JUDGMENT The petitioner, a Railway Servant, was placed under suspension with immediate effect by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P), Howrah, Respondent No. 2 in contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry on the basis of a charge-sheet issued under Rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules). The said Rule 9 lays down the necessary procedure for imposing penalties. 2. On a reference to the concerned charge-sheet it would appear that the charge against the petitioner was substantively to the effect that while working as Driver in K. 1 Up (Katwa Local) he disregarded the Up Outer and Up Home Signal at Bolagarh Station as a result whereof the Bogie, the particulars whereof are mentioned in the charge-sheet, get derailed at about 1948 hrs. and as such it was claimed that the instructions as laid down in G. R. 76 (a) and G. R. 78 were violated by him those G. R.s would hereinafter be referred to as the said instruction. The petitioner by his reply of 7th May, 1975 which is in Annexure 'C' to the petition, denied the validity of the charges as levelled and claimed that he was not at all liable and responsible for the offences charged. 3. It appeared that there was a fact-finding enquiry, which according to the petitioner was nothing but a sham one, and the said enquiry submitted the findings on 11th April, 1975. This body was composed of the Divisional Safety Officer, the Senior Divisional Mechanical. Engineer (C & W), Howrah, Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P), Howrah, Divisional Engineer (P) Howrah, Divisional Signal and Telecom Engineer, Howrah. It was the allegations of the petitioner that such fact-finding enquiry conducted themselves totally disregarding the note given under Chapter IX of the Accident Manual which are to the following effect:- "The enquiry should not, however, confine themselves in ascertaining the immediate cause of the accident. The scope of the enquiry should embrace a wider field and efforts should be made to determine whether there was a general laxity in working and negligence of supervision to which the accident may be attributed. The intention should not be to make a scapegoat of individuals, but to eradicate the root cause of the accident. The members of the Committee must, therefore, observe strict impartiality and avoid any partisan feeling. The intention should not be to make a scapegoat of individuals, but to eradicate the root cause of the accident. The members of the Committee must, therefore, observe strict impartiality and avoid any partisan feeling. The object should be to record facts and not to screen faults, and as such was a nullity. 4. It was alleged further by the petitioner that disciplinary enquiry was also purported to be held by the Enquiry Officer, who submitted his report on 21st July, 1975 and such report concluded that the petitioner violated the said instruction. It was contended by the petitioner that the findings of the said enquiry were based on pure surmises, conjectures and speculation and were not based on a legal evidence. That apart, the petitioner has alleged that the report does not discuss the evidence at all and as such was also violative of the mandatory provisions of Rule 9(19) of the said Rules and as such, has been claimed to be arbitrary, irregular and bad in law. The said sub-rule 19 of Rule 9 lays down: (19) (i) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be prepared and it shall contain: (a) the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour ; (b) the defence of the Railway servant in respect of each article of charge; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge ; and (d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor : Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the Railway servant has, either admitted the facts on which such article of charge, is based, or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge. (ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry, which shall include- (a) the report prepared by it under clause (i) ; (b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Railway servant; (c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; (d) written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer, if any, or the Railway servant or both during the course of the inquiry; and (e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry. 5. It was the specific assertions and allegations of the petitioner that the fact-finding enquiry was not impartial but the same was a partisan one and the conclusion as was arrived at was neither proper nor fair but the same was made or recorded for the sole intention and purpose of finding the petitioner's guilty so that the necessary penalty may be imposed on him. In short, it was claimed that such findings as arrived at, was neither bona fide nor fair and proper but was motivated. It was also the specific allegations of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in a fair way and manner as the petitioner was not informed by him of the fact as to when the enquiry was going to be closed and as such, the petitioner has claimed that he was deprived of adducing evidence in support of his defence with the result the petitioner was not given the reasonable opportunities within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 6. It was also specifically averred by the petitioner on a reference to the charge-sheet that the contexts of the same would prove and establish that everything was proceeded with or conducted with a prejudiced mind or prejudging of guilt of the petitioner. It has been claimed that such prejudging of guilt by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Howrah, who was the direct Superior Officer of the Enquiring Authority, raises and in fact has raised a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced. It has been claimed that such prejudging of guilt by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Howrah, who was the direct Superior Officer of the Enquiring Authority, raises and in fact has raised a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced. The petitioner has in fact, stated that the Enquiry Officer always conducted the concerned enquiry in the manner which was neither fair nor proper nor was such enquiry conducted in accordance with the rules and principles of natural justice. The petitioner has, in fact, stated that the evidence of Shri A. M. Saha was relied upon by the Enquiry Officer while finding the petitioner guilty of the offences as charged, whereas the unreliability of the evidence of the said Shri Saha appeared clear on the face of the records but the Enquiry Officer, while coming to his purported findings, did not consider such unreliability and as such, the resultant findings were also, according to petitioner, bad and perverse. That apart the petitioner has stated that the purported enquiry was allegedly conducted by the Enquiry Officer in the most unfair manner inasmuch as two witnesses who had been named in the charge-sheet were produced as prosecution witnesses, but they were not produced during the enquiry and furthermore it would appear from the enquiry report that the report of the fact-finding enquiry was accepted in toto by the disciplinary authority and in fact such disciplinary enquiry and the holding of the same was nothing but an empty or idle formality and ceremony. The petitioner has alleged that no