JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing, demanding or realising the new octroi duty levied by it according to the U.P. Government Ordinary Gazette Part III Notification dated 27-9-1969 against the plaintiff on the commodity of coal which is imported by it for its use and consumption at Agra in any manner whatsoever. 2. According to the plaintiffs case it is a limited company engaged in the business of generation and supply of electric energy in Agra town and for the purposes of its aforesaid business, the plaintiff imports steam coal for its use at Agra. New octroi schedule regarding the payment of octroi duty on certain commodities, including Hard Coke, Cinder dust and coal ash was enforced from 1-10-1969 but steam coal was exempted therein from payment of such new octroi duty. According to the plaintiff the defendant illegally and arbitrarily enforced the above new octroi duty against the plaintiff on the coal which is imported by the plaintiff for its use and consumption and is demanding the same and eventually the railway authorities are creating difficulties in the matter of the delivery of goods (coal) consigned to the plaintiff without having the clearance certificate of the defendant from its Octroi Barriers regarding its dues. 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendant on the ground that the coal imported by the plaintiff is not steam coal and is subject to payment of octroi duty. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by the provisions of Ss. 226 and 571 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the "Adhiniyam"). 4. The trial Court held that S. 226 of the Adhiniyam bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the plaintiff's suit and its only remedy was as has been prescribed by the Adhiniyam and also that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 571 of the Adhiniyam. On merits the trial Court recorded a finding that the coal imported by the plaintiff is not steam coal and is not exempt from octroi duty. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff preferred an appeal. The lower appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court on the question that the suit was barred by Sections 226 and 571 of the Adhiniyam. On merits the trial Court recorded a finding that the coal imported by the plaintiff is not steam coal and is not exempt from octroi duty. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff preferred an appeal. The lower appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court on the question that the suit was barred by Sections 226 and 571 of the Adhiniyam. However, the findings on merit recorded by the trial Court were reversed and it was held that the coal which was being imported by the plaintiff was not liable to octroi duty. The lower appellate Court, however, in view of its finding that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court and also that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 571 of the Adhiniyam dismissed the plaintiffs appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant in the present second appeal has challenged the finding of the two Courts below in so far as they held the suit being barred by Ss. 226 and 571 of the Adhiniyam. It has been urged that the provisions of S. 226 of the Adhiniyam will not bar the suit inasmuch as steam coal which the plaintiff was importing was not liable to octroi duty according to the amended schedule and the action of the defendant in demanding tax from the plaintiff was without jurisdiction. It has been strenuously urged that when an item is exempt from taxation and the Assessing Authority proceeds to assess an exempted item, the action of the Assessing Authority can be challenged by filing a suit and S. 226 will not operate as a bar. Reliance has been placed for this proposition on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator Municipal Committee Ludhiana ( AIR 1963 SC 1547 ) and on a decision of this Court reported in Devi Prasad v. Municipal Board, Kanauj ( AIR 1949 All 741 : (1949 All LJ 208)). 6. Section 226 of the Adhiniyam provides: "226. Bar to jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of taxations. No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or before any other authority than is provided in this Act." 7. 6. Section 226 of the Adhiniyam provides: "226. Bar to jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of taxations. No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or before any other authority than is provided in this Act." 7. The first question which arises for determination is whether on the language of the aforesaid section the jurisdiction of Civil Court in matters of taxation would be barred. The Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ), after reviewing its various authorities stated as follows (at p. 89):- "1. Where the Statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals, the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the Statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 2. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act, to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant, but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the Statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said Statute or not. 3. Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under the Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. 4. 3. Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under the Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. 4. When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit 5. Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. 6. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. 7. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." Let us now see whether in the present case proposition No. 1 as laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted case applies and the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded. There cannot be any manner of doubt that Section 226 of the Adhiniyam provides that any valuation or assessment or levy and the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed can be questioned only in the manner prescribed by the Act and by the authority mentioned in the Act and in no other manner or by any other authority. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in a recent case reported in Bata Shoe Co. Ltd v. Jabalpur Corporation, ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ), where Section 84 (3) of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act came up for consideration, which provided (at p. 958):- "84 (3). A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in a recent case reported in Bata Shoe Co. Ltd v. Jabalpur Corporation, ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ), where Section 84 (3) of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act came up for consideration, which provided (at p. 958):- "84 (3). No objection shall be taken to any valuation, assessment or levy nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act." The aforesaid section is in pari materia with Section 226 of the Adhiniyam in the present case. The Supreme Court while construing the aforesaid section held (at p. 958):- "It is plain from this sub-section that any valuation, assessment or levy and the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed can be questioned only in the manner prescribed by the Act and by the Authority mentioned in the Act and in no other manner or by any other authority. Since the sub-section expressly prohibits a challenge to a valuation, assessment or levy "in any other manner.............. than is provided in this Act" and since the Act has devised its own special machinery for inquiring into and adjudicating upon such challenges, the common remedy of suit stands necessarily excluded and cannot be availed of by a person aggrieved by an order of assessment to octroi duty. Similarly, the sub-section excludes expressly the power of "any other authority than is provided in this Act" to entertain an objection to any valuation, assessment or levy of octroi. This part of the provision is in the nature of ouster of the jurisdiction of civil Courts, at least by necessary implication, to entertain an objection to any valuation, assessment or levy. This is the evident intendment, meaning and implication of the provision;" In view of what has been laid down there cannot be any manner of doubt that Section 226 of the Adhiniyam ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 8. It may now be examined as to whether there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. 9. Under Section 472 of the Adhiniyam an appeal lies against the tax fixed or charged under the Act which shall be heard and determined by the Judge. 8. It may now be examined as to whether there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. 9. Under Section 472 of the Adhiniyam an appeal lies against the tax fixed or charged under the Act which shall be heard and determined by the Judge. The Judge under Section 472 is the Judge Small Cause Court and a further appeal has been provided under Sec. 476 of the Adhiniyam to the District Judge. It is, therefore, clear that a person aggrieved by the levy of tax can prefer two appeals under the Adhiniyam and these appeals lie to regular Courts i.e. the Judge Small Cause Court and the District Judge. In this connection it may be noticed that the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that under Section 472 an appeal shall not lie against the assessment of tax, as according to the learned counsel, the appeal has been provided only against the annual value fixed under the Act. Section 472 of the Adhiniyam provides as follows:- "472. Appeals when and to whom to lie. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any annual value or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge. (2) No such appeal shall be heard unless : (a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of complaint; (b) in the case of an appeal against an annual value an objection has previously been made and has been disposed of under Section 209. (c) In the case of an appeal against any tax in respect of which provisions exist under this Act for an objection to be made to the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari against the demand, such objection has previously been made and disposed of; (d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment or alteration made in the assessment list for property taxes under sub-section (1) of S. 213, an objection has been made in pursuance of a notice issued under the proviso to the said sub-section and such objection has been disposed of. (e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, in the case of an appeal made against an annual value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to the appellant, the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari." A bare perusal of the provisions of Section 472 leaves no manner of doubt that the appeals have been provided against any tax which is charged under the Adhiniyam. Provisions of Section 472 (2) (e) are specific that appeal will lie against any tax and the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, in my opinion, has thus no force. Reading the provisions of Section 226, 472 and 476 of the Adhiniyam leaves no room for doubt that condition No. 1 as laid down in Dhulabhai's case ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ) (supra) and Bata Shoe Co. ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ) (supra) squarely applies to the present case and the jurisdiction of the civil Court must be held to be excluded as there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. 