JUDGEMENT 1. Fr. Mario Pires has preferred this appeal against the judgement and order dated 9th June, 1977, passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, ordering him to pay a penalty of Rs. 51,380/- for contravention of some provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (hereinafter called for sake of brevity the Act). 2. Adjudication proceedings were held against the appellant for contravention of the provisions of Ss.4(1), 5(1)(aa) and 5(1)(d) of the Act and ultimately, penalties totaling Rs. 66,880/- were imposed by the learned Director of Enforcement. Aggrieved, appellant approached in appeal the Foreign Exchange Appellate Board and this appeal was partly allowed and the penalty reduced as above. The facts leading to be proceeding are as follows :- On basis of information that the appellant was indulging in the purchase and sale of foreign exchange, officers of the Enforcement Directorate, Panaji kept a watch and on 13th Oct. 1970 intercepted him near the Panaji wharf and recovered from his custody some foreign exchange, namely $370 U.S. Dollars and Frs. 30 and some papers. The residential premises of the appellant were also searched and various documents seized. Appellant was also interrogated and he stated that he had been systematically buying and selling foreign exchange and that he had also received certain payments otherwise than through an authorised dealer by order of his brother John Pires who, residing abroad (Africa), is a non-resident, and he had further placed some amounts of money to the credit of his non-resident brother. 3. Mr. S.K. Kakodkar, learned advocate appearing before me, submitted on behalf of the appellant that the penalties imposed on Fr. Pires are not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case and the law applicable. He urged that, in face of the evidence on record, it is evident that the so called confession of the appellant was not voluntary and in any case, such confession was retracted and is not corroborated. Pires are not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case and the law applicable. He urged that, in face of the evidence on record, it is evident that the so called confession of the appellant was not voluntary and in any case, such confession was retracted and is not corroborated. Realising, however, the limitations of his case, in view of the provisions of S.23EE of the Act which restricts the appeal from any decision or order of the Appellate Court under Sub-Sec. (3) or Sub-Sec. (4) of S.23E to questions of law only, the learned advocate contended that evidence has to be considered as to appreciate the propriety of the legal consequences drawn and placed, therefore, reliance on the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Distributors v. Bank of India Ltd. ( AIR 1979 SC 867 ) and of 'Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras' ( AIR 1957 SC 49 ). The whole case of the appellant rests as such, on the contention that the confession was wrongly made by him and that in any event, the same was retracted and hence, in the absence of proper corroboration, could not have been relied upon to hold him guilty of the contraventions allegedly committed by him and to impose thereafter penalties on him. 4. No doubt, as held by the Supreme Court in 'Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Madurai v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras' ( AIR 1957 SC 49 ) a finding on a question of fact is open to attack as erroneous in law, but such attack can be done only if the said finding is not supported by any evidence, or if it is unreasonable and perverse. However, inferences from facts that themselves are inferences of fact and not of law, are not open to review by the court. And in the Orient Distributor's case ( AIR 1979 SC 867 ) it was held that a question depending upon inferences to be drawn from facts and surrounding circumstances is not purely factual but relates to the propriety of the legal conclusion that could be drawn on basis of proved facts. Appellant submits that his confessional statements were obtained on coercion, as can be clearly inferred from the circumstances that he was interrogated for three consecutive days and from the fact that he retracted the same at a later stage. Appellant submits that his confessional statements were obtained on coercion, as can be clearly inferred from the circumstances that he was interrogated for three consecutive days and from the fact that he retracted the same at a later stage. This submission is, however, a mere inference of fact which was itself drawn from facts and therefore, in the light of the above rulings of the Supreme Court, is not open to review by this Court. It was also contended that the circumstance that admittedly the appellant was interrogated on 13th, 14th and 15th Oct. 1970, i.e. for three consecutive days and the fact that his residential premises were searched during the same period of time spell out that he was detained by the Enforcement Officers. And so, it was submitted, relying on the case of 'Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh' ( AIR 1956 SC 56 ) : (1956 Cri LJ 152) wherein it was held that the prolonged custody immediately preceding the