SACHAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the learned single judge by which he dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, against the order dated 21-9-1971 passed by the President -under Section 18 of the Air Force Act, 1950 hereinafter to be called the Act) dismissing the appellant from service with immediate effect. ( 2 ) THE appellant was granted a commission on 4-11-1949 and appointed in the rank of Pilot Officer on 2-6-1949. At the time of :passing of the implugned order he was working as a Wg. Cdr. It appears that on l6-3-1971 the appellant was asked to explain certain legations with regard to Iris alleged contacts with foreign missions and to give details with regard to the alleged acceptance of invitations by the appellant from the- foreigners. Thereafter the appellant not only met the officers but also gave in Writing his explanation. His son-in-law also gave his statements. The appellant denied the suggestion of any objectionable conduct and denied any impropriety having been committed. "these enquiries went on -for some time and ultimately the impugned order mentioned above was passed by the President which Was challenged in the Writ petition. ( 3 ) THE main argument addressed before the learned single judge was that as the impunged order mentioned that the appel- lant has been "dismissed from service", he had a right that a proper enquiry should have been held and opportunity should have been given- to him as required by Section 19 of the Act read with Rule 16 of the Air Force Rules) 1969 (hereinafter to becalled the Rules ). It was not disputed that no enquiry as required by Rule 16 was held. The learned judge has held that the tenure of the appellant was at the pleasure of the President within the meaning of Article 310 (1) of the Constitution of India and therefore the President was empowered to dismiss the appelelant without holding an enquiry and neither the Act not the Rules could put any restraint on the;presidential pleasure. The writ. petitioner was accordingly dismissed. The appellant. has come up in appeal. ( 4 ) SECTION 18 of the Act provides that every person subject to the Act shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. The writ. petitioner was accordingly dismissed. The appellant. has come up in appeal. ( 4 ) SECTION 18 of the Act provides that every person subject to the Act shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. Section 19 further empowers the Central Government subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules to dismiss or remove from service any person subject to the Act. Rule 16 of the Rules lays down that an officer may be dismissed or removed from Service for misconduct by the Central Government but before doing so and subject to the provisions of sub rule (2) he shall be given an opportunity show cause against such action. Admittedly no enquiry was held as contemplated by Rule 16. Mr. Joseph maintains that in such a situation where the impugned order dismisses the appellant from service the same had to precede by an enquiry and in its absence the order is vitiated. Now if it were a case of a member of civil service the argument would have been unanswerable but the hurdle in the way of the appellant is that he was admittedly a member of the Defence Services. Article 310 of the Constitution provides that except as expressly provided by this Constitution every person Who is a member of the Defence Service or of Civil Service of the Union,. . . . or holds any post connected with the defence, holds office during the pleasure of the President . Section 18 of the Air Force Act only repeats what has already,been provided in Article 310 of the Constitution. However, restrictions on the Presidential pleasure with regard to the member of a civil service are to be found in Article 311 laying down the restriction that no person holding a civil post shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and no such person shall be dismissed until he has been given opportunity of showing cause agains t the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. But Article 311 only covers the Case of persons who are members of Civil Services. It is thus clear that Article 311 has no application to persons like the appellant who were members of the Defence Services. But Article 311 only covers the Case of persons who are members of Civil Services. It is thus clear that Article 311 has no application to persons like the appellant who were members of the Defence Services. It is not therefore possible for the appellant to urge the argument by contending that the impugned order which mentions dismissal is bad because of not having complied with Article 311 of the constitution. Indeed Mr. Joseph did not rely on Article 311. His argument was that as- the order purports to dismiss the appellant, it was incumbent to hold an enquiry and gave opportunity to the appellant before passing the impugned order. Mr. Joseph says that the ambit of the Presidential pleasure under Article 310 cannot be said to authorise the exercise of power by the President to dismiss person without first holding an enquiry has the same would be inconsistent with the Rules and the principle of natural justice as it would amount to condemning a person behind his back. We cannot agree. Now it is not disputed that in England, all servants of the Crown hold office daring the pleasure of the Crown and the right to dismiss at pleasure-is an implied term in every contract of employment of the Crown : subject of course to an Act