Judgment :- 1. The question which arises in this referred Original Petition is as regards the validity of an order of confiscation made under S.67B of the Abkari Act. 1077 (the 'Act') A lorry (No. MED 4734) belonging to the petitioner was confiscated by Ext P3 order of the Assistant Excise Commissioner, Trichur, dated 27-10-1979 This order was confirmed in appeal by Ext. P5 order of the Joint Commissioner of Excise, Trivandrum, dated 12-12-1979 and in revision by Ext. P7 order of the Board of Revenue dated 26-2-1980. Exts. P3, P5 and P7 are challenged by the petitioner. 2. The petitioner's vehicle was proceeding on the Palghat-Trichur road on 7-8-1979. It was stopped and checked by the Excise Inspector at about 2 p. m. at Erumpupalam. The documents produced by the driver in charge of the vehicle showed that the vehicle was expected to carry 140 bags of potatoes. However, instead of the potatoes, the officer found 30 iron drums, each having a capacity of 230 litres, concealed underneath certain articles. The drums were seized It was found that they contained 6000 litres of rectified spirit and that they were carried without a permit The petitioner was not personally present in the lorry, but his brother was at the wheel. In addition to his brother, there were three other passengers in the lorry among whom was S. A Sulthan, s/o Syed Abdul Rahiman, of Bangalore. The offence alleged against the passengers were compounded at Rs. 1000/-each in terms of S.67 of the Act. 3. The petitioner challenges the order of confiscation contending that he was not in control of the vehicle at the relevant time and that he had taken sufficient care and precaution before the vehicle left Bangalore to see that no contraband articles were loaded. According to the petitioner's counsel, a vehicle is not liable to be confiscated unless the prosecution has proved mens rea on the part of the owner. In support of this contention, Counsel seeks to rely upon certain observations of Vadakkel J. in Vijayan v. Asst. Excise Commissioner, Cannanore (1980 KLT. 45) and Sasidharan v. State of Kerala (1980 KLT 671). It has to be noticed that the learned Judge did not say that the prosecution has the burden to prove mens rea. In support of this contention, Counsel seeks to rely upon certain observations of Vadakkel J. in Vijayan v. Asst. Excise Commissioner, Cannanore (1980 KLT. 45) and Sasidharan v. State of Kerala (1980 KLT 671). It has to be noticed that the learned Judge did not say that the prosecution has the burden to prove mens rea. In fact it was pointed out by the learned Judge that the burden was upon the owner of the vehicle to disprove mens rea. Vadakkel J , however, stated that mens rea was a relevant ingredient to constitute the offence which attracts the power to confiscate under the Act. The two decisions were confirmed in appeal. Speaking for the Division Bench Eradi C. J (as he then was) referred to the argument of the Advocate General that in the matters arising under S.67B it was not correct to say that proof of mens rea on the part of the owner/agent/person in charge of the conveyance was a pre-requisite for attracting liability to confiscation, and stated: "There is force in the above contention advanced by the learned Advocate General." (1981 KLT. 366). No view was, however, expressed by the Division Bench as to the relevance of mens rea to constitute an offence under the Act. The Division Bench dismissed the appeals principally for the reason that, in regard to public passenger vehicles like stage carriages and vans authorised to operate scheduled services on the concerned routes on the strength of permits issued by the Road Transport Authorities, the mere fact that a passenger had without the knowledge and connivance of the owner or agent concealed on his person or in his luggage a contraband article would not necessarily mean that the vehicle was used for carrying such contraband article and the exercise of power of confiscation in such circumstances, without more, would not be justified The offending passenger, in such circumstances, cannot he said to have had the minimal control over the operation of the vehicle so as to treat the vehicle itself as having been used in the commission of the offence. The Court then painted out: "In our opinion, a conveyance can be said to be 'used' for carrying the contraband article only if the person, who actually effects such transportation, has at least some degree of minimal control over the operation of the vehicle which may be either by his having obtained it on loan from its owner or on hire (as in the case of a taxi car or contract carriage or vehicles taken on hire for private use including buses, vans and private carrier vehicles) or other similar arrangement. In all such cases the person effecting the conveyance will be in a position to exercise at least a limited control as to the destination to which the vehicle should be taken or the route along which it should ply etc." In the case of a public passenger vehicle like a stage carriage the owner or his agent has neither the means nor the authority to check the articles transported by passengers as their personal effects, and much less to conduct a search of their bodies. This is not the position in the case of a goods vehicle like a lorry. 