JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This appeal under letters patent is directed against the judgment and order dated 22nd March, 1979 passed by Rege, J., in First Appeal No. 805 of 1974. This litigation has a somewhat protracted history which, however, will not be narrated by us in any great details. However, some salient features ought to be mentioned here. The dispute relates to what has been described as rights of services in respect of Dnyaneshwar Sampradaya attached to the Trust at Alandi in Pune District. As it is well known, Maharashtra produced a well known saint called Dnyaneshwar who took Samadhi at Alandi more than seven hundred years ago and the followers of his cult have erected a place of worship at Alandi. From this place every year a procession is taken to Pandharpur in the month of Ashad. The place of worship at Alandi has been declared as a Public Trust and is governed by a scheme originally prepared in 1852 by the then Collector of Pune. In 1934 a suit, being Civil Suit No. 7 of 1934, was filed in the District Court at Pune under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for the preparation of the scheme in respect of the said Trust. The District Court amended the scheme as it was framed in the year 1852 and passed a decree giving an amended scheme. This decree of the District Court was challenged by the Committee in charge of the Trust in First Appeal No. 92 of 1938 and by a judgment dated 16th November, 1939 this Court further modified the scheme as decreed by the District Court. It is not disputed that this scheme which was framed by the High Court by modifying the scheme of the District Court is still in force. 2. At this stage it may be mentioned that during the course of the detailed arguments, no authenticated copy of the scheme as modified by the High Court was produced before us nor does it form part of the record of this case as it has travelled from the learned District Judge to a Single Judge of this Court and thereafter before us. However, in the record of First Appeal No. 92 of 1938 we find an uncertified copy of the said scheme. However, in the record of First Appeal No. 92 of 1938 we find an uncertified copy of the said scheme. That was apparently annexed to a civil application which had been subsequently filed in this Court for amendment of the scheme under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. We will later in this judgment refer to this civil application made for amending the decree under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. We are proceeding on the basis that the copy of the scheme which is found in the record of First Appeal No. 92 of 1938 is the correct copy of the scheme as framed by the High Court. We have heard the arguments on the basis that this is the correct scheme and the learned Advocates have sought to interpret the various clauses of this scheme during the course of their arguments. Later in this judgment we will be summarising the provisions of this scheme. 3. At this stage we must refer to the civil applications which were made by some persons for amending the scheme as settled by this Court. These applications were made under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. They were three in number and were ultimately disposed of by a judgment of this Court in (Gangaram Govind v. Vinchurkar)1, XLIX Bom.L.R. 757. This Court held that an application under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code may be filed for amending the scheme for the purpose mentioned in section 151, namely for doing justice and the prevention of abuse of the process of the Court. In the aforesaid judgment this Court however noted that the point raised in the civil applications should not be decided by themselves because it depended largely upon evidence. Accordingly this Court sent the papers to the learned District Judge directing him to issue notice to the parties to frame necessary issues and come to a conclusion on the issues and report the conclusion to this Court. This Court also did not impose any time limit for the proceedings to be held by the District Judge pursuant to the said directions. It has not been pointed out to us whether pursuant to this any modification of the scheme was made. 4. We must also at this stage refer to another development to this particular scheme. This Court also did not impose any time limit for the proceedings to be held by the District Judge pursuant to the said directions. It has not been pointed out to us whether pursuant to this any modification of the scheme was made. 4. We must also at this stage refer to another development to this particular scheme. In the year 1948, some 41 persons made applications to the District Court at Pune which has originally framed the scheme requesting that several rights as mentioned by them in their respective applications should be granted to them because they had not been included in the scheme as it had been framed. Among the applicants was on Tatyasaheb Babasaheb Waskar who claimed four rights in his application, bearing No. 20 of 1948. Ultimately on 12th of April, 1948 the learned District Judge passed an order granting the rights of the some of the parties and refusing the prayers of the others. The order passed by the District Court in those applications is introduced in evidence in this case at Exhibit 31. It has not been shown to us that between the time the High Court settled the modified scheme and 12th of April, 1948 when the District Court passed the orders on the 41 applications, any additional rights apart from those settled in the modified scheme by the High Court had come into existence. We have therefore, broadly to proceed on the basis that the four rights which were claimed by Tatyasaheb Waskar, the applicant in Application No. 20 of 1948, came into existence for the first time as a result of the order passed by the District Court on 12th of April, 1948. 