reasonable person acting bona fide and on relevant considerations alone, disregarding all irrelevant considerations, could come to the alleged findings as were sought to be arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and as such, the findings as arrived by him were based on no evidence and were perverse too on the basis of the facts as above or the findings as arrived at by memorandum dated 29th July, 1975, a penalty of removal from service as petitioner was served. Such memorandum has been annexed as Annexure 'F' to the petition, 7. Such memorandum has been annexed as Annexure 'F' to the petition, 7. The petitioner has stated that the authority issuing such memorandum was not competent to issue the same inasmuch as Shri Ved Prokash, Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P), Howrah, respondent No.2, who issued the same, was a member of the fact-finding enquiry which as, mentioned, come to the finding of guilt of the petitioner. It has been contended by the petitioner that the disciplinary authority by functioning also as a member of the fact-finding enquiry, rendered himself unsuitable to function as disciplinary authority with an open mind and as such the concerned memorandum dated 29th July, 1975 purported to impose the penalty of removal of the petitioner was directly contrary to the contents of Railway Board's confidential letter No. E(D & A), 63 R. G. 6-16, dated 23rd December, 1960, It has also been claimed by the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer in the instant case being below the rank of the officer who conducted the fact-finding enquiry, could not be appointed to conduct the disciplinary enquiry inasmuch as in accordance with the Railway, Board's Serial Circular No. 7499. The Enquiry Officer in a departmental enquiry must be above or of the same rank with the officer who conducted the fact-finding enquiry and as such also it was claimed by the petitioner that the enquiry as was held in this case should be quashed. He claimed further that the circular issued by the Railway Board has a statutory force and are binding on all concerned and as such, the proposal to impose the penalty of the subject on the petitioner as mentioned above was violative of principles of natural justice and fundamental of fair play besides being in clear violation of the circular as mentioned above and so also the said instructions and so also the facts that the petitioner was not guilty of the said instruction. 8. Apart from all this it was also contended by the petitioner that the authority purporting to impose the penalty of dismissal in the instant case did not consider the written statement of the petitioner apart from the fact that the Enquiry Officer also did not consider the same. 8. Apart from all this it was also contended by the petitioner that the authority purporting to impose the penalty of dismissal in the instant case did not consider the written statement of the petitioner apart from the fact that the Enquiry Officer also did not consider the same. It was categorically stated by the petitioner that the cumulative effect of all the non-actions and inactions as mentioned above, would be that the proceedings as initiated or the findings as arrived at must be set aside. 9. Shri Sudhakar Ganguly, the Assistant Mechanical Engineer (P), Eastern Railway, Howrah, who has claimed himself to be appointed with the fact-finding enquiry of the case by the affidavit-in-opposition dated 11th May, 1974, filed on behalf of respondents has stated that the petitioner while working Up Howrah-Katwa Local caused the derailment of the train at Balagarh Station on 26th March, 1975 and in view of the gravity of the offence, he was placed under suspension by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P) on and from 27th March, 1975. He has also stated that the fact-finding enquiry into the manner was held by the Senior Scale Officer and the petitioner having been found guilty or the offences as charged, was proceeded under a mejor penalty charge-sheet. It has been stated that immediately after the derailment on 26th March, 1975, a senior scale officers as mentioned in paragraph 8 of the said opposition were found and they after careful consideration of the evidence on record submitted the findings on 11th April, 1975, holding the petitioner and the Leading Fireman responsible for the accident. It was also stated that the Enquiry Committee conducted the enquiry in question, strictly in compliance with the Rules laid down in Accident Manual and efforts were made by them to determine and find out whether there had been any general laxity in working or negligence of supervision to which the cause of the accident might be attributed. The deponent has stated that the members of the said Enquiry Committee observed strict impartiality and avoided any partisan feeling for the purpose of coming to a correct conclusion. 10. The deponent has stated that the members of the said Enquiry Committee observed strict impartiality and avoided any partisan feeling for the purpose of coming to a correct conclusion. 10. It was also and the further case of the deponent that on consideration of the reply to a charge-sheet submitted by the petitioner a departmental enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer strictly in accordance with the rules laid down for the manner and charges having been established, the Enquiry Officer submitted his findings holding the petitioner responsible of the charges as framed against him. Such findings have been claimed by the deponent to be due, fair and proper. He has alleged that the findings were arrived at purely on surmises, conjectures or speculation and were based no evidence as alleged. He has stated that evidence as alleged or as was available has been duly considered and disclosed in the proceedings and there was no violation of the provisions of Rule 9(19) of the said Rules or any violation of principles of natural justice. In fact, he has stated that departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the Rules and findings of the same were based on evidence as was available and such findings were also arrived at on consideration of the defence as put forward by the petitioner. 11. The deponent has stated that the petitioner was given all and every reasonable opportunities to defend his case at the enquiry and he has also stated that at the conclusion of the common proceedings, conducted against the petitioner and Shri Sukumar Singha Roy, Leading Fireman, it appeared that the persons involved had no reason to complain regarding the concerned proceeding and in fact, they were fully satisfied with such enquiry and the proceeding and also-agreed to submit their defence note within the seven days from 28th June, 1975 and accordingly submitted their defence note in due time. On the basis of the enquiry which was to the following effect :- "We are glad to declare that the D. A. Enquiry has been conducted in a manner satisfactory to us and we do not have any reason to gurdge regarding to its proceedings. The defence note will be submitted within seven days." 12. On the basis of the enquiry which was to the following effect :- "We are glad to declare that the D. A. Enquiry has been conducted in a manner satisfactory to us and we do not have any reason to gurdge regarding to its proceedings. The defence note will be submitted within seven days." 12. The deponent has further denied the statement that the guilt of the petitioner was prejudged by the disciplinary authority and he has reiterated that the petitioner having been found responsible for the derailment of the train in question by the fact-finding enquiry as mentioned above, the charge-sheet was duly issued and in the proceedings relevant to the said charge-sheet, the petitioner was also found to be guilty. Such findings have also been claimed to be due, legal and proper apart from being inappropriate after following the principles of natural justice. It has further been stated by the deponant that Shri A. M. Saha was the Assistant Station Master on duty at Belagarh Station on the material date and his statement was very important inasmuch as he was entrusted with train passing duly and he knew the real fact of the accident. The allegations of the petitioner that he was not appraised of the evidence of the said Shri Saha has been denied and he has been stated that the Enquiry Officer had correctly relied on the evidence of Shri Saha for arriving at the conclusion and such reliance was lawful and valid. It has been stated further that the witnesses named in the charge-sheet through whom the articles of charge-sheet framed against the petitioner was proposed to be sustained were examined during the course of the proceedings and the deponent has denied any allegations which are contrary thereto. He has denied the allegations that the report of the fact-finding enquiry was accepted in toto by the Enquiry Officer and has stated that the departmental enquiry was quite independent of the fact-finding enquiry and was conducted strictly according to the Rules. In support of such submissions the deponent has relied on the declaration as given by the petitioner, the particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. In support of such submissions the deponent has relied on the declaration as given by the petitioner, the particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. It has been averred by the deponent that the Enquiry Officer, after careful consideration of all the evidence as recorded during the enquiry and the records as produced, came to the conclusion duly that the charges against the petitioner were established and accordingly submitted his report to the effect that the petitioner was guilty. He has reiterated that the disciplinary authority, after careful consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer and so also the relevant records relating to the enquiry, agreed with the same and came to the conclusion duly that the petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in the services and as such issued the show came notice dated 19th July, 1975 as impeached, proposing to impose the petitioner, the penalty of removal from service. 13. The deponent has accepted the position that Shri Ved Prokash, Secretary of the concerned authority who is respondent No.2, was one of the five members of the Fact-Finding Enquiry Committee but has stated that the said disciplinary authority being a Senior Scale Branch Officer of the Loco Department under whom the petitioner was working at the relevant time was only competent to impose the proposed penalty of removal from the service and issued in particular, that Shri Ved Prokash was not competent to issue the memorandum, dated 29th July, 1975, on the ground that he was one of the members of the Fact-Finding Enquiry Committee. It has been contended by the deponent that there was no bar of an official who has earlier conducted a Fact Finding Enquiry to be a disciplinary authority provided he is 0therwise competent to become a disciplinary authority in accordance with the Rules. It has been stated by the deponent that Shri Ved prokash has neither conducted the departmental enquiry nor has given evidence at the said enquiry and has stated further that under Rules, every accident has to be enquired by the officer competent to enquire for ascertaining or determining the laxity in working or negligence of supervision to which the accident may be attributed and in fact, such enquiry would be in the nature of a preliminary one which could be conducted by a body of which the disciplinary authority may be a member. As such, it has been stated that disciplinary authority, inspite of being one of the members of the Fact-Finding Enquiry, was competent to act as a disciplinary authority of the petitioner and there is no bar in conducting departmental enquiry by a officer lower in status than that of the officer who conducted the Fact Finding Enquiry. The deponent has stated further that the Memo dated 29th July, 1975, as impeached was neither violative of the principles of natural justice nor was contrary to the Circular dated 11th July, 1969 as alleged. He has stated that charges against the petitioner as framed, having been established at the departmental proceedings, the impugned second show cause notice dated 29th July, 1975, was issued duly and properly apart from being with authority and jurisdiction. The allegations about the non-application of mind and violation of principles of natural justice by the Enquiry Officer, in coming to his conclusion have been denied, so also the allegations that there was no violation of the said instruction by the petitioner. 14. By his affidavit-in-reply dated 6th June, 1979, the petitioner has denied the material allegations as contained in the affidavit-in-opposition and particularly reiterated the stands as taken by him in his petition of motion. 15. The petitioner, in his reply, has stated that the fact-finding enquiry was conducted in violation of the Note given to Chapter IX of the Accident Manual, as a result whereof, such enquiry was rendered invalid and there was thus no basis for holding that the enquiry in question, was conducted, continued and completed in compliance with the Rules. It has also been stated that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry strictly in accordance with the Rules as laid down, apart from the fact that the enquiry, as held, was illegal and based on no evidence. The petitioner has further denied that he was given reasonable opportunities to defend his case and has also denied the fact that he was satisfied with the enquiry proceedings. It was his categorical case that he was not responsible for derailment of the concerned train and principles of natural justice were violated in the concerned departmental enquiry. The petitioner has stated that the findings as arrived at, were not in conformity with the Rules and the evidence as was available, was not appropriately considered. 16. On the above facts and pleadings, Mr. The petitioner has stated that the findings as arrived at, were not in conformity with the Rules and the evidence as was available, was not appropriately considered. 