4. We shall now look at the statutory provisions. S.9 and 10 read as follows: "9. Prohibition of the transport of liquor. The Government may, from time to time, by notification, prohibit the transport of liquor or of intoxicating drugs, or of any kind of liquor or intoxicating drugs, from any local area into any other local area. 10. Transporting of liquor or intoxicating drug. No liquor or intoxicating drug, exceeding such quantity as the Government may, from time to time, prescribe by notification in the Gazette either generally for the whole State or for any local area, shall be transported except under a permit issued under the provisions of the next following section." While S, 9 permits the Government to prohibit absolutely the transport of liquor from one local area to another, S.10 prohibits the. transport of liquor in excess of the prescribed quantity except under a valid permit. It is an offence to carry rectified spirit without a valid permit S.55 says: "55. For illegal import, etc. transport of liquor in excess of the prescribed quantity except under a valid permit. It is an offence to carry rectified spirit without a valid permit S.55 says: "55. For illegal import, etc. Whoever in contravention of this Act or of any rule or order made under this Act or of any licence or permit obtained under this Act, (a) ...transports, transits or possesses liquor or any intoxicating drug; or shall on conviction before a Magistrate be punished, S. 64 says: "Presumption as to commission of offence in certain cases. In prosecutions under S.55 it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that the accused person has committed an offence under that section in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug, or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the manufacture of liquor other than toddy or of any intoxicating drug or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the manufacture of liquor or of any intoxicating drug, for the possession of which he is unable to account satisfactorily; (emphasis supplied) "This section. dispenses, with the need for the prosecution to prove mens rea in proceedings under S 55. It has done away with the common law presumption of innocence of the accused, and has placed upon him the initial burden to account for the possession of materials the carriage of which is prohibited without a permit. S, 34 authorises an officer of the Excise Department or the Police Department to seize and detain any article which he has reason to believe is liable to confiscation. 5. The things liable to confiscation are those mentioned under S.65 which reads: "65. What things liable to confiscation. In any case in which an offence has been committed under this Act, the liquor, drug, materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus in respect or by means of which an offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation carts, vessels or other conveyances used in carrying the same shall likewise be liable to confiscation." (emphasis supplied) S. 66 empowers the Magistrate to order confiscation. Power is also given to Abkari Officers to order the confiscation in certain circumstances. S 67B which was inserted by Act 24 of 1975 provides: "67B. Confiscation by Abkari Officers in certain cases. Power is also given to Abkari Officers to order the confiscation in certain circumstances. S 67B which was inserted by Act 24 of 1975 provides: "67B. Confiscation by Abkari Officers in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where any liquor, intoxicating drug, material, or any animal.'cart, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying the same is seized and detained under the provisions of this Act; the officer seizing and detaining such property shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce the same before an officer authorised by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Gazette, not being below the rank of an Assistant Excise Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer). (2) Where an authorised officer seizes and detains any property specified in sub-section (1) or where any such property is produced before an authorised officer under that sub-section and he is satisfied that an offence under this Act has been committed in respect of or by means of that property and that such property is liable to confiscation under this Act, such authorised officer may, whether or not a Prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence order confiscation of such property. It(emphasis supplied) & 67C provides for show-cause notice before confiscation. It further provides: "67C. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), no order confiscating any animal, court, vessel or other conveyance shall be made under S.67B if the owner of the animal, cart, vessel or other conveyance proves to the satisfaction Of the authorised officer that it was used in carrying the liquor or intoxicating drug or the material without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the animal, cart, vessel or other conveyances and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use." (emphasis supplied) 6. These provisions indicate that sufficient power has been conferred upon the Abkari Officers to confiscate a vehicle by means of which an offence has been committed under the Act. If liquor is carried without a valid permit an offence is committed which is liable to be punished under S.55. These provisions indicate that sufficient power has been conferred upon the Abkari Officers to confiscate a vehicle by means of which an offence has been committed under the Act. If liquor is carried without a valid permit an offence is committed which is liable to be punished under S.55. In a prosecution arising under S.56 the burden is placed upon the accused to prove his innocence and not upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. Any vehicle used for the carriage of such liquor without valid licence is equally tainted with the offence, as it were, and is therefore liable to be confiscated, unless the owner proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that the vehicle was so used without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the vehicle and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. This burden is statutorily placed squarely upon the owner. A penalty of confiscation is a penalty in rem, unlike a penalty against the offender which is a penalty in personnm: Collector of Customs, Madras and others v D. Bhoormul (1974) 3 S.0 R.833, 842 7. However, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power under S 67B is that the officer should be satisfied that an offence under the Act has been committed. An offence is committed only if the vehicle has been used for the carriage of articles in respect of which or by means of which an offence under the Act has been committed Although the accidental presence of contraband article in a vehicle would not necessarily and conclusively establish that the vehicle has been used for the carriage of that article, it would indeed be a relevant and significant circumstance for the officer to form an opinion as to whether an offence has been committed. The mere fact that the contraband article was concealed in the luggage of a passenger in a public passenger vehicle may not, without more, provide sufficient ground for the officer to form the conclusion that an offence has been committed by means of the vehicle, for, as pointed out by this Court, it is neither practical nor permissible for the owner of the bus or his agent to check the person or the passenger or the luggage carried by him. In such circumstances the satisfaction of the officer is liable to be scrutinised with great care, particularly because of the serious inconvenience that a callous exercise of the power is likely to cause to the other passengers. Each case has therefore to be examined with reference to the relevant facts of that case Contraband articles carried in a bus, van, lorry or other vehicle under special contract with one or more persons is a totally different situation. In such a case the conclusion that the person in charge of the vehicle had permitted the use of the vehicle for the commission of an offence is irresistible, unless the owner succeeds in dispelling the presumption by proving his innocence 8. It is a cardinal principle of law that unless a statute has either expressly or by necessary implication ruled out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, no man should be convicted for a criminal offence in the absence of a guilty mind. But it is an equally well accepted principle that where an act is prohibited by statute, the very doing of that act constitutes the offence, whether or not the offender has a guilty mind: See AIR. 1966 SC 43. See also, Craies on Statute Law. 7th Edn, pp. 536 et seq ; Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., pp 127 et seq. In Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner - (1968) 2 W L. R.1303, it was held by the House of Lords that since the Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1964, prohibited possession of drugs except upon certain conditions, a person was guilty of an offence under the Act if he possessed the articles without lawful authority, and that the question whether he had a guilty or innocent mind or a laudable or improper purpose was irrelevant. In Regina v. Patter son - (1962) 2 Q. B. 429, referring to S.28 of the Larceny Act, 1916, which provides: "Every person who shall be found by night ...having in his possession without lawful excuse (the proof of which shall lie on such person) any key, picklock, crow, jack, bit, or other implement of house breaking... In Regina v. Patter son - (1962) 2 Q. B. 429, referring to S.28 of the Larceny Act, 1916, which provides: "Every person who shall be found by night ...having in his possession without lawful excuse (the proof of which shall lie on such person) any key, picklock, crow, jack, bit, or other implement of house breaking... shall be guilty of a misdemeanour," Lord Parker C J. stated: "...it seems to this Court perfectly clear that in the case of those named implements, once they have been found on the defendant by night and possession of them has been proved, the onus shifts to him to prove on a balance of probabilities that he had a lawful excuse for their possession at