JUDGMENT V. Khalid, J. 1. Election to the Syndicate of the Kerala University was held in accordance with the provisions relating to election in the year 1980. The last date for filing nomination was 21st May, 1980. The petitioner, who is an Ex-Member of Parliament and respondents 3 and 4 filed their nominations. No objection was raised by the petitioner at the time of scrutiny of nominations. The Members of the Syndicate are elected on the basis of proportional representation by single transferable vote. Respondents 3 and 4 were declared elected in the first round itself since they got the quota of first votes. The petitioner did not get elected. Thereupon he filed an election petition dated 2nd June, 1980 under statute 5(2) of Chap.1 of the First Statutes of the University. I am not adverting to the details not strictly relevant as to the events that took place before the election petition was actually taken up for consideration by the 1st respondent, the Chancellor. The Chancellor heard the election petition after giving due notice to the parties concerned on 30th July, 1980. The challenge against the election of respondents 3 and 4 was based on the third proviso to S.22 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which prevented a person being the Member of the Syndicate for two terms in succession. Respondents 3 and 4 were functioning as the Members of the Syndicate for a period of one year and four months with effect from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 and had continued as Members for four years from February, 1976 on being elected. The petitioner's case was that the election of respondents 3 and 4 in question would enable them to continue as Members of the Syndicate for a third term which was opposed to S.22. The Chancellor in Ext. P-1 order after considering the rival contentions put forward held that respondents 3 and 4 had not been the Members of the Syndicate for two terms in succession coming within the mischief of S.22 of the Act and dismissed the petition. The decision by the Chancellor was grounded on the finding that the expression 'term' used in S.22 of the Act postulated two terms after an election as envisaged in the Act. The decision by the Chancellor was grounded on the finding that the expression 'term' used in S.22 of the Act postulated two terms after an election as envisaged in the Act. The period of one year and six months during which respondents 3 and 4 continued in office from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 cannot be brought within the word 'term' used in S.22. It is this order that is under challenge in the Writ Petition. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the University, respondents 3 and 4 and the learned Advocate General in support and against of the contentions raised in the petition. The point at issue falls within a short compass and that relates to interpretation to be given to the third proviso to S.22 of the Act which governs the matter. I read S.22 in full: - ''Term of office of members of Syndicate. - Members of the Syndicate, other than ex officio members, shall hold office for a term of four years from the date of their election: Provided that no person elected in his capacity as a member of a particular body or as the holder of a particular office shall be a member of the Syndicate for a longer period than three months after he has ceased to be such member or holder of such office unless in the meanwhile he again becomes a member of that electorate or the holder of that office: Provided further that the member referred to in item (b) under the heading 'Other Members' in S.21 shall hold office for a period of one year from the date of his election or till he ceases to be a member of the Senate, whichever is earlier: Provided also that no person other than an ex officio member shall be eligible to hold office for more than two terms in succession". This Act was preceded by the 1969 Act which was preceded by the Kerala University Act of 1957. Respondents 3 and 4 who were Members of the Syndicate before 1976 continued in office from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 under S.82(1) of the Act. Their being Members of the Syndicate for this period was not by virtue of an election. They were there by virtue of a nomination. Respondents 3 and 4 who were Members of the Syndicate before 1976 continued in office from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 under S.82(1) of the Act. Their being Members of the Syndicate for this period was not by virtue of an election. They were there by virtue of a nomination. S.82 was enacted for the continuity of the University administration till the proper authorities were constituted as per the provisions of the Act. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner forcefully contended that S.22 contained an in-built safeguard preventing Members of the Syndicate from continuing for more than two terms in succession, lest they should establish any vested interest in the Syndicate. A high academic body like the Syndicate should be free from vested interests, from bias and from other extraneous influences. This can best be safeguarded by introducing new blood into the Syndicate and this intendment of the legislature is reflected in the embargo contained in third proviso to S.22 preventing a Member from continuing in the Syndicate for two terms in succession. Viewed against this background, he contended, the word 'term' should not be rigidly construed. To effectuate the intendment of the legislature and to implement the wholesome objects with which S.22 was enacted the word 'term' should be given an interpretation in consonance with the intendment of the legislature and not an interpretation to defeat it. He, therefore, submitted that the terms of office of respondents 3 and 4 from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 and four years from February, 1976 after election should be construed as the two terms contemplated under S.22 of the Act. The learned Advocate General and the counsel for the University and respondents 3 and 4 countered this submission with the plea that the term contemplated under S.22 is the term during which a person is a Member of the Syndicate after election held under the Act. According