JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - This is defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff respondent for declaration that the order terminating bis services contained in letter no. 45/70-71 dated 9-6-1971 and notice no. 44/70-71 dated 8-6-1970 are illegal and invalid and he still continues to be in service as Assistant teacher and is entitled to the emoluments etc. attached to that post. 2. The defendants in the suit are Managing Committee of the Lady Parson Kaur Inter College, Basdila Sardarnagar in the district of Gorakhpur, the Principal of the College, the college itself through the Manager and one Hari Prasad. The plaintiff's case was that he was appointed as an assistant teacher in the college on 14-7 67 in J. T. C scale of pay on one year probation, that on the expiry of the period of probation, he automatically became a confirmed teacher under the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, hereafter `the Act.' That on 15-6-1970 he received the impugned letter and notice informing him that on account of his unsatisfactory work and poor results his services were being terminated by one month's notice. The plaintiff challenged the impugned notice and order on the ground that they were malafide, that the services could not be terminated by one month's notice, that the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and being by way of punishment it was bad, inasmuch as in opportunity was given to the plaintiff to submit his explanation it was also alleged that the record of the work of the plaintiff was satisfactory and that the Manager bad no power to issue the impugned order and further that no approval had been obtained of the District Inspector of Schools as required under the Act and lastly that it was served on the plaintiff during the summer vacation. On these allegations the plaintiff prayed for declaration that lie was still in the service of the college and was entitled to the emoluments attached to the post which he was occupying. 3. On these allegations the plaintiff prayed for declaration that lie was still in the service of the college and was entitled to the emoluments attached to the post which he was occupying. 3. The suit was contested by defendants 3 and 4, inter alia, on the grounds that the plaintiff was still on probation at the time when the impugned order was made, that since his work was found to be unsatisfactory, a resolution was passed by the Managing Committee of the college on 2- -1970 for terminating the service of the plaintiff and that resolution was sent to the District Inspector of Schools for approval and the latter accorded his approval on 6-6-1970 and it was thereafter that the impugned notice was served on the plaintiff. It was also contended that the remedy of the plaintiff was by way of an appeal against the order of the District Inspector of Schools and since the plaintiff did not do so, his suit in the Civil Court was not maintainable and further if his services had been terminated in contravention of the provisions of law, his remedy was only to claim damages. 4. The trial court framed a cumber of issues. On the main questions involved in the case it held that the plaintiff was still a probationer when the impugned order was passed and that his services could be terminated by giving him one month's notice. It was held that the impugned order and notice were not invalid. On the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court and the plaintiffs right to sue, however, findings were given in the affirmative. Being aggrieved the plaintiff filed an appeal. 5. The lower appellate court has, disagreeing with the trial court, taken the view that after the expiry of one year's period the plaintiff would be deemed to have been confirmed under the provisions of the Act and the termination of his services having been made in violation of the rules framed under the Act, it was liable to be declared illegal. It has also taken the view that the termination was by way of punishment and the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity of hearing and since that was not done, the order was illegal. In the result the suit had been decreed for declaration as prayed but parties have been directed to bear their own costs. It has also taken the view that the termination was by way of punishment and the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity of hearing and since that was not done, the order was illegal. In the result the suit had been decreed for declaration as prayed but parties have been directed to bear their own costs. Being aggrieved the defendants have now filed the present appeal. 6. It was submitted before, me on behalf of the defendants-appellants that the suit was not maintainable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. According to the counsel the remedy of the plaintiff-respondent lay in filing an appeal against the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools and since he did not avail of the remedy, the order became final now it cannot be questioned in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 16-G of the Act. It was emphasised that the Act is a special Act containing a complete Code in itself. On the other hand it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the proceedings of the alleged meeting of the Committee of Management on 2-6-1970 were void ab initio, inasmuch as it proceeded on a wrong premise that the plaintiff was a mere probationer. That being so, the consequential orders pissed id pursuance of of the resolution and the alleged approval of the District Inspector of Schools were all null and void. It was emphasised that after the expiry of one year's period the plaintiff was automatically confirmed under Regulation 11 of Chapter 3 of the Regulations framed under the Act and that being so, whatever action was taken against the plaintiff on the basis of resolution dated 2-6-1970 was without jurisdiction and was ultra vires of the provisions contained in section 16 G (3) (a) and subsection (4) of that section was not at all attracted. In the alternative it was contended that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred inasmuch as the impugned order was made complete breach of `the statutory obligations. 