of Parliament providing otherwise and prescribing a tenure for good behaviour and expressly providing for power to determine for a cause. But Mr. Joseph says that doctrine of tenure of pleasure cannot be read in that vide ambit in our Constitutional set up. It is undoubtedly true that unless such adoctrine is to be found in the Constitution ft cannot be spelled out by analogy of Crown prerogative. But the respondents do not claim to rely on Presidential pleasure except on the authority of Article 310 of the Constitution which must be given full effect unless its rigour is controlled by other provisions of the Constitution. Thus in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court 751) (l) it was held : (1) In India every person who is a member of a public service described in Art. 310 of the Constitution holds office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, subject to the express provisions therein. (2) "this tenure is subject to the limitations or qualifications mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. (3) the Parliament or the Legislatures of State cannot make a law abrogating or modifying this. tenure so as to impinge upon the over-riding power conferred upon the President or the Governor,. under Article 310 as qualified by Article 311. (4) the Parliament or the Legislatures of States can make law regulating the conditions of service of such a member which includes proceedings by way of disciplinary action without affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution read with Article 311 thereof. With regard to the apprehension expressed by Mr. Joseph that the tenure at pleasure can work injustice and arbitrariness the Supreme Court had this to say; at page 760 : It may be that the farmers of the Constitution having incorporated in our Constitution the tenure at pleasure unhampered by legislative interference, thought that the said limitations and qualifications would reasonably protect the interests of the civil. servants against arbitrary actions. Reference by Mr. Joseph to Mr. Moti Ram Deca v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway (A. I. R. 1964 SC 600) (2) is of no avail because there also it has been clearly observed: the rules and indeed exercise of powers conferred on the delegate must be subject to Article 310 and so Article 309 cannot empower or affect the pleasure of the President or the Governor specifying therein. There is thus no doubt that Article 309 has to be read subject to Article 311; but as in the present case the appellant was a member of the Defence Services, Article 311 was inapplicable and therefore the pleasure under Article 310 can be exercised untrammelled by any other provision of the Constitution of the statute (see ILR 1974 (2) Delhi 258 ). Reference by Mr. Joseph to P. A. Ahammed Kannu v. Travancore-Cochin $tate (A. I. R. 1956 Trav-Co. 35) (3) is equally of no avail. In that case admittedly the employee was holding a civil post. There was a statutory rule which required an enquiry to be held before passing the order of dismissal. The impugned order mentioned that the employee had been dismissed but no enquiry had been held. 35) (3) is equally of no avail. In that case admittedly the employee was holding a civil post. There was a statutory rule which required an enquiry to be held before passing the order of dismissal. The impugned order mentioned that the employee had been dismissed but no enquiry had been held. It was in that conext that it was said that the pleasure of the Rajpramukh had to be exercised subject to the statutory rules which had been framed by him. This authority is analogus to the case of the member of a civil service who. has the protection of Article 311 and cannot be dismissed from service without holding an enquiry. This authority is not applicable to the present case because the appellant is a member of the Defence Services. Thus- the position of a member of defence force vis-a-vis. any action taken against him in exercise of Presidential pleasure would be akin to that which was noticed in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State (A. I. R. 1937 P. C. 31) (4 ). In that case the service of the employee under the Government of India Act was during His Majesty s pleasure and though the Service Rules provided for an enquiry to be held before dismissing an employee, the employee was dismissed without holding an enquiry. The challenge to the dismissal on the ground that rules have been violated was answered by the Privy Council as follows- : the argument for a limited and special kind of employment during pleasure but with an added contractual term that the rules are to be observed is at once too artificial and too far-reaching to commend itself for acceptance. Though the court redognised that the Section contains a statutory and solemn assurance that the tenure of office though at pleasure will not be subject to capricious or arbitraty action but will be regulated by rule. Though the court redognised that the Section contains a statutory and solemn assurance that the tenure of office though at pleasure will not be subject to capricious or arbitraty action but will be regulated by rule. But it was emphasised that pursuant to the principle so laid down, redress in such cases is not obtainable from the courts by action even where there has been serious and complete failure, to adhere to important and fundamental rules, as for instance in the case of a person who has been dismissed from service without any investigation into the charge as per Rule 