5. The place of Tatyasaheb Waskar in the family which is involved in the litigation is to be found in the genealogy which has been reproduced in the judgment of Rege, J., as well as in the judgment of the District Judge. The common ancestor of the parties involved in this litigation is shown to be one Tukobadada. However, we have been informed that before Tukobadada there was his father Sayaji whose father was one Mallappa. That Mallappa was a man of saintly character who was associated with the Alandi temple from the beginning can also be gathered from a book written by one Sakhare Maharaj. The said book has been introduced in evidence as Exhibit 59. However, we have been informed that before Tukobadada there was his father Sayaji whose father was one Mallappa. That Mallappa was a man of saintly character who was associated with the Alandi temple from the beginning can also be gathered from a book written by one Sakhare Maharaj. The said book has been introduced in evidence as Exhibit 59. Reverting to the genealogy reproduced in the judgment of Rege, J., one notices that Tukobadada had three children, namely Vithoba, Gangaram and Muktabai. Gangaram and Muktabai did not have any children while Vithoba had three children, namely Narayan, Dnyanoba and Tukoba. Tukoba's line again become extinct. Narayan's son was Prabhu who died in the year 1899 and his son Babasaheb died in 1969. Tatyasaheb Waskar, who is respondent No. 1 in this appeal, is the son of the said Babasaheb. Narayan's brother Dnyanoba had two children, namely Eknath and Hari. Hari's line seems to have become extinct while Eknath had a son by name Bhanudas and the present appellant Appasaheb is the son of the said Bhanudas. 6. From the evidence on record it can be seen that there is what is called a Waskar Pad Meaning a group which performs Bhajana in connection with the Alandi temple. From time to time the members of the Waskar family seem to have performed sevas associated with the Alandi temple. In the year 1969 the appellant filed an application, numbered as Miscellaneous Application No. 368 of 1969, purportedly in the Court of the District Judge at Pune and purportedly again under Clause 15 of the scheme settled by this Court. In this application respondent No. 1 was joined as opponent No. 1 while the Trust and its Managing Trustee were joined as opponents Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. In the said application the applicant has given the genealogy and has referred to the history of the family. Thereafter he has also made a mention of Civil Suit No. 7 of 1934 and of the fact that the scheme was framed in the said suit. According to the appellant, in the scheme framed in the said suit, the panch Committee has not mentioned in the notes submitted to the Court the name if a particular Waskar for the performance of a particular seva of the Waskar family, but they have only said Waskars. According to the appellant, in the scheme framed in the said suit, the panch Committee has not mentioned in the notes submitted to the Court the name if a particular Waskar for the performance of a particular seva of the Waskar family, but they have only said Waskars. According to the appellant, respondent No. 1 managed to get his name included in the rules instead of the name of the Waskar family. The appellant contended that the right of performing a seva was of the Waskar family as a whole and the said right had been enjoyed by the appellant himself for several years before this application was made. According to the appellant, the cause of action for the application arose on Chaitra Shudh 9th of the Shake Year 1890 when according to him the first respondent started a separate group and obstructed the right of the appellant in the performance of his seva. The Panch Committee did not take cognizance of the trespass thus committed by the first respondent. According to him, there is a dispute between the Sevakaris and the Panch Committee and this dispute should be settled under Clause 15 of the scheme. The prayer Clause is worded as follows : "There is a right to perform certain Sevas at different occasions by the Waskar family standing for a long time. It may be declared that the said right is given to the applicant as well as to the opponent No. 1 and the Court may also frame rules for performing those rights by the applicant and opponent No. 1." 7. The application was originally heard by the Assistant Judge of Pune who by his judgment and order dated 28th of August, 1971 dismissed the same as being not maintainable. The learned Assistant Judge took the view that the dispute raised by the applicant was not the one which was contemplated under Clause 15 of the scheme. This decision of the learned Assistant Judge was challenged by the appellant in an appeal, being First Appeal No. 272 of 1972, which was heard and allowed by Vaidya, J., by his judgment and order dated 29th of September, 1973. This decision of the learned Assistant Judge was challenged by the appellant in an appeal, being First Appeal No. 272 of 1972, which was heard and allowed by Vaidya, J., by his judgment and order dated 29th of September, 1973. While so allowing the appeal, Vaidya, J., noticed that Clause 26 of the scheme conferred jurisdiction of deciding the dispute mentioned in that clause on the District Judge who was a persona designata and the application was wrongly entertained by the learned Assistant Judge. Vaidya, J., also held that the dispute raised by the appellant in his application was one covered by Clause 15 of the scheme and could properly be adjudicated upon by the District Judge to whom the case was remanded. 