ORDER N.D. Ojha, J. - An application was made by respondent No. 3 under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of an accommodation in the tenancy of the petitioner on the ground that he bona fide needed it for his own use. It appears to have been filed some time in the early part of the year 1976, the number of the case being 13 of 1976. The case went on for about a year and on 21st March, 1977 the parties filed a compromise application whereby the application under Section 21 was to be allowed and the petitioner was given three and-a-half years time vacate the accommodation in question. An order was passed disposing of the application under Section 21 in terms of the aforesaid compromise. The three-and-a-half year's period allowed to the petitioner to vacate the accommodation was to expire on 20th September, 1980. The petitioner took full advantage of the order passed on the basis of the compromise application. Fifteen days before the expiry of three-and-a-half years, however he instituted a suit on 5th September, 1980 for cancellation of the order dated 21st March, 1977 passed on the basis of the compromise aforesaid on the ground that it was illegal and void. He also made an application for temporary injunction restraining the respondent No. 3 from evicting the petitioner in execution of the order dated 21st March, 1977. This application was allowed by the trial Court by passing an order staying the execution of the order dated 21st March, 1977. An appeal was preferred against that order by respondent No. 3 which was allowed by the Civil Judge on 13th February, 1981. The Civil Judge has, inter alia, taken the view that the suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3-A, C.P.C. and consequently no interim injunction could be granted to the petitioner as prayed for. It is this order of the Civil Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. Having heard counsel for the petitioner at some length, I am of opinion that the impugned order does not suffer either from any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. 2. Having heard counsel for the petitioner at some length, I am of opinion that the impugned order does not suffer either from any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. By Section 74, C.P.C. (Amendment) Act 1976, inter alia, an Explanation was added to Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. which reads: "Explanation- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." By the same section a new Rule 3-A was inserted which reads: "3-A. Bar to suit.- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful." Section 34 (1) (f) of the Act provides: "34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them. - (1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect, of the following matters namely- (a) to (e) .................................... (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith." In view of Section 34 (1) (f) the provisions in regard to recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith contained in O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. were applicable to the application under Section 21 which was decided on 21st March, 1977, and the aforesaid order will be deemed to have been passed in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. 4. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. was not applicable (for) two reasons: (1) because it applies only to a suit and (2) because of Section 38 of the Act. I find no substance in either of these two arguments. 5. Section 34 (1)(f) of the Act makes the provision of O. 23, R. 3 C.P.C. which is the relevant provision in regard to recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and framing an order in accordance therewith applicable to the proceedings under the Act. I find no substance in either of these two arguments. 5. Section 34 (1)(f) of the Act makes the provision of O. 23, R. 3 C.P.C. which is the relevant provision in regard to recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and framing an order in accordance therewith applicable to the proceedings under the Act. The word "suit" used in order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. will necessarily have to be interpreted in a manner so as to include an application under Section 21 of the Act for otherwise Section 34 (1)(f) of the Act would be rendered nugatory. 6. So far as Section 38 of the Act is concerned it provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the C.P.C. 1908. Section 34 (1) (f) of the Act also apparently falls within the purview of the term "provisions of this Act" used in Section 38. As such it cannot be said that there is anything contained in Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. which is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Indeed because of Section 34 (1)(f) the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. have virtually become a part of the Act. The rule of legislation by incorporation is well too established. The bar created by Order 23, Rule 3-A, C.P.C. is in a mandatory form and since the present suit which has been instituted by the petitioner is for setting aside the order dated 21st March, 1977 on the ground that the compromise on which the said order was passed was not lawful, it is clearly barred by the said Rule 3-A. The term "was not lawful" used in Rule 3-A will include a compromise which is stated to be even void in view of the Explanation to O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the question raised by the petitioner that the compromise on which the order dated 21st March, 1977 was passed was not lawful. I am not expressing any opinion on this point. 7. Lastly, it was urged that R. 3-A was inserted in the C.P.C. by S. 74 of the 1976 Amendment, whereas S. 34 (1)(f) of the Act is of a date prior to it, namely of the year 1972. I am not expressing any opinion on this point. 7. Lastly, it was urged that R. 3-A was inserted in the C.P.C. by S. 74 of the 1976 Amendment, whereas S. 34 (1)(f) of the Act is of a date prior to it, namely of the year 1972. Consequently Rule 3-A will not be applicable. This argument ignores a vital circumstance that the present suit which has been instituted is not a suit under any of the provisions of the Act. This suit has been instituted in view of Section 9, C.P.C. If something was being done under the provisions of the Act the argument as to whether Rule 3-A was applicable to the proceedings under the Act or not may have arisen for consideration. Since the suit in which the present injunction application has been made is not a proceeding under the Act but has been instituted in view of Section 9, C.P.C. the argument that Rule 3-A will not apply to the suit has no substance and deserves to be rejected. Once the suit has been filed in view of Section 9 C.P.C. every provision contained in the C.P.C. applicable to a suit will apply to it. Consequently Rule 3-A will be applicable to the suit which has been instituted by the petitioner after the commencement of the Amending Act, 1976. 8. No other point has been pressed. 9. In the result, 1 find no merit in this Writ Petition. It is accordingly dismissed. 10. Copy of this order may be supplied to counsel for the petitioner today on payment of usual charges.