14 under S. 96-B. Though these observations are no longer to be considered good law with regard to the justiciability in matters where a person holding a civil post has been dismissed without holding an enquiry as provided by Article 311, they would continue to apply to the case of the appellant, a member. of defence forces. The reason is that Article 310 provides for the tenure of such a member at pleasure. As Article 311 is not applicable the power under Article 310 is untrammelled and we agree with the learned single judge that the power to put an end to the tenure may be exercised by any of the modest known to law for the purpose and that there is no distinction whether the tenure be put an end to by termination or dismissal, because such a power to remove or dismiss is covered in the Presidential pleasure as provided in Article 310. We may note that though the observations in Venkat Rao s case were not fully approved in the State of U. P. v. Babu Ram (Supra) but that was only with regard to the assumption of the Privy Council that the tenure at pleasure could only be modified by statute and not by rules- made under a statute. But so far as the ambit of tenure at pleasure under Article 310 in a case where Article 311 is not applicable there was no difference. ( 5 ) MR. Joseph next contended that even if Art. 311 is not applicable still on the principles of natural justice an opportunity should have been given before using the word dismissal in the impugned order. Stress was laid on the ever expanding concept of natural justice and reference was made to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another. Joseph next contended that even if Art. 311 is not applicable still on the principles of natural justice an opportunity should have been given before using the word dismissal in the impugned order. Stress was laid on the ever expanding concept of natural justice and reference was made to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another. (1978) I Supreme Court Cases 248 (5), to persuade us to hold that notwithstanding the in-applicability of Article 311 a hearing was mandatory. We find the argument untenable. To so read the requirement of hearing would be to curtail the Presidential pleasure which can be withdrawn at any time and for any reason. In that case reference maybe made to Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union of India (A. I. R. 1971 SC 2111) (6 ). There a Supervisor of the Army Ordinance Corps against whom a chargesheet was given and he was called upon to submit his defence to the charges but before the enquiry could be concluded he was given one month s notice of discharge and his services were terminated. It was- held that as the employee was holding the post connected with thedefence Article 311 was inapplicable. Nevertheless it was urged that the order though purporting to be an order of discharge was in fact an order passed under instructions from the Army Headquarters and therefore it was a colourable exercise of power and natural justice required that he should have been given an opportunity to show cause against his discharge or termination. This plea was rejected by the court with the following observations : as regards the applicability of the rule of natural justice it has not been shown to us how under the general law of master and servant, in the absence of any protection conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution such a rule can be invoked. The whole emphasis of argument rests on the use of the expression dismissal in the impugned order. Though it may be broadly accepted that the word dismissal used in the Government of India Act as also in the Constitution and the Services Rule has been interpreted to mean termination of a persons s service by way of punishment (see The Workers employed in Hira Kud Dam v. The State of Orissa and another A. 1. Though it may be broadly accepted that the word dismissal used in the Government of India Act as also in the Constitution and the Services Rule has been interpreted to mean termination of a persons s service by way of punishment (see The Workers employed in Hira Kud Dam v. The State of Orissa and another A. 1. R. 1971 SC 2242) (7), it does not mean that the word dismissal while exercising the pleasure under Section 18 of the Act has to be given that meaning. The reason is that the pleasure under Section 18 of the Act can be exercised without giving any reasons. It gives the President over-all powers to terminate the service of an employee. , The use of the word dismissal does not always mean that it has been used by way of punishment. It is apparent that the source of order is really article 310 of the Constitution and Section 18 of the Act which talks of Presidential pleasure is only reiteration of the pleasure doctrine provided In the Constitution. The dismissal or removal by way of punishment which requires an enquiry to be held under Rule 16 of the Air Force Act, 1969 is to be found in Section 19 of the Act. But as power here has been exercised under Section 18 of the Act the word dismissed" has been used loosely to denote termination of service simpliciter and not by way of penalty. In our view the President merely because he has used the word dismiss cannot be said not to have exercised his pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) THE argument that because Section 19 of the Act and the Air Force Rules provide for an inquiry before an officer can be dismissed, resort cannot be had to section 18 of the Act suffers from the fallacy of not appreciating that the President s pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution cannot be controlled by the statute or rules because the benefits of Article 311 which impose limitation on the exercise of that pleasure does not extend to those Who hold office oconnected with the defence, (see Union of India and another v. K. S. Subramanian, AIR 1976 SC 2433 ) (8 ). In that case the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965, were applicable, but no enquiry had been held and it was ua-ged that this made the Order of termination of service illegal. Negativing this the Supreme Court observed : "the 1965 Rules are applicable when disciplinary proceedings ,are taken. They do not make disciplinary proceedings under the rules incumbent or obligatory whenever the services of a person covered by these rules are terminated. The oblation to follow the procedure for punishment laid down in the rules flows- from the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. And as the opening words of Article 310 show, the doctrine, of office held at the pleasure of the President does not apply to cases covered by Article 311. it was also observed, in. other cases of such servants, where no such disciplinary proceedings are instituted (and none were started against the plaintiff-respondent), the 1965 Rules, governing procedure for punishments to be imposed, will not apply at all. This argument that procedure under Section 19 read with rules was bound to be followed is repelled. ( 7 ) NEXT contention by Mr. Joseph is that the Central Government could resort to Section 19 in case of a officer while invoking the pleasure doctrine under Article 310 and Section 18 of the Act a), its discretion arid there being no guiding rules action is violated. He says there are two modes of exercising power under the Act, in Section 18 and 19 of the Act -the one more harsh and the other more beneficial to the servant the provisions would be discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution. We canmot, agree. In the first instance this argument ignores Article 33 of the Constitution, the result of which is that each and every provision of the Act is law made by Parliament and that if any such provision tends to affect the fundamental right under part III of the Constitution that provision does not, on that acoount, become void, as it must be taken that Parliament has thereby in the exercise of its- power under Article 33 of the Constitution made the requisite modification to affect the respective fundamental right (See Ram Sarup v. Union of India AIR. 1965 SC. 247) (9 ). 1965 SC. 247) (9 ). That apart we see no discrimination because the Presidential pleasure under Article 310 and which is reproduced in Section 18 of the Act is anexercise of different facet of power than the exercise of power under Section 19 of the Act which is. merely statutory. ( 8 ) THE next argument is of mala fide. The allegations are too bald and lack in substance. The main trend of the allegation is that the whole thing was manoeuvred at the instance of respondent No. 5 who though the appellant s classmate and is a good friend of the appellant from 1946 and though he continued to visit his house right up to the time of action being taken against him had become hostile against him and had manoeuvred to get reports against him from the intelligence department. There is no merit in this. In our opinion the suggestion that respondent No. 5 who was a comparatively junior ranked officer was able to pressurise senior officers both in the Army and Police to get a false report made and influence the President in making the impugned order is so meritless as that it has to be stated to be rejected. ( 9 ) THOUGH we, therefore uphold the impugned order and will affirm the judgment of the single judge we cannot but observe that in case the power is- exercised under Section 18 in terms of Article 310 of the Constitution it would be advisable for the authorities- to avoid using the word dismissal which in common parlance does amount to punishment and amounts to casting a stigma on an employee. But for the fact that the appellant is a member of the defence forces, and action is under Section 18 of the Act, the use of the word dismissal would have made the order bad if no enquiry had been held previously. The reason is that because Act also by Section 19 provides that if a person is to be penalised an enquiry must precede it. If therefore the President chooses to exercise his pleasure under Article 310 he may simply terminate an employee s service without using the word dismissed which has in common parlance come to mean termination by way of punishment. It is well to remember that it not only necessary that justice is done but that it must seem to be done. If therefore the President chooses to exercise his pleasure under Article 310 he may simply terminate an employee s service without using the word dismissed which has in common parlance come to mean termination by way of punishment. It is well to remember that it not only necessary that justice is done but that it must seem to be done. It is essential to give a greater assurance to the members of armed force (who do not enjoy many of the statutory safeguards enjoyed by members of civil services) and who must feel reassured that a. serious application of mind was made at the highest before taking action against him. We need not say more. ( 10 ) THE result is that the judgment of the learned single Judge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.