G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15-10-1974 passed by the District Judge, bellary, in RA No. 64 of 1974 on his file allowing the appeal on reversing the judgment and decree dated 29-7-1972 passed by the Munsiff, Harapanahalli, in OS No. 215 of 1971 on his file decreeing the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff instituted a suit in the court of the Munsiff, Harapanahalli, for the recovery of Rs. 7,626 with costs and current interest from the defendant on a simple mortgage bond dated 17 8 1962 (Ex. D 1 ). The defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,800 from the plaintiff on 17-8-1962 and, according to the plaintiff, executed a simple mortgage bond, Ex. D 1 in respect of his land bearing Sy. No. 159 of Hiremegalageri measuring 6 acres 32 cents. Interest was agreed to be paid at 12% per annum. According to the plain- tiff the defendant did not repay the amount due under the mortgage bond. Further he averred in the plaint that the defendant managed to get back the mortgage bond by practising fraud on the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed for a decree against the defendant for realising Rs. 7,626-35 together with costs and current interest by the sale of the mortgaged property. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit by filling his written statement. on 12-2-1972. He affirmed that the mortgage debt was duly discharged. He had paid Rs. 2,200 on 26-6-1968, Rs. 1,000 on 27 6 1968, Rs. 1,800 on 30-6-1968 and Rs. 1,000 on 1-7-1968. He had subsequently paid Rs. 400 in cash to the plaintiff within a month thereafter. The plaintiff had returned the original mortgage deed to the defendant and its head was torn in token of full satisfaction as was customary. He denied that he managed to get the mortgage deed by practising fraud on the plaintiff. The plaintiff was a money lender. He had no licence. On these, he prayed that the suit be dismissed. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff framed the following issues as arising from the pleadings in the suit : (1) Whether the defendant has discharged the debt on the mortgage deed dated 17-8 1962 ? The plaintiff was a money lender. He had no licence. On these, he prayed that the suit be dismissed. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff framed the following issues as arising from the pleadings in the suit : (1) Whether the defendant has discharged the debt on the mortgage deed dated 17-8 1962 ? (2) Whether the defendant has practised fraud on the plaintiff while taking back the mortgage deed ? (3) Whether the plaintiff made any endorsements on the mortgage deed for satisfaction of the debt ? (4) Whether the plaintiff is a money lender and has no licence? (5) Does the defendant prove that he received the suit debt of Rs. 3,800 from g. M. Rudraiah ? (6) What reliefs ? ( 5 ) DURING trial, the plaintiff examined p. Ws. 1 to 3 including himself and the defendant examined D. Ws. 1 to 3 includ. ing himself. The plaintiff got marked Exs. P-1 to P-5 (a) and the Deft got marked exs. D-1 to D-3 (a ). ( 6 ) THE learned Munsiff appreciating the evidence on record answered issues 1 to 5 in the negative and, in that view, he decreed the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant went up in appeal before the Civil Judge, Bellary, in RA No. 71. of 1972 on his file. Thereafter, the appeal was withdrawn by the District jugde, Bellary, and it came to be registered on his file as RA No. 64 of 1974. The learned District Judge re assessing the evidence on record held that a presumption arises in favour of the plea of the defendant that the mortgage debt was satisfied because the mortgage bond was produced by the defendant and the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant obtained the deed by practising fraud on the plaintiff. He further held that an adverse inference should be drawn against the plaintiff as he failed to produce the accounts though he admitted that he - had kept regular accounts. He further believed the plea of satisfaction relying upon the oral evidence of the defendant and his witnesses and, in that view, he allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. He further believed the plea of satisfaction relying upon the oral evidence of the defendant and his witnesses and, in that view, he allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has come up in the above second appeal before the Court. ( 7 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellant-plaintiff strenuously urged before me that the Court below was not justified in dismissing the suit. He submitted elaborating his argupents that the court below was not justified in drawing a presumption of satisfaction because the deed was produced by the defendant. He further submitted that the endorsements on the deed were not by the plaintiff but merely by the defendant and that they were not registered. He further submitted that in view of the definite and specific version put forth by the plaintiff that the defendant by fraud, with the assistance of one Rudraiah took away the deed, no pre- sumption could have been raised in favour of the defendant's plea of satisfaction. He further submitted that no adverse inference could be drawn against the plaintiff for not producing the accounts. He also submitted that oral evidence could not prove the satisfaction on the facts of this case. Hence, according to him, the learned district Judge was not justified in dismissing the suit. ( 8 ) THE points, therefore, that arise for my consideration in this appeal are (1) Whether the learned District Judge was justified in drawing a presumption in favour of the defendant's plea of satisfaction because the mortgage bond, Ex. D 1, was produced to the Court by the defendant ? (2) Whether the learned District Judge was justified in drawing an adverse inference against the plaintiff because he did not produce his books of accounts ? (3) Whether the learned District Judge was justified in holding that the mortgage debt was satisfied and, in that view, dismissing the suit ? (4) Whether the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge should be interfered with ? ( 9 ) IN the plaint itself it is averred that the mortgage deed was obtained back by the defendant by practising fraud on the plaintiff with the help of one Rudraiah. Both the Courts below have rightly pointed out that no particulars of fraud are. ( 9 ) IN the plaint itself it is averred that the mortgage deed was obtained back by the defendant by practising fraud on the plaintiff with the help of one Rudraiah. Both the Courts below have rightly pointed out that no particulars of fraud are. mentioned in the plaint except stating in a bald manner that the defendant obtained the