8. After remand, the learned District Judge of Pune by his judgment and order dated 11th of September, 1974 dismissed the application on merits. The learned District Judge found, among other things, that the right of performing seva had been exercised by the father of the first respondent and after the death of the father of the first respondent that right devolved upon the first respondent who was the only son of the father. The appellant could not claim any share in the right which was enjoyed by the father of the first respondent and after him by the first respondent. This order of the learned District Judge dismissing the application on merits was challenged by the appellant in First Appeal No. 805 of 1974. Rege, J., who heard this appeal dismissed it on two grounds. In the first place he held that the appeal was not maintainable on the ground that the order has been passed by the learned District Judge in exercise of the powers vested in him under Clause 15 of the scheme and not in a suit. While taking this view, Rege, J., relied upon a judgment of this Court in (Mahadev v. Govindrao)2, XXXVIII Bom.L.R. 1137. Rege, J., also took the view that the rights of seva were always enjoyed by the eldest member of the eldest family and, therefore, the first respondent alone could continue to exercise the said rights. This order of the learned Single Judge passed on 22nd of March, 1979 is challenged in this letters patent appeal. 9. Mr. Rege, J., also took the view that the rights of seva were always enjoyed by the eldest member of the eldest family and, therefore, the first respondent alone could continue to exercise the said rights. This order of the learned Single Judge passed on 22nd of March, 1979 is challenged in this letters patent appeal. 9. Mr. Gumaste, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal, has criticised the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the first appeal was not maintainable. He has pointed out, and in our opinion rightly, that what has been mentioned in the judgment of this Court in Mahadev's case is no longer good law in view of a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in (Bhagaraju Venkata Janki Rama Rao v. Hindu Religious Endowments)3, A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court, 231. Though we accept, for reasons to be mentioned hereinafter, the contention of Mr. Gumaste that the view that an order passed under a scheme framed by a Court under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code can be appealable, as we will show presently, on the facts of this case, however, and on the provisions contained in the scheme which is before us, the order passed by the learned District Judge is not appealable. Before we proceed to examine the question in detail, we must notice what was decided by this Court in Mahadev's case and what is the effect of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Rama Rao's case on the decision in Mahadev's case. 10. In Mahadev's case a scheme had been framed by the High Court and there was a clause in the said scheme empowering the District Judge to remove or suspend a trustee. Pursuant to the powers granted by this clause the District Judge removed one of the trustees and also proceeded to appoint a receiver. In an appeal preferred against the said order, this Court held that the order passed by the District Judge in accordance with the powers conferred upon him by a scheme of management was not open to appeal on merits. On page 1144 of the report it is mentioned that this Court had in (Lambodar v. Dharanidhar)4, XXVIII Bom.L.R. 64 decided while dealing with the same scheme, that the District Judge was a persona designata and no appeal lay from his orders. On page 1144 of the report it is mentioned that this Court had in (Lambodar v. Dharanidhar)4, XXVIII Bom.L.R. 64 decided while dealing with the same scheme, that the District Judge was a persona designata and no appeal lay from his orders. Proceeding further, however, the Division Bench held that even if the District Judge is not a persona designata but a Court it did not follow that the orders passed by him in accordance with the powers conferred by the scheme is open to appeal on merits. Reference was made to some earlier decisions in support of the view that an order passed by a District Judge in accordance with the powers conferred upon him by a scheme of management were not open to appeal. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Lambodar v. Dharanidhar referred to above. In this particular case it has been specifically laid down that the order of the District Judge appointing a trustee pursuant to a power given to him under the scheme was not appealable because the District Judge was a persona designata. In (Jeranchod v. Dakore Temple Committee)5, XXVII Bom.L.R. 872 (Privy Council) a similar view had been taken. In that case the Privy Council itself had prepared a scheme under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and that scheme had empowered the Committee of a temple to frame rules for the management subject to the sanction of the District Judge. Rules were accordingly framed and the order sanctioning the rules was challenged and it was held by the Privy Council that the said order santioning the rules was outside section 92 as well as section 47 and, therefore, not appealable. We may only briefly mention that similar view has been taken consistently by this Court in three other cases, namely (Shridhar v. Ganu)6, XXIX Bom.L.R. 891, (Chandraprasad v. Jinabharthi)7, XXXIII Bom.L.R. 520 and (Kadri v. Khumbmiya)8, XXXIII Bom.L.R. 546. We may only briefly mention that similar view has been taken consistently by this Court in three other cases, namely (Shridhar v. Ganu)6, XXIX Bom.L.R. 891, (Chandraprasad v. Jinabharthi)7, XXXIII Bom.L.R. 520 and (Kadri v. Khumbmiya)8, XXXIII Bom.L.R. 546. Broadly speaking it might be said that the view consistently taken by this Court in accordance with heavies expressed by the Privy Council in some of its cases was that it was competent for a Court framing a scheme under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code to provide in the scheme for an application to be made to the District Judge or the District Court for amending the scheme or for managing the scheme and that any order made by the District Judge or the District Court pursuant to the power given by the scheme was not appealable. 11. Reading the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rama Rao's case, we are satisfied that the view taken by this Court in the abovementioned cases that an order passed by the District Court pursuant to the power given to it under a scheme is not appealable is no longer correct. In Rama Rao's case, the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 were considered. " Section 75 of the said Act provided that where the administration of a religious endowment is governed by any scheme settled under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that scheme should be deemed to be a scheme settled under the Madras Act and that such scheme may be modified and cancelled in the amendment provided in the Madras Act. Section 57(9) of the Madras Act provided that any scheme of administration settled by a Court under that section or deemed to be settled under section 75, be modified or cancelled by the Court on an application made by the Board or the trustee or any person having interest, but not otherwise." The question arose as to whether an order passed pursuant to an application under section 57(9) of the Madras Act was appealable. It was held in unmistakable terms that such an order was appealable. While discussing this question the Supreme Court has pointed out that it was perfectly legal to make provision in the scheme itself for an application to be made for modification of the scheme. It was held in unmistakable terms that such an order was appealable. While discussing this question the Supreme Court has pointed out that it was perfectly legal to make provision in the scheme itself for an application to be made for modification of the scheme. Thereafter the Supreme Court proceeded to lay down as follows :--- "If the reservation of power or the liberty in the decree would produce such a result and render the amendment of the scheme an amended decree so as to satisfy the definition of a decree within section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, it appears to us that it makes no difference that such a liberty to move the Court to modify the decree is conferred not by the scheme-decree by an independent enactment such as the Act now before us.......". 12. In other words, the Supreme Court has in clear terms held that an order passed by a Court upon an application made under a statute or under any clause of a scheme is appealable. The contrary view taken by this Court in the several cases, therefore, can no longer be held to be good law. We must, however, hasten to add that what has been mentioned by the Supreme Court in Rama Rao's case is in respect of an application made to a Court and not in respect of an application made to a persona designata as was the case in some of the judgments of this Court. The leading case on this subject is Lambodar v. Dharanidahar referred to above. In that case it was specifically held that the order of the District Judge under a scheme was not appealable because the District Judge was a persona designata. If, therefore, the order is passed by an authority or a person or a functionary as a persona designata in exercise of the powers given to him under a scheme, such an order, in our opinion, cannot be appealable. The question, therefore, which we will have to consider in the instant case is whether the District Judge exercising powers under Clause 15 and other clauses of the scheme is a persona designata or judicial officer whose order can be said to be appealable. At this stage it becomes necessary to examine the provisions of the scheme as settled by this Court. 13. At this stage it becomes necessary to examine the provisions of the scheme as settled by this Court. 