making of the confession is sufficient to stamp it as involuntary unless it is properly explained, that the confessional statements of the appellants are clearly involuntary and obtained by coercion. This submission is, however, based on the assumption that appellant had been under custody during the relevant time he was interrogated. Such custody is not proved and, on the contrary, the learned appellate court held that it was never the case of the appellant that he had been detained and kept in custody by the Enforcement Officers, and this implies that the learned Board arrived at the finding of fact that appellant was not in custody at the relevant time. This finding, being purely of fact and arrived at also purely from the facts, is not open to review by this Court and has as such, to be accepted. This being so, the above ruling of the Supreme Court in Nathu's case is distinguishable and is not applicable to this case. 5. It was further urged by Mr. This finding, being purely of fact and arrived at also purely from the facts, is not open to review by this Court and has as such, to be accepted. This being so, the above ruling of the Supreme Court in Nathu's case is distinguishable and is not applicable to this case. 5. It was further urged by Mr. Kakodkar that the said statements even in case they were voluntarily made, amount to confessions made to Officers vested with powers similar to those of a police officer and therefore, they are not admissible in evidence, Powers of arrest, search and custody of documents seized were undoubtedly given to the Enforcement Officers by Sections 19A, 19B, 19C, 19D and 19G of the Act, but nevertheless the fact remains that such Powers are more akin to those conferred on the Customs Officers by the Customs Act. It is, as such, pertinent to note that a Customs Officer is not a police officer, as held by the Supreme Court in 'Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras' ( AIR 1970 SC 1065 ) : (1970 Cri LJ 998). Similarly, in 'Percy Rustomji Basta v. State of Maharashtra' ( AIR 1971 SC 1087 ) : (1971 Cri LJ 933), their Lordships observed :- "Customs Officer making inquiry under Section 107 of the Customs Act is not a police officer and person against whom inquiry is made is not an accused person, and further that statements made by such a person in inquiry are not statements made by a person accused of any offence." Also, in 'Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1972 SC 1224 ) : (1972 Cri LJ 759) the Supreme Court held that statements recorded by a Customs Officer under the Customs Act are admissible in evidence and are not hit by the provisions of S.25 of the Evidence Act or Art.20(3) of the Constitution. It would therefore appear, as correctly submitted by Mr. J. Dias, learned Government Advocate, that the statements made to an Enforcement Officer, whose powers are similar and akin to those of a Customs Officer, are admissible in evidence, I fully endorse this view and find, as such, no substance in the contention of Mr. Kakodkar to the contrary. It is quite true, as observed by the learned Board, that under the Act an Enforcement Officer is not authorised to summon persons and to record their statements. Kakodkar to the contrary. It is quite true, as observed by the learned Board, that under the Act an Enforcement Officer is not authorised to summon persons and to record their statements. But, as also correctly held, there is no bar to the questioning of a person apprehended by such officers or whose premises were searched, and the confessional statements made in answer to the questioning constitute extra judicial confessions. 6. But confessions, whether judicial or extra judicial, must be voluntary and genuine and besides should have some corroboration to be relied upon and to be the basis of a conviction. Therefore, the circumstances under which the confession is made, the manner in which it is made, the persons to whom it is made, are aspects to be borne in mind before acting on a confession, particularly on a non-judicial confession. Two rules of caution are to be followed, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Wakil Nayak v. State of Bihar,' (1971) 3 SCC 778 : (1972 Cri LJ 566) before such action namely. (1) whether the evidence of confession is reliable and (2) whether it finds corroboration. In the case before us, the confessional statements made by the appellant are not in any manner tainted with suspicion and on the contrary, they appear to be genuine. In fact, the wealth of details of the operations conducted, the disclosure of facts that could be only of the knowledge of the appellant himself and his candid statement that "It is written in moral theology. that penal laws do not oblige in conscience which means that only after catching me I became a sinner", are sure pointers to their genuineness, voluntariness and reliability. Though the truth of the latter statement vis-a-vis the canon law is very doubtful, the fact remains that, coming from the mouth of a priest who also averred in his Memo of Appeal to the Appellate Board that he was wholly ignorant of the technical laws in technical and of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in particular, the said statement