book written by Dr. P.D Sharma. Nobody prevented the non-petitioner to refer to the aforesaid report and book during the course of arguments and in any case such report and book has hardly any relevance in determining the question whether the news item published by the contemner amounts to contempt of court or not. Thus, in our opinion the application submitted by the contemner at the fag end of the case hardly deserves any consideration. 20. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. Teja Singh and the Hon'ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 186 : (1954 Cri LJ 460) that the power of High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all Courts of Record. Section 1(2), Criminal Procedure Code expressly excludes special jurisdictions from its scope. Hence, the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In our view, we have followed the above principle and granted full opportunity to the contemner to defend himself. We had also taken care of explaining the substance of the charge to the contemner Sri D.P. Bansal on 12th May, 1981 by drawing a separate order sheet. The contemner understood the charge explained to him and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Mr. Bhagirath Singh Shekhawat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri O.P. Bansal also submitted that the contemner fully knows the case against him and he only prayed that he may be furnished a copy of order-sheet dated 24th Apr. 1981 and 4th May, 1981. The contemner understood the charge explained to him and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Mr. Bhagirath Singh Shekhawat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri O.P. Bansal also submitted that the contemner fully knows the case against him and he only prayed that he may be furnished a copy of order-sheet dated 24th Apr. 1981 and 4th May, 1981. We had thus given a direction on 12th May, 1981, to the Additional Registrar to supply a copy of order dated 24th Apr. 1981 and 4th May, 1981 to Shri Bhagirath Singh, Advocate. We placed reliance in this regard on the following observations made in Ram Mohan Lal in the matter of Misc. Case No. 436 of 1934 : AIR 1935 Allahabad 38 : ((1935) 36 Cri LJ 620) : "There can be no justification of contempt of Court, even assuming that the writer of a manifesto believes all he states therein to be true. If anything in the manifesto amounts to the contempt of Court, he is not permitted to lead evidence to establish the truth of his allegation. Contempt of Court is saying or writing anything about the Court which may lower the prestige of the Court or bring it into contempt." 21. We now take up the question as to what sentence should be awarded to the contemner in the facts and circumstances of this case. 22. It may be observed that in the reply as well as in the arguments advanced before us, the contemner has tried to defend the contents of the news item published by him in his weekly newspaper "Prasant Jyoti" dated 30th Mar. 1981. He has not furnished any apology nor has shown any regret about such publication. He is all in all the editor, publisher, and printer of such article. There was no indication of any remorse or contrition on the part of the contemner during the whole case. The contemner has scandalised the past and present Judges of the High Court of this State and also 32 judicial officers of the lower courts. 23. Thus, taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case we find it just and proper to sentence the contemner Shri O.P. Bansal to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of the payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days.Order accordingly. 23. Thus, taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case we find it just and proper to sentence the contemner Shri O.P. Bansal to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of the payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days.Order accordingly. *******