Judgment : Against the acquittal of the respondent, who stood charged under sections 16(1)(a)(i), 7(i) and 2(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the State has preferred this appeal. 2. lit appears from the facts of the case that P.W.1 Food Inspector, Karamadai Panchayat Union went to ‘Mercuri Hotel’ in Karamadai on 26th August, 1977 at 10 A. m. P.W.1 introduced himself to the respondent who was sitting in the hotel at that time, and then purchased 660 ml. of buffalo milk which was kept there for sale for a sum of 0.80 P. under Exhibit P-1 cash receipt. P.W.1 also issued Form VI notice to the respondent marked as Exhibit P-2. As required by law P.W.1 after adding formalin, divided the said milk into three parts and poured the same into three dry, clean empty bottles and after observing all the formalities, sent one bottle to the Public Analyst and handed over the remaining two bottles to the Local Health Authority. The Public Analyst, in his report, Exhibit P8 has opined that the sample was deficient in solids-not-fat to the extent of at least 71%. Therefore P.W.1 laid a charge-sheet against the respondent under the afore-said sections. 3. When the respondent was questioned under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, he denied the offence and contended that the milk, from which the sample was taken by P.W.1 was not intended for sale, but it was kept in his hotel only as an ingredient for preparing tea or coffee. 4. The trial Court on the evidence projected by The prosecution, came to the conclusion that the sample of buffalo’s milk taken by P.W.1 from the hotel was kept only as an ingredient for preparing tea or coffee and the prosecution has not brought home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. With these observations the respondent was acquitted. It is against this acquittal, this appeal has been preferred. 5. It is contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that on the facts of present case, P.W.1 did go to the hotel of the respondent and he did purchase the milk from the hotel for which the respondent has issued Exhibit P-1 cash receipt. It is also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that milk is an article of food and under the Act. It is also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that milk is an article of food and under the Act. “Food” means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. It has to be considered, therefore, whether the respondent has purchased a food article from the respondent’s hotel or it was an ingredient to be added in coffee or tea. If it was only an ingredient and not a food article there was no necessity for the respondent to sell milk alone to P.W.1. That apart, the contention of the respondent that milk was not intended for sale is falsified by the issuance of the cash receipt, Exhibit P-1 by the respondent to P.W.1. That apart, the respondent has not let in any evidence to show that the milk, which was kept in the hotel, was not for sale. The milk purchased by P.W.1 under Exhibit P.1 cash receipt for 0.80 P. is a sale of food article. 6. Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, contemplates that: “No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food, for the sale of which licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence; (iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; (v) any article of food in contravention of any other provision of this Act or any rule made there under, or (vi) any adulterant. Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to store any adulterated food or misbranded food or any article of food referred to in clause (iii) or clause (iv) or clause (v) if he stores such food for the manufacture therefrom of any article of food for sale.” 7. In State by Public Prosecutor v. Govinda-raj Chettiar1, on similar facts, Maheswaran, J., had occasion to consider the Explanation to section 7 of the said Act. In State by Public Prosecutor v. Govinda-raj Chettiar1, on similar facts, Maheswaran, J., had occasion to consider the Explanation to section 7 of the said Act. In that case also, it was contended that the milk kept was not for sale, but it was intended to be used for the preparation of tea. Considering the Explanation Maheswaran, J., has observed thus: “This Explanation was introduced by amending Act XXXIV of 1976, which came into force on 1st April, 1976. This Explanation clarified that a person shall be deemed to store any adulterated food if he stores such food for manufacture there from of any article of food for sale. The sample was taken on 20th February, 1977, after the amendment. Therefore, the order of acquittal on the ground that the milk was stored not for sale, is incorrect and has to be set aside.” 8. Similarly, Varadarajan, J., as he then was, had an occasion to consider this point in State by Public Prosecutor v. C. Sambandam alias Sambandamoorthy2. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Food Inspector, Calicit v. Gopalan3, Varadarajan, J., as he then was, held as follows: “In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to agree with the learned Sessions Judge in this case, that merely because the milk sold to P.W.1 was taken from the milk which was being boiled in the tea shop and that milk was intended for being used in the preparation of tea to be sold to the customers, there was no sale of milk as such to P.W.1. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, I hold that there was sale of adulterated milk by the accused in this case to P.W.1” I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by Varadarajan, J., as he then was. The facts in the instant case bring to light that the milk was kept in the hotel and P.W.1 purchased the same from the respondent by paying cash under Exhibit P-1. If it was an ingredient, for the preparation of tea or coffee, then there was no necessity to sell the milk alone, by the respondent to P.W.1. After going through the judgment of the trial Court, I am of the view that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate against the respondent has to be set aside. 9. If it was an ingredient, for the preparation of tea or coffee, then there was no necessity to sell the milk alone, by the respondent to P.W.1. After going through the judgment of the trial Court, I am of the view that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate against the respondent has to be set aside. 9. But on a close reading of the judgment and the evidence in this case, I find that the acquittal of the respondent has to be sustained on a different ground. I find on a close reading of the evidence and the records of the Court below, that P.W.1 has not followed the procedure laid down under section 13(2) of Central Act XXXVII of 1954. Section 13(2) of the Act runs thus: “On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 14-A forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons as the case may be, informing such person of persons that it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the copy ofthe report to get the same of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.” In this case, I find that the complain was lodged against the respondent on 22nd November, 1977, and the notice as required under section 13(2) was issued to the respondent on 9th November, 1977, that, is even before lodging the complaint to the Magistrate. This is against the provisions of section 13(2) of the said Act. It is on this ground, I am of the view that the acquital of the respondent has to be sustained. Accordingly, this criminal appeal fails and is dismissed. Criminal appeal dismissed.