JUDGMENT: Venugopal, J.- By letter dated 1st July, 1977, the appellant was appointed as Assistant Professor of Mathamatics in Ayya Nadar Janaki Ammal College, Sivakasi (hereinafter to be referred to as the College) the first respondent herein. By letter dated 19th June, 1978, the appellant was continued on probation in the same post for a period of two years from 5th July, 1978. On 2nd January, 1979 the appellant entered into a service agreement with the College. The agreement provided that, the appellant was employed as Assistant Professor, with effect from 5th July, 1978 and he shall be on probation for a period of not less than one year from the date of taking charge of his appointment, and if no order extending the period of probation was passed in writing within six months after the period of probation he shall be deemed to have completed his probation. After issuing some memos, and calling for explanation from the appellant, the College discharged the appellant from service with effect from 4th July, 1980. The appellant made a representation to the Madurai Kamaraj University, (hereinafter to be referred to as the University) the second respondent herein. The University, holding that the action of the College in discharging the appellant without the prior approval of the competent Authority is in violation of section 19 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred to as Act XXI of 1976) and ordered the reinstatement of the appellant in service with immediate effect. Against this order passed by the University, the College filed a writ petition, alleging that the post held by the appellant was only temporary, and the order of termination passed against the appellant is not punitive termination but merely termination of the services of a probationer for unsatisfactory work, and the provision of section 19 (1) of the Act was not attracted. The writ petition was resisted on the ground that the appellant was not a probationer at the time of the termination of his services and even in the case of probationers, prior approval of the competent authority for terminating their services was required under section 19 (1) of Act XIX of 1976, and as the order passed by the College was illegal and contrary to law, the University was justified in ordering reinstatement of the appellant. The learned judge of this Court held that section 19 will apply only to termination by way of disciplinary proceedings and so far as the termination of a probationer does not involve any disciplinary proceedings, there is no scope for applying section 19 (1) of Act XIX of 1976 and the order of reinstatement passed by the University was without jurisdiction and the order was quashed. Against this order of the learned Judge, the present writ appeal is filed. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant advanced the following contentions: 1. Under the rules framed under Act XIX of 1976, a private teacher appointed for a term exceeding three months should be taken on a permanent basis, and the appellant is, therefore, entitled to count his service from his first assumption of charge on 4th July, 1977 and he would be deemed to have completed his probation at the expiry of two years from that date viz., on 4th July, 1979, and since no order extending the period of probation was passed within six months after the expiry of the said probation, the appellant must be deemed to have completed his probation on 4th July, 1979. 2. As the initial appointment of the appellant on 4th January, 1977, was not temporary, the probation commenced from 4th January, 1977 and the order continuing the appellant on probation for two years from 5th July, 1978 is without jurisdiction, and contrary to rules, and by clause (2) of the agreement, probation was completed after the expiry of six months after the one year initial period of probation which commenced on 4th July, 1977. The order placing the appellant on probation for a period of two years from 5th July, 1978 was superseded by agreement, dated 2nd January, 1979 when he was placed on probation for one year from the date of taking charge, and if 5th July, 1978 is considered as the date of taking charge, he would have completed his probation on 5th July, 1979 as provided under the second paragraph of clause (2) of the agreement. 3. Section 19(1) of the Act XIX of 1976 covers all cases of termination, including the case of termination, of a probationer. 3. Section 19(1) of the Act XIX of 1976 covers all cases of termination, including the case of termination, of a probationer. Even granting for argument's sake that section 19 (1) covers only punitive termination of service of a teacher, in the instant case the order passed is not termination simpliciter, but is a punitive action preceded by issue of memos, calling for explanation, and this is nothing but a punitive action cleverly camouflaged as an order of termination of a probationer, and such an order without the prior permission of the competent authority, violates the mandatory provision of section 19 (1), and the order is invalid and inoperative. 4. When the order passed is invalid and inoperativey, it has no existence in the eye of law, and the order of reinstatement passed by the University is perfectly legal and justified. 5. When an alternative remedy is provided under section 37 of the Act, without exhausting that remedy, it is not open to the College to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for relief. 3. The following contentions were raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent: 1. The first appointment of the appellant with effect from 4th July, 1977 was only a temporary appointment on a provisional basis as the affiliation for starting postgraduate courses in the College was granted to the College only on a temporary provisional basis. 