is very significant because it hints at the voluntary character and genuineness of the confessional statements, clearly showing that the theory of duress and coercion advanced at a later stage is an afterthought which has no support in the evidence and in circumstances of the case. So also, the constant changing stands taken by the appellant about the finding of the foreign exchange in has custody, namely that no foreign exchange was found on him, that the same was planted on him by one Mr. John D'Souza and finally, that the same was foisted on him by the Enforcement Officers go a long way to show that the appellant, caught red handed with the foreign exchange and being unable to explain that he was in possession thereof in a lawful manner, made a confessional statement trying to justify his illegal activity with a curious and sui generis interpretation of the canon law. Then, the confessional statements made by the appellant get ample corroboration not only in the recovery of the foreign, currency and documents from his person, but also from the passbooks and other documents seized in his residence. In 'State of Maharashtra v. P.K. Pathak' (1980) 2 SCC 259 : (1980 Cri LJ 923) the Supreme Court held that a confession corroborated by a recovery can justify a conviction. Hence, in the premises, I find no error in the findings of the learned Director of Enforcement and the Appellate Board as regards the voluntariness and genuineness of the statements made by the appellant and as regards their admissibility in evidence. 7. Faced with this state of affairs, Mr. Kakodkar contended that, at any rate, the said confessional statement made by the appellant to the Enforcement Officers cannot be the basic of a conviction because they were retracted and are not corroborated, Reliance was placed in support of this submission on the case of 'Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab' ( AIR 1957 SC 637 ) : (1957 Cri LJ 1014), 'Nazir v. Emperor' (AIR 1933 All 31) : (1933 (34) Cri LJ 489) and 'Muthuswami v. State of Madras' ( AIR 1954 SC 4 ) : (1954 Cri LJ 236). In Sarwan Singh's case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that, though it is always open to the Court to convict an accused on his confession itself, even if he has retracted it at a later stage, nevertheless Courts shall require some corroboration to the confessional statement before convicting an accused on such a statement. Then, in Nazir v. Emperor, it was held that a retracted confession of a co-accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated in the material particulars. Then, in Nazir v. Emperor, it was held that a retracted confession of a co-accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated in the material particulars. Similarly, in 'Arjuna Lal Misra v. The State' ( AIR 1953 SC 411 ) : (1983 Cri LJ 1633) it was held that a conviction solely based on the retracted confession is opposed to law and does not therefore stand. And in Muthuswami's case, the Supreme Court observed that no hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding the necessity of corroboration in the case of retracted confession in order to base a conviction thereon. But apart from the general rule of prudence when the circumstances of a particular case cast a suspicion on the genuineness of the confession, it would be sufficient to require corroboration of the retracted confession. In the case before us, the required corroboration exists as already mentioned. It is true that in Muthuswami's case it was also observed that a confession should not be accepted merely because it contains a wealth of detail which could not have been invented and that unless the main features of the story are shown to be true, it will be unsafe to regard the wealth of uncorroborated details as a safeguard of truth. The required corroboration of the main features of the story exists in this case and hence, I find no substance in the submission to the contrary made on behalf of the appellant. 8. The last point raised before me is in respect of the show cause notices No. III and V. Mr. Kakodkar urged that no payment within the meaning of the Act has been proved and as such, the penalties imposed on the appellant on that court are not justified and legal. He invited my attention to the meaning of payment given at page 150 of the Commentary on the Law relating to Foreign Exchange in India by S.R. Wakil and to the case of 'George Elwin King v. Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Control, Bombay ( AIR 1974 All 452 ) wherein it was held that the receipt of money by order or on behalf of a person residing abroad does not constitute payment. I am unable to accept this submission in the circumstances of this case where it is clearly established that the appellant received amounts of money from one Patel and one N.C. Desai on behalf of his brother John Pires and deposited the same amounts in special accounts opened in the name of the latter. The amounts involved are such that it is clear that they represent discharge of obligations and therefore, payments within the meaning of the Act. 9. In the premises and for the foregoing reasons, the appeal has no substance and is, as such dismissed. Appeal dismissed.