to them, the Chancellor of the University has come to a proper and reasonable conclusion and this court would not normally interfere with that conclusion on inconsequential grounds, for the policy of the court should be to affirm a reasonable conclusion arrived at by the Chancellor and not to interfere with it even if a slightly different conclusion is possible under the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits in reply to this plea that in matters of interpretation of Statutes the court should unhesitatingly step in when the court finds that the interpretation given by the Chancellor is not in conformity with the object and intendment of the legislature. I proceed on the assumption that the petitioner's counsel is justified in the submission that this court should exercise its jurisdiction on being satisfied that the interpretation put by the Chancellor on the relevant provisions of law in question is not in conformity with the intendment of the legislature and does not advance the wholesome object with which the section in question was put on the statute book. 4. The first respondent found in clear terms that the term of office of respondents 3 and 4 from 1969 to 1974 was not a term within S.22 of the Act. During that period they were functioning under S.82(1) of the Act. The 1st respondent made pointed reference to the Explanation to S.20 of the 1969 Act and held that the absence of such an Explanation in the 1974 Act made it abundantly clear that the two successive terms contemplated under the third proviso to S.22 of the Act were the terms pursuant to an election held under the provisions of the Act. It is this conclusion that has to be tested against the provisions of the Act, the object of the legislature and the intendment of the enactment, in accordance with known principles of interpretation of law. 5. The only question that needs to be decided in this case is whether respondents 3 and 4 have disabled themselves from standing for election on account of the embargo contained in the third proviso to S.22 of the Act which I have already read. The main section provides that every elected member shall hold office for a term of four years from the date of their election. There was considerable discussion at the bar about the connotation of word 'term'. I do not think, an examination of the meaning of the word 'term' need detain me. S.22 deals with a term of four years. The third proviso is in this section. The normal rule of interpretation of statutes is that a proviso can control only the section in which it appears. What does the proviso say? I do not think, an examination of the meaning of the word 'term' need detain me. S.22 deals with a term of four years. The third proviso is in this section. The normal rule of interpretation of statutes is that a proviso can control only the section in which it appears. What does the proviso say? It enables an ex officio member to hold office for more than two terms in succession, but not any other member. Reading the section as a whole the member who is prevented by the third proviso from holding office for more than two terms in succession is the member elected under the provisions of the Act and not any other member. Therefore a person who had held office as a member of the Syndicate either as an elected member or as a nominated member under the provisions of any of the predecessor Acts will not come within the mischief of this proviso. This position is in my view, abundantly clear from the section itself and it is not necessary to go beyond that. 6. Considerable assistance is available, for holding so, in the 1969 Act which preceded the 1974 Act. S.20 of the 1969 Act (Kerala University Act, 1969) reads as follows: "20. Term of office of members of syndicate: - Members of the Syndicate, other than ex officio members, shall hold office for a term of four years from the date of their election: Provided that no person elected in his capacity as a member of a particular body or as the holder of a particular office shall be a member of the Syndicate for a longer period than three months after he has ceased to be such member or holder of such office unless in the meanwhile he again becomes a member of that electorate or the holder of that office: Provided further that no person other than ex officio member shall be eligible to hold office for more than two terms in succession. Explanation: - For the purposes of the foregoing proviso, 'term' shall include a term of office as member of the Syndicate constituted under the Kerala University Act, 1957, notwithstanding that such term was less than or greater than four years". The main S.20 here is similar to S.22 of the 1974 Act. Explanation: - For the purposes of the foregoing proviso, 'term' shall include a term of office as member of the Syndicate constituted under the Kerala University Act, 1957, notwithstanding that such term was less than or greater than four years". The main S.20 here is similar to S.22 of the 1974 Act. Similar is the position with the second proviso in this section and the third proviso in S.22 of the present Act. But the explanation in S.20 of the 1969 Act is absent in the 1974 Act and this explanation is extremely important for the adjudication of the issue raised in this case. The two sections juxtaposed would show that the 1974 Act marks a complete departure from the 1969 Act due to the absence of the explanation. In D.R. Fraser and Co. Ltd. v. The Minister of National Revenue ( AIR 1949 PC 120 ), it is observed in Para.11: "The contrast is pointed. When an amending Act alters the language of the principal Statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately". The position before me cannot be made clearer. Note the contrast between S.20 of the 1969 Act and S.22 of the 1974 Act. There is no difficulty to understand that the deletion of the explanation in S.22 of the 1974 Act was deliberate. The only inference possible is that any term during which a member held office except otherwise than by election under the 1974 Act will not come within the mischief of the third proviso to S.22. 