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1981 DIGILAW 263 (RAJ)

Govind Kaur v. Hardev

1981-07-06

KANTA BHATNAGAR, S.K.M.LODHA

body1981
JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (For short `the Act') is directed against the order dated December 9th, 1980 of a learned single Judge of this Court by which he held the appellant guilty for Contempt of Court and sentenced her to one month's simple imprisonment and further to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and costs of the application. 2. The appellant and respondent will hereinafter be referred as non-applicant and applicant respectively. The applicant instituted a suit for ejectment against the non-applicant, in regard to shop No. 5 and certain other premises situate on Station Road, Jodhpur. The suit was decreed by the Munsif city, Jodhpur on February 5, 1972, An appeal was preferred. The applicant's suit in respect of shop No. 5 was dismissed and for other premises, the decree was maintained on August 28, 1973 by the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur. A second appeal was lodged by the non-applicant. In the second appeal decree for eviction regarding shop No. 6 was maintained whereas the decree pertaining to the open land was set aside on March 13, 1980. Operative portion of the judgment of this Court is as under : "In the result, the appeal No. 476 of 1973 filed by Govind Kaur, is partly allowed. The plaintiff's decree for eviction regarding shop No. 6 is maintained, whereas the decree in respect of the open land is set aside. The defendant No. 1 shall be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month with effect form the date the possession over shop No. 6 is delivered by her to the plaintiff. The decree in respect of shop No. 5 passed by the first Appellate Court, is maintained. Consequently, appeal No. 7 of 1974 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of both the appeals." Where the judgment of the second appeal was pronounced learned counsel for the non-applicant sought time to vacate it within two months. On that day, the non-applicant was present in person. She undertook to handover the vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant on or before the expiry of two months from that day. It will be useful to quote in extenso the order dated March 13, 1980 : "Judgment pronounced. The appeal is partly allowed. On that day, the non-applicant was present in person. She undertook to handover the vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant on or before the expiry of two months from that day. It will be useful to quote in extenso the order dated March 13, 1980 : "Judgment pronounced. The appeal is partly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of both the appeals (See separate judgment). Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for time to vacate shop No. 6. within two months. The appellant undertakes to handover vacate possession of shop No. 6 to the respondent Hardeo on or before the expiry of two months from today."The non-applicant preferred Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5093 of 1980 in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court passed an ex-parte order on May 7, 1980 staying the execution of the decree of this Court dated March 13, 1980. The Special Leave Petition of the non-applicant was dismissed by the Supreme Court on October 6, 1980. On March 31, 1980, the non-applicant's adult son Richpal Singh filed a suit against the applicant, and the non-applicant-appellant, for permanent injunction restraint the applicant from executing the decree. An application for issuance of temporary injunction was also filed on October 8, 1980. The applicant-respondent, however, gave an undertaking that he will not execute the decree against Richpal Singh. The application for temporary injunction was rejected on October 27, 1980. Richpal Singh preferred an appeal against the applicant restraining him from executing the decree against Richpal Singh until next date. Therefore, continuance of the order, no separate order was passed. On November 26, 1980, an application was moved by Richpal Singh for continuance of the order. The learned District Judge Jodhpur passed an order to continue the ad interim order upto December 1, 1980. The order passed on December 1, 1980 was continued till December 22, 1980. The appeal preferred by Richpal Singh was rejected by the District Judge, Jodhpur on January 17, 1981. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 36 of 1981 against the appellant order dated January 17, 1981 was filed and that was dismissed on March 24, 1981. On October 13, 1980, an application was submitted by the applicant that non-applicant has committed a wilful breach of the undertaking given to the Court and as such she should suitably be punished for contempt of Court. On October 13, 1980, an application was submitted by the applicant that non-applicant has committed a wilful breach of the undertaking given to the Court and as such she should suitably be punished for contempt of Court. On October 16, 1980, the learned Judge ordered issuance of notice returnable within 10 days. Reply to the application was filed on behalf of non-applicant appellant of November 6, 1980 stating inter alia, that she has not committed any breach of undertaking given before this Court, what to say of wilful breach. A rejoinder to the reply was filed by the applicant on November 18, 1980. An additional reply was submitted on behalf of the non-applicant on December 1, 1980 restating that the non-applicant has not committed any wilful breach of the undertaking given by her and orders of this Court with malafide intention. It may be stated here that on December 3, 1980, learned counsel for the applicant filed certified copies of the Civil Misc. Petition No. 6566 of 1980 submitted in the Supreme Court and the affidavit of the non-applicant dated April 27, 1980 and the Court ordered that the documents be placed on record. The learned Single Judge, by his order dated December 9, 1980 held the non-applicant guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced her to simple imprisonment for one month. He, however, directed that the imprisonment will not be carried out if the non-applicant conforms to and comply with the undertaking given to the Court and handover vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant within a week from that day. She was, however, ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and the costs of the application. The learned Single Judge recorded the following findings in his order : (1) that the non-applicant gave an unconditional and unqualified undertaking to the Court and further it cannot be doubted that there has been breach of that undertaking : (2) that possession of shop No. 6 was not delivered by the non-applicant to the applicant. (3) that there has been wilful breach of the undertaking by the non-applicant and, therefore, she is guilty of contempt of Court. Feeling aggrieved, the non-applicant has filed this appeal as aforesaid. 