JUDGMENT - R.S. BHONSALE, J.:---This petition, originally filed by one Haridas Advani, whose heirs and legal representatives have been subsequently brought on record, after his death while the petition was pending in this Court, had challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the concurrent findings of the Officer on special duty (hereinafter referred to as "O.S.D.") appointed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, holding that the disputed premises and that the licence was validly terminated. As a consequence thereof the original petitioner was directed to hand over vacant possession of the disputed flat in question to the original disputant, original respondent No. 2 to this petition. This order of the O.S.D. was confirmed by the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal by its order dated October 20th, 1977. The Co-operative Tribunal also confirmed all the findings of the O.S.D. principally those findings being that the O.S.D. had jurisdiction to try this disputes as it was covered under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Societies Act) that the original petitioner in this petition, was a licensee of the respondent No. 2 and not a tenant under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. The further findings which were confirmed by the Co-operative Tribunal were that the licence created in favour of the original petitioner by respondent No. 2 was validly terminated. The order of the O.S.D. directing the original petitioner to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the said flat No. 2 in the building "Blue Nile" to the original disputant No. 1, present respondent No. 2, was also confirmed. It is against these concurrent findings and the conclusions arrived at by the two authorities below that have been challenged in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties the relevant facts may briefly be stated:---Respondent No. 2 Smt. Veena G. Jaisinghani (hereinafter referred to as the "original disputant No. 1") was a member of respondent No. 1 Blue Nile Co-operative Housing Society (hereinafter referred to as the said society"), at 2nd Floor 24 off Turner Road, Bandra, Bombay-50. The original disputant No. 1 was allotted flat No. 2 in the said society building "Blue Nile" on the ground floor. The original disputant No. 1 was allotted flat No. 2 in the said society building "Blue Nile" on the ground floor. When the dispute came to be filed before the O.S.D. admittedly, respondent No. 2 original non-disputant was in occupation of the said flat. It has been the consistent case of original disputant No. 1 that by leave and licence dated February 20, 1970 she had allowed non-disputant to occupy the said flat and the monthly compensation was fixed at Rs. 375/- per month. Immediately after the occupation, the original non-disputant failed to pay the amount of compensation, for the month of March 1970 and, therefore, by a notice dated 27th June, 1970 the said licence in favour of the non-disputant was revoked. As the non-disputant refused to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the disputed flat, the original disputant was constrained to file a dispute under section 91 of the said Act, before the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, who in turn directed the original disputant No. 1 to be heard by the O.S.D. When this dispute was presented to the O.S.D. the said society was opponent No. 2 to the said application presented by the original disputant No. 1 before the O.S.D. Before the O.S.D. the main defence adopted by the non-disputant was that he was occupying the disputed premises not in the capacity as licensee but as a tenant and he was paying the rent of Rs. 375/- per month. In fact, he had paid an amount of Rs. 4150/- to the original disputant No. 1 in presence of certain witnesses. After this amount was paid the original disputant No. 1 wanted these non-disputant to sign certain more papers and the non-disputant signed the name on the representation being made that the document was made only to ensure the payment of rent. He also contended the quantum of the standard rent in respect of the suit premises, which according to him, could not be more than Rs. 110/- per month and not Rs. 375/- per month. The society which was joined as opponent to the application, filed by the original disputant No. 1, supported the case of the original disputant No. 1 by an order dated January 1974. The learned O.S.D. allowed the society to be transposed as a co-disputant No. 2 instead of being opponent No. 2, to the original application. 375/- per month. The society which was joined as opponent to the application, filed by the original disputant No. 1, supported the case of the original disputant No. 1 by an order dated January 1974. The learned O.S.D. allowed the society to be transposed as a co-disputant No. 2 instead of being opponent No. 2, to the original application. The learned O.S.D. who heard this matter on merits reframed the issues and arranged them in a different order than was done by this predecessor-in-title. These issues as follows :--- 1) whether this Court has jurisdiction to try this case ? 2) whether the opponent is a tenant under the Rent Act ? 3) If not whether the disputant has validly terminated the licence ? 