13. The scheme which was originally framed in the year 1852 was subsequently modified by the order of the District Court in Suit No. 7 of 1934. This in term was modified by this Court in First Appeal No. 92 of 1938. We are referring to the scheme which is thus finally modified by the High Court in the aforesaid appeal. The scheme is called "Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, Alandi, Scheme, 1852". Clause 2 of the scheme provides for a committee of six persons called Panchas for the management of the Sansthan. It is further provided that the committee shall elect one of the trustees as the Sarpanch. Clause 3 is in the following terms :--- "Any vacancy in the committee shall be filed by the District Judge, Poona, (as a persona designata) from among those nominated for co-option by the committee, provided that the committee do nominate not less than five names for each vacancy that may occur, the District Judge having the right to call for further names from the trustees, if necessary........." Those persons who shall not be eligible to act as trustees have been described in the same clause. Clause 3-A provides for the tenure of the office of a trustee and it says that it shall be seven years subject to his re-appointment thereafter. The trustees who were holding office at the date of the preparation of the scheme were deemed to have been appointed under the scheme itself and their tenure was said to run from the date of the District Judge's order dated 11th December, 1937. Clause 3-A, it may be mentioned, was inserted by this Court in First Appeal No. 92 of 19.38. Clause 4 describes some of the powers of the trustees. Clause 5 of the scheme requires the committee to keep true and correct accounts of the funds received and disbursed on account of the Sansthan in the forms and books as may be approved by the District Judge. 14. Clause 6 of the scheme deals with the powers of the Panchas in relation to the investments of the funds of the Sansthan with the previous sanction of the District Judge. Clauses 7 and 8 describe some other powers of the Sansthan and do not refer to the District Judge at all. 14. Clause 6 of the scheme deals with the powers of the Panchas in relation to the investments of the funds of the Sansthan with the previous sanction of the District Judge. Clauses 7 and 8 describe some other powers of the Sansthan and do not refer to the District Judge at all. Clause 9, however, proceeds to say that the committee, with the previous sanction of the District Judge, shall appoint a person to be called "Sansthan Manager" who shall be the Chief Executive Officer under the control of the committee and whose duties and remuneration would be as prescribed by the Rules made in that behalf. The removal of the Sansthan Manager is made subject to a right of appeal to the District Judge under Clause 9. Clause 10 refers to the powers of the committee to institute and defend suits and other proceedings and the procedure to be followed in doing the same. The committee is required to prepare a budget of the annual receipts and expenditure in the month of August every year and submit the same to the District Judge for approval under Clause 11. The audited accounts are required to be submitted to the District Judge under Clause 12 of the scheme. Any expenditure exceeding Rs. 500 in the aggregate in a year not provided for in the annual budget can be made only with the sanction of the District Judge. This is so provided in Clause 13 of the scheme. The borrowing powers of the committee are described in Clause 14 and they are hedged in by the requirement of the previous sanction of the District Judge. Clause 15, which is somewhat important and around which the arguments have been advanced before us, must be reproduced in its entirely : "The Committee is authorised to fine or suspend any hereditary servant of the Sansthan subject to a right of appeal to the District Judge in that behalf, but that no hereditary servant shall hereafter be dismissed without the sanction of the District Judge. The rights of the Waghmare Guravas, if any, which form the subject matter of the suits pending in the First Class Sub-ordinate Judge's Court at Poona shall, if and when so determined in those suits, be embodied in the Rules as an integral part thereof. The rights of the Waghmare Guravas, if any, which form the subject matter of the suits pending in the First Class Sub-ordinate Judge's Court at Poona shall, if and when so determined in those suits, be embodied in the Rules as an integral part thereof. So also the rights of any of the Varshasandars, Sevekaries, Hakdars and Palkhi processionists, if disputed by the committee of trustees, may be got determined by the claimants, either by an application to the District Judge, or by separate suits to be filed by them in that behalf. The rights thus established will also be embodied in the rules as an intergral part thereof. Nothing in this clause shall prevent the parties to those suits or applications from putting forward any defence which may be open to them other than that of a bar under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure" (emphasis provided) In Clause 16 of the scheme it is provided that subject to the sanction of the District Judge the committee shall frame Rules for the guidance of the trustees for the administration of the Sansthan. The Rules thus framed may be varied by the committee again with the sanction of the District Judge. It is then provided; "Such rules when sanctioned by the District Judge shall have the same force as the scheme" 15. The highlights of the Scheme summarised by us above may now be noted. In the very opening part of the scheme, it has been mentioned that the District Judge, who has to fill the vacancy in the committee of trustees, is designated as a persona designata. Throughout the scheme, reference is to the District Judge and not to the District Court. If, therefore, in the earliest part of the scheme the District Judge, to whom repeated references have been made in the subsequent parts of the scheme is specified as a persona designata, can he be regarded in any other capacity in the later parts of the scheme? In our opinion, it would be anomalous to refer to the District Judge as a persona