Lahiri, J.:- In this writ application the petitioner questions the validity of the orders of fixation of his pay and allow­ance in Upper Division Grade with effect from 25.9.70 marked Annexures 'E' and 'B'. The petitioner claims that he is enti­tled to pay and allowances is the said Grade w.e.f. 1.2.63. 2. The Intrinsic Facts-The petitioner served for about four years as a Clerk/Supervisor in the USA Surplus Stores during World War II. Therefore, he was reemployed as Lower Division Clerk on 13.1.48 and transferred to the Records, Assam Regi­ment, Shillong on 16.9.53. In 1950 he claimed benefits and previkges which were attached to his War Service (about 4 years), but the claim was turned down and Respondent 5, also a Lower Division Clerk, was promoted an Upper Division Clerk w.e.f. February. 1953 throwing overboard his legitimate claim of War Services. However, the Ministry of Defence HQrs. found that he was entitled to the benefits and privileges of his approved War Service (w.e.f. 25.3.43 to 1.4.46) in the matter of (a) seniority, (b) promotion, (c; refixation of pay. He put up his claims for getting the entitlements and claimed that Respondent 5 had been promoted to the post of Office Super­intendent w.e.f. 1.1.63 depriving his legitimate claim. A vacancy in Upper Division Clerk was caused on and from 1.1.63 due to promotion of Respondent 5, in the office where the petitioner worked, but Respondent 6, a junior to the petitioner by about 14 years, was promoted to the said vacancy w.e.f, 1.2.63. Res­pondent 6 was also confirmed in the Lower Division Grade w.e.f. 1.4.59 and was appointed to the Selection Grade on 1.7.59. In consequence thereof Respondent 6 was promoted Upper Division Clerk depriving the petitioner's legitimate light on the ground that the petitioner's Matriculation certificate was not acceptable. He petitioned before this Court and in Civil Rule No. 220(H) of 1968 (P.C. Purkayastha vs. Union of India and Ors.), the High Court by its order dated 13.3.70 passed a declaratory order to treat the petitioner as Matriculate as the certificate was genuine and acceptable. Where after Respondent 1 passed an order on 10.11.70 that having examined the case of the petitioner and in consultation with the Ministry of Defence it had been decided that the petitioner would be confirmed in the post of Lower Division Clerk w. e. f. 1. 4. Where after Respondent 1 passed an order on 10.11.70 that having examined the case of the petitioner and in consultation with the Ministry of Defence it had been decided that the petitioner would be confirmed in the post of Lower Division Clerk w. e. f. 1. 4. 59 against the permanent vacancy kept unfilled for him and would be promoted to Upper Division Clerk against the vacancy kept unfilled for him from 1.4.66. In the same order (Annexure 'E') it was decided that the petitioner would be given pre­sumptive seniority in Upper Division Grade w.e.f. 1.2.63 and would be placed at Serial No. 3 over Respondent 6 in the seniority list, however, his pay and allowances would be admissible from the date of issue of promotion order. The promotion order was issued, vide Annexure 'B', reading : 'presumptive seniority in the Upper Division Clerk has been granted with effect from 1. 2. 63 and pay and allowances will be admissible from the date of issue of the promotion orders i. e. w. e. f. 25 Sept' 70." (Emphasis added) It is a Part-II order in respect of Civilians working in Defence Services. The petitioner made several representations and demanded justice. He claimed inter alia that when pre­sumptive seniority had been granted in the Upper Division Grade w. e. f. 1. 2. 63 and he was promoted to Upper Division Grade against the vacancy kept unfilled for him from 1. 4. 66, there was no legal justification to deprive him his pay and allowances on and from 1. 2- 63- He questions the validity of pay and allowances from the date of issue of promotion order as arbitrary, illegal, ultra vires and passed without any autho­rity of law. The petitioner questions the validity of the orders marked Annexures 'E' and 'B' whereby the Respondents having granted him seniority in Upper Division Grade w. e. f. 1.2.63 granted him pay and allowances, w. e. f. 25. 9. 70. On failure to get justice from the Respondents the petitioner filed this writ application. 3. Mr. N. M. Lahiri, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, appeared on behalf of the petitioner and challenged the validity of the impugned order on various grounds. 9. 70. On failure to get justice from the Respondents the petitioner filed this writ application. 3. Mr. N. M. Lahiri, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, appeared on behalf of the petitioner and challenged the validity of the impugned order on various grounds. However, I shall only confine myself to the question as to whether the impu­gned order of payment of pay and allowances to the peti­tioner w. e. f- 25.9.70 is valid when the petitioner has been granted seniority, presumptive or otherwise, in the Upper Divi­sion Grade w. e. f. 1.2.63. It is beyond question, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was deprived of his legitimate claim on account of wrongs committed by Respondents 1 to 4. The respondents were compelled to rant seniority to the petitioner in Upper Division Grade w. e. f. 1. 2. 63 to uphold his just claim. Seniority in the said Grade could not be granted from 1. 2. 63 unless he entitled to it as the question of grant of seniority in Upper Division Grade could not have arisen unless the petitioner was legally entitled to the post. It was a fallacy to promote the petitioner to Upper Division Grade from 1.4.66 when his presumptive seniority in the said Grade was granted from 1. 2. 63. As such, the petitioner claims that he was promoted w. e. f. 1. 2. 