Judgment :- 1. The appellants are defendants in the suit, 2nd appellant being the wife of the 1st appellant. The suit was one for declaration of the easement with respect to a pathway leading to the kudikidappu purchased by the respondent-plaintiff in the proceedings in O. A. No. 138 of 1970 on the file of the Land Tribunal, Pallom. The trial court granted the relief, and the first appellate court in appeal has confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. 2. In this second appeal the appellants have taken various contentions. Firstly, the counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit itself was misconceived and was not maintainable either in law or on facts. He relied on the definition of S.2 (25) (b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the relevant portion of which lays down as follows: "(b) and kudikidappu' means the land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto:" His argument is that the easements attached thereto having been included in the Kudikidappu, no separate action for the enforcement of easement right could be instituted in a civil court. In that connection reliance was placed by him on the provisions contained in sub-sections (1), (3) and (7) of S.125 of the Act which read as follows: "125. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts. (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government:. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969." "(3) If in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding rights of a tenant or of any kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only." "(7) No civil court shall have power to grant injunction in any suit or other proceeding referred to in sub-section (3) restraining any person from entering into or occupying or cultivating any land or kudikidappu or to appoint a receiver for any property in respect of which a question referred to in that sub-section has arisen, till such question is decided by the Land Tribunal, and any such injunction granted or appointment made before the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or before such question has arisen, shall stand cancelled." 3. The relief sought in the suit according to the appellants' counsel, relates to a question which was required to be determined by or under the Act Under S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The submission made by the counsel for the appellants is that in view of the fact that application O. A. No. 138 of 1970 under S.80-B of the Act for the purchase of kudikidappu right was pending before the Land Tribunal, kudikidappu right being a question to be decided exclusively by the Land Tribunal, and in view of the inclusive definition given to "kudikidappu" so as to bring within its sweep the easement right also, civil court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter by virtue of the provisions contained in S 1250) of the Act. In this context it would be advantageous to refer to what the respondent plaintiff was entitled to purchase under S.80A (3) of the Act. In this context it would be advantageous to refer to what the respondent plaintiff was entitled to purchase under S.80A (3) of the Act. That section provides as follows: "The extent of land which the kudikidappukaran is entitled to purchase under this section shall be three cents in a city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in a Panchayat area or township:" By virtue of subsection (1) of S.80A kudikidappukaran shall have the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him and lands adjoining thereto The 10 cents of land the respondent plaintiff was entitled to purchase for which the application was pending before the Land Tribunal was evidently for the purchase of the kudikidappu occupied by him and lands adjoining thereto which did not take in the easement right which stood apart. It is, therefore, clear that the application under S.80B of the Act before the Land Tribunal was only for the purchase of the kudikidappu occupied by him and lands adjoining thereto not exceeding 10 cents as permitted under S.80A(1) and (3) of the Act In fact the question of easement right was not before the Land Tribunal, and there is nothing to show that that was a matter which was to be determined by or under the Act so as to prevent the Civil Court from settling, deciding or dealing with that question. 1, therefore, find no merit in the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants with respect to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the civil court was having no jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with the question of easement raised in the suit. 4. 1, therefore, find no merit in the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants with respect to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the civil court was having no jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with the question of easement raised in the suit. 4. The counsel for the appellants also drew my attention to the provisions contained in R.77 and 92 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970 (the Rules) R.77(1) of the Rules lays down that the Land Tribunal shall, as far as possible, make available to the kudikidappukaran for his purchase, such portion of the land adjoining the kudikidappu which is necessary or useful for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu and R.92(1) lays down that for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the Land Tribunal shall have power to issue commissions, grant injunction, appoint receivers and make during the pendency of the proceedings such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Tribunal to be just and necessary to meet the ends of justice. As far as R.77 is concerned, the submission made by the Counsel for the appellants is that it must be presumed that by the provisions contained in sub-rule (1) of that Rule purchase would include the easement rights, as that might fall with the expression "land adjoining the kudikidappu which is necessary or useful for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu,"and therefore the matter has already been dealt with by the Land Tribunal and it cannot be re-agitated in the civil court not only because of S.125(1), (3) and (7) of the Act but also because of the application of the principles of res judicata ! do not think these contentions are correct In carving out the land to be purchased by the kudikidappukaran R.77 of the Rules directs the Land Tribunal to ensure that as far as possible it should make available to the kudikidappukaran for his purchase such portion of the land adjoining the kudikidappu which is necessary or useful for the convenient enjoyment of the kudikidappu. It has no reference at all to the question of easement right. As far as the contention based on R.92(1) of the Rules is concerned, the power to grant injunction is confined to the subject-matter that was before the Land Tribunal. It has no reference at all to the question of easement right. As far as the contention based on R.92(1) of the Rules is concerned, the power to grant injunction is confined to the subject-matter that was before the Land Tribunal. We have already noticed that the application before the Land Tribunal was only for the purchase of the land permitted under S.80A(1) read with S.80A(3) of the Act, and it has no relevance to the question of easement right. Therefore it cannot be argued that the civil court was not competent to give the declaration or to grant the injunction. 5. Lastly, on the merits of the case the counsel submitted that though the prayer in the plaint was to grant a foot-path with a width of 4 feet, the commissioner, pw. 4, has found that the width of the foot-path was only 2 feet, and therefore there was no justification for granting a foot-path with a width of 3 feet. He also submitted that under S.13 of the Indian Easements Act the petitioner who was the plaintiff and who was in the nature of a licensee, could not have asked for the relief until he became the full owner of the land According to him, when the suit was instituted, the plaintiff had not become the full owner of the land, and therefore he could not have been given the relief of easement of necessity. Apart from the fact that he had interest in the property in view of the conferment of fixity of tenure, without being liable to be evicted, with respect to the kudikidappu, there is evidence to show that the plaintiff, his father and forefathers had been in occupation of the kudikidappu, and that access to that kudikidappu was through the pathway. The courts below have rested their decision on the plaintiff's right of easement of necessity. It would appear that the plaintiff was entitled to claim the relief on the basis of the easement right prescribed by long user as the evidence would disclose The courts below have chosen to believe the evidence of pws. 1 to 3 who are neighbours and have considered the evidence of pw. 4, the commissioner, his report and sketch, Exts. C-1 and C-2 respectively, and granted the relief. 1 to 3 who are neighbours and have considered the evidence of pw. 4, the commissioner, his report and sketch, Exts. C-1 and C-2 respectively, and granted the relief. In view of the fact that the relief was given on a proper evaluation of the evidence on record, and it being a concurrent decision, I do not think that this Court is justified in interfering with the decision of the courts below. To crown everything, it would appear that before the first appellate court the appellants had argued only on the question of the width of the foot-path, without seriously challenging the grant of the declaration or injunction as such. The result, therefore, is that the second appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, I would direct the parties to bear their respective costs in the second appeal.