7. After carefully considering the respective submissions, in my opinion, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff's suit was maintainable and that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain it. In the alternative it was contended that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred inasmuch as the impugned order was made complete breach of `the statutory obligations. 7. After carefully considering the respective submissions, in my opinion, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff's suit was maintainable and that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain it. The general principle on which the jurisdiction of Civil Court can successfully be excluded in respect of decision by special Tribunals is well settled The difficulty usually arises in its application to given causes. In Secretary of State v. Hask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 it was laid down that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Further, even if the jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Court s have jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In Dulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 , after an exhaustive discussion of the case law the legal position was summarised by the Court thus "7..................... (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provisions, however, does not exclude those case where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open, A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 8. These principles have been reaffirmed by the supreme Court in Srinivasa v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 71 and by a Full Bench of our Court in Union of India v. Shadi Lal Sugar and General Mills Ltd., 1980 AWC 377 . The present case may be examined with reference to propositions 1 and 6 above and for that purpose it shall not be out of place to refer to the scheme of the Act at first. The present case may be examined with reference to propositions 1 and 6 above and for that purpose it shall not be out of place to refer to the scheme of the Act at first. The preamble of the Act says "Whereas it is expedient to establish a Board to take the place of the Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of the High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh and prescribed courses therefor." In other words the purpose which this Act seeks to serve is to regulate and supervise the system of the High School and Intermediate Education and prescribed courses in Uttar Pradesh. It is a self contained Code. In Sections 3 to I4A the Act provides for the constitution of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, term and office of members, powers of the Board, officers of the Board, power and duties of Chairman and appointment of certain Committees. Section 15 gives the Board power to make regulations, Thereafter provision are made for the scheme of administration which every institution is required to frame, for inspection of recognised institutions and constitution of selection committee, savings as to minority institutions and provisions for assistance during examination. Then comes section 16-G which provides for conditions of service of Heads of Institutions, teachers and other employees. This section along with the Regulations framed under it provides a complete Code in this behalf. Sub-section (3) of this section says that no Principal. Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector, The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. Under clause (b) the Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management. Clause (c) gives a right to any party to prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, against an order of the Inspector made under Clause (b). The appellate authority may after such inquiry, if any, as it considers necessary, confirm, set aside, or modify the order and the order passed by such authority shall be final. Clause (c) gives a right to any party to prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, against an order of the Inspector made under Clause (b). The appellate authority may after such inquiry, if any, as it considers necessary, confirm, set aside, or modify the order and the order passed by such authority shall be final. Then comes sub-section (4) which says: "An older made or decision given by the competent authority under sub-section (3) Shall not be questioned in any Court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the directions contained in the order or decision within the period that may be specified therein." Similar provisions are made in sub-sections (5) to (9) art regard to the suspension of the head of the institution or a teacher by the Management and sub sect;on (7) lays down that the order of Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. 