16. On the above facts and pleadings, Mr. Majumdar, appearing in support of the Rule, claimed that there were violation and breach of principles of natural justice, as the disciplinary authority, which initiated the proceeding, viz. the said Shri Ved Prokash, who had signed the impugned order in Annexure 'F' was a member of the Fact Finding Committee and the Enquiry Officer was subordinate to him. It was claimed that in view of the above, possibility of interest and effect on the determinations, cannot be overruled, rather the tilt of the balance was more towards accepting the contentions as put forward by the petitioner and as such also, the proceedings as held, initiated and sought to be conducted, cannot be said to be impartial and fair. It was further claimed that even if the contentions of the respondents, viz. that the said Shri Ved Prakash had not considered the records, are accepted, the possibilities as mentioned above, cannot be wiped out. In support of the contentions as aforesaid, reference was made to the determinations in the case of (1) S. Partha Sarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2701 . In that case, it has been observed that the continuance of inquiry by biased officer, even if he ceases to officiate as officer appointed to inquire, was bad in law. The charge-sheet in this case was issued on or about 22nd April, 1975 under Rule 9 of the said Rules, after the order of suspension dated 27th March, 1975 and on the basis of the enquiry report of the Fact Finding Body, as in Annexure 'D' to the petition and thereafter, Shri Ved Prokash, Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P), Howrah, respondent No.2, who was admittedly a member of the said Fact Finding Body, issued the second show cause notice dated 28th and 29th July, 1975, as in Annexure 'F', asking the petitioner to show cause why the penalty of removal from service, should not be imposed on the petitioner. Such Fact Finding Enquiry Body was admittedly a high powered Committee, intended to set up, for the purpose of preliminary investigation of facts and to come to a conclusion at that stage. Mr. Such Fact Finding Enquiry Body was admittedly a high powered Committee, intended to set up, for the purpose of preliminary investigation of facts and to come to a conclusion at that stage. Mr. Majumdar, further claimed that the said Shri Ved Prokash being a party to the proceeding in view of the facts as mentioned above, which proceedings, was the basis of the charges, also acted illegally and with material irregularity and in violation of all norms of justice and fair play, not only in taking part in the proceedings subsequent to his report, but also in issuing the second show cause notice. In support of such contentions, reference was made to the determinations in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., AIR 1959 SC 308 , where, on fact, it has been observed amongst others, that the authority empowered to decide and dispute between the opposing parties must be one without bias, and the proceeding and the hearing given, in violation of that principle, are bad. 17. The guiding principles for holding the Enquiry in a case like this are mentioned under Chapter IX of the Accident Manual, the particulars thereof, have been quoted hereinbefore. The report in this case was dated 21st July, 1976, which Mr. Majumdar claimed to be violative, not only of the guidelines as indicated above, but also claimed to be violative of the concerned GRs. apart from being in violation of Rule 9(19) of the said Rules and contrary to or inconsistent with the Railway Board's Serial Circular No. 7499 dated 25th June, 1970, the particular whereof are quoted hereunder:- Sl. No. 7499, Circular No. E-308/0, Vol. VI dated 25th June, 1970. Authority competent to conduct departmental enquiry under the Discipline & Appeal Rules. "In accordance with the instructions contained in Board's letter No. E (D & A) 62-RG-6-19 dated 10th April, 1962 except in cases arising out of fact-finding enquiries like accident enquiries, consequent to audit reports and reports from S. P. E. Departmental Enquiries for disciplinary action are not to be entrusted to an officer lower in status than that of the officer who conducted the fact-finding enquiry. The Board have considered the matter further and decided that disciplinary cases arising out of enquiries made by Vigilance Organisation may also be excluded from the scope of the instructions." It was specifically claimed that the Enquiry Officer, being below the rank of the officers, who conducted the Fact Finding Enquiry, could not in any event or view, be appointed to conduct the disciplinary enquiry, as in view of the Circular as quoted above, the Enquiry Officer in a 'Departmental Enquiry, must be above or of the same rank of the officers, who conducted the Fact Finding Enquiry. In view of the above, Mr. Majumdar further claimed and contended that the enquiry as held or conducted or the proceedings relating to the same, must be held to be void, irregular, improper and unauthorised, apart from being without jurisdiction. In this connection, he referred to the Disciplinary Enquiry Proceedings as in Annexure "E" to the petition and the report on the same, which was given by the Assistant Mechanical Engineer (P), Howrah who was lower in rank than the authorities or the officers comprising the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee. 18. While on the above branch of his submissions and his submissions that disciplinary proceedings against a Government Servant, would be quasi-judicial in nature and what should be the manner and the terms of the order, Mr. Majumdar referred firstly, to the determinations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the case of (3) Shri H. Khanna, etc. v. The Union of India & Ors., 1971(1) SLR 618. In that case, it has been observed that in a disciplinary proceeding against a Government Servant, whether original or appellate or quasi-judicial in nature, not only that the principles of natural justice will have to be followed but the final order has to contain the reasons, which have to be communicated to the delinquent officer, in order to enable him to effectively challenge those reasons in appeal or in other statutory proceedings available to him. He, secondly, referred to the findings and observations of the Gujarat High Court, in the case of (4) Chandra Shankar Chuni Lal Vyas v. State of Gujarat, 1977(2) SLR 270, wherein, following the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment as earlier referred to, amongst others, it has in fact been held that an order of dismissal, must be a speaking one and should contain the due and detailed reasons. That apart, it has been observed that the Court would not look into any document which is not disclosed to the other side. Such observations were made, as some notes, which were not disclosed earlier, were sought to be relied upon. 19. In view of the above and when admittedly, the charge-sheet in this case as in Annexure "B", was signed and issued by Shri Ved Prokash, whose particulars have been mentioned hereinbefore and he was a member of the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee and he also issued the enquiry notice, Mr. Majumdar submitted that there was a procedural lapse or at least a chance for the same, so the entire proceedings, according to him, was vitiated. Mr. Majumdar specifically contended, when the said Shri Ved Prakash, a senior and influential official, had issued the charge-sheet, there would have been the possibility or the possibility of such thinking in the mind of the delinquent officer, that the findings of the Fact Finding Enquiry. Committee, were not independent and perhaps, they were influenced by the said Shri Ved Prokash. Such being the position, Mr. Majumdar also contended that the possibility of some bias in the procedure or the initiation of the proceedings, cannot be ruled out. He contended that if some bias was there, then the proceedings as initiated and conducted, should not be allowed to be continued and that apart, the existence of procedural irregularity as mentioned above, has also established procedural lapse and bias in the same, which should be enough and sufficient to answer this Rule in favour of the petitioner and to arrive at a finding of procedural ultra vires, as such, even though the petitioner has come to this Court earlier than reaching the finality of the proceedings, this Court should interfere. It should be noted that this Rule was obtained against the second show cause notice. Mr. It should be noted that this Rule was obtained against the second show cause notice. Mr. Majumdar, categorically claimed and submitted that consideration of the report as mentioned above would not certainly be taken or considered as consideration of the records and that fact alone, leaving aside other infirmities, would be enough and sufficient to hold a case of procedural ultra vires. 