2. The appellant was placed on probation for a period of two years with effect from 5th July, 1978 and before the expiry of that period, the appellant's services were terminated for his unsatisfactory work, and termination of service of a probationer for unsatisfactory work does not fall within the ambit of section 12 (1) of the Act. 3. Prior permission of the competent authority is required only in case of punitive termination and not in case of termination of services of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. 4. As the order passed by the University reinstating the appellant is for non-compliance of section 19 (1) , and as section 19 (1) has no application to this case, the order passed by the University is clearly illegal and has been rightly quashed by this Court. 4. On these rival submissions, the two main questions to be considered are… 1. Whether the appellant was a probationer at the time of termination of his services; and 2. 4. On these rival submissions, the two main questions to be considered are… 1. Whether the appellant was a probationer at the time of termination of his services; and 2. Whether section 19 (1) is attracted where a probationer is discharged from service before confirmation. 5. Taking up the first question section 17 of Act XIX of 1976 provides: — “The Government may make rules in consultation with the University regulating the number and conditions of service (including promotion, pay, allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respects disciplinary matters but excluding qualifications) of the teachers and other persons employed in any private college.” Section 24 provides: “(1) This Chapter or any rule providing for all or any of the matters specified in this Chapter or any order made in relation to any such matter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any… (i) other law for the time being in force; or (ii) award, agreement or contract of service, whether such award, agreement or contract of service was made before or after the date of commencement of this Act; or (iii) judgment, decree or order of Court, Tribunal or other authority: Provided that where, under any such award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise, any teacher or other person employed in any private college is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he will be entitled under this Chapter, such teacher or other person shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Chapter. (2) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be construed as precluding any such teacher or other person from entering into an agreement for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Chapter. (2) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be construed as precluding any such teacher or other person from entering into an agreement for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Chapter. (3) The provision of sub- section (2) of section 18 and of sections 19 to22 both (inclusive) of this Chapter or any rule providing for all or any of the matters specified therein or any order made in relation to any such matter shall not apply to a minority-college.” Rule 11 (2) (i) of the Rules provides: “The Committee of every college shall enter into an agreement with the teachers in Form 7-A and with the employees other than teachers, in Form 7-C. If the appointment is for a period not exceeding three months, the agreement shall be made in Form 7-B in the case of teachers, in Form 7-D in the case of employees other than teachers.” Clause 2 of Form 7-A provides: “That the said teacher shall be on probation for a period of not less than one year from the date of taking charge of his/her appointment. The college committee may for reasons to be recorded in writing extend the period of probation to a further period not exceeding one year. If no orders extending the period of probation are passed in writing within six months after the period of probation, the said teacher shall be deemed to have completed his…her probation.” 5. The first appointment letter, dated 1st July, 1977 is to the effect that the appellant should report for duty before the Principal on 4th July, 1977 and his appointment is purely temporary for the current acadamic year 1977-78. It is contended for the appellant that since under rule 11 (2) (i) any appointment for a period not exceeding three months shall be in Form 7-B and since no such agreement in Form 7-B was executed and as the appellant was employed for a period of more than three months, he must be deemed to be a permanent teacher. It is contended for the appellant that since under rule 11 (2) (i) any appointment for a period not exceeding three months shall be in Form 7-B and since no such agreement in Form 7-B was executed and as the appellant was employed for a period of more than three months, he must be deemed to be a permanent teacher. In the absence of any statutory provision it is not open to the appellant to invoke any such deemed fiction and the appellant cannot be considered as a permanent teacher merely on the ground that Form 7-B agreement was not executed and he continued in the employment for a period exceeding three months. The appointment letter clearly mentions that the appointment of the appellant was purely on a temporary basis. The reason for the College making the temporary appointment was that the affiliation was granted to the College for running the Post-Graduate courses in Mathematics on purely temporary and provisional basis. Further, the appellant's appointment was subject to the condition that he should come out successful in the second semester of M. Phil, examination for which he appeared in May, 1977. In the appellant's representation to the University made on 9th July, 1980 he has himself admitted that he was appointed as a temporary teacher for the academic year 1977-78. The attempt to spell out that the appellant was a permanent teacher ever since the date of his first appointment on 4th July, 1977 has to be negatived. 