designata for a part of the scheme and as a Presiding Officer of the District Court for another part of the scheme. In our opinion, it would be anomalous to refer to the District Judge as a persona designata for a part of the scheme and as a Presiding Officer of the District Court for another part of the scheme. The intention of the scheme was to put the Trust under the administrative supervision of the District Judge for the time being in office and not to subject the detailed working of the scheme to the judicial function of a District Court presided over by a District Judge. Further, when we examine the functions of the District Judge in the scheme, we notice that they are mostly supervisory or administrative and practically none of them is he required to do in a judicial capacity or judicial manner. The sanctions to be given for the dismissal of a servant; the grievance to be heard from a dismissed Manager of the Sansthan; the approval of the forms in which the accounts are to be kept; the sanction to be given for the investment of funds-these and other functions which have been given to the District Judge under the scheme cannot , in our opinion, be described as such functions which are to be discharged by a judicial officer in a judicial manner exercising his judicial functions. Some of the functions given to him are advisory in nature. It is inconceivable that this Court or the District Court when it earlier framed the scheme could have intended that it is the District Court which shall discharge all these administrative and supervisory functions under the scheme. So, apart from the fact that the term "District Judge " and not the term "District Court " has been used in the scheme, there are sufficient indications available in the scheme itself which unmistakably show that the District Judge mentioned in the scheme was to act as a persona designata and not in the capacity of the Presiding Officer of a District Court. 16. Mr. Gumaste invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Central Talkies Limited v. Dwarka Prasad)9, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 606, for the purpose of supporting his contention that despite the mention of the term "District Judge", we must hold that the District Judge is not a persona designata but the Presiding Officer of the District Court. Mr. Gumaste invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Central Talkies Limited v. Dwarka Prasad)9, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 606, for the purpose of supporting his contention that despite the mention of the term "District Judge", we must hold that the District Judge is not a persona designata but the Presiding Officer of the District Court. In the Central Talkies's case, an Additional District Magistrate was appointed as such by notification under section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure whereunder he was invested with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code as well as under any law for the time being in force. It was, therefore, held that he was competent to deal with an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a suit without special authorisation from the District Magistrate. The facts of that case, therefore, clearly show that though the notification mentioned an Additional District Magistrate, by virtue of the provisions contained in section 10(2) of the Code it was held that he was possessed of the powers of the District Magistrate under any other law, including the Rent Act referred to above. In other words, in our opinion, he was regarded as a person belonging to a class and, therefore, he could not be regarded as a persona designata. 17. At this stage it will not be inappropriate to refer to a Division Bench judgment of the this Court in (Nagnath v. Osmansaheb)10, 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 342 : 1977 Mh.L.J. 491. In this judgment apart, from several other judgments of this Court in which this vexed question of an authority being a persona designata was discussed, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies's case was also noticed and analysed. Despite the observations to be found in the Central Talkies's case on which Mr. Gumaste placed great reliance, this Court held that the District Judge under section 25(1) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 was a persona designata and not the District Court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the reliance placed by Mr. Gumaste on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies's case is not of any assistance to him. 18. Mr. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the reliance placed by Mr. Gumaste on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies's case is not of any assistance to him. 18. Mr. Gumaste then proceeded to rely upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in (Tahukur Das v. State of M.P.)11, A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court 1. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Sessions Judge who was appointed as an Appellate Authority by the State Government under section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act was a persona designata. Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, the scope of which fell to be determined by the Supreme Court, is in the following terms : "6-C(1). Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under section 6-A may, within one month from the date of the communication to him of such order, appeal to any judicial authority appointed by the State Government concerned and the judicial authority shall, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, pass such order as it may think fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against." By a notification issued by the M.P. Government, the Sessions Judge was appointed as an Appellate Authority under section 6-C. It was held that by doing so the State Government constituted an Appellate Authority in the Sessions Court over which the Sessions Judge presides. This was so because the Sessions Court is constituted under the Criminal Procedure Code and the expression "judicial" qualifying the "authority" clearly indicates that the authority alone can be appointed to entertain and hear appeals under section 6-C on which was conferred the judicial power of the State. The to "judicial power of the State" has to be understood in contradistinction to executive power. On the language of section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, the Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge appointed by a notification by the State was necessarily a judicial officer and not a persona designata. In our opinion, this judgment also will not help Mr. Gumaste. 19. On the language of section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, the Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge appointed by a notification by the State was necessarily a judicial officer and not a persona designata. In our opinion, this judgment also will not help Mr. Gumaste. 19. It may be noted that in several decisions this question as to whether an authority in whom certain powers have been vested and to whom certain functions have been given is a persona designata or not has been considered by reference to the well known definition of persona designata to be found in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary. We now make a reference to the Sixth Edition of the same. "Persona designata" has been defined therein as follows :--- "A person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character." A proper analysis of this definition should show that it is when a person is described as an individual or described as filling a particular character that he becomes a persona designata. If, however, a person is described as a person ascertained as a member of a class then he would not be a persona designata. The two judgments of the Supreme Court to which we have already made a reference and on which Mr. Gumaste has placed considerable reliance, deal with a person who is described as a member of a class and not described as an individual or as filling a particular character. The said definition can be broken down in its constituent parts as follows :--- "A person pointed out or described" (a) as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or (b) as filling a particular character." The words "as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class" are in parenthesis and separate the words "an individual" which immediately precede them. Therefore, the person ascertained as a member of a class cannot be a persona designata. The words "or as filling a particular character" are separated from the words in parenthesis by a regular punctuation and must, therefore, be read without the words in parenthesis after the words "an individuals". So read, a person who is described as filling a particular character must be regarded as a persona designata by Osborn. 20. Mr. The words "or as filling a particular character" are separated from the words in parenthesis by a regular punctuation and must, therefore, be read without the words in parenthesis after the words "an individuals". So read, a person who is described as filling a particular character must be regarded as a persona designata by Osborn. 20. Mr. Gumaste went to the extent of saying, and this must be regarded as being consistent with all his arguments, that it is only when a particular person is pointed out by his name that he would be regarded as a persona designata. According to him, the words "as filling a particular character" are to be read as a part of the parenthetical clause. We are unable to accept this interpretation of the definition contained in Osborn's Dictionary. We have already indicated above which words are in parenthesis and which words are to be read as disjunctive after the words "an individual". Moreover, Mr. Gumaste's arguments go beyond the definition contained in Osborn's Dictionary because this definition says that persona designata may be a person who is pointed out or described as an individual and not named as an individual. We are, therefore, reluctant to accept Mr. Gumaste's contention that a persona designata is only a person whose name is mentioned and not a person which office is described. 21. In (Pravinkant v. Bombay Municipality)12, A.I.R. 1981 Bombay 37, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court entertaining an application under section 504 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not a persona designata but acts as a Court and the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act will Apply to the applications filed to that Court. While taking this view, the Division Bench has referred to both the judgments of the Supreme Court to which we have already made a reference. We are not called upon to decide the correctness or otherwise of the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Pravinkumar's case for the simple reason that we are not dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. If it is Mr. We are not called upon to decide the correctness or otherwise of the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Pravinkumar's case for the simple reason that we are not dealing with the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. If it is Mr. Gumaste's argument that after the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thakur Das's case whenever a judicial officer is mentioned in any enactment or scheme he must not be regarded as a persona designata, we have no hesitation in rejecting that argument. 