20. In support of his contentions against Shri Ved Prakash or the actions as taken by him or the way he participated in the proceeding, which, apart from the submissions as aforesaid, was also claimed to be in violation of principles of natural justice, Mr. Majumdar made a further reference to the determinations in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. (supra). That was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the Rules framed thereunder. Under section 68D(2) of that Act, hearing was required to be given by the State Government. But such hearing in the case, was given by the Secretary in charge of Transport Department and the final decision was made by the Minister-in-Charge. On such facts, a question arose as to whether there was violation of principles of natural justice. Apart from the holdings as mentioned hereinbefore it has also been observed that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned agreement to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. Therefore, the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure. The relevant findings and observations in the case of S. Partha Sarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), to which Mr. Majumdar also made further references while on the above aspect under consideration, have already been mentioned hereinbefore. Therefore, the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure. The relevant findings and observations in the case of S. Partha Sarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), to which Mr. Majumdar also made further references while on the above aspect under consideration, have already been mentioned hereinbefore. In the case of (5) Dayanand v. The Union of India & On, 1977 CHN 589, to which Mr. Majumdar relied, the facts were, that the petitioner, a permanent employee of the South Eastern Railway, was employed at the material time as Chargeman, Grade "B" at Kharagpur Railway Workshop. He was charge• sheeted on May 20, 1969, by respondent No.2 and he filed his reply denying all allegations made therein. Thereafter, the matter was enquired into and the Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of a charge, it was alleged, for which he was not specifically charged. On September 13, 1971, a second show-cause notice was issued directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be reverted to a lower stage in the grade of Chargeman "B" to which the petitioner replied. In the present Rule, the petitioner has challenged the charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice as illegal, mala fide, arbitrary and not authorised as the disciplinary authority was not the appointing authority and further, there was total non-application of mind and of such facts, it was observed that (1) the question to be decided first is whether the present application against the charge-sheet and the second show-cause notice when no finality has yet been reached is maintainable. Ordinarily such an application is not maintainable. An application against the issue of a charge-sheet may be maintainable if the charges are found to be groundless or void ab initio or when it has been issued without jurisdiction or in capricious or mala fide use of power or on baseless grounds and there has been total non-application of mind. When there is some basis for the charge-sheet, the same should not be interfered within this jurisdiction until and unless a finality is reached or all available remedies or reliefs under the concerned statute is exhausted. High Court will not be justified in interfering with all facts because it is not that all wrongs which can be cured or interfered within this jurisdiction. High Court will not be justified in interfering with all facts because it is not that all wrongs which can be cured or interfered within this jurisdiction. The High Court may be of course interfered if the findings are perverse, apart from holding that (2) the rule of finality, as in the case of a charge-sheet applies with all force on the question of interference by the High Court against the second show-cause notice, as no finality of the proceeding is reached. Such determination was made by me and Mr. Majumdar submitted that the determinations as made therein or as mentioned above, in fact, would not be against the petitioner in this case, but they would support his contentions as referred to hereinbefore. 21. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, appearing for the answering respondents, claimed that particulars of bias or the person, who is acting with a based mind or way, should be available specifically from the pleadings and according to him, pleadings in this case, lacked in such particulars. According to him, at least, it has not been established that the petitioner was complaining, whose bias was there against him. In fact, Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out that there has been no allegation of bias so far as the Enquiry Officer was concerned or there has been no due and cogent reasons shown or established about any harshness of the C.Rs. It was also pointed out by him that the provisions of the Accident Manual. were not only due and proper, but they were reasonable and bona fide too. In short, Mr. Roy Chowdhury claimed and contended, not only bias in the official, now named, has been proved and established in this case, but the petitioner has not also been able to establish any harshness or unreasonableness in the procedure and he has failed in his attempt to establish further, that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the enquiry and the findings arrived at therein or on that basis, were due, bona fide and proper and such findings were also arrived at, after due opportunities to the petitioner to represent and establish his case. 22. It was claimed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the cases as cited on behalf of the petitioner were not applicable in the facts of this case, rather they were distinguishable. 22. It was claimed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the cases as cited on behalf of the petitioner were not applicable in the facts of this case, rather they were distinguishable. While on his submissions on bias as recorded hereinbefore Mr. Roy Chowdhury referred to the determinations in the case of (6) A. K. Karipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 150 . In that case, it has been observed that with the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, Courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power, and the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years, apart from holding that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. In that case, the selection was made by a Board, one of the members of which, was a candidate. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. In that case, the selection was made by a Board, one of the members of which, was a candidate. Though he had not taken part in the deliberations of the Board at the time of his own selection, but had taken part at the time of selection of others, including the rival candidates, as such the selection as made was observed to be vitiated as there was conflict between interest and duty of such members, causing a reasonable apprehension or likelihood of bias. 23. While on his replies to the submissions on the question of bias, Mr. Roy Chowdhury referred to the determinations in the case of (7) Manak Lal, Advocate v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 425 , for the tests of bias or the requirments for establishing the same. In that case, it has been observed that it is well settled that every member of a Tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and in dealing with cases of bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however, small it may in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as Judge. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however, small it may in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as Judge. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead, a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case, apart from holding that the principle, "nemo debet esse judex in causa propria sua", precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein. This principle applies not only to justices but to all tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties. In that case, it has been observed that if it is true that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public, it is equally true that when a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and is given the privilege of being tried by a Tribunal of the Bar Council, the enquiry before the Tribunal must leave no room for a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the lawyer that the Tribunal may have been even indirectly influenced by any bias in the mind of any of the members of the Tribunal. Apart from the above, Mr. Roy Chowdhury also referred to the observations in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Drs. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. (supra) claiming that the findings and observations therein and as quoted and mentioned hereinbefore, do really support the respondents and not the petitioner. In fact, Mr. Roy Chowdhury claimed that the tests regarding the likelihood of bias, were neither established nor proved to the hilt or beyond any reasonable doubt in this case and as such, no determinations contrary to the contentions of the respondents or against them, can or should be made. Mr. Roy Chowdury referred to the facts in the case of S. Partha Sarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), which were, that the Deputy Director was inimical towards the appellant and harassed him in various ways. Mr. Roy Chowdury referred to the facts in the case of S. Partha Sarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), which were, that the Deputy Director was inimical towards the appellant and harassed him in various ways. Manvi was appointed as Director-in-charge, on August 1, 1957. As Director-in-charge, Manvi caused the appellant to be suspended from service and thereafter he framed certain charges against the appellant on May 13, 1959 and they were communicated to the appellant. The appellant protested saying that Manvi should not conduct the enquiry on the basis of the charges for the reason that Manvi had bias against him and that he was not duly authorised to conduct the enquiry. In spite of the protest Manvi conducted the enquiry. The appellant wanted to inspect several files and documents in the enquiry for the purpose of his defence, but his requests in that behalf were not granted. The appellant, therefore, refused to participate in the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted and the appellant was found guilty of some of the charges. On the basis of the enquiry report, the Director issued a show cause notice to the appellant why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted a written explanation stating that the enquiry was vitiated on account of the bias of the Enquiry Officer, that he was not given reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry as he was not supplied with copies of the relevant documents nor given an opportunity to inspect the concerned files and that the Enquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry. The Director, however, found the appellant guilty and passed an order removing him from service with effect from April 11, 1960. Thereafter, the Government, on, the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, modified the order of removal and ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant from service. On such facts it was observed that the test of likelihood of bias which has been applied in a number of cases is based on the "reasonable apprehension" of a reasonable man fully cognizant of the facts. Such observations in the given facts, Mr. Roy Chowdhury claimed would not be applicable in the facts of this case. 24. Replying to the observations in the case of Manak Lal, Advocate v: Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi & Ors. (supra), Mr. Such observations in the given facts, Mr. Roy Chowdhury claimed would not be applicable in the facts of this case. 24. Replying to the observations in the case of Manak Lal, Advocate v: Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi & Ors. (supra), Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended and claimed further that the determinations as made therein would not apply in this case, as objections as taken now or as mentioned hereinbefore, were not taken at the first instance. Such procedural aspect, viz. objections as mentioned or referred to hereinbefore, n0t having been taken at the initial stage, Mr. Roy Chowdhury specially claimed that it was implied waiver of such objections or the right to raise them, if not specific waiver, and as such, the petitioner would not now be entitled to contend in the manner, as has been sought to be done. Apart from contending that Rules 13 and 14 of the said Rules, which are as under:- 13. Common Proceedings.-(1) Where two or more Railway servants are concerned in any case, the President or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Railway servants, may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceedings. (2) Any such order shall specify- (i) the authority which may function as the disciplinary authority for the purpose of such common proceeding; (ii) the penalties specified in Rule 6 which such disciplinary authority shall be competent to impose; provided that such authority shall not impose the penalties specified in clauses (vii) to (ix) of that rule if that authority is subordinate to the Appointing Authority; and (iii) whether the procedure laid down in Rule 9 and Rule 10 or Rule 11 shall be followed in the proceeding. 