Judgment :- 1. The appellant M. K. Narayanan is the complainant in C. C. No. 104 of 1977 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam. The complainant is a resident of Karunagappilly. On the relevant date he was a Councillor of the S. N. D. P Yogam and the President of the Karshaka Congress, Krishnapuram Block. He is a social worker and had functioned as the President of the S. N. D. P Union, Karunagappilly, Devaswom Secretary, S. N. D, P. Yogam and also as a member of the Devaswom Committee at Ochira Devastanam. Prior to his functioning in the above capacities he was in the service of the Government of Kerala He was the Business Manager to Sreemoolam Hanloom Weavers Apex Society and was promoted as Assistant Registrar of Industries (Co-operative Societies) until his retirement from Government Service According to the Complainant, he had been serving the Government Departments with all sincerely and retired from service with unimpeachable antecedents. After retirement he rendered service in the Sankar Sbastiabadipurthi Memorial Hospital conducted by the Sree Narayana Trust Medical Mission, Quilon. According to the complainant, he was being held in high esteem by the public at large and his community in particular in recognition of the various services rendered in different capacities. According to him, he had not given any room for complaint either when he was in Government service or thereafter. The accused is an Advocate practising at Varkala. There was a suit relating to Sree Narayana Trust and the various institutions belonging to and under the management of the trust, for the preparation of a scheme for the management of the trust. An appeal, A. S. No. 689 of 1972 was pending before this court. A control committee was appointed to supervise the management of the trust and the institutions thereunder. The second respondent in that appeal is the accused in the present case. He was also one of the members of the control committee to supervise the management. There was an allegation that appointments were made to the service of Colleges and the Medical Mission without previous sanction of the committee. From November, 1972 onwards the complainant was working as an Assistant Secretary of the Sree Narayana Trust Medical Mission and later on as Administrative Assistant, on a salary of Rs. 300/- per month. There was an allegation that appointments were made to the service of Colleges and the Medical Mission without previous sanction of the committee. From November, 1972 onwards the complainant was working as an Assistant Secretary of the Sree Narayana Trust Medical Mission and later on as Administrative Assistant, on a salary of Rs. 300/- per month. The Chairman of the control committee asked information about the appointment as the control committee had not been appraised of the fact of appointment; neither was its sanction obtained. Since no information was given the salary of the complainant was disallowed. On 20th of March, 1973, the respondent accused filed C.M.P. No. 3378 of 1973 seeking orders of this Court for directing the counter-petitioners in that petition to abide by the decisions of the committee, to remove the third counter petitioner from bis position as the person managing the affairs of the Sree Narayana Trusts Medical Mission and for other reliefs. An affidavit was sworn to by the respondent-accused in support of the petition, which is marked as Ext. P1 in the present case. In Para.7 of the affidavit reference was made to the appointment of the complainant as Administrative Assistant. According to the deponent it was an absolute waste of trust fund to have either Assistant Secretary or Administrative Assistant, especially when such appointment was made without reference to the control committee. The deponent further stated "to add injury to insult Shri M. K. Narayanan is also a person involved in a charge of misappropriation of funds while he was in service." According to the complainant, this passage is highly defamatory so far as he is concerned. The allegations made are false to the knowledge of the accused. The complainant was never proceeded against for alleged misappropriation of funds. The averment in the affidavit is per se defamatory and is vitiated my malice. The statement was made by the accused knowing that the imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant. The allegations were denied in the counter affidavit filed in the above petition, which is marked as Ext. P11. But inspite of the denial the accused in his reply affidavit reiterated that the complainant was guilty of misappropriation of funds while he was in service. The allegations were denied in the counter affidavit filed in the above petition, which is marked as Ext. P11. But inspite of the denial the accused in his reply affidavit reiterated that the complainant was guilty of misappropriation of funds while he was in service. According to the complainant, several members of the S N. D. P. Yogam and Sree Narayana Trust had occasion to go through the affidavit sown to by the accused and it had the effect of lowering the status of the complainant in the estimation of these people. Enquiries were being made with the complainant in respect of the allegations. Since affidavits were filed in a case in which there was considerable public interest inside and outside the State very many people had occasion to know about the contents of the affidavit. The complainant has been greatly injured on account of the averments in the affidavit. There is no justification or truth in the allegations. It was on the above grounds that the complaint was filed alleging an offence punishable under S.500 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The complainant examined pws.1 to 4 and filed Exts. P1 to P12. The accused denied the allegations and took up the stand that it was his duty as a member of the committee to look after the misappropriation of the trust properties and that he filed an affidavit challenging the appointment of the complainant as the Secretary only in the interest of the Trust and on account of the duty imposed on him by the High Court. According to him, what be had done was on public good. He had no motive or intention to defame the complainant. 