63 and was entitled to pay and allowances from the said date and there was no authority of law to deprive his legitimate claims; the impu­gned orders of fixation of pay and allowances from 25. 9. 70 were illegal, ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 4. Mr. A. Sarma, learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 4 submits that War Service was counted and benefits there under granted by the Respondents in exercise of their administrative power. The learned counsel submits that undoubtedly the presumptive seniority was granted to the petitioner from 1.2.63 as he was entitled to but pay and allowances were ordered to be paid from the date of issue of the promotion order, i.e., "the date on which he [meaning the petitioner] admittedly/actually for the first time began to work as U.D.'' The determination was dis­cretionary and the action was administrative, the order was not penal nor was it violative of any law. There was no inherent right to promotion as it rested entirely at the pleasure of the master and the dateline for payment was determined at "the pleasure ", 5. The days of Lords and serfs are over. Such conception is a taboo in welfare State. Truly speaking no public servant can claim to be a master as all render service to the people. However, the relationship is that of employers and employees. It is indubitable that since 1950 the petitioner's just, fair and legitimate claims were turned down twice. First, the petitioner claimed that his war Service should be counted and his seniority, promotion and pay should be fixed accordingly. Respondents took it as if the petitioner had "opened a campaign", gave a 'battle", fought it but showed a "white flag" and conceded to the rightful claim. Now, the respondents started an "offensive war" against the petitioner and declared his Matriculation Cer­tificate unacceptable. The petitioner believed in the sword of spirit, petitioned before this court for justice and obtained dec­laratory relief, viz., that his Matriculation certificate was genuine and acceptable according to law. To obtain the consequential reliefs and to set right the wrongs the petitioner approached the respondents for his legitimate seniority, pay, promotion and allowances on and from the date to which he was entitled to. The respondents subjugated and declared that he was entitled to seniority in Upper Division Grade from 1.2.63, but disenti­tled him of the benefits flowing from that order. Instead, they fixed an imaginary date, namely, 25.9 70, for reasons unknown. The order is stranger than fiction. The delayed posting, con­firmation and promotion was default of the respondents them selves. The petitioner suffered long agony for the positive in­action of the respondents. They harmed the petitioner for the third time in granting him the flowing benefits of his confir­mation in UD Grade from an imaginary date but not from the date of fixation of seniority in UD Grade, namely, 1.2-1963 The deprivation of the legitimate right is sought to be suppor­ted and the ground that the order were rendered in exercise of their unlimited and absolute discretionary power in the field of administrative action, which was final. 6. "Legal maxims'' are store houses of wisdom of past generation. Only those Roman maxims which are founded on reason, public convenience and necessity have withstood the test of time and are described as "Legal maxims". 6. "Legal maxims'' are store houses of wisdom of past generation. Only those Roman maxims which are founded on reason, public convenience and necessity have withstood the test of time and are described as "Legal maxims". It is apparent that some of the principles which are essential in law have been encompassed in the form of legal maxims. Niceties and beauty of expression apart, we find the essence of law incorporated in the maxims. They may be applied directly or in qualified manner or to a limited extent according to the exigencies of a particular case and the novelty of the circumstances. One of such legal maxims, in my opinion, is directly applicable in the instant case, namely, "NULLUS COMMODUM CAPERE POTESI DE INDURIA SUA PROPRIA". It means that no man can take advantage of his wrongs. In the instant case the respondents were at fault and deprived the petitioner's rightful claims. Now, the respondents, instead of granting him the benefits from 1.3.63, have taken advantage of their own wrongs. 7. It follows, therefore, that the respondents have taken advantage of their own wrongs but the essence of law and justice does not permit such an action to stand. Where is the authority of law in support of the order? Mr. Sarma contends, there is none. Counsel submits that in the absence of any positive law such orders can be made to meet the exigencies of the situation. It is true that such administrative action may be taken, but such actions sans (sic) reasons and fairness cannot be upheld. It is wrong to suggest that administrative actions of discretionary nature is not subject to judicial review. The notion of a dis­cretion which is to be exercised not in a capricious and impetous way, put in a disciplined and responsible manner, is a conception which has had a wide application in Indian law. It originates from Dharmasatra, if not earlier. It is wrong to suggest that administrative actions of discretionary nature is not subject to judicial review. The notion of a dis­cretion which is to be exercised not in a capricious and impetous way, put in a disciplined and responsible manner, is a conception which has had a wide application in Indian law. It originates from Dharmasatra, if not earlier. It really means a compromise between the idea that people who possess power should be trusted with a free hand, and not tied down by narrow formulae and the competing notion that some contingent control must be retained over them in case they act in an unreasonable (sic) w. e. f. 