mortgage deed by practising fraud on the plaintiff with the help of one Rudraiah. No particulars are given. It is not even mentioned as to when the plaintiff came to know that the deed was lost. The manner of fraud is not mentioned. The part played by the said Rudraiah is not mentioned. That being so, the Courts below have correctly held that it is a mere assertion of fraud without giving particulars as required under Order VI Rule 4 of CPC. Both the Courts below have further held that the fraud alleged is not proved. It may further be mentioned that even in Ex. P 2 the notice issued by the plaintiff demanding the defendant to pay the amount, it is not mentioned as to when the plaintiff came to know that the deed was lost. Admittedly, the deed is executed on 17 8 1962 and it is only after nine years that it is mentioned in Ex. P 2 that the deed was lost. It is not probable that the plaintiff would have kept quiet for such a long time if the deed was really lost. It is necessary to recall in this context that the plaintiff is a man of wordly wisdom being a merchant. If really the deed was lost with the intervention of Rudraiah, his nephew, the plaintiff would have certainly given particulars of the fraud in the plaint itself. In the circumstances, therefore the Courts below have rightly held that the alleged fraud is not proved. If that be so, the fact remains that the defendant got into possession of Ex. D 2 in a legal manner. It is in this perspective that we have to find out whether the presumption contemplated under S. 114 (i) of the Indian evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) arises from the facts of the case. S. 114 (i) reads : "that when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged. " that being so. S. 114 (i) reads : "that when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged. " that being so. it is obvious that since in this case the mortgage bond, which ought to have been in the custody of the plaintiff, has come to the custody of the defendant and he has produced it in Court, the normal factual presumption would be that the obligation has been discharged. That is what is doae by the learned District judge. I find no reason to differ. When the deed of security is found in the hands of the debtor, prima facie, the presumption is that the debt has been discharged, though the party may place other circumstances on record to rebut such a presumption as it is a rebuttable presumption, vide bhog Houg Kong v. Ramanathan Chctty (1), ramanath v. Raggha (2) and Sara Upadyaya v. S. R. M. M. A. Firm (3 ). ( 10 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellant no doubt, invited my atten. tion to a decision in the case of Pandit ram Kumar Missir v. Pandit Pamnath missir (4 ). Therein also it is held that when a mortgage bond is produced from the custody of the mortgagor, a presumption under S. 114 of the Evidence Act arises that the mortgage debt is discharged. The learned counsel further invited my attention to a decision in the case of Abdul Karim v. Manjl Hansraj (5 ). That was a case of Hundi. On the facts of that case, their Lordships have held that the burden did not shift as it was a negotiable instrument and as the endorsements were not made on the deed itself. The facts of that case are different from the facts of the present case. Here we are concerned with a mortgage deed and not a negotiable instrument. The shifting of burden under S. 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act would not arise from the facts of the present case. That being so, i have no reason to differ from the reasoning of the learned District Judge that a presumption arises on the facts of this case that the mortgage debt was discharged since the mortgage deed itself was produced by the defendant from his custody (S. 114 (i) of the Act ). 1. 29 IA 43 equivalent to 29 Cal. 334. 2. 1. 29 IA 43 equivalent to 29 Cal. 334. 2. 68 IC 892. 3. AIR 1933 Rangoon 61. ( 11 ) IT is true that the endorsements found on the mortgage deed are not by the plaintiff for payment of money but they are made by the defendant himself and, therefore, no reliance could be placed on them for discharge of the debt. But the presumption does not depend upon the endorsement made. As the deed itself is produced by the obligor, that circumstance would not affect the presumption raised under S. 114 (i) of the Act. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court of India in the case of Kundanlal Hallarorn v. Custodian evacv. ee Property (6), speaking through subba Rao, J. , has held that if a relevant piece of evidence is withheld by the plaintiff, S. 114 of the Evidence Act enables a court to draw a pre umption to the effect that, if produced, the said evidence would be unfavourable to the plaintiff. This presumption, if raised by a Court can under certain circumstances, rebut the presumption of law raised under S. 118 of the negotiable Instruments Act. In the instant case, the plaintiff has admitted in evidence that he has maintained accounts. He is a merchant. Obviously therefore it is normally expected that the transaction regarding the mortgage debt would also be accounted for in his books of accounts. The books of accounts would be relevant piece of evidence. The plaintiff in spite of challenge has not produced the same. Therefore, the learned District Judge has drawn an adverse inference that if such accounts were produced, the satisfaction pleaded by the defendant would have been proved. S. 114 (g) of the Evidence Act reads :"that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be 4. AIR 1942 Patna 315. 5. ILR 1 Bombay 295. 6. AIR 1961 SC 1316 . unfavourable to the person who withholds it. "therefore, there is nothing wrong legally in drawing a presumption especially so on the facts of this case where the mortgage deed, Ex. D 1, has been produced by the defendant from his custody. ( 13 ) IN addition to this the defendant has given his evidence and has adduced evidence of two more witnesses. "therefore, there is nothing wrong legally in drawing a presumption especially so on the facts of this case where the mortgage deed, Ex. D 1, has been produced by the defendant from his custody. ( 13 ) IN addition to this the defendant has given his evidence and has adduced evidence of two more witnesses. It is in that perspective and conspectus of circumstances that the learned District Judge has held believing the oral evidence that the mortgage debt is discharged. I have no reason to differ. Moreover, if is essentially a finding on a question of fact which binds this Court sitting in second appeal. ( 14 ) IN the result, therefore, I hold that this appeal has no substance and it is liable to be dismissed. I dismiss the same. No costs. --- *** --- .