22. We have earlier mentioned that a Division Bench of this Court in Nagnath's case 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 342 : 1977 Mh.L.J. 491 has referred to several decisions in which this question of an authority being a persona designata or otherwise has been referred to. A reference to the same is not uncalled for at this stage. In (Balaji Sakharam v. Merwanji Nowroji)13, I.L.R. XXI Bom. 279, a District Judge who was to decide to validity of an election to a Municipal Commissioner was held to be a persona designata Similarly in (Gangadhar v. Hubli Municipality)14, XXVIII Bom.L.R. 519, a District Judge passing an order under section 22 of the Bombay District Municipal Act was held to be a persona designata and not a Court amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Further there is judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in (R.S. Navalkar v. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu)15, XXV Bom.L.R. 463, wherein Macleod, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench referred to an earlier decision of this Court in (Bhaishankar v. The Municipal Corporation of Bombay)16, I.L.R. 31 Bom. 604. And held that the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court at Bombay acting under the powers granted to him by section 33 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act was not a Court sub-ordinate to the High Court and that he was a persona designata. It is unnecessary to multiply the authorities. We have quoted sufficient number of them to show that even if a person is designated by his particular office it cannot be said that he cannot become a persona designata. We have already analysed the definition of "persona designata" contained in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary and have pointed out how a person filling a particular character can be a persona designata though he is not described by his personal name. We have already analysed the definition of "persona designata" contained in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary and have pointed out how a person filling a particular character can be a persona designata though he is not described by his personal name. We are, therefore, not persuaded to hold that the judgment of this Court in Pravinkant's case is an authority for the proposition that whenever a judicial officer of a Court is appointed he always acts as a Court and not as a persona designata. Neither the judgment in Pravinkant's case nor either of the two Supreme Court judgments, on which the Division Bench in Pravinkant's case relied, has laid down any such proposition. On an exhaustive review of the authorities referred to by us above, we are of the opinion that the District Judge mentioned in the scheme is a persona designata and not a Court. This is despite the fact that certain somewhat apparently quasi judicial powers have been given to him in Clauses 15 and 16 of the scheme. If once it is held, as we are holding, that he is a persona designata, any order made by him under the said scheme, including an order made under Clause 15 of the scheme, is not an appealable order. The first appeal which was dismissed by Rege, J., was itself not maintainable as held by him, though on different reasons. If this is so, this letters patent appeal is also not maintainable and will be dismissed on that ground. 23. A necessary corollary of our view is that the District Judge when he is deciding any question under Clause 15 or Clause 16 of the scheme is not deciding the said question as a District Court. While deciding any question under the said clauses he will not be modifying the scheme because the modification of the scheme will necessarily be done by the Court under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 15 of the present Bombay Public Trusts Act. Moreover, we notice that the dispute between the Sevekaries and the committee envisaged under Clause 15 is a dispute between the Sevekaries as a group on the one hand and the panch Committee on the other and not a dispute inter se among the Sevekaries. Moreover, we notice that the dispute between the Sevekaries and the committee envisaged under Clause 15 is a dispute between the Sevekaries as a group on the one hand and the panch Committee on the other and not a dispute inter se among the Sevekaries. The right of the parties to establish or vindicate their rights and privileges is expressly kept open by specific provision in Clause 15 of the scheme. Whatever has been decided by the District Judge in the instant case is not a judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties under the scheme. No question of the abridgement of the rights, if any, of the appellant under the scheme arises on the facts of this case. 24. In the result, this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with no order at to costs. 25. The appellant has also filed a petition, being Civil Application No. 3025 of 1981 for production of additional evidence. Since the appeal itself is held to be not maintainable, this application also is not maintainable and is, therefore, rejected. Appeal dismissed. -----