3. We have heard Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the non-applicant (appellant) and Mr. J.C. Maloo for the applicant-respondent. 4. In the first instance, Mr. (3) that there has been wilful breach of the undertaking by the non-applicant and, therefore, she is guilty of contempt of Court. Feeling aggrieved, the non-applicant has filed this appeal as aforesaid. 3. We have heard Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the non-applicant (appellant) and Mr. J.C. Maloo for the applicant-respondent. 4. In the first instance, Mr. Bhoot argued that the non-applicant did not submit any undertaking to the Court on March 13, 1980 inasmuch as the Court while allowing the time for vacating shop No. 6, did not grant any indulgence and no benefit was taken inasmuch as under Section 13(9) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, (No. XVII of 1950) for short `the Act of 1950' hereinafter, two months time for vacating shop No. 6 was permissible and it was merely on arrangement between the parties for vacating shop No. 6. He also submitted that even if any undertaking was given on March 13, 1980 that came to an end so soon Special Leave Petition was filed in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court came to be seized of the matter. This is strongly opposed by Mr. Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant. In these circumstances, the first question that arises for our determination is whether the non-applicant gave any undertaking to the Court or it was merely an arrangement by way of agreement between the parties for vacating the shop. 5. Section 13(9) of the Act of 1950 is as under : "(9) Where any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in sub-section (1) the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of two months from the date of the decree or order." A perusal of Section 13(9) of Act of 1950 shows that after the decree or order for eviction, which is made, on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 13, the landlord cannot obtain possession thereof until the expiration of two months from the date of the decree or order. This is an extra protection given to the tenant. This is an extra protection given to the tenant. It only creates a bar for the landlord to obtain possession on the basis of a decree or order for eviction made on the grounds specified in Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950 before the expiration of two months. As two month's time was granted by the Court on March 13, 1980 for vacating shop No. 6, the argument of Mr. Bhoot is that she cannot be said to have been given any benefit and when no benefit was taken or drawn by the non-applicant, there was no undertaking in the eye of law of the breach of which the non-applicant could be punished. The learned Single Judge considered Baburam Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasir, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1528; Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubai and others, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1909; Nisha Roy Chowdhary v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Calcutta 294; P.K. Kriplani v. Mahabir Ram and another, AIR 1952 Calcutta 452; Sukumar Mitra v. Tarashankar Ghosh, AIR 1952 Calcutta 591 and Babulal Parekh v. M/s. Lachhminarayan Swalram and others, AIR 1964 Orissa 63. 6. The decree in respect of shop No. 6 and other premises was passed by the learned Munsif on February 5, 1972. An appeal was preferred and suit regarding shop No. 6 was dismissed and the decree in respect of shop No. 6 was and other premises was maintained by the learned Additional District Judge, Jodhpur, by his judgment dated August 28, 1973. In the second appeal, the decree for eviction regarding shop No. 6 was maintained and in respect of the open land, it was set aside. From these facts, it is abundantly clear that the High Court in second appeal did not pass any decree or order for eviction of the non-applicant from shop No. 6 under Section 13(1)(h) of the Act of 1950. The learned Munsif had granted three months time to the non-applicant to vacate the suit property and deliver vacant possession to the applicant. This Court merely maintained the decree for eviction in respect of shop No. 6 which was passed by the Munsif and confirmed by the Additional District Judge. In other words, no decree or order for eviction was passed by this Court. This Court merely maintained the decree for eviction in respect of shop No. 6 which was passed by the Munsif and confirmed by the Additional District Judge. In other words, no decree or order for eviction was passed by this Court. As soon as the appeal against the appellate judgment confirming the decree for eviction in respect of shop No. 6 was dismissed, the applicant was entitled to obtain possession of shop No. 6. Two months time was prayed for on behalf of the non-applicant which was granted and she undertook to handover vacant possession on or before the expiry of tow months form the date of the judgment. In these circumstances, it is futile to contend that no benefit was taken or granted to the non-applicant as period of two months was permissible under Section 13(9) of the Act of 1950. 7. On March 13, 1980, when the judgment was pronounced, the non-applicant was present in person. Her counsel was also present. He made a request to Court for grant of time to vacate shop No. 6. She was granted time to vacant shop No. 6 within 2 months. She undertook to deliver vacant possession of shop No. 6 the non-applicant on or before the expiration of two months from that day, i.e. March 13, 1980. This cannot be said to be an arrangement by way of agreement between the parties for vacating shop No. 6. It is an undertaking to the Court. An undertaking is a promise, given to the Court by a party to a proceeding, to do or not to do particular thing, which is enforceable as an injunction because when the Court accepts an undertaking given by a party, its order amounts in substances to an injunction. An undertaking given to the Court by a person or a Corporation in pending proceedings on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action or inaction, has the same force as an injunction made by the Court and breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt. An `undertaking given to Court' should be distinguished from a consent order, or what is known as an order passed on a compromise petition filed by the parties in a civil proceedings. An `undertaking given to Court' should be distinguished from a consent order, or what is known as an order passed on a compromise petition filed by the parties in a civil proceedings. A consent order is a mere agreement between the parties, even though the Court might record it and append its order thereto and in case of the failure of a party to comply with the terms of a consent order, the injured party cannot apply for committing the defaulter for contempt; his remedy is by way of specific performance or injunction. However, when a party secures an order from the Court on giving an undertaking to the Court that he will take a particular course of action or inaction, such undertaking itself operated as an injunction made by the Court because the Court has made its order on the faith of the undertaking, e.g., stay of execution of the decree or order. 