6. In the letter, dated 19th June, 1978, it is stated that the appellant is continued on probation in the same post for a period of two years from 5th July, 1978. The attempt to spell out that the appellant was a permanent teacher ever since the date of his first appointment on 4th July, 1977 has to be negatived. 6. In the letter, dated 19th June, 1978, it is stated that the appellant is continued on probation in the same post for a period of two years from 5th July, 1978. Placing emphasis on the words “continued on probation in the same post” the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the period of probation should be computed from 4th July, 1977 when the first appointment was made, and if so computed, the probationary period expired on 4th July, 1979 and since no order extending the period of probation was passed within six months after the said period of probation, the appellant shall be deemed to have completed his probation on 4th July, 1979 in terms of clause 2 of the agreement in Form 7-A. The letter dated 19th June, 1978 makes it clear that the appellant is continued on probation in the same post for a period of two years from 5th July, 1978. In the letter written by the appellant on 21st June, 1978, he has accepted his continuance on probation for two years from 5th July, 1978 and not from 4th July, 1977. The first appointment made on 4th July, 1977 resulted in break of service from 16th June, 1978 to 4th July, 1978. When there was a break in service and the letter placing the appellant on probation specifically provides that the probation is to commence on 5th July, 1978, it is not open to the appellant to contend that the two years probation commenced from 4th July, 1977. The period of probation has to be computed only from 5th July, 1978 and the probationary period expired on 4th July, 1980. If six months period had elapsed from 4th July, 1980 and no order extending the probation is passed, the appellant in terms of clause (2) of agreement in Form 7-A must be deemed to have completed his probation and become a permanent teacher. However, before the expiry of the six months period from 4th July, 1980, the services of the appellant were terminated on 30th June, 1980. It is, therefore, obvious that on the date when the services of the appellant were terminated, he was only a probationer. 7. However, before the expiry of the six months period from 4th July, 1980, the services of the appellant were terminated on 30th June, 1980. It is, therefore, obvious that on the date when the services of the appellant were terminated, he was only a probationer. 7. The appellant entered into an agreement with the College on 2nd January, 1979 and clause (2) of the agreement provides that he shall be on probation for a period of not less than one year from the date of taking charge of his appointment and clause (3) provides that if no order extending the period of probation was passed in writing, within six months after the period of probation, the teacher shall be deemed to have completed his probation. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the expression “shall be on probation for a period of not less than one year from the date of taking charge” will only mean that the appellant shall be on probation for one academic year and a little more and so construed, the appellant's probationary period can extend only upto 5th July, 1979 and a little more (say one or two months) and since no order extending the period of probation was passed within six months from 5th July, 1979, the appellant shall be deemed to have completed his probation. A careful reading of clause (2) of the agreement shows that the minimum period of not less than one year is fixed as the period of probation for the appellant. The maximum period of probation is not specified in the agreement. If the maximum period is not specified, it should be taken as comprising any reasonable period with due regard to the fact that the minimum period of probation fixed is not less than one year and six months time is given to further extend the period of probation. Viewed against these safeguards, the two years’ period of probation fixed for the appellant in the communication, dated 19th June, 1978 can very well come within the purview of the expression “the teacher shall be on probation for a period of not less than one year”. The contention that under clause 2 of the agreement the appellant can be placed on probation for one academic year and a little more cannot, therefore be accepted. 8. The contention that under clause 2 of the agreement the appellant can be placed on probation for one academic year and a little more cannot, therefore be accepted. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the agreement provides prabation period of not less than one year and contrary to the terms of the written agreement fixing the period of probation as two years, in the letter, dated 19th June, 1978 is hit by section 92 of the Evidence Act. Even before the execution of the agreement, the appellant's period of probation was fixed as two years. The agreement merely specified the minimum limit for which a teacher can be put on probation and the minimum period is one which is not less than one year. Since the agreement provides the fixing of the probationary period as not less than one year, the probation period of two years fixed under the letter dated 19th June, 1978 is not contrary to the terms of the agreement. Even granting for argument's sake that the agreement executed by the appellant on 2nd January, 1979 supersedes the two year period of probation fixed in the letter dated 19th June, 1978, even then the appellant was only a probationer on the date when his services were terminated. The appellant executed the agreement with the college on 2nd January, 1979. The agreement provided that the period of probation should be not less than one year. Even taking that the probationary period fixed in the agreement was only one year, an order extending the period of probation can be passed within six months from 2nd January, 1980. In other words, the time-limit for passing the order extending the period of probation was upto 1st July, 1980. But in the instant case, the order of termination was passed on 30th June, 1980. Thus in any view of the matter it is evident that the appellant was only a probationer when his services came to be terminated on 30th June, 1980. 