4) whether the disputant is entitled to the vacant possession of the suit flat ? 5) whether the disputant is entitled to arrears of compensation as claimed? 6) what relief and what orders ? 3. The learned O.S.D. as stated above, held that he had jurisdiction to try and decide the case. He also held that non-disputant was not a tenant but a licensee, whose licence was validly terminated. In order to arrive at these findings, the learned O.S.D. went into the entire record of the case, scrutinised the various documents and assessed the evidence before him, including that of one Chandru Badlani, who had produced certain documents before the O.S.D. The findings arrived at by the learned O.S.D. and confirmed by the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal, are already referred to above. 4. In this petition, the only point which was keenly contested and vehemently argued by both the sides was whether the learned O.S.D. had jurisdiction to try this case at all. According to the learned Counsel Shri Suresh, appearing for the non-disputant in this petition and now on behalf of his heirs and legal representatives, this was a dispute essentially between the licensor-original disputant No. 1 and the licensee-original petitioner or non-disputant. The controversy in his submission was that it did not touch the business of the society though it could affect the business of the society. The controversy in his submission was that it did not touch the business of the society though it could affect the business of the society. The learned Counsel further submitted that on a careful perusal of the record in this case, it cannot be said that the licensor created a licence in favour of the non-disputant in her capacity as a member of the said society and, therefore, it could not be said that when the initial application was presented to the said society, the said society was effectively interested in the dispute. There was neither a resolution of the said society produced before the learned O.S.D. nor was any notice issued by the society the non-disputant and, therefore, in the absence of production of a resolution or a notice or in the absence of any averment regarding the society calling upon the original disputant No. 1 to get vacant possession of the disputed premises, the society had really no cause of action and the position remained unchanged even after transposition of the society from the place of opponent No. 2 in the original application to the place of the co-disputant. In fact, the submission was made in terms of the ration of (Kalawati Ramchand Malani v. Shankar Rao Patil)1, 76 Bom.L.R. 718. The position did not change and according to the learned Counsel the test laid down in Kalawatis case remained unsatisfied. A little later this and other cases will be described in detail. 5. In support of his submission the learned Counsel placed reliance on the bye-law No. 71 of the society which prohibited a member of the society from parting possession of the flat. According to him the act of giving premises on licence was not done in the capacity as a member of the said society. In the initial application by the original disputant No. 1 no resolution authorising the original disputant No. 1 to give this flat on a leave and licence basis to non-disputant was referred to. According to him the act of giving premises on licence was not done in the capacity as a member of the said society. In the initial application by the original disputant No. 1 no resolution authorising the original disputant No. 1 to give this flat on a leave and licence basis to non-disputant was referred to. The learned Counsel contended that the letter on which the original disputant No. 1 now relies on to show that the society had consented to this arrangement by letter dated January 8, 1970 authorising her to give this flat on the basis of leave and licence to the non-disputant was never produced either before the learned O.S.D. or before the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal and for the first time it was relied upon by the original disputant No. 1 in this Court. According to the learned Counsel the only inference that is inescapable is that inspite of the bye-law No. 71 the original disputant No. 1 let out the premises to non-disputant original petitioner. This was a case of letting simpliciter by the licensor member of the society to the licensee the original non-disputant petitioner and if the letting was not done in the capacity as a member of the society, this case was squarely covered by the direct rulings of the Supreme Court on the point. The learned Counsel drew my attention to the decision in (M/s. Sabharwal Brothers and another v. Smt. Guna Amrit Thadani)2, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1893, that the letting by a member of the society of the flat purchased from the society could not be said to touch the business of the society. This ratio was confirmed by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kalawatis case (supra). The learned Counsel also contended that initially the society never chose to raise a dispute against the non-disputant either by giving a notice or by any resolution. As far as the transposition of the society was concerned, the learned Counsel also argued that in terms of the decision of this Court in (Panjumal Hassomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh)3, 