8. The expression "a party undertakes" used in orders and decrees of the Court, was examined by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court, consisting of Chagla, C.J. and Gajendragakar, J. as he then was in Bajranglal Khemka and another v. Kapurchand Ltd., AIR 1950 Bombay 336; wherein, it was observed as follows : "........ The clauses does not state to whom the undertaking and it may be that it would be possible to hold that, as the parties were settling the dispute between themselves, the undertaking was given by one party to the other; or, at the highest the only thing that could be urged would be that the expression is ambiguous, and in a contempt matter, unless the Court is clearly satisfied that the undertaking was given to the Court, the Court would not proceed to commit the person in default to jail. But in our opinion, the expression "undertake" has come to acquire thorough long practice, a technical meaning. In all orders and decrees of the Court whether the expression "a party undertakes" has been used, it has always borne the meaning that the undertaking has been to the Court. The Advocate General has also referred us to the forms and orders that appear in "Seton on Decrees and Orders", and in those forms the expression used has always been "a party undertake" and never "a party undertakes" to the Court. The Advocate General has also referred us to the forms and orders that appear in "Seton on Decrees and Orders", and in those forms the expression used has always been "a party undertake" and never "a party undertakes" to the Court. Therefore, English Courts as well, the expression "a party undertakes" when used in decrees or orders has come to acquire the same technical meaning. What is more, it has been held by Bhagwati, J., an opinion with which I entirely agree - that it has been the long standing practice on the original side that whenever counsel wishes to give an undertaking to the Court, he never expressly uses the works " to the Court", but merely states that he undertakes on behalf of his client and that undertaking is always understood to be an undertaking to the Court, which could be enforced by committal proceedings. In case we find that the consent terms were signed by Mr. Rege for Mr. Desai's clients and Mr. Amin for the plaintiff, both counsel with very large and extensive practice on the original side. Therefore, in our opinion, looking to the surrounding circumstances, looking to the context, and also looking to the fact that the expression has come to acquire a technical meaning, we can only construe the undertaking given by the defendants as an undertaking given to the Court and not given to the other side." In Bajinath Prasad v. Shyam Sunder, 1961(2) Cr. L.J. 222., in execution of a partition decree by delivery of possession of certain premises to the petitioner by evicting the respondent offered resistance to the delivery. Thereupon, the petitioner made an application under Order 21, Rule 98, Civil Procedure Code and the High Court made the following order : "Upon hearing........advocate for the said applicant and......advocate for the said respondent and upon the said respondent by his said advocate undertaking to vacate the premises....on or before the first day of October....hundred and sixty." The respondent failed to deliver possession on or before the first day of October, 1960. In an application by the petitioner for committal of the respondent for contempt, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the undertaking was given to the party and not to the Court and that therefore, there was no contempt. The learned Judge, after distinguishing Bisha Kant. In an application by the petitioner for committal of the respondent for contempt, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the undertaking was given to the party and not to the Court and that therefore, there was no contempt. The learned Judge, after distinguishing Bisha Kant. Roy's case, held that the undertaking was not between the parties inter se but was given to the High Court and there having been a clear breach of undertaking, contempt of the High Court was committed.In Chhaganbhai's case, the appellant in previous revision proceedings before the High Court gave a solemn undertaking to handover certain premises in his possession. The undertaking was on record and in view of that the revision was dismissed. The question that arose in that case was whether there was breach of undertaking. It was held that there was nothing in the conditions of the undertaking to imply that it was merely a consent order passed upon an agreement between the parties to which the order of the Court was superseded and that it was clearly a case of express undertaking to the Court incorporated in the order. The Court further held that the case being of a deliberate violation of an undertaking to the Court the effect was the same as that of breach of an injunction and hence it amounted to contempt of Court.10. In Baburam Gupta's case (supra), it was observed as under : "In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the Court amounts to contempt of Court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the Court itself and hereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. The same cannot, however, be said of a consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practiced by the person concerned not on the Court but on one of the parties. Thus, the offence committed by the person is qua the party and not qua the Court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of Court is completely absent in such cases. Thus, the offence committed by the person is qua the party and not qua the Court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of Court is completely absent in such cases. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the Court by the contemner or incorporated by the Court in its order, there can be no question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking. In the instant case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise." We have already held that there was no question of obtaining any benefit under Section 13(9) of the Act of 1950 after the decision of the second appeal. In the presence of the non-applicant, a prayer was made by her counsel to allow two month's time for vacating the shop. The Court allowed the period of two months for the purpose. In other words, the Court granted her indulgence to vacate the shop. When time was allowed for vacating it, it necessarily follows that there could not be forcible dispossession in execution of the decree. The learned Judge, who passed the order on March 13, 1980 and the order under appeal held that two months time was allowed for vacating shop No. 6 on the undertaking given by the non-applicant. As a result of that, the applicant could not dispossess her by levying execution within a period of two months. The Court granted her time on the promise that she would deliver vacant possession within two months from that date, i.e. March 13, 1980.11. Keeping the principles laid down in Bajranglal's case (supra), Baijnath"s case, Baburam's case, and Chhaganlal's case and the order dated March 13, 1980 containing the prayer made by the learned counsel for the non-applicant to the Court for granting time for vacating shop No. 6 and the undertaking by the non-applicant that she will deliver the vacant possession in a period of two months, we are definitely of the opinion that it was an unconditional and unqualified undertaking to the Court. We agree with the learned Single Judge when he held that it was an undertaking to the Court.12. We agree with the learned Single Judge when he held that it was an undertaking to the Court.12. In this connection, the further question that arises for determination is whether that undertaking came to an end as soon as the special leave petition was filed in the Supreme Court. It is true that the special leave petition was filed in the Supreme Court and it stayed that execution of the judgment and decree and passed an ex-parte order on May 7, 1980. The special leave petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on October 6, 1980. This shows that the decree of eviction passed by the Munsif and confirmed by the learned District Judge and maintained by the High Court remained intact. The applicant was entitled to obtain possession of Shop No. 6 at any rate after the dismissal of the special leave opinion on October 6, 1980 as the non-applicant had undertaken to deliver its vacant possession at the time of pronouncement of the judgment of the second appeal on March 13, 1980. The non-applicant cannot be permitted to get out of the consequences flowing from the breach of the undertaking given on March 13, 1980 merely on the ground that after the pronouncement of the judgment and passing of the order on March 13, 1980, special leave petition was preferred in which an ex-parte order staying the execution of the decree was passed and that special leave petition was dismissed on October 6, 1980. It follows, therefore, that the non-applicant has committed breach of the undertaking.13. Mr. Bhoot, however, contended that breach of undertaking by itself is not sufficient for, there should be `wilful breach'. According to him, there was no intentional breach and for the reasons, which have been given by her it cannot be said that there was wilful breach. He submitted that she could not fulfil the undertaking given by her as a suit for injunction was filed by her adult son Richpal Singh in his own right and, therefore, the applicant could not obtain the possession and, thus, there was no wilful breach of the undertaking. He submitted that the non-applicant was ready and wiling to deliver possession but it could not be done for reasons beyond her control. It was urged that there was no allegation regard wilful breach in the contempt petition filed by the applicant much less evidence in this regard. He submitted that the non-applicant was ready and wiling to deliver possession but it could not be done for reasons beyond her control. It was urged that there was no allegation regard wilful breach in the contempt petition filed by the applicant much less evidence in this regard. He pressed for our consideration that there was no obstruction created by the non-applicant in not delivering possession of Shop No.6. In this connection, learned counsel referred to paras 8, 9 and 10 of the reply and para 6 of the additional reply. In these circumstances, another question which we are called upon to decided is whether there has been wilful breach of the undertaking ?14. `Contempt of Court' defined in Section 2(a) means civil contempt or criminal contempt. `Civil contempt' has been defined in Section 2(b) to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court is a civil contempt. It means that there should be a breach of undertaking and that such breach is wilful. `Wilful has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Volume II to mean done on purpose or wittingly; proposed, deliberate, intentional (Chiefly, now always, in bad sense, of a blameworthy action; freq, implying (`perverse, obstinated). In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Vol III, `wilful' has been defined as done deliberately; not accidental or without purpose, intentional, self-determined. In Venkatarmaiya's Law Lexicon Vol. II, it has been stated that the word `wilful' when used in statutes connoted different concepts. In certain cases, `wilful' may mean "wantonly". In certain other cases, it may mean "intentionally", or "deliberately" and in other cases, it may merely mean "consciously".15. A perusal of the order dated November 26, 1980 shows that the non-applicant was present in person. She stated before the Court that she is prepared to deliver the possession of the premises in question. On that day at 4 O' clock, the Court appointed a Commissioner in whose presence possession may be delivered. A perusal of the order dated November 26, 1980 shows that the non-applicant was present in person. She stated before the Court that she is prepared to deliver the possession of the premises in question. On that day at 4 O' clock, the Court appointed a Commissioner in whose presence possession may be delivered. It appears from the report of Shri Premchand Sharma, who was appointed as Commissioner that he asked the non-applicant to vacate the possession of Shop No. 6, to which she relied as under : eS