4. The trial court held, on a consideration of the entire evidence in the case, that the charge against the accused had not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The Court held that the accused had no intention to harm the reputation of the complainant. He had only pointed out the unjust appointment made by the Chairman, Secretary and other office bearers of the Medical Mission Trust. The allegations in the affidavit were made in good faith for the benefit of the society. Being a member of the supervisory committee appointed by the High Court the complainant was bound by law to bring to the notice of the High Court the maladministration that was going on. The allegations in the affidavit were made in good faith for the benefit of the society. Being a member of the supervisory committee appointed by the High Court the complainant was bound by law to bring to the notice of the High Court the maladministration that was going on. The allegation against the complainant was without any malice. The court also held on the evidence that no harm was caused to the reputation of the complainant. On the above basis the Court acquitted the accused. It is this order of acquittal that is challenged in the present appeal. 5. The main contention of the appellant is that the materials placed before the Court do not in any way support the allegation in the affidavit that the appellant had misappropriated public funds while he was in service. According to the appellant, in the absence of concrete materials before Court the averment in the affidavit should be taken as false. In the counter affidavit filed before the High Court there was denial of the allegation. Even assuming that the original allegation was made in good faith once it is pointed out in the counter affidavit that the averment, that the complainant had misappropriated public funds, was without basis the accused should have conceded that fact and should not have pursued the matter further. On the other hand, what the accused has done in this case was to reiterate the allegation even after the denial in the counter affidavit in the reply affidavit filed by him. This according to the appellant shows that there was no bonafides on the part of the accused and the statement is vitiated by malice. Therefore it is argued that this is a fit case where the trial Court should have found the accused guilty of the offence and passed appropriate orders. 6. Ext. P10 is the original affidavit, of which Ext. P1 is the certified copy. There is no case that the affidavit Ext. P10 and the reply affidavit Ext. P12 were not sworn to by the first accused. The case of the respondent in his statement under S.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that as a member of the supervisory committee it was his duty that the funds of the trust were not issued. The appellant became a Secretary of the Medical Mission Trust against the rules of that trust. The case of the respondent in his statement under S.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that as a member of the supervisory committee it was his duty that the funds of the trust were not issued. The appellant became a Secretary of the Medical Mission Trust against the rules of that trust. When bis appointment was opposed he was allowed salary and allowances as Administrative Assistant. Therefore, the respondent felt that it was his duty to move the High Court in the matter. The motion was made for public good. There was no intention to defame the appellant. 7. There is no scope for doubt that the averment in the affidavit that the appellant was a person involved in a charge of misappropriation of funds while be was in service is defamatory so far as he is concerned. The respondent has not produced any material which may even suggest a case of misappropriation on the part of the appellant. No instance where the appellant has been guilty of misappropriation has been mentioned in the course of the trial It has therefore to be concluded that the averment in the affidavit to the effect that the appellant has misappropriated public funds is factually incorrect. The trial Court proceeded on the footing that even if the statement in Ext. P10 and Ext. P12 are defamatory the appellant has not suffered on account of such statement. Reference was made in this connection to the evidence of pws.1 to 3. It is pointed out by the trial Court that the appellant has stated in his evidence that even after the above said allegations he has a prominent part in the society and that was his belief. pws.2 and 3 in their evidence have also stated that they maintain a good opinion as regards the appellant and that