9. It will be seen that the Committee of Management is the appointing authority of the head of an institution, the teachers and other employees. It 19 also the authority to discharge any such employee or remove or dismiss him from service or reduce him in rank or serve him with a notice of termination from service but for all this prior approval in writing of the Inspector & required. In case the Inspector approves such action of the Committee, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. Subject to that right, an order made by the Inspector becomes final and cannot be questioned in any court. In case an appeal is filed, the order passed by the appellate authority shall be final. The powers of to appellate authority are quite extensive. In the present case one of the grounds taken by the plaintiff-respondent on which the impugned order and notice were challenged was that prior approval in writing of the District Inspector of Schools had not been obtained. This allegation was specifically refuted by the defendants in their written statement and it was stated that prior approval had been obtained. Thereafter, the plaintiff did not file any replication. This allegation was specifically refuted by the defendants in their written statement and it was stated that prior approval had been obtained. Thereafter, the plaintiff did not file any replication. The position is that the meeting of the Committee of Management took dated 2-6-1970 and at that meeting it was resolved that the services of the plaintiff respondent be terminated by serving him with one month's notice. That action was approved by the District Inspector of Schools by his order dated 6r.6-1910 and a notice wag given on 8-0-70. The order of the Manager dated 9-6^80 was merely communication of the order of the Inspector. The plaintiff-respondent challenged the validity of the notice and the order of the Manager but did not challenge the order of the Inspector in the present suit. That being so, the contention urged is this appeal on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the order was Dull and void cannot be entertained. Apart from this in the present case with reference to propositions 1 and 6 aforesaid it would be difficult to hold that the order of the Inspector can be challenged in the Civil Court. 10. In this behalf reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on the decision of the Full Bench in S. L. Sugar Mills' case (supra), that was a case under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the scope of Sections 35, id and 40 thereof came up for consideration. Section 35 of that Act empowers any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed by a Central Excise Officer under that Act and rules framed thereunder to file an appeal before Central Board of Excise and Customs. The appellate authority has been given power to make further inquiry and pass such orders as it thinks fit. It may confirm, alter or annul the decision appealed against. The powers are, thus, analogous to the powers of the appellate authority under section 16-G (3) (0) of the Act. Section 36 confers revisional powers on the Central Government and Section 40 provides that no snit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Central Government We any matter of Central Government or State Government or anything which is done, or intended to be done in goop faith in pursuance of the Act and Rale made thereunder. Section 36 confers revisional powers on the Central Government and Section 40 provides that no snit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Central Government We any matter of Central Government or State Government or anything which is done, or intended to be done in goop faith in pursuance of the Act and Rale made thereunder. It is held by the Court that from a reading of these provisions it is clear that a complete code is provided therein and the remedy of the aggrieved person is only to seek redress thereunder and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is clearly excluded. In my opinion this ratio Will squarely apply to the present HAM, On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent my after was invited to a decision of A learned Judge of this Court in Aryavarta Intermediate College, Bhalsault Fatfteh through Manager v. District Inspector of Schools, Fatehpure, 1980 U.P. LBEC 154 in which it was held shat under section 16 G (4) of the Act the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is express and unambiguous and will apply to all causes in which the actions of the authorities mentioned in Section 16-G is challenged. The only exception possibly would be in those causes where the impugned action is beyond the ambit of the powers of the authorities purporting to exercise the powers which are specified under Section 16 G. I do not think that his observation would give any help to the plaintiff-respondent because the action of the Inspector has not been challenged in the present suit and in my opinion it could not have been challenged in view of the bar contained in section 16-G. What has been challenged is the notice and the letter of the Manager but that challenge is ineffective because the notice was issued only in pursuance of the order of the Inspector and so was the letter of the Manager. Without challenging the order of the Inspector the challenge to notice and the letter of the Manager is ineffective. 11. The controversy as to whether the plaintiff-respondent was a probationer or a permanent employee on the date the order was made by the Inspector need not be gone into on the view taken above. It is also not necessary for me to refer to the relevant regulations on Chapter 3 in this behalf. 12. 11. The controversy as to whether the plaintiff-respondent was a probationer or a permanent employee on the date the order was made by the Inspector need not be gone into on the view taken above. It is also not necessary for me to refer to the relevant regulations on Chapter 3 in this behalf. 12. In view of the above discussion the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court cannot be upheld and are set aside. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the suit hence stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs although.