that hour of the night and in the circumstances in question." In Chajutin v. White head - (1938)1 K.B. 506, Lord Hewart C J. observed: "...the case seems to me to fall within the large and comprehensive class of cases where, if a person does the act which is prohibited by a statute, that fact imputes to him a sufficient degree of mens rea to bring it about that the offence is proved." Lord Goddard observed in Evans v. De//-(1937) 53 ILR. 310,313: "With the complexity of modern legislation one knows that there are times when the court is constrained to find that by reason of the clear terms of an Act of Parliament mens rea, or the absence of mens rea, becomes immaterial, and that if a certain act is done an offence is committed whether the person charged knew or did not know of the Act." 9. Transportation of liquor or intoxicating drug is strictly regulated by the statute the violation of which is an offence, and the offender is liable to be proceeded against in personam and his goods in rem. If, in such a case, the burden were to be placed on the prosecution to prove the knowledge or guilty mind of the accused, the efficacy of the statutory control would be seriously impaired and the liquor or drug pedlar might escape by some story plausible enough to raise some doubt. This is the danger which Lord Pearce had in mind when he said: "As soon as everyone who has a good motive may with impunity possess them, the efficacy of the control is injured. This is the danger which Lord Pearce had in mind when he said: "As soon as everyone who has a good motive may with impunity possess them, the efficacy of the control is injured. For that reason it cannot, I think, have been intended that it should be a defence for an unauthorised person to show that he may have possessed the drugs for a laudable object or with no guilty intentions. For the unauthorised person is simply not allowed to have them for any object whatever." (Warnxer v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner'-(1968)2 WLR.1303,1344). (emphasis supplied) 10. Where an act is proscribed under the statute, the doing of the act being the offence, an enquiry as to the state of the mind of the offender is immaterial. The offender is presumed to be guilty until he succeeds in justifying the act in the manner prescribed under the statute. In such a case, as Lord Wilberforce puts it, there is "no need, and no room, for an enquiry whether any separate requirement of mens rea is to be imported into the statutory offence....the statute contains its own solution " (Warnxer's case, supra). See also Regina v. Hussain (1981) 1 WLR 416. 11. Whatever be the significance in theory as to the relevance of mens rea in the context of welfare legislation, the doctrine, as classically understood in the common law as a rule of presumption of innocence, has no place in matters of prosecution or confiscation under the Act. The authorised officer has no burden to prove the guilt of the owner. The burden is that of the owner to prove his innocence. The only conditions precedent to the exercise of power under S 67B are that the circumstances (the jurisdictional facts) must warrant the formation of a satisfaction and that the procedure (natural justice) prescribed under S.67C(1) must be followed. When these two conditions are satisfied the burden is upon the owner to prove his innocence in the manner laid down under S 67C(2). 12. The vehicle in question is a lorry meant for the transport of goods The documents carried by the driver of the lorry who was none other than the petitioner's brother himself did not contain any valid licence. The documents showed that the lorry was intended to carry potatoes. But the goods carried were drums containing rectified spirit. 12. The vehicle in question is a lorry meant for the transport of goods The documents carried by the driver of the lorry who was none other than the petitioner's brother himself did not contain any valid licence. The documents showed that the lorry was intended to carry potatoes. But the goods carried were drums containing rectified spirit. None of the passengers could give satisfactory explanation for his presence in the lorry or the carriage of the contraband articles. The suspicious circumstances in which the four persons were found and the articles were concealed necessarily constituted sufficient evidence for the officer to be reasonably satisfied that the vehicle was used for the commission of an offence. The procedure prescribed under S.67C was duly complied with. The owner failed to prove his innocence and the care taken of the vehicle in terms of S 67C(2) The mere fact that the owner resided outside the State and that he was not present in the vehicle at the relevant time did not make any difference to the exercise of power under S 67B. 13. In the circumstances the challenge against Exts. P3, P5 and P7 fails. This Original Petition is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed. The petitioner asks for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court We are not satisfied that any substantial question of law of general importance which in our opinion requires a decision by the Supreme Court arises in this case. Leave is refused. Leave refused.