rks dCtk nsus dks rS;kj gwa] esjk yM+dk fjNikyflag bl ij dkfcy gS tks vkids lkeus nsus ls bUdkj dj jgk gSA Thus, the possession of the shop in question was not handed over to the applicant. The judgment was pronounced on March 13, 1980. A request was made by the learned counsel for the non-applicant in her presence that time may be allowed for vacating the shop. When it was not within her power and control to vacate the shop, we fail to understand why such a request was made. Not only that she undertook to handover its possession to the applicant on or before the expiration of two months from that day. The undertaking was given on March 13, 1980. A special leave petition was field in the Supreme Court against this judgment. A petition for staying of execution of the judgment dated March 13, 1980 was submitted. Para 2 of that application is as follows : "That the petitioner is in possession of the disputed shop, being shop No. 6. The petitioner is running her business of repairs of motor vehicles and motor parts in the said shop and if she is evicted therefrom she will be put to an irreparable loss, this business is the only source of livelihood of the petitioner and her family." This petition was supported by her affidavit. In para 3 of the affidavit, it was stated by her with reference to the petition for stay, that the averments made in the said affidavit are true to my knowledge; that I believe the legal submission to be true and that nothing has been concealed. In para 3 of the affidavit, it was stated by her with reference to the petition for stay, that the averments made in the said affidavit are true to my knowledge; that I believe the legal submission to be true and that nothing has been concealed. It may be stated here that on the date when she filed the petition for stay of execution of the judgment of the Court dated March 13, 1980 passed in Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 467 of 1973, she asserted that she was in possession of Shop No. 6 and has been carrying her business in it and that in case she is evicted, she would be put to irreparable loss as the business carried on by her in that shop is source of livelihood of her and her family. It has not been controverted that the suit was filed by her adult son Richpal Singh on March 13, 1980. The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition on October 6, 1980. The application for grant of temporary injunction was filed on October 8, 1980 by Richpal Singh. In the stay petition before the Supreme Court joint possession was not pleaded. From these facts, it is to be meant whether there has been intentional, deliberate, flagrant or purposed breach of undertaking by the non-applicant or not ?16. Before we do say, let us examine the decisions having bearing on the question, which may provide guidelines for determinating the aforesaid question before us.17. The facts in Gour Gopal and others v. Smt. Shantilata Mitra and others, AIR 1976 Calcutta 475, are somewhat similar to the facts to the case in hand, and they have been noticed in detail by the learned Single Judge and we would not like to restart them.It was observed in that case as under : "It will be a sad day for the Court if the Court allows the solemn undertaking given to this Court to be mere papers signifying nothing. The parties and litigants must knew and appreciate that they should not be allowed to treat the solemn undertaking given to this Hon'ble Court like a child's play. Undertaking to Court and legal rights are entirely different and separate matters." The sanctity of the undertaking was emphasised in that case. The contemners were held guilty of contempt and a fine of Rs. Undertaking to Court and legal rights are entirely different and separate matters." The sanctity of the undertaking was emphasised in that case. The contemners were held guilty of contempt and a fine of Rs. 1000/- was imposed on each one of them and they were also ordered to suffer imprisonment for each and it also observed that such an imprisonment will not be carried out if they conform to their undertaking to Court and vacate the premises in suit and put the applicant in possession thereof within a week. The learned Single Judge has noticed in detail the facts in Saleemuddin and another v. Sharfuddin, AIR 1980 Delhi 39, but we will like to briefly notice them here also. In that case, an application for ejectment was moved by the landlord against the tenant M and order of eviction was passed on August 18, 1967. As no appeal was preferred, the order became final. The tenant M died on 1961 leaving behind a widow, three sons and two daughters. The widow also died in January, 1975. One of the tenant's son and daughter, namely S and Mst. A, filed objections under Section 3 and 4 of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976, claiming to be covered by the definition of the term `tenant' and could not be ejected in execution of the eviction order. The objections were dismissed. They preferred appeal which was also dismissed. During the pendency of the appeal, the objectors prayed for stay of execution of the eviction proceedings. The stay was granted on the appellant' furnishing security for the due performance of the decree and S's father-in-law gave a surety bond. The objector preferred a second appeal in the High Court. The objectors did not press their appeal and prayed for time to vacate the premises by December 31, 1977. He gave an undertaking to this effect to the Court which was accepted. The appeal was dismissed. A direction was made that the order of the eviction will not be executed before December 31, 1977. A few days before December 31, 1977, H, another son of M filed a suit for declaration claiming that the eviction order passed against M was inexecutable against him and an interim injunction restraining the landlord's from executing the eviction was sought. It was declined. An application was moved by the landlords for execution. A few days before December 31, 1977, H, another son of M filed a suit for declaration claiming that the eviction order passed against M was inexecutable against him and an interim injunction restraining the landlord's from executing the eviction was sought. It was declined. An application was moved by the landlords for execution. One MS filed objection in the execution proceedings. While the objections were pending, the landlord's submitted an application for taking action for contempt on February 6, 1978 against S on the basis of the undertaking given by him. A contention was raised on behalf of S that he is helpless in delivering the possession as members of the family of H, who was lodged in Jail are residing in the disputed premises and they did not allow him to