JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal who has lost in both the Courts below. The plaintiff died during the pendency of this appeal on 15 February 1975, and is represented now by his heirs and legal representatives. 2. The plaintiff was born on 8 March 1906. On 28 April 1949, he joined service of the Lower Ganges Yamuna Electricity Distributing Company at Bulandshahr (hereinafter referred to as the company) as a cashier-cum-accountant. the said company was taken over by the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board (hereinafter for brevity, the Board) in exercise of its rights under the Indian Electricity Act on 1 June 1961, and the plaintiff along with a number of other employees of the company, was transferred as an employee to the Board. The company framed standing orders which were duly certified under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. These standing orders governed the employees of the company even after their services stood transferred to the Board. On 13 December 1961, the services of plaintiff were terminated by the Superintending Engineer of the Board, under whom he was working, on the ground that he had attained the age of compulsory retirement of fifty five years. This order was challenged by the plaintiff in the Court of Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, in Suit No. 65 of 1963, (Kali Charan Saxena v. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board), The suit was decreed on 17 December 1965, and it was declared that the plaintiff continued to be in service and that the order, dated 15 December 1961, terminating his services was void. A further decree for recovery of some amount was also passed in favour of the plaintiff. There after inspite of repeated efforts, the plaintiff was not permitted to join his post. Instead, he was served with a notice, dated 29 August 1966, issued under the signatures of the second defendant (Chief Engineer, Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, Lucknow) by which the services of the plaintiff were dispensed with in exercise of powers under Cl. 18 (c) of the standing orders. The order, according to the plaintiff, was invalid and ineffective for the reasons mentioned in Para. 8 of the plaint. 18 (c) of the standing orders. The order, according to the plaintiff, was invalid and ineffective for the reasons mentioned in Para. 8 of the plaint. Since the plaintiff was entitled to continue in service so long as he was physically fit, the relief that he sought in the suit, giving rise to the present second appeal, primarily was for a declaration about the order, dated 29 August 1966, being invalid and ultra vires. A further relief that the plaintiff sought was for recovery of certain amounts enumerated in relief clause to which, according to the plaintiff he was entitled. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant. respondents according to whom, the plaintiff had been validly discharged in exercise of powers under Cl. 18 (c) of the standing orders. it was denied that the impugned order was invalid for any of the reasons mentioned by the plaintiff in Para. 8 of the plaint or that the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs sought by him. 4. The trial Court and, thereafter, the lower appellate Court have refused to grant relief to the plaintiff. They have taken the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief on any of the grounds put forward by him. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has urged that the order, dated 29 August 1966, was bad for:- (1) it was a penal order which had been passed without giving any opportunity of defence to the plaintiff; (2) that it had been passed by an authority who had no jurisdiction to do so ; and (3) that it had not been passed in accordance with Cl. 18 (c) of the standing orders for it had been passed arbitrarily and also without disclosing the reason for which it was passed, to the plaintiff. 6. The trial Court had discussed the question of the impugned order being penal in nature under issue (1). It took the view that no element of punishment was involved in the termination of the plaintiff's services by the impugned order. To the same effect was the conclusion of the lower appellate Court. 6. The trial Court had discussed the question of the impugned order being penal in nature under issue (1). It took the view that no element of punishment was involved in the termination of the plaintiff's services by the impugned order. To the same effect was the conclusion of the lower appellate Court. It has been argued that both the Courts below did not deal with this matter in accordance with law, inasmuch as, they have not looked into the sequence of events leading to the issuance of the impugned order from which it was fully established that the order had been passed as a punitive measure. This submission cannot be accepted. Apart from the bald assertion in Para. 8(f) of the plaint that the discharge notice is punitive in character there is no assertion of fact from which a plea that the order was being assailed as penal in character can be culled out. In his statement on oath also the plaintiff did not assert that the order had been passed by way of punishment. Apart from the circumstance of there being a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in the earlier Suit No. 65 of 1963, filed by him, the only other fact which was put forward in support of this plea was that the plaintiff was not permitted to resume his duties. These two facts, by themselves, were not enough to indicate that the order impugned in the present case was passed by way of punishment, this submission of the learned counsel, thus, falls. 7. The second submission again does not have much merit. The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that under S. 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the Board could only frame regulations providing, inter alia, for service conditions of its employees. It was not empowered by that provision to delegate Its powers of appointment and termination of service of Its employees to subordinate functionaries. In the facts of this case, it is not necessary to examine this submission seriously for it is undisputed that the services of the plaintiff stood transferred to the Board as a consequence of the company being taken over by it on 1 June 1961, in exercise of its right to do so under the Indian Electricity Act. In the facts of this case, it is not necessary to examine this submission seriously for it is undisputed that the services of the plaintiff stood transferred to the Board as a consequence of the company being taken over by it on 1 June 1961, in exercise of its right to do so under the Indian Electricity Act. There were admittedly no regulations at that time which provided for any particular officer exercising the powers of appointment and termination of the services of the employees of the erstwhile licensees. The Board, as an employer, could exercise the power of appointment and, consequently, of termination of the services of the taken over employees even in the absence of any statutory regulations in that regard. The decision of the Board to entrust its power in that regard to its Chief Engineer through a resolution cannot, thus be characterised as being in conflict with any statutory provision. Section 15 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, empowers the Board to employ officers and servants for carrying on its obligations under that Act. Such a power necessarily includes the powers to terminate the services of its employees. The Board as a Corporation, could adopt a convenient mode for exercise of. its powers and about its functioning in respect of a matter, which necessarily had to be provided for, through a resolution for so long as there were no statutory regulations governing it, to the extent that it was not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. 