9. For all the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant was only a probationer when his services came to be terminated on 30th June, 1980. Thus in any view of the matter it is evident that the appellant was only a probationer when his services came to be terminated on 30th June, 1980. 9. For all the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant was only a probationer when his services came to be terminated on 30th June, 1980. Taking up the second question, section 19 (1) provides: “Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.” The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the words “otherwise terminated” mentioned in section 19 (1) need not be similar to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, and it would include termination of any other character or for any other reason, and hence it should include even the termination of service of a probationer. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the words “otherwise terminated” should be read in ejusdem generis with the words “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank” and it will have a meaning analogous or similar to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Section 2 (kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines the expression “lay off” and states: - “‘lay off’ (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power, or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the break-down of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched.” The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Management of Kaireetta Estate, Kotagiri v. Rajamanickam and others1, held that the expression any other reason in section 2 (kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act means any reason which is allied or analogous to reasons already specified in that section. An example of the application of the ejusdem generis rule can be found in Eton Rural District Council v. River Thames Conservators2*. An example of the application of the ejusdem generis rule can be found in Eton Rural District Council v. River Thames Conservators2*. Section 9 (1) of the English Land Drainage Act, 1930 provided “it shall be the duty of every catchment board to take steps for the commutation of all obligations imposed on persons by reason of tenure, custom, prescription or otherwise, to do any work, in connection with the main”. It was held that the words “or otherwise” had a meaning ejusdem generis with ‘tenure’, custom, prescription’, and hence the obligations referred to were those imposed on land and did not include purely contractual obligations“. In the instant case, the words “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank“1 occurring in section 19 (1) constitute a genus or class or category and is followed by the general word “otherwise terminated.”. The general expression “other wise terminated” should be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as designated by the preceding expression “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank” and there is nothing in the Act to indicate that a wider sense was intended to be conveyed by the use of the general expression “otherwise terminated-. The generality of the expression “otherwise terminated” was thus limited by the previous words “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank” and hence it should be confined to termination analogous to “dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.” Having regard to the object of the Act and the safeguards provided viz., that no teacher employed in a private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, except with the prior approval of the competent authority, the words “otherwise terminated” can take within their ambit only punitive termination or termination by way of punishment, and not termination of services of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. When the college discharges a probationer for poor performance and unsatisfactory work and refuses to confirm him, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that even in such cases, the prior approval of the competent authority should be obtained before such termination. So the words “otherwise terminated” occurring in section 19 (1) should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank” and so construed, section 19 (1) covers only punitive termination and not termination of services of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. 10. So the words “otherwise terminated” occurring in section 19 (1) should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words “dismissed, removed or reduced in rank” and so construed, section 19 (1) covers only punitive termination and not termination of services of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. 10. The next question for consideration is whether the instant case is one of punitive termination of service or merely termination of service of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the decisions reported in Agra Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. Sri Alladin and others1, Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd. and others2and Gujarat Steel Tubes Lid. etc. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others3, contended that the form of the order of termination or the language in which it is couched is not conclusive, and even if the order is worded in the language of simple termination of service, facts and circumstances of the case should be gone into to ascertain whether the order was colourable exercise of the power of the Management to terminate the services of the appellant and find out whether in fact, the order of termination was passed with a view to punish the appellant, and in the instant case, a number of memos, were issued to the appellant calling for his explanation, and the order of termination was a mere cloak for the punitive action which the college took against the appellant. The learned counsel further contended that as the order of termination was passed explicitly on the ground of unsatisfactory work and conduct, it has resulted in a stigma and the order of termination amounts to punishment, and such a punitive order of termination falls within the ambit of section 19 (1) of the Act and, prior permission of the competent authority is required before passing such an order of termination. 12. All the decisions relied on by the learned counsel are cases arising under the Industrial Disputes Act, Section 33 (2) (b) ; of the Industrial Disputes Act. makes it obligatory upon the employer to make an application to the Tribunal under the proviso, when he discharges or dismisses a workmen for misconduct. Termination simpliciter or automatic termination of service under the conditions of service or under the Standing Orders is outside the scope of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. makes it obligatory upon the employer to make an application to the Tribunal under the proviso, when he discharges or dismisses a workmen for misconduct. Termination simpliciter or automatic termination of service under the conditions of service or under the Standing Orders is outside the scope of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Tribual to find out whether a particular termination of service of a workman is in truth and substance innocuous and in exercise of a bona fide right under the contract or a dismissal of a workman for misconduct clothed as an innocuous order of termination. So, even if the order of discharge is worded in the language of simple termination, it is incumbent on the Tribunal to go behind the order of termination or the language in which it is couched and find out from the facts and circumstances of the case, whether it was a colurable exercise of the power by the management to terminate the services of an employee, for misconduct, and with a view to punish the employee. The cases relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant may not be strictly applicable to cases arising under Article 311 of the Constitution. 13. In the decision reported in. The Union of India and others v. P.S. Bhat1, the respondent was first appointed as an Announcer in the All India Radio. Later he was selected by direct appointment for the post of Producer and was appointed as such on probation. While he was on probation, he was reverted to the post of Announcer. The respondent alleged that the motive behind the order was that he had indulged in loose talk and had used abusive language against his superior officer which was tape-recorded and sent to the Station Director. The question arose whether the order terminating the services of the respondent, on probation, from the post of Producer was an order by way of punishment, with a stigma attached to it. It was held that the order of termination was not an order by way of punishment attracting the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and it was only an order of termination of services of a probationer. It was held that the order of termination was not an order by way of punishment attracting the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and it was only an order of termination of services of a probationer. It was further held that the conduct of the respondent in indulging in loose talk and in filthy and abusive language may be considered to be the motive or the inducing factor which influenced the authorities to pass the impugned order and the order cannot be said to be by way of punishment. In the decision reported in Commodore Commanding, Southern Naval Area Cochin v. V. N. Rajan2, the Supreme Court pointed out that even a temporary Government servant is entiled to protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution where termination involves such stigma or amounts to punishment, and when the decision to terminate the services was on the ground of unsuitability of the Government servant in relation to the post held by him, such termination is not by way of any punishment and is not vitiated for non-observance of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and if the services of a temporary employee or probationer are terminated by an order which does not ex facie disclose any stigma or penal consequences and is merely a termination order simpliciter, the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are not attracted. Similarly, if the services of a temporary employee or probationer are terminated in accordance with the conditions of service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or unsuitability for the job, then also the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are not attracted. 14. In the decision reported in Oil and Natural Gas Commission and others v. Dr. MD. S. Iskander Ali1, the service of a probationer appointed in a temporary post showed that his work was not satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service. Though an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him. The Appointing Authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the petitioner. The question arose whether such termination attracted Article 311 of the Constitution. Though an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him. The Appointing Authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the petitioner. The question arose whether such termination attracted Article 311 of the Constitution. It was held that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency, might be the motive, or the inducing factor which influenced the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the employer undoubtedly possessed and flowed from the contract of service, termination of service could not be termed as penalty or punishment. 15. In the instant case the order of termination passed against the appellant does not ex facie disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the appellant. It is merely a termination order simpliciter. Order of termination is not based on any misconduct or stigmatic conduct on the part of the appellant. It is no doubt true that a number of memos have been issued to the appellant and explanation called for by the Principal of the College and the order of termination was proceeded by an enquiry. But the memos issued and the explanations called for and the holding of enquiry were merely to ascertain the suitability of the appellant for continuing him in the post held by him. In passing the order of termination, the College did nothing more than exercising the power conferred under the agreement executed by the appellant to terminate the services of a teacher before completion of his probation, for unsatisfactory work. In accordance with the agreement, the appellant's services can be terminated for unsuitability for the job held and for unsatisfactory work. In the instant case as a result of the memos, issued and explanations obtained and the enquiry hold, the College came to the conclusionthat the appellant was unsuitable for the job and in exercise of the power conferred under the agreement executed by the appellant, his services were terminated and his probation was not confirmed. Such a termination of service of a probationer for unsatisfactory work, does not fall within the ambit of section 19 (1) of the Act. 16. The basis of the order of reinstatement by the University is that the termination of service of the appellant attracted section 19 (1) and since such a termination took place without the prior approval of the competent authority, the appellant should be reinstated. 16. The basis of the order of reinstatement by the University is that the termination of service of the appellant attracted section 19 (1) and since such a termination took place without the prior approval of the competent authority, the appellant should be reinstated. Since section 19 (1) is not attracted in the instant case, the very basis of the order of reinstatement passed by the University is knocked off, and the order passed by the University is void and without jurisdiction. The University has passed the order of reinstatement by misconstruing section 19 (1) and it passed on a misapplication and a misreading of section 19 (1) and hence the order passed cannot be legally sustained. When section 19 (1) is not attracted, the question whether the order of termination passed under section 19 (1) without the prior permission of the competent authority is void ab initio, invalid and inoperative as contended by the appellant, or it is merely voidable and is good till it is not aside as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, do not really survive for consideration. In this view, we refrain ourselves from going into the question as to what is the legal effect of the order of termination without obtaining the prior permission of the competent authority. The voluminous case law cited by both sides as to what is the effect of the order passed under section 19 (1) without the prior permission of the competent authority, has not been referred to or considered by us in the view we have taken, namely, that section 19 (1) is not attracted at all in this case. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that the writ petition has been filed without following the procedure prescribed under section 37 and rule 23. The University ordered reinstatement of the appellant by passing the impugned order on the basis that the appellant's order of termination falls within the ambit of section 19 (1) and the prior approval of the competent authority should be obtained. As already pointed out, the appellant's order of termination is not punitive termination, but termination of services of a probationer. Such a termination does not fall within the ambit of section 19 (1) and the University has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering reinstatement by passing the impugned order. As already pointed out, the appellant's order of termination is not punitive termination, but termination of services of a probationer. Such a termination does not fall within the ambit of section 19 (1) and the University has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering reinstatement by passing the impugned order. As the University has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order, it is liable to be rectified in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. In this view, though an alternative remedy is provided for the College under section 37, it can still invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to set aside the order passed by the University in excess of its jurisdiction. The contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant has to be, therefore, rejected. 18. In the result, the writ appeal fails and stands dismissed, in the circumstances, without costs. 19. After the judgment was pronounced, learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are satisfied that no substantial question of law of public importance fit to be decided by the Supreme Court arises on the findings given by us. Hence, the leave asked for is refused. R. S. ----- Appeal dismissed.