deliver the possession and did not vacate the same. It was observed by the learned Judge that how can it now be urged with any show of reason that S is unable to deliver the possession. On these facts, it was found that the breach was wilful and that he (S) has broken the terms of the undertaking. It was further observed that it was a case of blatant breach of the undertaking given to and accepted by a Court law. S's counsel was present on April 7, 1977. He made a statement in the same terms. The learned Judge observed that H's suit and M.S's objection were engineered proceedings, which seem to have been brought at the instance of S. Those observation were objected to, but the learned Judge was of the view that they were not without reasonable basis.18. The learned Judge observed as under:-"The course of proceedings and the conduct of the parties, their relationship all suggest that the suit and the objections are intended to delay delivery of possession. In any event Saleemuddin is not released from his undertaking. Once a party has given an undertaking to the Court he is bound by its terms. I found my decision on Saleemuddin's undertaking given to the Court on 7th April, 1977 and the breach of that undertaking. The terms of the undertaking and the beach are clear beyond question. Saleemuddin is guilty of the breach of the undertaking. The breach of an undertaking is liable to be visited by the same punishment as breach of an injunction. Saleemuddin is, therefore, punishable in contempt. The terms of the undertaking and the beach are clear beyond question. Saleemuddin is guilty of the breach of the undertaking. The breach of an undertaking is liable to be visited by the same punishment as breach of an injunction. Saleemuddin is, therefore, punishable in contempt. This is my conclusion." (Emphasis added)As regards the argument that S's helplessness on the part of the contemner, though technically there is a breach, it is not wilful, the learned Judge observed as follows : "It is a case of wilful, deliberate and flagrant breach of the undertaking given to a Court of law. The entire course of proceedings right from 1976 when the objections were filed clearly shows that by one device or other the landlord's have been kept out of possession. The Court undertaking before this Court has not been fulfilled. The Court has been mocked at with impunity. If this breach is not wilful and deliberate how else shall we characterise it." (Underling is ours)The learned Judge found S guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 12 of the Act.19. The facts in Lajuklara v. Nrishingha, AIR 1952 Calcutta 669, are that the opposite party did not vacate the premises on or before October 31, 1951 and he had undertaken in the Court to do, both personally and through his advocate. He not only did not vacate the premises, but on November 2, 1951 made an application to the Small Cause Court for an order that a notice may be issued to the landlord to show-cause why execution of the decree should not be stayed be disposal of a suit which the opposite party intended to filed in the Court. The application was made under the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. After having made that application, the opposite party continued to sit on the premises and did not vacate them till December 4, 1951 which was after the Rule had been served upon him. Chakravarti, J., with him P.N. Mukerjee, J, agreed, observed as under : "The Court, it is true, ought not to be vindictive in matters of this kind. At the same time, the Court cannot allow itself to be trifled with. Chakravarti, J., with him P.N. Mukerjee, J, agreed, observed as under : "The Court, it is true, ought not to be vindictive in matters of this kind. At the same time, the Court cannot allow itself to be trifled with. Litigants before this Court ought to understand that they will not be permitted to give undertaking to this Court and then break them with impunity; far less will they be permitted to have recourse to such dubious means as arming themselves with the orders of a subordinate Court in prosecution of a scheme to flout the orders of this Court." The next case that we may notice is Suretnessa Bibi v. Chintaharan Das, AIR 1955 Calcutta 182. In that case, an appeal from an order of ejectment, pending before the High Court, a joint petition of compromise was filed by the parties whereby the tenant, while supporting the petition by an affidavit, gave to the Court an unconditional and unqualified undertaking that he will vacate the premises on a certain named date and the appeal was disposed of in terms of the petition of compromise under the provisions of Order 20XIII, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. The tenant failed to give vacant possession on the named date. It was held that he was guilty of a deliberate breach of the personal undertaking given by him to the High Court.It was observed : "It is settled law that breach of an undertaking given to a Court by a person in pending proceeding on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt." From the undertaking that the non-applicant gave on March 13, 1980 as well as from what she settled in her stay petition in the Supreme Court supported by her affidavit and from what she represented before the learned Single Judge during the pendency of the contempt application on November 26, 1980, it is clear that she claimed herself to be in possession and at no point of time she represented that she is not in a position to deliver vacant possession.20. We have no hesitation in holding that the non-applicant had deliberately flouted the undertaking given by her. The learned Single Judge was right when he held that there was wilful breach of the undertaking given by the non-applicant.21. We have no hesitation in holding that the non-applicant had deliberately flouted the undertaking given by her. The learned Single Judge was right when he held that there was wilful breach of the undertaking given by the non-applicant.21. Before we examine the other contentions, raised by the learned counsel for the non-applicant, we would like to say a few words about the authorities relied on by him.22. What has been held by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in K.N. Sinha v. Sahdeo Jha, 1977 Cr. L.J. 1174, is that the essential ingredient for a civil contempt is "wilful disobedience" and not any and every disobedience, due to various reasons and further that the disobedience was wilful has to be proved; the expression connotes purposeful and clear intent to flout. Wilful breach of undertaking given to Court is a civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act. We have already held that for making out a case of