that was their impression earlier also. It is further stated by Pw-2 that at the time when the statement was made and even prior to that the appellant was occupying a high position in society. According to Pw-3, the appellant is an honest and efficient officer and is a person very much interested in the community. He knew the appellant for about ten years and he holds the same opinion about the appellant even now. According to Pw-3, the appellant is an honest and efficient officer and is a person very much interested in the community. He knew the appellant for about ten years and he holds the same opinion about the appellant even now. The trial Court therefore stated that the allegations in the affidavit have not the effect of lowering the position of the appellant in the estimation of the public, and hence, no harm is caused to the reputation of the appellant. It was on this ground that the first respondent was acquitted. 8. The approach of the trial Court does not appear to be correct. If the statement in the affidavit is per se defamatory the mere fact that persons close to the appellant or those who knew him intimately did not change their opinion about the appellant in spite of the defamatory statement is not a criterion which should be taken into account in holding whether a person is guilty of defamation. Once it is made out that a particular statement is defamatory the person responsible for such statement can escape liability only if it is made out that his case falls under one or the other of the Exceptions mentioned in S.499 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent does not plead specifically any particular Exception. His case is only that the affidavit was sworn in the interests of the public and in the interest of the trust which he represented. Since it is not made out that the imputation is true he has to make out that his case falls under either Exception 9 or Exception 10. Under Exception 9 it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good. Under Exception 10 it is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good. It is no doubt open to the respondent to contend that it was in the interest of a public body that he made the statement. It is no doubt open to the respondent to contend that it was in the interest of a public body that he made the statement. But Exceptions 9 and 10 have application only in cases where the imputation is made in good faith. Good faith has been defined in S.52 of the Indian Penal Code as follows: "Nothing is said to be done or belived in'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention". In the instant case it may be that the appointment of the appellant was made unauthorisedly by the committee. That by itself was sufficient ground for the respondent for challenging the appointment. He need not have put forward another ground that the appellant was involved in misappropriation of funds. Once he made such an imputation it was up to him to make out that the statement was made on reasonable grounds and that he believed it to be factually correct. The first respondent has no such case. Even assuming that the statement in Ext. P10 affidavit was made bonafide and in good faith once it was denied in the counter affidavit the first respondent was not justified in reiterating the imputation in the reply affidavit filed by him. The imputation, in spite of the challenge as to its correctness, is sufficient to show that the first respondent has not taken due care and attention before making the statement. This is sufficient to suggest lack of good faith and therefore the first respondent is not entitled to claim protection either under Exception 9 or under Exception 10 of S.499 of the Indian Penal Code. It has also to be stated that Exception 9 regarding imputation on the character of another has application only in the case of opinion. It has nothing to do with an assertion of facts: See Chandrasekhara Pillai v. Raman Pillai,1964 KLT. 317. In the instant case what the first respondent has done was to make an assertion of the fact of the involvement by the appellant in a case of misappropriation. The imputation is not proved to have any basis. In the circumstances of the case it is lacking in good faith. The first respondent is guilty of an offence punishable under S.500 of the Indian Penal Code. I therefore differ from the conclusions arrived at by the trial court and hold that the accused is guilty of the offence. The imputation is not proved to have any basis. In the circumstances of the case it is lacking in good faith. The first respondent is guilty of an offence punishable under S.500 of the Indian Penal Code. I therefore differ from the conclusions arrived at by the trial court and hold that the accused is guilty of the offence. The order of acquittal is therefore set aside and the first respondent is convicted for an offence punishable u/s. 500 IPC. 9. As regards the punishment, there is no case for the appellant that there is any personal enmity between himself and the first respondent. The circumstances of the case clearly make out that the first respondent made the statement in his anxiety to set right matters with regard to the trust. Although he was reckless in making the statement the interest of justice will be served if the first respondent is admonished under S.3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. He is accordingly admonished. The appeal is allowed as above. Allowed.