76 Bom.L.R. 729 that merely adding society as party or by transposition from the place of opponent No. 2 will be an idle formality. As far as the transposition of the society was concerned, the learned Counsel also argued that in terms of the decision of this Court in (Panjumal Hassomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh)3, 76 Bom.L.R. 729 that merely adding society as party or by transposition from the place of opponent No. 2 will be an idle formality. Looked from any angle the learned Counsel submitted that the learned O.S.D. should not have assumed that this dispute or controversy did not touch the business of the society and the whole order without jurisdiction was a nullity. This was the only point argued in this petition. Since the parties chose to contest this petition only on the basis of correctness of the jurisdiction assumed by the learned O.S.D., no other submissions on merits were submitted. 6. As against this, the learned Counsel Shri Punwani drew my attention to the fact that initially the dispute came to be filed in the year 1970. This was much prior to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Kalawatis case. The learned Counsel referred me to the averments in the original application submitted to the Registrar of the co-operative societies. In this application, according to the learned Counsel, paragraphs 1, 7 and 8 if read carefully, indicate that the said society was classified as Housing Society and co-partnership tenancy under section 12(1) of the said Act read with Rule 16(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules. It was further averred in paragraph 7 of the said application that the disputant was entitled to recover the possession of the said flat from opponent non-disputant as his licence stood revoked and he was liable to vacate the said flat and hand over vacant possession of the said flat to the disputant. The disputant further submitted that as per the bye-laws, rules and regulations of the said society, the disputant is required to occupy the said flat herself. It was further averred in paragraph 8 of the said application that though the member of the society and, therefore, the dispute touched the business of the society. According to the learned Counsel, these averments in the original application are indicate of the interest of the co-operative society in the said dispute. It was further averred in paragraph 8 of the said application that though the member of the society and, therefore, the dispute touched the business of the society. According to the learned Counsel, these averments in the original application are indicate of the interest of the co-operative society in the said dispute. He relied upon the decision of this Court in (I.R. Hingorani v. Pravinchandra Kantilal Shah)4, 67 Bom.L.R. 306, in which the late Chief Justice Shri Chainani and Gokhale, J., referred to the correct procedure to be followed in referring a dispute covered under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative. Societies Act, 1960, to the Registrars nominee. 7. Repelling this arguments the learned late Chief Justice observed :--- "This argument is without any merit. The nature of the dispute will not change because the society has not been made a party to the proceeding. Section 91 itself contemplate that a dispute touching the business of a society may arise between a member and member or between a member and a person claiming through a member". 8. The submission of the learned Counsel Shri Punwani was that the application as was originally preferred to the Registrar was perfectly in order. It is only after the decision of Kalawatis case by this court that the learned O.S.D. had allowed the original disputant to transpose the society as a co-disputant. The Counsel also contended that the non-disputant had never chosen to challenge the jurisdiction of the learned O.S.D. except saying in the written statement that only the Small Causes Court was competent to try the dispute. The learned Counsel also drew my attention to the fact that an altogether a new case is being made out in this petition inasmuch as according to the averments in the position, it is the petitioners case now that there was an agreement to purchase the flat. The learned Counsel also relied upon certain unreported judgments of this Court in support of his two propositions that (i) the society was effectively interested and (ii) the controversy did touch the business of the society and after the decision of Kalawatis case the society had applied for transposition and that itself showed the effective interest the society had in the dispute. He further submitted that there can be no manner of doubt that the learned O.S.D. had jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 9. He further submitted that there can be no manner of doubt that the learned O.S.D. had jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 9. He further drew my attention to the fact that the dispute was authorised by the society to give this flat on leave and licence basis to the non-disputant and is doing so there was no change of the position and, therefore, there was no occasion to the original disputant to produce the resolution of the society on record. In fact, the non-disputant raised no objection that the transposition was done without the authority of the society. According to the learned Counsel, there it exist such a resolution which was shown to the learned O.S.D. and to the members of the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal. In fact, such an objection does not find in the present position also. It is only for the first time that the learned Counsel had chosen to argue this point in the Court. 