8. The issuance of the impugned notice by the Chief Engineer at the relevant time could, therefore, not be characterised as illegal on that score. 9. The next submission, which has strenuously been made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, may now be noticed. The submission is that no reason for the impugned action having been put forward by the Board nor disclosed by it either to the plaintiff or before the Court, the order had to be held to be arbitrary and, thus, liable to be declared invalid. 10. In Para. 8(c) of the plaint it has been alleged that the notice is mala fide and against natural justice and without any cause. 10. In Para. 8(c) of the plaint it has been alleged that the notice is mala fide and against natural justice and without any cause. In Para 11 it it was averred that:- " the plaintiff has in duty bound accepted the letter, dated 29 August 1966, from defendant 2 under protest but one month's salary in lieu of notice period was not accepted because the order was neither justified nor the amount equivalent to one month's salary of the plaintiff was offered. The plaintiff is still mentally and physically fit to discharge his duty." These averments were met in the written statement filed on behalf of the Board wherein it was averred that Para. 8 is not admitted. Its Sub-cl. (g) is also vague and the plaintiff cannot take the defendant by surprise by disclosing any other reason is evidence and the plaint being vague is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. And further in Para. 11 it is submitted that the plaintiff without any just cause refused to accept one month's salary himself, and it is his own fault and he cannot take advantage of the same. It is further asserted that there arises no question of his mentally and physically fit to discharge the duties but without prejudice it is submitted that he is not at all mentally or physically fit to discharge the duties. In the additional pleas, in Para. 4 it was said that "the plaint is vague inasmuch as the plaintiff has not shown in Para. 18(a) as to how and upto what extent the order of discharge does not fulfil the conditions as laid down in Para. 18(c) of the standing orders. The services of the plaintiff were no longer required by the Board and hence notice discharging his services under Cl. 18(c) of the standing orders was served and the services have been rightly terminated." It is submitted that the plea that the plaintiff took was that the impugned order bad been passed without any reason and that under standing order 48(c), it could only be passed for some reason. As such, the order could not be sustained under the standing order. The defence of the Board, on this part of the case, was that the plaintiff's plea was vague and further that the services of plaintiff had been dispensed with as they were no longer required. As such, the order could not be sustained under the standing order. The defence of the Board, on this part of the case, was that the plaintiff's plea was vague and further that the services of plaintiff had been dispensed with as they were no longer required. The two Courts below have taken the view that the fact that the services of the plaintiff were no longer required was good reason to justify the impugned order under standing order 18(c). The correctness of this view has been assailed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. 11. Clause 18(c) of the standing orders read thus : " When for any reason the services of a permanent employee are no longer required by the company, he may be discharged on being given one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. 12. It is true that the clause aforesaid does not permit arbitrary termination of the services of an employee yet the exercise of the power under this clause, if not mala fide, cannot be assailed on the ground that the reason for which the services were so terminated was not sufficient to do so. In the instant case, the finding recorded by the Courts belows is that the impugned order had not been passed mala fide. The sole question that remains to be considered is whether the conclusion that the impugned order was Justifiable under the above, clause as the services of plaintiff were no longer required is correct in law. From the pleadings noticed above, it is clear that the case of the plaintiff was not that his services had been terminated for no reason. It was, on the contrary, to the effect that the impugned order had been passed mala fide with a view to get rid of the plaintiff who had obtained a decree in his favour earlier suit. The use of the words " without any cause" in Para. 8 (c) of the plaintiff cannot be considered in isolation. They are to be read in conjunction with the words used earlier and only as a general statement of the plaintiff's case. The Issues were struck in the case on 11 February 1967, as is clear from the order sheet maintained by the Presiding Officer in English. In his statement recorded under Order X, Civil Procedure Code, on that date, the plaintiff stated that. The Issues were struck in the case on 11 February 1967, as is clear from the order sheet maintained by the Presiding Officer in English. In his statement recorded under Order X, Civil Procedure Code, on that date, the plaintiff stated that. " no reason for the discharge was given to me in the notice, dated 29 August 1966, The Chief Engineer was not empowered to give notice of discharge under Cl. 18(c) but the Board was `so competent. Ground (g) of Para. 8 of the plaint is waived." There is no specific issue on the question as to whether the impugned order was passed for some reason or had been passed arbitrarily. The issues were read over to the counsel for the parties. No issue, other than those framed in the case, was sought to be raised. In this state of affairs, it could not be expected from the defendant-Board to have placed on record any evidence disclosing the reason for which the impugned order was actually passed. The Plaintiff has to suffer for hit failure to require specifically the defendant- Board to place on record the precise reason or reasons for which it passed the impugned order. Since the plaintiff did not join issue with the defendants about this aspect of the matter, at the appropriate stage, namely, at the stage of the trial of the suit where evidence could, if necessary, be brought before the Court to decide whether there was any relevant reason or not to enable the Board to pass the impugned order no relief can be granted to him at this stage on that count. 13. In the result, the appeal has to be held as lacking in merits. It is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Before parting with the judgment I must observe that Sri H. P. Gupta, who appeared for the Board, has been great assistance to the Court.