civil contempt as envisaged by Section 2(b) of the Act, the breach should be wilful, i.e., deliberate, intentional, purposeful and with an intention to flout.23. So far as Pushpaben v. Narandas Badiani, (1979)2 SCC 394 , is concerned, while considering Section 2(b) of Act, their Lordships held that failure to honour undertaking given to Court on the basis of which the matter was compromised and settled, amounts to civil contempt on showing of wilful disobedience of order of the Court. We shall also deal with this authority later on at appropriate stage. In Baburam's case (supra), there was no undertaking at all and, therefore, the question of breach of such undertaking did not arise. On the facts, it was held that disobedience of compromise, decree or order does not amount to contempt. In this case, as stated above, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was right in holding that the non-applicant had committed a wilful breach of the undertaking.24. It was next argued by Mr. Bhoot that the learned Single Judge was not right in awarding punishment of imprisonment to the non-applicant on the ground that she had committed breach of the undertaking given by her on March 13, 1910 and it is only in the exceptional circumstances where the Court holds that imposition of fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary.25. Before we proceeded to examine the above argument of Mr. Bhoot, we may state as to what is the object of punishment for contempt of Court.26. It was observed in Advocate General, Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 946, that the Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression `contempt of Court' may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. Their Lordships have quoted from Offutt v. U.S. (1954) 348 US 11 : "It is a mode of vindicating the Majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage." In Jonnison v. Baker, (1972)1 All England Reporter 997, it was observed as under : "The law should not be seen to sit by imply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope." It is clear from sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act that if in the opinion of the Court, the sentence of the fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, then, the Court may direct for determining the contemner in a civil prison for a period not exceeding six months. In this case we have held above, there was wilful breach of the undertaking which the non-applicant gave on March 13, 1980. She did not deliver the vacant possession of Shop No. 6 before the expiry of two months from that day. She preferred a petition for special leave before the Supreme Court on April 27, 1980 and obtained ex-parte stay order on May 7, 1980. The petition for special leave was dismissed on October 6, 1980. After the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court, her adult son Richpal Singh moved an application for grant of temporary injunction on October 8, 1980 restraining the applicant from taking possession in execution of the decree that was passed against her. The petition for special leave was dismissed on October 6, 1980. After the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Supreme Court, her adult son Richpal Singh moved an application for grant of temporary injunction on October 8, 1980 restraining the applicant from taking possession in execution of the decree that was passed against her. In these circumstances, we are called upon to determine the correctness of the order of the learned Single Judge when he directed to sentence the non-applicant to simple imprisonment of one month and also to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and the costs of the application.In this connection, considerable reliance was placed by Mr. Bhoot on Pushpaben's case (supra). Having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case, their Lordships held that there are no special reasons for sending the appellants to jail and for the sentence of imprisonment, the appellants were instead sentenced to a fine Rs. 1000/- each and in case of default, 15 day's simple imprisonment. That case is not of any avail and is distinguishable. Respondent No. 1 had given loan of Rs. 50000/- to the appellants on certain condition. The loan has not been repaid. Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under Section 420 Indian Penal Code and during the pendency of the complaint, the parties compromised, on the basis of which, the Court passed the following order : "The accused has given an undertaking to the Court that he shall repay the sum of Rs. 50000/- to the complainant on or before July 21, 1972 with interest mentioned on the reverse. In view of the undertaking, I permit the compromise and acquit the accused." On violation of the appellant of the undertaking, respondent No. 1 moved the High Court which held them guilty for civil contempt and sentenced them to one month's simple imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the finding that the appellants had committed wilful disobedience of the order of the Court by the committing a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court on the basis of which alone the appellants had been acquitted, but altered the sentence and observed as under : "Having regard to the circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the present case squarely falls in the first part of Section 12(3) and a sentence of fine should have been given by the High Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal to this extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court is set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In case of default, 15 days simple imprisonment. Four weeks time to pay the fine." It was also observed as follows : "A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passed the extreme sentence of imprisonment it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonments is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule." In Bajranglal Khemka's case (supra), the learned Judge dismissed the appeal with costs and confirmed the order of the learned Single Judge and modified the order to the extent that as the time given by the learned Judge for carrying out the requisitions had expired, the time was extended for one month from that date. In Lajuklata's case (supra), after holding the opposite party guilty of contempt of Court directed that he be detained till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- failing which he will be committed to civil prison for seven days. In Suretennessa Bibi's case (supra), learned Judges convicted the opposite party for having committed an act of contempt and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for