10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the present case is such where despite the exclusion of the civil Court's jurisdiction the civil suit would lie because there is an exemption in respect of the coal which the plaintiff is importing within the Nagar Mahapalika and there is in that sense an express prohibition in the Act to levy the tax. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Firm Seth Radha Kishan ( AIR 1963 SC 1547 ) (supra) and of this Court in the case of Devi Prasad (1949 All LJ 208)(supra). 11. Section 172 of the Adhiniyam provides for taxes to be imposed by the Mahapalika. Section 172 (2)(b) specifically gives power to the Mahapalika to impose an octroi on goods and animals brought within the city for consumption, use or sale therein. 11. Section 172 of the Adhiniyam provides for taxes to be imposed by the Mahapalika. Section 172 (2)(b) specifically gives power to the Mahapalika to impose an octroi on goods and animals brought within the city for consumption, use or sale therein. It is in exercise of this power that the State Government by its notification dated September 19, 1969 provided for an octroi on goods and animals brought within the octroi limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, Agra for consumption, sale and use to be levied at the rates shown in the Schedule and subject to the exemptions given therein. The relevant heads in the Schedule for the purposes of determining the controversy in the present case are item No. 38 i.e. hard coke, cinder, coal dust and coal at Rupees 0.15 per quintal. Item No. 233 in the list mentions other articles not included in any head and not specifically exempted from octroi at Rs. 2/-. At the end of the schedule it has been provided that the following articles shall be exempt from octroi:- "Serial No. 10. Steam coal except coke and cinder." From a bare perusal of the aforesaid notification in so far as it relates to the present case it is clear that the exemption is only in respect of steam coal and in respect of other varieties of coal the octroi will be leviable either under item No. 38 or item No. 233 of the Schedule. The crucial question which thus arises for determination is as to whether in a case in which goods are being sought to be brought under exemption clause, the aggrieved party can get redress under the provisions of the Adhiniyam and whether it can file a civil suit on the ground that the goods cannot be validly taxed by any determination made under the Act within the meaning of S. 226 of the Adhiniyam. Precisely this very controversy arose before the Supreme Court in the case M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ). The argument raised in the aforesaid case was that the assessment order purported to tax a sale which was outside the State under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. Precisely this very controversy arose before the Supreme Court in the case M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ). The argument raised in the aforesaid case was that the assessment order purported to tax a sale which was outside the State under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. It was argued that if a sales tax statute exempts certain transaction from the purview of its charging section and the appropriate authority makes an order of assessment in respect of such an exempted transaction, the assessment would be beyond its jurisdiction and can be impeached by a suit. The Supreme Court held (at p. 1947):- "Section 20 protects "assessment made under the Act or the rules made thereunder" by appropriate authorities. There can be little doubt that the clause "an assessment made" cannot mean the assessment properly or correctly made. The said clause takes in all assessments made or purported to have been made under the Act. Its plaint, the appellant is undoubtedly calling into question the assessment order made against it, and such a challenge to the assessment order is plainly prohibited by S. 20. An order of assessment, though erroneous, and though based on an incorrect finding of fact, is, nevertheless, an order of assessment within the meaning of S. 20 and S. 20 in terms, provides that it will not be called in question in any civil Court." The Supreme Court further relying on the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( AIR 1962 SC 1621 ) held that according to the majority view, the question about the taxability of a particular transaction falls within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authorities exercising their powers under the taxing Act and their decision in respect of it cannot be treated as a decision on a collateral fact the finding on which determines the jurisdiction of the said authorities. It was also held that the words of Section 20 are so wide that even erroneous orders of assessment made would be entitled to claim its protection against the institution of a civil suit. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Bata Shoe Co. ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ) (supra) also considered this aspect of the matter. It was also held that the words of Section 20 are so wide that even erroneous orders of assessment made would be entitled to claim its protection against the institution of a civil suit. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Bata Shoe Co. ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ) (supra) also considered this aspect of the matter. In the case before the Supreme Court it was argued that the action of the Municipal Committee to levy double the duty by way of penalty was without jurisdiction and thus the civil suit was not barred. The Supreme Court held (at p. 963):- "The argument that double duty was levied on the plaintiffs though not justified by the terms of Rule 14 (b) goes to the correctness of the levy, not to the jurisdiction of the assessing authority. The rule authorizes the imposition of double duty if dutiable articles are imported (a) without paying the duty or (b) without giving declaration to the Octroi Moharrir. It may be that neither of these two eventualities occurred and therefore there was no justification for imposing double duty. But the error could be corrected only in the manner provided in the Act and by the authority prescribed therein. The remedy by way of suit is barred." 