JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This is plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit of the year 1969 which was dismissed by the trial court. The lower appellate court decreed it in part. 2. The plaintiffs case was that to the north of his house there was a piece of land which was his Sehan. The defendants bad a house towards the north of the plaintiffs house. The door of the defendants house opened towards east. The defendants had a Sehan in that direction. The defendants, it was alleged, illegally encroached upon a portion of the plaintiffs Sehan by making a Varandah. They had also built a new door towards the plaintiffs Sehan. They were interfering with the plaintiffs possession on over two Neem trees which stood over plaintiffs Sehan. As such, the plaintiff prayed that the defendants be restrained by means of permanent injunction from doing so. The suit was contested by the first three defendants. They denied that they had encroached upon any part of the plaintiffs Sehan or that they had opened a new door towards it. Their case was that the defendants did not have a Sehan towards the north of his house nor had he anything to do with the Neem tree which stood on a piece of land to the north of the plaintiffs house. 3. The plaintiff filed a sale-deed (Ext. I) dated April 1, 1908. According to his case, the sale-deed clearly established that there was a Sehan to the north of his house. The parties led oral evidence about their respective cases. The trial court, in its judgment eventually given on March 6, 1968 when he matter was dealt by it again upon a remand of the case to it by the lower appellate court, found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he had his Sehan to the north of his house or that any encroachment thereon had been made by the contesting defendants. It also found that the plaintiff had nothing to do with the Neem trees. It dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff assailed that decree in an appeal. 4. The lower appellate court, however, felt that there was a door of the plaintiff opening towards north of his house and the plaintiff was entitled to a passage therefrom. It also found that the plaintiff had nothing to do with the Neem trees. It dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff assailed that decree in an appeal. 4. The lower appellate court, however, felt that there was a door of the plaintiff opening towards north of his house and the plaintiff was entitled to a passage therefrom. The court was opinion that the plaintiff had not been able to prove by evidence the exact extent of the passage. However, in its opinion, the width of the passage should be at least 6' at the point where it touched the Chabutara (plate-from) lying to the east of the house of the contesting defendants. It therefore, modified the trial court decree to the extent that the plaintiff was held entitled to a passage across the disputed land and the defendants were restrained from interfering with such a passage of the plaintiff having a width of 6'. In other respects, the dismissal of the suit was upheld. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff has approached this court in present second appeal. 5. Sri R.S. Dubey learned counsel for the plaintiff has addressed me at length. He has drawn my attention to some pieces of evidence on the record in an effort to persuade me to take view that the findings by the two courts below about the plaintiffs failure to establish his case was perverse. He has, unfortunately, not succeeded in doing so. 6. What has particularly been emphasised by Sri Dubey is that the courts below were not right in taking the view that the land which the plaintiff claimed to be his Sehan land was not identifiable on the spot. He has urged that a look at the sale-deed (Ext. I) would establish beyond doubt that the land lying towards north of the plaintiffs house was his Sehan. A perusal of the judgment of the trial court and that of the lower appellate court would show that after referring specifically to the sale-deed and to the boundaries mentioned therein as well as to the map prepared by the Commissioner which forms part of the decree of the lower appellate court, the courts have come to a definite conclusion that the land to which the plaintiff was laying claim did not correspond to the boundaries given in the sale-deed. In spite of his tenacity. In spite of his tenacity. Sri Dubey has not been able to convince me that his submission about the boundaries given in the sale-deed corresponding to the land in dispute and thus fixing with certainty the land which was part of the Sehan of the plaintiff's house was correct. The submission in regard to Section 92 of Evidence Act is also not relevant to the issue. Sri Dubey has not been able to persuade me that any reliance has been placed by the courts below upon evidence in contravention of that provision. It was not the plaintiffs case that the contesting defendants and he were claiming through the sale-deed (Ext. I) or that evidence was being led contrary to the terms of that sale-deed. 7. Another submission of Sri Dubey is that the courts below erred in not getting the property in suit surveyed through an expert Commissioner to fix the identity of the land in question. He has not been able to satisfy me that any such request was made to any of the courts. I am not inclined to accept that there was a request made by the plaintiff that the land in suit be surveyed through a Commissioner so as to enable the plaintiff to establish his case that the land towards the north of his house was part of his Sehan land. 8. The concurrent finding of the two courts below that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the land in suit was his Sehan land is enough to dispose of this appeal. The question being essentially one of fact cannot be permitted to be re opened at this stage particularly twenty years after the suit was instituted. 9. The appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. Since no one has appeared to oppose it at the hearing, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.