7. The learned Advocate General brought to my notice the following passage from Craies on Statute Law at page 108 in reinforcement of the submission that the departure in the 1974 Act is deliberate and to understand what S.22 means is to first see what it does not mean. I quote the following from page 108: "In order to know what a statute does mean, it is one important step to know what it does not mean; and if it be quite clear that there is something which it does not mean, then that which is suggested or supposed to be what it does mean must be in harmony and consistent with what it is clear that it does not mean. What it forbids must be consistent with what it permits". The matter, with great respect, is pithily put. What it forbids must be consistent with what it permits". The matter, with great respect, is pithily put. To understand what the third proviso to S.22 of the 1974 Act means is to first see what it does not mean. To understand what the third proviso to S.22 of the 1974 Act forbids is first to see what S.20 of the earlier Act permits. What the third proviso to S.22 of the 1974 Act forbids is holding office for more than two terms in succession. This holding office is under the 1974 Act. The second proviso to S.20 of the 1969 Act also forbids more than two terms in succession. But the explanation permits taking into account for the purpose of the second proviso the term of office held by a member of the Syndicate under the 1957 Act notwithstanding that such term was less than or greater than 4 years. The Chancellor in this case has correctly understood S.22 of the 1974 Act to mean that the bar contained in the third proviso to S.22 is the two terms of four years in succession as contemplated under that section. 8. The period of one year and six months during which the two Syndicate members namely respondents 3 and 4 continued in office from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 cannot be construed as a term coming under S.22 of the 1974 Act. As already indicated the term in the contemplation of S.22 is a term of 4 years, which is the term that the third proviso contemplates. That the period of one year and six months during which respondents 3 and 4 continued in office cannot be equated to a term mentioned in S.22 is apparent from the wording of S.22 and S.82 of the Act. S.22 states that members of the Syndicate shall hold office for the term of 4 years from the date of their election. S.82(1) which is the transitory provision reads as follows "82. Transitory provisions. S.22 states that members of the Syndicate shall hold office for the term of 4 years from the date of their election. S.82(1) which is the transitory provision reads as follows "82. Transitory provisions. - (1) Any officer or authority of the University of Kerala exercising any power or performing any duty under the Kerala University Act, 1969, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall for a period of nine months from such commencement or until the corresponding officer or authority is appointed, elected, nominated or constituted, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder, whichever is late, continue to exercise such powers or perform such duties, as the case may be, so far as such powers or duties are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act". (italics mine) This section enables the Members of the Syndicate to continue to exercise the powers and duties not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1974 Act. That is an enabling provision for continuity in the affairs of the University. That provision does not envisage holding of office of members of the Syndicate pursuant to an election. Therefore continuance in office of respondents 3 and 4 under S.82 of the Act will not come within the mischief of the third proviso to S.22 of the 1974 Act. In fact S.82 of the Act recognises the continuity of the members of the Syndicate under the 1969 Act without the inhibition contained in the explanation to S.20 of the said Act. I therefore hold that the conclusion arrived at by the Chancellor is correct and is consistent with the intendment of the enactment. For this reason I refrain from adverting to the authorities cited before me touching upon the interpretation of statute, etc. 9. The learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 raised an objection about the maintainability of the petition on the ground that all the members of the Syndicate had not been made parties to the petition. According to him R.148 of the High Court Rules obliged a petitioner to implead all parties likely to be affected by the result of the Original Petition on the party array. The objection raised is that the Members of the Syndicate are elected on the basis of proportional representation by single transferable vote. According to him R.148 of the High Court Rules obliged a petitioner to implead all parties likely to be affected by the result of the Original Petition on the party array. The objection raised is that the Members of the Syndicate are elected on the basis of proportional representation by single transferable vote. Respondents 3 and 4 were declared elected in the first round itself since they got the quota of first votes in the first round itself. If it is a case of an ordinary election, a Member is declared elected if he gets more votes than the defeated member. In such cases, success in an election petition would affect only one seat. But here, since the election is on the basis of proportional representation any decision affecting the election of respondents 3 and 4 will have a bearing upon the election of the other Members and perhaps Members who did not get elected. R.148 of the High Court Rules says that all persons directly affected shall be made parties to the petition and when they are numerous one of them may with the permission of the court be impleaded for the benefit of all. Non-impleadment of the Members of the Syndicate likely to be affected by the result of the Original Petition, it is contended, offends the High Court Rules. R.148 of the High Court Rules is a mandatory provision. In my judgment this objection is well founded. 10. I hold that the order Ext. P-1 passed by the 1st respondent is valid and has to be upheld. Respondents 3 and 4 are entitled to hold office for another term pursuant to their having been declared elected. I dismiss the writ petition directing the parties to bear their costs.