13. Recently a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Sir Shadi Lal Sugar and General Mills Ltd. ( AIR 1980 All 379 ), had the occasion to decide a similar question. In the aforesaid case the plaintiff had filed suit for recovery of certain amount on the basis that they were entitled to refund of the said amount in view of a notification dated 4th May 1961 which, in fact, provided for exemption in the excise duty on sugar. The question which came up for consideration was whether the civil suit was barred in view of the fact that the Excise Act provided a complete machinery for redress. It was held (at p. 384):- "In the instant case the plaintiff-respondent is seeking a refund in view of the notification issued by the Central Government on 4-5-1961. In case such a refund is refused by the Central Excise Officer the plaintiff-respondent could have filed an appeal under Section 35 of the Act. It was held (at p. 384):- "In the instant case the plaintiff-respondent is seeking a refund in view of the notification issued by the Central Government on 4-5-1961. In case such a refund is refused by the Central Excise Officer the plaintiff-respondent could have filed an appeal under Section 35 of the Act. The powers of the appellate authority being very wide the effective relief could be given to the plaintiff-respondent by the appellate authority. The Trade Notice dated 9th May 1961 only explains the import and lays down the procedure for the enforcement of the notification dated 4th May 1961. It is always open to the appellate authority constituted under the Act to interpret the notification as well as the Trade notice in order to give effective relief to the aggrieved person. The question of the quashing of the Trade notice dated 9th May 1961 does not arise. The Appellate Authority is empowered under the wide powers conferred upon it not to give effect to the Trade Notice dated 9th May, 1961 in case it comes to the opinion that it destroys the effect of the notification dated 4th May, 1961. The appellate authority had, therefore, full jurisdiction to decide the question involved in the present suit." It was held that a complete code is provided by the Act to an aggrieved person to seek redress in case he is aggrieved by the decision of any officer or authority constituted under the Act and thus the provisions clearly intend that the jurisdiction of the civil Court be excluded. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Firm Seth Radha Kishan ( AIR 1963 SC 1547 ) (supra). Special reliance was placed on what has been said by the Supreme Court in Para 9 of the aforesaid report, which runs as follows:- "But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned levy was not made under the Act but in derogation of the provisions thereof. There is no force in this contention. Section 61 (2) of the Act specifically empowers the Municipal Committee to levy any tax other than those specified therein with the previous sanction of the State Government. There is no force in this contention. Section 61 (2) of the Act specifically empowers the Municipal Committee to levy any tax other than those specified therein with the previous sanction of the State Government. The levy of terminal tax was sanctioned by the Punjab Government by notification No. 264643 dated July 21, 1962, at the rates shown in the column 3 of the schedule to the said Notification. Under the said notification read with S. 61 of the Act the Municipal Committee is empowered to levy terminal tax on salt, whether it is common salt or not. The Committee has therefore, ample power under the Act and the notification issued by the State Government to impose the said tax. The only dispute was as regards the rate of tax payable in respect of the salt brought by the appellant into the limits of the Municipal Committee. The rate depended upon the character of the salt. The ascertainment of the said fact is necessary step for fixing the rate and it is not possible to say that in ascertaining the said fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel contended that if a municipal committee levies terminal tax on an article not liable to tax under the Act, a suit would lie, and, therefore, the same legal position should apply even to a case where the Municipal Committee levies the tax in respect of an article under an Entry not applicable to it. We do not see any analogy between these two illustrations, in the former, the municipal committee does not act under the Act, but in the latter it only commits a mistake or an error in fixing the rate of tax payable in respect of a particular commodity; one is outside the Act and the other is under the Act. One raises a question of jurisdiction and the other raises an objection to a matter of detail. We, therefore, hold that in the present case the mistake, if any, committed in imposing the terminal tax can only be corrected in the manner prescribed by the Act. The appellants have misconceived their remedy in filing the suit in the civil Court. One raises a question of jurisdiction and the other raises an objection to a matter of detail. We, therefore, hold that in the present case the mistake, if any, committed in imposing the terminal tax can only be corrected in the manner prescribed by the Act. The appellants have misconceived their remedy in filing the suit in the civil Court. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct." In my opinion the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court instead of helping the learned counsel for the plaintiff goes against him. What has been held is that if an article is not liable to tax under the Act a suit would lie but if the municipal committee levies a tax in respect of an article under the entry not applicable to it, the suit would not lie, as it will not be a question of jurisdiction. The real import of the decision is that if there is a prohibition under the Act to levy tax on an article, a suit may lie. However, in the present case there cannot be any dispute that the Mahapalika had power to levy octroi and has, in fact, exercised that power. Octroi is leviable on all articles under item No. 233, even if they may not have been mentioned separately. It is only under the exemptions which have been provided under the notification that octroi will not be levied on certain articles. The question, therefore, arises whether it will be for the authorities to determine as to whether the goods which are being imported in the municipal limits are exempted articles or not and as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) (supra), the same will be within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authorities exercising their power under the Adhiniyam and their decision in respect of it cannot be treated as a decision on collateral facts the finding on which determines the jurisdiction of the said authority. In case the determination by the appropriate authorities is even erroneous and based on incorrect finding of fact, it will be an order or determination under the Act within the meaning of Section 226 of the Adhiniyam and cannot be called in any civil Court. 15. In case the determination by the appropriate authorities is even erroneous and based on incorrect finding of fact, it will be an order or determination under the Act within the meaning of Section 226 of the Adhiniyam and cannot be called in any civil Court. 15. It may be noticed that reliance was also placed on the case of Firm Seth Radha Kishan ( AIR 1963 SC 1547 )(supra), by the plaintiffs in the case of Bata Shoe Company ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ) (supra). The Supreme Court while explaining the case of Seth Radha Kishan (at pp. 963, 964 of AIR 1977 SC) (supra) held:- "Plaintiffs sought support to their contention as regards the maintainability of the suit for refund of double duty and revised duty, from certain observations contained in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana (1964) 2 SCR 273 at p. 284: ( AIR 1963 SC 1547 at p. 1551) to the effect that "a suit in a civil Court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions". In the first place, the assessment in the instant case was made by the authority duly empowered to do so and secondly the authority was acting under the Act while revising the assessment and imposing double duty. If it exceeded that power it acted wrongly, not without jurisdiction .............The observations on which plaintiffs rely cannot, in the context, be taken to mean that the Act protects correct assessments only and that every incorrect or wrong order of assessment can be challenged by a suit though the statute gives it finality and provides full and effective remedies to challenge it. Except in matters of constitutionality and the like a self-contained Code must have priority over the common means of vindicating rights. Except in matters of constitutionality and the like a self-contained Code must have priority over the common means of vindicating rights. We would like to add that if the observations on which plaintiffs rely are to be understood literally, they are contrary to the decision in Kamala Mills case ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) where, speaking for a seven Judge Bench, Gajendragadkar C.J. observed that if the appropriate authority while exercising its jurisdiction and powers under the relevant provisions of the Act comes to an erroneous conclusion, it cannot be said that the decision is without jurisdiction (page 78)." 16. The next case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant is a decision of this Court reported in Devi Prasad (1949 All LJ 208) (supra). The aforesaid case has no application as in that case the tax imposed was found to be illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Board. There cannot be any quarrelling with the proposition that in case the imposition of tax is without jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the civil Court would not be barred. In the case of Devi Prasad (supra) reliance had been placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in District Board, Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt ( AIR 1948 All 382 ): (1948 All LJ 338 at p. 340) and it was held :- "If an assessment is made within the framework of the Act but the assessment is wrong it may not be possible for the civil Court to give to the assessee any relief and his remedy may be confined to an appeal under the Act. If, on the other hand, the assessment complained of is beyond the competence of the Board and is, therefore, an illegal imposition, the civil Court will certainly have jurisdiction to interfere." As far as the present case is concerned, as has been observed above, the levy of toll tax is within the jurisdiction of the Mahapalika and the question which arises in the present case is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim exemption of his article under the exemption clause. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the levy of octroi on any variety of coal is outside the jurisdiction of the Mahapalika. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the levy of octroi on any variety of coal is outside the jurisdiction of the Mahapalika. In fact, a bare reading of the notification shows that toll tax is leviable on all varieties of coal excepting one variety i.e. steam coal which has been exempted. This question as to whether the article which is being imported by the plaintiff is covered by the exemption clause will have to be determined by the authorities levying octroi. Maybe that in some case their decision may be erroneous but that erroneous decision can be got corrected by aggrieved person by filing an appeal to the Judge Small Cause Court and thereafter a second appeal to the District Judge. A complete machinery in this respect has been provided by the Adhiniyam itself. In view of what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Dhulabhai ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ) and Bata Shoe Company ( AIR 1977 SC 955 ) (supra), there cannot be any manner of doubt that the present suit was clearly barred by the provisions of Sec. 226 of the Adhiniyam. 17. The next question which arises for determination is as to whether the present suit is barred by the provisions of S. 571 of the Adhiniyam. Section 571 of the Adhiniyam provides:- "Protection of persons acting under this Act against suits. 17. The next question which arises for determination is as to whether the present suit is barred by the provisions of S. 571 of the Adhiniyam. Section 571 of the Adhiniyam provides:- "Protection of persons acting under this Act against suits. (1) No suit shall be instituted against the Mahapalika or against the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari or against any Mahapalika Officer or servant in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act.- (a) until the expiration of two months next after the notice in writing has been, in the case of the Mahapalika, left at the Mahapalika Office and, in the case of Mukhya Nagar Adhikari or of a Mahapalika Officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, if any, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, Advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purposes of such suit, (b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding." The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the realisation of octroi on an exempted article cannot be said to be an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act. The argument in effect is that if under the Act no octroi can be charged on the exempted article, the charging of octroi on such an article cannot be said to be an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Poona Municipal Corporation v. Dattatraya Nagesh ( AIR 1965 SC 555 ) and Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. (Private) v. Municipal Committee Dhamangaon ( AIR 1966 SC 249 ). Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Poona Municipal Corporation v. Dattatraya Nagesh ( AIR 1965 SC 555 ) and Bharat Kala Bhandar Ltd. (Private) v. Municipal Committee Dhamangaon ( AIR 1966 SC 249 ). In both these cases it was held that the tax could not be imposed as there was complete absence of power to impose such a tax. In the case of B.K. Bhandar (supra) it was held that where the question raised is as to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to proceed against the assessee and levy on or collect from him an amount in excess of that permitted by the Constitution, the matter would be entirely out of the bar of that provision. Similarly, in the case of Poona Municipal Corporation (supra) it was held that "A tax or octroi refund is not thus one of the taxes which the Bombay Municipal Corporation could impose. It is not one of the specified taxes. Nor is it a tax which the State Legislature has power under the Constitution to impose in the State. Apart from this absence of power to impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier parts of Section 127, we have the categorical prohibition in sub-section (4) against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation." The aforesaid cases would, therefore, have no application whatsoever to the present case inasmuch as, as has been held above, there is no prohibition imposed on the Mahapalika under the Adhiniyam to levy octroi. The power is Clearly there under S. 172 (2) of the Adhiniyam. The acts which would fall within the category of those "done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act" could only be those which were done under a vestige or semblance of authority, or with some show of a right. The power is Clearly there under S. 172 (2) of the Adhiniyam. The acts which would fall within the category of those "done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act" could only be those which were done under a vestige or semblance of authority, or with some show of a right. If an act was outrageous and extraordinary or could not be supported at all, not having been done with a vestige or semblance of authority or some sort of a right invested in the party doing that act, it would certainly not be an act which is "done or purpored to have been done in pursuance of the Act." The distinction between ultra vires and illegal acts, on the one hand, and those purporting to be done in pursuance of the Act, on the other is quite well known. The distinction is really between ultra vires and illegal acts, on the one hand, and wrongful acts, on the other, wrongful in the sense that they purport to have been done in pursuance of the Act, they are intended to seem to have been done in pursuance of the Act and are done with a vestige or semblance of authority, or sort of a right invested in the party doing those acts. If the defendants, therefore had no power to levy octroi duty at all, either wholly or in regard to some classes of goods, and had purported to levy the same, it would certainly have been an act which was outrageous and extraordinary, with not a vestige or semblance of authority, or not even shadow of a right. However, under the Adhiniyam, under S. 172 (2) the power has been given to the Mahapalika to impose octroi duty on articles and goods imported within their territorial jurisdiction and the Mahapalika in exercise of that power has, in fact, levied the said octroi duty, which comprises various articles including coal of various varieties. If the defendants while interpreting the meaning of 'steam coal' have wrongly made a