25.9.70 and not from 1.2.63 must be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution as the respondents have mise­rably failed to establish that the order was fair or grounded on reasons. The arbitrary determination of the date may not be made applicable to other public servants similarly situated and one public servant might be arbitrarily discriminated against whereas others might be favoured, under the shield of absolute discretion. The administration, to be competent, must have employees who are not constantly troubled by uncertainty about their service conditions. Under the guise of absolute discretion, if unlimited and unguided discretion is regarded as acceptable formulae for making such an order it will be the surset menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised penalty. We cannot substitute our judgments for those of administrators but they are not absolved from minima in review well-settled in administrative law and founded on Constitutional obligations. An administrative order of discre­tionary nature must satisfy that it is not bad to a reaso­nable man reasonably instructed in the law Culled from Baldev Raj Chadha vs. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 321 , The claims of the petitioner were his entitlements, he was qualified to receive them. As such, they are more like property than charity or gratuity. Public interest cannot be upheld if Government servants are deprived of their legitimate claims. As such, they are more like property than charity or gratuity. Public interest cannot be upheld if Government servants are deprived of their legitimate claims. In the landmark cases of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ; E. P. Rayappa vs. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 and Kasturi Lal vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1980 SC 1992 , (sic) and unfair way. Discretion in public affairs is seldom absolute. It is ordinarily qualified. It must be used "judiciously". So the expression is commonly expressed as "a judicial discretion", though exercised in administrative actions. Executive, no less than judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness grounded on reasons is the essence of the guarantees epitomised in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Governmental action in the field of Administrative law, should be, to put it in the negative language "must not be arbitrary and capricious"-in a positive form "it must be reasonable and fair". Administrative action is a positive act. It must be grounded on some principles, must be reasonable and relevant, In The Manager, Government Branch Press vs. Balliappa AIR 1979 SC 429 , their Lordships have ruled that termination of service of a temporary Government servant without reasons is arbitrary and liable to be struck down. Such orders without the backing of any reason carry with them germs of discrimination. The decision rules that Article 16 takes within its fold matters prior to the actual act of employment, but comprehends all the matters in relation to employment, prior and posterior, including matters incidental to employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment like, the provisions as to salary, increment, leave, pension, age of superannuation, promotion and even termination. It has been held that the rule of master and servant in its original and absolute form is not applicable to the Government servants. The impugned orders, in so far as they give effect to the petitioner's pay and allowances the Supreme Court not only rejected the wooden discretion (sic) between rights and privileges but has opened a new vista that even in the field of grant of Government larges (sic) the Welfare State can­not deprive these rights arbitrarily. The impugned orders, in so far as they give effect to the petitioner's pay and allowances the Supreme Court not only rejected the wooden discretion (sic) between rights and privileges but has opened a new vista that even in the field of grant of Government larges (sic) the Welfare State can­not deprive these rights arbitrarily. Governmental discretions have been checked even in the matter of grant of such larges (sic). It has been held that such administrative actions must be reasonable, fair and just. It has been ruled that law so enunciated is based on the preamble to the Constitution and the directive principles which concretize and give shape to the reasonableness envisaged in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and other fundamental rights. It has been held that where Government action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, fairness and justness, it must be struck down as invalid. 8. I conclude that the respondents fixed the date of seniority w-e-f 1.2.63, but determined an imaginary date for granting benefits of the petitioner's seniority, pay and promo­tion, namely, w.e.f. 25.9.70. The fixation of the dateline is not based on law. It is arbitrary, vague and fanciful. It is not based on reasons and justice and it is not fair and impartial. Grant of pay and allowances to the petitioner w-e-f- 25.9.70 in­stead of 1.2.63 is violative of all the norms of justice known in the field of administrative law as well as violative of Arti­cles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. 9. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned orders insofar as they grant pay and allowances w.e.f. 25.9.70 are invalid and declare that the petitioner is entitled to get all the benefits on and from 1.2.63. Bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the case, the status of the parties, the effect of denial of justice to the petitioner, while allow­ing the petition, I award a cost of Rs. 500/- (one set) payable by Respondent 1 to the petitioner- 10. The petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute.