JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - The plaintiff filed a suit in which he prayed that an injunction be issued restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the khasra Plot No. 302 new plot No. 379 situate in village Bhamera, Pergana Agota, District Bulandshahr. 2. The plaintiff's case was that the land in suit was transferred by the defendants and their predecessor-in-interest in favour of Radhey Lal and others in 1950 and Radhey Lal in his turn transferred the land in suit to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that the plaintiff was in possession since then and had his brick kiln on the land. Due to some mistake the name of the vendors of the plaintiff and the plaintiff himself could not be mutated over this land in the revenue papers. It was alleged that, the defendants without any right wanted to interfere with the plaintiff's possession over the land in suit. The plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss if the defendants interfered with the possession of the plaintiff. 3. In the suit the plaintiff also sought an interim injunction. 4. The defendants contested the suit with the allegations that they were owners in possession of the land in suit. It was asserted that the land was agricultural land and they were paying the land revenue for the same and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. It was also asserted that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The defendant's case was that in the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, they were recorded as tenure holders of the land and as such the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The brick kiln was also said to have not existed over the land in suit. 5. The trial Court took up the interim matter and granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the land in suit. It found that there was a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. The brick kiln was also said to have not existed over the land in suit. 5. The trial Court took up the interim matter and granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the land in suit. It found that there was a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. It also found that the suit was not barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as a brick kiln existed over the land in suit and the land in suit had ceased to be land within the meaning of the said Act. The trial Court took cognisance of the fact that a copy of the sale deed dated 15-6-1966 executed by Radhey Lal and others in favour of the plaintiff had been filed. On the basis of the evidence, the trial Court held that the plaintiff appeared to be the person in possession of the land. It further found that balance of convenience lay in favour of granting an injunction and an injunction was accordingly granted as referred to above. 6. The defendants preferred an appeal. The lower appellate Court was of the view that as the revenue entries were in favour of the defendants and as the defendants had been recognised as Bhumidhars of the land in suit in consolidation proceedings, the plaintiff was required to seek a declaration of his Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It also went out to hold that merely because the plaintiff had filed a suit for an injunction simpliciter, the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was also of the view that by refusal of an interim injunction the plaintiff would not suffer any irreparable loss. It held that the trial Court erred in granting an interim injunction. The lower appellate Court accordingly set aside the order and sent back the record to the trial Court with a direction to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to a proper Court as required by law. 7. Aggrieved by the order of the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 8. The lower appellate Court accordingly set aside the order and sent back the record to the trial Court with a direction to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to a proper Court as required by law. 7. Aggrieved by the order of the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 8. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal had been taken on the ground that no further appeal lay against the order passed by the lower appellate Court in appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) of the Code. It is urged that Section 104 (2) of the Code provides that no appeal shall lie against an order passed in an appeal under the Section. 9. Section 104 (2) of the Code runs as follows : "No appeal shall lie from any order passed under this Section". 10. The learned counsel for the respondents has, in support of his argument, relied upon a decision of Mr. Justice Verma in the case of Mt. Umatur Robab v. Mahadeo Prasad ( AIR 1941 All 338 ): (1941 All LJ 516). In that case what had happened was that a suit was decreed against the appellant ex parte. The appellants applied for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. This application was dismissed by the Munsif. An appeal was filed against his order by the defendant. He died during the pendency of the appeal and no application for substitution of his legal representatives was filed within the time allowed by law. The result was that the appeal abated. Some time later an application was made that the abatement be set aside and the appeal be restored. This application was rejected by the appellate Court and against that order the defendant preferred an appeal from order to the High Court. Mr. Pandey appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay from the order of the lower appellate court. His argument was that the appeal in the court below being an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 (d) read with Section 104 (1) of the Code no appeal lay against any order passed in that appeal. He relied on Section 104 (2) of the Code which provided that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under that section. His argument was that the appeal in the court below being an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 (d) read with Section 104 (1) of the Code no appeal lay against any order passed in that appeal. He relied on Section 104 (2) of the Code which provided that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under that section. His preliminary objection was upheld. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant in reply to the preliminary objection, has referred to me a decision in the case of Haji Abdul Karim v. Mohd, Ismail (DAFO No. 44 of 1967) decided on 22-9-1978 by the Allahabad High Court. It is reported in the Summary of Cases in 1979 (5) All LR (SOC) 81. It appears that a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was decreed. The defendant appealed. The lower appellate court set aside the decree for ejectment and dismissed the suit in so far as the relief for ejectment was sought by the plaintiff. It, however, remanded the case to the trial court in respect of plaintiff's claim for arrears of rent and the trial court was directed to ascertain the period and the amount of rent due. The Court further held that if the entire decree had been set aside and the case remanded only an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 would lie but in view of the facts that the order of the lower appellate Court was in two distinct parts and the lower appellate Court had finally dismissed the suit for ejectment, a second appeal was also maintainable. I do not see how this case is of any substance for a decision on the point of maintainability of the instant appeal from order. The difficulty in accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit has not been finally dismissed but only a direction has been issued by the lower appellate Court to the trial Court to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to proper Court. 12. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a case of Jaggannath v. Union of India (1975 All LJ 591). In that case what had happened was that the plaintiff instituted a suit claiming three reliefs. He sought a declaration that the order of removal of the plaintiff from the service was invalid. 12. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a case of Jaggannath v. Union of India (1975 All LJ 591). In that case what had happened was that the plaintiff instituted a suit claiming three reliefs. He sought a declaration that the order of removal of the plaintiff from the service was invalid. He claimed a decree for arrears of wages and he sought an injunction directing the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff in service. The trial Court decreed the suit, granted a declaration that the order terminating the plaintiffs service was illegal and ultra vires and issued a mandatory injunction commanding the defendants to reinstate the plaintiff. A decree for arrears of wages was also granted. The defendants appealed. On appeal the Additional District Judge held that the suit was not cognisable by the Civil Court and directed that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper authority which the lower appellate Court thought was the relevant authority under the Payment of Wages Act. 13. A learned single Judge of this Court had on an appeal by the defendants, held that the order of the Additional District Judge was not appealable as a decree as the suit of the plaintiff had not been dismissed. The learned single Judge held that the impugned order was in the nature of an order under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code. The learned single Judge further held that the order would be appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1 (a) of the Code and was appealable as an order. This decision can be of no assistance to the appellant as there was a regular appeal before the lower appellate Court against the decree of the trial Court decreeing the plaintiffs suit. The appeal before the lower appellate Court being a regular appeal, the case is distinguishable from the present case where there was an appeal from order. 14. Section 104 (2) of the Code is clear that no appeal shall lie from an order passed in an appeal under Section 104 (1) read with the Rules. I, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the present appeal from order is not maintainable. The appeal is accordingly dismissed However, in the special circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs