ORDER R.R. Rastogi, J. - This is plaintiff's application in revision under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The brief facts are these: Sri Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath. Dehra Dun through Sri Brahma Swarup Goyal, Abhey Math, Sri Prithvi Nath Mandir Trust Committee through its Secretary Sri Brahma Srarup Goyal, Sri Murari Lal and Sri Brahma Swarup Goyal had filed a suit for permanent, injunction restraining defendants-opposite-parties 1 to 6 from interfering in their management and control of the affairs of the aforesaid trust and in their operation of the bank accounts. The suit was filed some time in 1970. On 20-8-1974 a compromise took place between the plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants 1 to 5 on the other and the suit was decided in terms thereof on 28-8-1974. On 10-9-1974 defendant opposite-party No. 6 Sri T.S. Agarwal made an application for impleadment of defendant No. 4 aforesaid and opposite parties Nos. 7 to 16. A copy of this application is Annexure 2' to the affidavit filed with the stay application. On the same day defendant opposite-party No. 7 gave a similar application. This application was numbered as paper No. 124-A-1. On 4-11-1974 defendant opposite party No. 4 gave an application stating that he did not wish to he impleaded in the proceedings and on the same day opposite parties 12 to 16 gave another similar application. On 3-4-1975 opposite-party No. 7 gave an application for amendment of his application 124-A-1 and sought impleadment of opposite parties 6 to 11 and 17 to 23. This application was numbered as paper No. 227-A-1. On 5-8-1975 defendant opposite-party No. 6 gave an application stating that he did not want to press his application dated 10-9-1974. The trial Court took up the aforesaid applications 124A-1 and 227A-1. but not the application dated 5-8-1975 which had been given by the opposite party No. 6, for disposal. The aforesaid applications had been contested by the plaintiffs-applicants. 2. After hearing parties, the Court below has held that, the main point for consideration in the suit was as to who was in management and control of the property of the trust and till that question was decided, no proper injunction could be granted against the defendants. Hence acting under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure it has taken the view that the impleadment of op-posite-parties Nos. Hence acting under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure it has taken the view that the impleadment of op-posite-parties Nos. 7 to 23 was necessary to enable it to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the controversy. In the result applications 124A-1 and 227A-1 have been allowed and plaintiffs have been directed to move an application for amendment of their plaint. The plaintiffs feel aggrieved with this order. 3. It may be noted that the revision was dismissed against opposite parties Nos. 7 to 23 by an order made on 4-12-1979. Further Sri A.K. Banerjee one of the counsel for the opposite parties on his behalf and on behalf of his colleague Sri Santosh Kumar gave a statement before the Court that he had no instruction to appear on behalf of the respondents. Thus, I had not the advantage of hearing the opposite-parties. 4. It was submitted before me on behalf of the plaintiffs-applicants by Sri Ratnakar Bharti that the view taken by the Court below was erroneous in law and suffered from a jurisdictional error and hence cannot be sustained. I find considerable merit in this contention. In the first instance, it may be noted that as provided under Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The proviso which has been inserted to this Rule by Act. No. 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977. says that nothing in this Rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. In other words for non-joinder of a necessary party now a suit could be defeated. Rule 10 (2) of this order empowers a Court to strike out or add parties. No. 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977. says that nothing in this Rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. In other words for non-joinder of a necessary party now a suit could be defeated. Rule 10 (2) of this order empowers a Court to strike out or add parties. It reads as under:- "(2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may he necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." This provision confers on a Court powers to strike out the name of any plaintiff or defendant if he has been improperly joined or to add the name of any person as plaintiff or defendant if he ought to have been joined and secondly if his presence before the Court may be necessary for effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit. In other words, the object of this sub-rule is to bring before the Court, at the same time, all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to one subject-matter so that the disputes may all be determined at the same time without delay, inconvenience and expense of separate actions and trials. A wide discretion has been given to the Court, but it must be exercised on judicial principles and not improperly. As noted above it is confined to two cases: (1) that a party ought to have been joined but was not joined and is a necessary party; and (2) that without the presence of such person or such party the question involved in the case cannot be effectually and completely decided. As noted above it is confined to two cases: (1) that a party ought to have been joined but was not joined and is a necessary party; and (2) that without the presence of such person or such party the question involved in the case cannot be effectually and completely decided. Another important aspect is that this power can be exercised, "at any stage of the proceedings." If a suit has been terminated by the parties by a lawful compromise this power cannot be exercised or where a preliminary decree has been passed and an appeal is filed against it and the appellate Court has become seized of the matter or where a final decree has been passed and the matter so far as regards that Court has become conclusive. This power can also not be exercised where the suit has abated and is no longer pending. In the present case the exercise of the power was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court below mainly for the reason that in so far as defendants 1 to 5 were concerned, they had already entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs and the suit had been terminated. As for defendant No. 6 though on 10-9-1974 he gave an application for impleadment of defendant No. 4 and himself and some other persons but subsequently on 5-8-1975 he gave another application withdrawing that application. A certified copy of this application has been filed before me. The position, therefore, is that on the date when the impugned applications 124A-1 and 227-A-1 were taken up for consideration the suit in so far as the defendants 1 to 5 were concerned, stood decided in terms of compromise and in so far as defendant No. 6 was concerned, it was to be decided on the basis of the controversies involved as between him and the plaintiffs and it is not the finding of the Court below that in order to decide that controversy it was necessary to implead opposite parties Nos. 7 to 23 to the suit. 5. There is another aspect of the matter and it is that normally the Court should not add a person as defendant when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. 7 to 23 to the suit. 5. There is another aspect of the matter and it is that normally the Court should not add a person as defendant when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the best judge of his own interest and it should be left to him to choose his opponent from whom he wants relief. If he seeks relief against a particular person, it is not the look out of the Court to see whether the relief should be claimed against other persons, nor is it the duty of the Court to investigate whether the necessary parties have been added or left out. See Meghraj Agarwala v. Radheshyam Agarwala (AIR 1977 Orissa 138) and G.D.F. Luis v. I.P.H. Fernandes (AIR 1977 Goa 4). However, it is open to the Court to implead a new party as a defendant even against the plaintiff's consent in a fit and proper case. For this purpose the test is not whether the joinder of a person proposed to be added as defendant would be according to or against the wishes of the plaintiff or whether the joinder would involve an investigation into a question not arising on the cause of action averred by the plaintiff. The test is whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff will directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his rights. Another useful test may be to see whether after his joinder the main evidence in the suit and the main enquiry will remain the same as before his coming in. 6. If these tests and principles are applied to the present case, it would be seen that the Court below exceeded its jurisdiction in directing impleadment of opposite-parties Nos. 7 to 23. The plaintiffs opposed to the addition of these persons as defendants in the suit. They had already come to terms with five of the defendants and it was only with regard to defendant No. 6 that it was to be seen whether or not they were entitled to the relief of injunction claimed. That controversy did not involve any dispute with regard to the person or persons who were looking after the affairs of the trust. That controversy did not involve any dispute with regard to the person or persons who were looking after the affairs of the trust. The controversy sought to be introduced subsequently by the proposed addition not only enlarged the scope of the suit but was not connected with the relief which the plaintiff's claimed in the suit. In my opinion, therefore, the order suffers from manifest mistake of law and jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. 7. The revision is hence allowed and the impugned order dated 1-7-1975 is set aside. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.