determination or adjudication in that behalf, then even if that determination may be found to be wrongful, it cannot be said that what the authorities purported to do was illegal or outrageous or extraordinary or done without having any vestige or semblance of authority or even without a shadow of right. The authorities had the power and the authorities had to impose octroi on articles and goods imported within their jurisdiction and thus would clearly have the right and authority to do so and in case their decision is erroneous then it will be held that it was an act which they purported to do in pursuance of the Act and, therefore, their action would clearly be within the powers conferred under the Adhiniyam. In this connection, relying on two decisions reported in Ram Chander Sahai v. Cantonment Board, Meerut (AIR 1947 All 42) and Madan Lal v. Cantonment Board, Mathura, (1978 All LJ 1147), it has been urged that as the power to levy octroi was not a mandatory duty cast on the Mahapalika, notice would not be necessary as the act of the Mahapalika was in the discharge of a discretionary function enumerated in Section 172 (2) of the Adhiniyam. The argument proceeds on the assumption that there is no mandatory duty cast on the officers to realise octroi duty which has been prescribed by the Mahapalika. It is true that Sec. 172 (2) of the Adhiniyam gives the discretionary power to the Mahapalika to impose an octroi on goods or animals brought within the city for consumption, use or sale therein. However, once that discretionary power has been exercised by the Mahapalika, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the officers have to perform the mandatory duty of realising the aforesaid tax. A bare perusal of Section 172 (3) of the Adhiniyam will show that the Mahapalika taxes shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws framed thereunder. It is, therefore, clear that once Mahapalika has levied the tax, the same shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the Act and the rules and the bye-laws by the officers. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that there is no obligation imposed under the Adhiniyam to assess and levy and also realise tax which has been prescribed by the Mahapalika, under the Adhiniyam. It may further be noticed that in Ram Chander Sahai's case (supra) the whole argument proceeded on the basis that what was being enforced by the plaintiff was a contractual right. It may further be noticed that in Ram Chander Sahai's case (supra) the whole argument proceeded on the basis that what was being enforced by the plaintiff was a contractual right. In Madan Lal's case (supra) it was held that the tax levied contravened the express constitutional provision enacted by Article 276 of the Constitution and by no stretch of imagination on the findings which had been recorded in the aforesaid two cases it can be said that the suit will be bad for want of service of notice as it could not be said in those cases that the officers purported to act under the Act. This contention raised thus has also no force. 18. In the end the learned counsel for the appellant urged that the suit being for injunction, under the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 571 of the Adhiniyam no notice was required to be given as the object would have been defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding. The lower appellate Court has relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Hazi Ahmad Raza v. The Municipal Board, Allahabad (1952 All WR (HC) 536: (1952 All LJ 223)) to negative the contention raised by the learned counsel for the apnellant. The precise controversy involved in the instant case came up for decision in a later decision of this Court reported in Municipal Board. Shikohabad v. Chandra Deo Prasad (1963 All LJ 688) where it was laid down while construing a similar provision of Section 326 (4) of the U.P. Municipalities Act as under (at p. 690 of 1963 All LJ):- "The exception given in sub-sec. (4) has also a very restricted meaning. Its language goes to show that even in case of injunction a notice is necessary to be given to the Board or to its officers or servants covered by sub-section (1). (4) has also a very restricted meaning. Its language goes to show that even in case of injunction a notice is necessary to be given to the Board or to its officers or servants covered by sub-section (1). But where the object of the suit would be defeated by giving a notice in an injunction suit such a notice need not to given." Relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Hazi Ahmad Raza (supra) it was further held (at p. 690 of 1963 All LJ) "There was no question of the object of the suit failing by mere payment of the tax which had been imposed upon the plaintiffs and if the plaintiffs had succeeded in the suit they could have claimed refund of the tax paid by them. ........." In the instant case also it cannot be said that the object of the suit would have failed by the mere payment of tax which would be imposed on the plaintiff as in the event of the plaintiff's success in the suit it could have claimed refund of the tax so paid by it. The contention raised, therefore, has no force, and the plaintiff could not claim benefit of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Section 571 of the Adhiniyam. The suit could not be instituted until the expiration of two months next after the notice in writing had been given. In the present case no notice having been given the suit was rightly held to be barred by the provisions of S. 571 (1) of the Adhiniyam. 19. For the reasons stated above, the findings of the two courts below that the suit was barred by the provisions of Sections 226 and 571 of the Adhiniyam cannot be said to suffer from any error of Law requiring interference in this second appeal. 20. In the result, the present second appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.