three moths and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-.27. de italisize : Sindhri Iron Foundry, 1964(68) Cal. W.N. 148, the appellant did not carry out the undertaking mentioned in the order; he did not vacate premises No. 6 on or before October 1, 1960 and he did not vacate the premises by that time also. On November 16, 1960 the Attorney for the respondent took out a notice of motion praying for an order that the appellant be committed for contempt of Court for breach of the undertaking. On November 16, 1960 the Attorney for the respondent took out a notice of motion praying for an order that the appellant be committed for contempt of Court for breach of the undertaking. The learned Single Judge found that the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court for breach of the undertaking to vacate the premises and passed the order directing that in the event of the appellant carrying out his undertaking and vacating the remiss and putting the respondent in possession thereof within one week from the date of the order, there should be no further punishment to prison for two months for contempt of Court. An appeal was filed and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. In P.D. Lad v. D.R. Mehta, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1909, it was observed : "Another feature of the case is that the appellant gave no sign of even regret at any stage not to mention an apology of any kind. Even in this Court, learned counsel for the appellant took up the impossible position that there had been no breach of any undertaking. We agree with the High Court that this is a case of perverse and deliberate flouting of undertaking given by a litigant who, evidently, had no intention to abide by them. The undertakings seemed to have been taken very lightly by him as mere cloaks for obtaining an order which would not have been passed but for the undertakings. The High Court rightly observed that it had no option except to convict the appellant and to sentence him to three months imprisonment in Civil Jail." The question regarding sending the contemner to civil prison was also considered in Saleemuddin's case (supra). In that case, the learned Judge sentenced the contemner to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine a Rs. 2000/- under Section 12 of the Act. It was observed as under : "I have awarded the maximum punishment, Saleemuddin does not deserve a light sentence. He is contumacious. Everything that he does beaths defiance. With such cases of defiance as this one we have to grapple with hoofs of steel." The aforesaid decision of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts provide useful guidelines as to when sentence of simple imprisonment should be awarded to the contemner. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chandubhai's case (supra) upheld the conviction and sentence awarded to the contemner. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chandubhai's case (supra) upheld the conviction and sentence awarded to the contemner. The learned Single Judge has given reasons after proper application of mind that sentence of imprisonment is necessary as fine will not meet the ends of justice. We have already detailed the reasons which led to the passing of sentence of imprisonment.28. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of opinion that the learned Single Judge was right when he sentenced the non-applicant to one month's simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- and the costs of the application.29. It was contended on behalf of non-applicant that after acceptance rent damages for use and occupation by the applicant after expiry of two month, it was not open to the applicant to move the application praying that the non-applicant should be punished for the wilful breach of undertaking. A decree for arrears of rent and ejectment was passed against the non-applicant. In pursuance of the decree for ejectment, until the date of delivery of the vacant possession of Shop No.6, she was required to pay rent/damages for use and occupation. The non-applicant filed a petition for special leave to the Supreme Court on April 27, 1980. An ex-parte order was granted on May 7, 1980 which lasted till October 6, 1980 when the petition for special leave was passed by the Supreme Court, there was no question for the non-applicant to vacate Shop No. 6 and as she remained in possession, she was required to pay rent/damages for use and occupation. In these of circumstances, the acceptance of the rent after the expiry of the period mentioned in the undertaking will not disentitle the applicant to contend that there was wilful breach of the undertaking on the part of the non-applicant, when she failed to deliver the vacant possession of Shop No. 6 on or before the expiry of the time mentioned in the undertaking. The argument that acceptance of the rent after the expiry of the time mentioned in the undertaking disentitled the applicant from moving the application for taking action for wilful breach of undertaking is, thus, rejected.30. No other point survives for our consideration in this appeal.31. The argument that acceptance of the rent after the expiry of the time mentioned in the undertaking disentitled the applicant from moving the application for taking action for wilful breach of undertaking is, thus, rejected.30. No other point survives for our consideration in this appeal.31. The net result of the discussion made herein above is that the non-applicant gave an undertaking to the Court; that there was a wilful breach of that undertaking and as such she is guilty of civil contempt and that having regard to the facts and circumstances, the sentence of imprisonment awarded by the learned Single Judge is proper and just. We, however, modify the order to this extent that as the time granted by the learned Single Judge for carrying out the undertaking given to the Court and to handover the possession of Shop No. 6 to the applicant within a week from the date of the order, has expired, we extend that time by one week from today. We uphold the direction of the learned Single Judge that the sentence of imprisonment will not be carried out if non-applicant complies with the undertaking within a week from today.32. Except with the modification aforesaid, we dismiss the appeal with costs and confirm the order dated December 9, 1980 of the learned Single Judge.33. Mr. Bhoot states that the appellant intends to file appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act and prays that the execution of punishment may be suspended.We direct that the execution of punishment shall remain suspended for a period of 60 days from today. Appeal dismissed. *******