14. Special procedure in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13. (i) where any penalty is imposed on a Railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) where the President is satisfied that in interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules. The disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit : Provided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule. 25. Mr. Roy Chowdhury claimed further that the prohibition against a person being a Judge in his own cause, does not imply that an authority discharging official functions would not start proceedings in a matter in which he is authorised by the statute and such prohibition according to him should only mean that the person should not have any personal interest in the cause he is called upon to adjudicate. The above submissions were made on a specific reference to the determinations in the case of (8) Shanti Prokash & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1971 P & H. 447. On the basis of such observations and holdings, Mr. Roy Chowdhury contended that since the said Shri Ved Prokash had no personal interest in this case and such interest was neither established nor proved by any legal evidence, the submissions as made by Mr. Majumdar were not only available, but they were baseless too. 26. In reply, Mr. Majumdar submitted that since there was basic incompetence of Shri Ved Prokash, to act or take action in the matter and in the manner as he did, being the member of the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee, the submissions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury, would be of no help and assistance in this case. The evidence in this case was closed on 28th June, 1975 and the representation was filed by the petitioner on 5th July, 1975 and since the same was not duly and appropriately considered or according to Mr. Majumdar, was not considered at all, the entire proceedings were also claimed to be vitiated. To substantiate such submissions he referred to the determinations in the case of (9) E. Ventesta Rao v. Divisional Superintendent, South Eastern Railway, Weltair & Anr., 1979 Lab I. C. (Notes)3. In that case, subsequent to the submission of the report by the Enquiry Officer and before the disciplinary authority imposes penalty, the submission of the representation by the delinquent officer places the corresponding obligation on the disciplinary authority to consider such representation. In that case, subsequent to the submission of the report by the Enquiry Officer and before the disciplinary authority imposes penalty, the submission of the representation by the delinquent officer places the corresponding obligation on the disciplinary authority to consider such representation. The expression "consider", therefore, must be taken to be a genuine consideration, which implies the application of mind to the various facts and circumstances mentioned in the representation and on the petitioner Ticket Collector was found guilty of misconduct inasmuch as he was not able to account for certain amount said to be in his possession on the crucial date and he was reported, as a measure of penalty. He made a representation that the Enquiry Officer was biased and mutually acted both as Prosecutor as well as Judge. The report submitted by the Vigilance Inspector was said to be joint report but the Station Master denied that it was so. The authorities concerned could not explain the circumstances of the petitioner's collecting as a matter of fact more number of tickets on the crucial date than on the previous day as well as on the subsequent day and on such fact, it has been held that it was necessary on the part of the disciplinary authority to apply his mind to the contents of the representation and assign reasons in support of his conclusion in token of his having applied his mind to the facts of the case, and for such failure to comply with the mandatory requirements, the order of reversion was quashed. 27. In the case of Dayanad v. The Union of India & Ors. (supra), following several other determinations of this Court and also considering the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of (10) Charan Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 1821 , apart from the rule of finality, it has been observed that ordinarily, the High Court should not interfere at the second show-cause stage, as in this case, because by the issue of the concerned second show-cause notice, no finality is reached and such rule would apply specially when no Jurisdictional fact would be involved. The learned Advocates appearing for the p3rties wanted to rely on the observations in Dayanand's case (supra), in support of their respective submissions on the maintainability of the proceedings at this stage. The learned Advocates appearing for the p3rties wanted to rely on the observations in Dayanand's case (supra), in support of their respective submissions on the maintainability of the proceedings at this stage. In Charan Singh's case (supra), it has been observed that where disciplinary proceeding against the employee was dropped by an Enquiry Officer, who was not competent to impose the punishment, was revived by the Competent Officer, by issuing a fresh show-cause notice against dismissal, the writ petition, challenging the revival of proceeding, was premature as no punitive action was taken and there was no present grievance, which could be ventilated in Court. In fact, Mr. Roy Chowdhury's submissions on the maintainability of this proceedings were also in the above line. 28. In the case of (11) Director, Enforcement Directorate, Government of India & Ors v. Saroj Kumar Bhotika & Anr., 82 CWN 61, it has been observed that an application under Article 226 would not be maintainable, if redress can be had through the law, under which the action challenged, is proposed to be taken. Thus on the basis of Bhotika's case and so also on the basis of determinations on the point. I think that even though it is not that all wrongs which can be corrected by writs, but writs can be issued and applications for them, can be entertained in some exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, even when neither any finality in the proceedings, has been reached nor the other remedies available in the statutes are availed of or resorted to. In fact, in Bhotika's case (supra), apart from holding as above, it has been observed that when the challenge is such, as cannot be determined by the authority appointed to take action, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court remains unimpaired. It has also been observed that in such case, the Court has to see whether the ground on which the challenge is based, it can be entertained and determined by the authority created by the statute. In fact, such determinations in Bhotika's case (supra), were followed by me in the determinations dated 23rd June, 1978 in the case of (12) Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Civil Rule No. 2152 (W) of 1974). But that determinations have not been approved in the case of (13) Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal & Ors, 1979(2) CLJ 127 . (Civil Rule No. 2152 (W) of 1974). But that determinations have not been approved in the case of (13) Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal & Ors, 1979(2) CLJ 127 . The petitioner in that case was employed as Chief Inspector, Food and Supplies. He was served with a charge-sheet alleging possession of amount disproportionate to his income. Petitioner filed written statement denying the charge. Enquiry was held but no report was published. Another charge-sheet containing identical charges was served on him. The first charge-sheet was withdrawn. Petitioner submitted his explanation to the second charge-sheet, denying all charges. Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charges had been proved. Disciplinary authority issued a second show-cause notice to the petitioner. Petitioner challenged the second show-cause notice by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule but the Rule was discharged by the trial court on the ground that the writ petition at the second show-cause stage was not maintainable and in the appeal, he contended that the charge-sheet was issued with a closed mind, and it has been held that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, challenging the second show-cause notice on the grounds that the charge-sheet has been issued with a closed mind and that the principles of natural justice have been violated, is maintainable even though no final order has been passed and no punitive action has been taken. When two Bench determinations, which, if not dissimilar, but are not very nearly similar to each other, I think, I shall not be unjustified to follow the one, which in my view appear to be more appropriate to the facts of the given case and as such, I select to follow the determinations in the case of Director, Enforcement Directorate etc. v. Saroj Kumar Bhotika (supra). Thus, in my view, ordinarily no interference can or should be made by the Court in this jurisdiction against a second show cause notice or initiation of proceedings, unless a finality in the proceedings is reached. v. Saroj Kumar Bhotika (supra). Thus, in my view, ordinarily no interference can or should be made by the Court in this jurisdiction against a second show cause notice or initiation of proceedings, unless a finality in the proceedings is reached. But, there may be exceptional circumstances like total lack of jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings, as a consequence whereof, actions consequent to the initiation were taken or if such initiation was on total non-application of mind or the proceedings as initiated was perverse or based on perversity or such findings as arrived at, at the enquiry. -There cannot also be any doubt that if the initiation of the proceedings by the issue of the charge-sheet, was initially invalid, for the reasons or the particulars as mentioned hereinbefore or such initiation was unauthorised or against principles of natural justice and even if the delinquent had any reason to believe the same to be so in the special circumstances of a given case or there was any bias of the existance or scope for thinking the proceedings to be a biased one, all proceedings or actions taken subsequent to such initiation, would be void and irregular, apart from being in capricious use of power and jurisdiction and as such, in such or appropriate cases having special features, the delinquent officer may approach this Court, after the initiation and before the final order or finality. 29. In this case Shri Ved Prokash was admittedly a member of the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee, who gave their report in Annexure "D" on 11th April, 1975. He also issued the charge-sheet dated 22nd April, 1975 as in Annexure "B" and thereafter, the second show-cause notice dated 28th and 29th July, 1975 as in Annexure "F". Even though there has been no legal evidence to establish that the said Shri Ved Prokash had any personal interest in the matter or that he was directly interested in having, the petitioner removed from his services, it cannot be denied that he directly participated in the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee or in the deliberations of the same. Even though there has been no legal evidence to establish that the said Shri Ved Prokash had any personal interest in the matter or that he was directly interested in having, the petitioner removed from his services, it cannot be denied that he directly participated in the Fact Finding Enquiry Committee or in the deliberations of the same. Thus, even though no exceptions were taken at the initial stage, the petitioner cannot be shut out in contending or saying that the said Shri Ved Prokash had a biased or prejudiced mind against him, in the matter of having the charge-sheet issued or the proceeding as initiated through the same continued, conducted and concluded for his active participation in the Committee as mentioned above and it may also be, that he was interested in having the guilt of the petitioner established, for the purpose of establishing the bona fides of the said Fact Finding Enquiry Committee and as such, there was a case of procedural bias or procedural ultra vires in this matter, and that too because of the active participation of the said Shri Ved Prokash, the mind of the petitioner was also clouded against the bona fides of the deliberations of the said Committee or the subsequent findings as arrived at through the proceedings, so initiated, or even he had such doubt in his mind. If a person is required to be proceeded with or any finding is arrived at in such a proceeding, there must be strict following of the principles of natural justice or at least strict compliance with or the following of the same and that too, in such a way, that the person charged, must also have the feeling that justice has been done to his case, which includes amongst others, decision in accordance with law, after due and necessary opportunities to him, apart from following the principles of natural justice, in addition to the fact that a person cannot act as a Judge and Prosecutor for the same cause. In this case, when admittedly Shri Ved Prokash had acted and judged the guilt of the petitioner or at least prima facie came to the conclusion as a member of the concerned Committee that he was guilty of the offences charged, so he should not have issued the chargesheet and the continuance of the further proceedings or the continuation of the same, on the basis of such charge-sheet as issued by him, was improper and so also without jurisdiction and bad and as such, this case would, in my view, come within the exceptional circumstances as mentioned above and the application for a writ, would be maintainable. The Railway authorities had no doubt the power, authority, competence and jurisdiction to form and also to have the opinion of such Fact Finding Enquiry Committee as in this case. But in constituting such Committee they should not have kept as a member of the same, who because of his office and position was required to take part or in the initiation, continuance and conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. 30. For the views as expressed above, the Rule should succeed and the points other than those as discussed above are not required to be considered or gone into on merits at this stage. The Rule is thus made absolute on the grounds as indicated above. The proceedings are set aside from the charge-sheet stage. There will be no order for costs. I have it on record that for such views as expressed, points other than those as decided above are kept open and the respondents would, if they so want or intend or are advised, be entitled to proceed in the matter from the stage of the issue of the charge-sheet and to determine the proceedings, if so initiated, in accordance with law.