Judgment M.P. Saxena, J. 1. THE Nagar Palika, Chitrakut Dham Karvi has filed this appeal against the order dated 27-3-1976 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Karwi, in Criminal Case No. 131/75 dropping the proceedings under Section 307 (b) of the U. P. Municipalities Act against Mahadeo Prasad respondent. 2. ADMITTEDLY Mahadeo Prasad respondent had made certain unauthorised constructions on the Nagar Palika land on or about 10-12-1972. He was served with a notice under section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act to remove those constructions but he did not do so. A. complaint under Sections 185/211/307 of the Municipalities Act was filed against him on 19-2-1974. The Tahsildar Magistrate convicted him and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 250/- and directed him to remove the constructions forthwith failing which imposed a fine of Rs. 25/- per day till the order was complied with. The respondent filed an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge who by his order dated 8-5-1974 maintained the conviction and fine of Rs. 250/- but set aside the order oi' demolition and fine for continuing breach. As regards demolition he observed:- "The order of the Tahsildar Magistrate directing the appellant to remove the construction in this very order and judgment is illegal. It was the work of the Nagar Palika and not that of the Magistrate under these circumstances the learned Tahsildar Magistrate was not justified in ordering the appellant to remove the new construction.'' As regards daily fine for continuing breach he observed that there being no order for demolition of the new constructions this question did not arise. Neither party filed an appeal or revision against it and the order became final. 3. ON 2-2-1975 the Nagar Palika filed another complaint alleging that Mahadeo Prasad had not demolished the constructions inspite of his conviction and was liable to be punished for continuing breach under section 307 (b). ON 3-6-1975 the respondent raised a preliminary objection by means of an application that the complaint was barred by section 300 Cr. P.C. The application was rejected on 31-1-1976 by the following order:- "Heard the parties. ON 3-6-1975 the respondent raised a preliminary objection by means of an application that the complaint was barred by section 300 Cr. P.C. The application was rejected on 31-1-1976 by the following order:- "Heard the parties. In view of the provisions of Section 307 (b) of the U. P. Municipalities Act the present conditions for the imposition of fine for the breach of every day since the date of first conviction upto the date of complaint would not be barred by the provisions of Section 300 Cr. P.C. Therefore, the application stands rejected." 4. THEREAFTER the complaint came up for hearing and it was held to be not maintainable. Firstly, that in the absence of compliance of Section 307 (a) proceedings under Section 307 (b) could not be initiated. Secondly that the complaint was vague inasmuch as it did not disclose from which date the damages for continuing breach were claimed. The proceedings were accordingly dropped and the Nagar Palika has now come up in appeal to this Court. Three main points have arisen far determination in this appeal. The first question is whether the order regarding: continuing breach should have been passed in the order of conviction or a separate complaint was maintainable. In Emperor v. Purshottam Kandu, AIR 1935 Allahabad 986 it has been held that separate prosecution is necessary for continuing breach. In Jagannath Achari v. The Municipal Board, Faizabad, 1950 ALJ 592 also a second complaint was filed in respect of continuing breach after the first complaint had resulted in conviction under section 185/307 of the Municipalities Act. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that the order regarding continuing breach could not be passed in the first information and the courts had taken a correct view in the first case. 5. THE second point involved is whether section 307 (a) and (b) of the Municipalities Act are mutually exclusive or action under section 307 (b) cannot be taken unless requirements of section 307 (a) have been complied with. In this connection it maybe stated that there is no nexus between the two clauses. Clause (a) refers to execution or demolition of work while clause (b) refers to punishment. Sub-clause (a) is not a condition precedent to sub-clause (b). In this connection it maybe stated that there is no nexus between the two clauses. Clause (a) refers to execution or demolition of work while clause (b) refers to punishment. Sub-clause (a) is not a condition precedent to sub-clause (b). This conclusion is borne out form the following observation made in the case of Darbari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1973 ACC 47 : "It is obvious from Section 307 that a person who contravenes the provisions of section 178/180 of the Act is liable of conviction to a fine which may run up to Rs. 1000/-. Power to remove or demolish the unauthorised construction vests only in the Board (Town Area) under provisions of section 186 of the Act and that power can be exercised only by the Town Area after giving a written notice to the owner or to the occupier. Criminal Court is not competent while convicting a person under this Section to direct demolition of the construction.'' 6. IT is thus clear that it is the concern of the Town Area to have the unauthorised construction demolished. Hi can do so suo-moto or can take assistance of the civil court. The power to prosecute the defaulter for continuing breach is not hadged in by any condition or requirements of sub-clause (a). The learned trial court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that unless requirements of sub-section (a) were complied with the respondent could not be prosecuted for continuing breach. The third point for consideration is whether the complaint was vague- failure to give the date when disobedience started and the date upto which it continued. The learned trial court was wrong to hold that these dates were wanting. Obviously the appellant wanted action from the date of first conviction i. e. 19-2-1974 upto the date of the complaint i. e. 2-2-1975. The learned trial court was wrong in rejecting the complaint on the preliminary ground. 7. THE appeal is allowed and the trial court is directed to dispose of the complaint on merit according to law- Appeal allowed.