10. From this rival submission between the parties, the question that falls for determination is whether the learned O.S.D. had jurisdiction to decide this dispute. In this petition, we are faced with the concurrent findings of the two authorities below. Both the learned O.S.D. and the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal, in effect, have held that they had jurisdiction to decide this dispute, that the non-disputant was a licensee whose licence was validly terminated and the non-disputant was directed to hand over vacant possession of the disputed flat to the original disputant. The question extensively argued by the learned Counsel before me was posed as a question of pure law whether the learned O.S.D. had jurisdiction to entertain a dispute on reference made by the Registrar of the societies. The finding on assumption of jurisdiction by both the authorities is based on certain facts which according to the authorities are held proved in these proceedings. The facts which are held to be proved by both the authorities will of some assistance in arriving at a finding whether the society was effectively interested in this dispute and whether the dispute touched the business of the society. There may be necessary distinction between the expressions : "dispute touching the business of the society" and "dispute effecting the business of the society". There may be necessary distinction between the expressions : "dispute touching the business of the society" and "dispute effecting the business of the society". In the facts of the present case, however, it cannot be said that the society was not effectively interested in the dispute and it had not raised a dispute by adopting a particular resolution. The learned O.S.D. has observed that when the society was made opponent No. 2 to the original application it did file its written statement and further filed certain documents on the record. These documents were as follows :--- 1) Bye-laws of the society. 2) Letter dated 15-1-1970 of the society permitting the allottee member to give the flat on leave and licence to the non-disputant. 3) The form of nominal membership filed by the opponent Haridas. 4) Receipt No. 82 dated 12-4-70 counterfoil by which the opponent paid the subscription to the society for nominal membership. 11. These documents were relied upon by the original disputant as well as by the society to show that the original disputant did not give the disputed flat on leave and licence in her private capacity but in her capacity as a member of the said society and, therefore, the dispute touched the business of the society. These documents have been accepted by both the authorities and the finding of fact recorded by the learned O.S.D. was that he was convinced that the disputant No. 1 obtained prior consent of the society, the disputant No. 2 and then parted with the possession of the said flat and gave it to the opponent non-disputant. This fact of the disputant, therefore, is qua her membership, and, therefore, the dispute touches the business of the society and falls within the purview of the section 91 of the said Act. In my opinion, the reliance by the learned O.S.D. on the other circumstance indicative of consent being given by the society to the original disputant No. 1 to give this flat on licence to non-disputant and also non-disputant applying for nominal membership of the society is sound one and there is nothing to doubt the correctness of these facts found. In fact, the learned O.S.D. has given a sound reasoning for this conclusion. In fact, the learned O.S.D. has given a sound reasoning for this conclusion. One of the arguments advanced for the non-disputant was that the permission given by the society to disputant No. 1 was not found on record and, therefore, it was of doubtful validity. Repelling these contentions the learned O.S.D. has held that if the society wanted to assist the disputant it could have manipulated initially and could have brought the original application on itself. I find there is considerable force in the argument of Shri Punwani that at the time when the dispute came to be filed by the Registrar of the societies, as per ratio laid down in Hingoranis case, there was no insistance of such consent of the society being proved, and that seems to be the correct position in law. 12. It is only after ruling in Kalawatis case was handed down, it became clear that mere letting of such a flat by the member of the society in the name of the other allottee would not touch the business of the society. The learned O.S.D. has held that both the original disputant and the society were very much honest in their dealings otherwise it would have been very difficult for the society to produce the documents in question. The learned Co-operative Appellate Tribunal has also confirmed this finding and has placed reliance on these documents in support of its finding. The society was effectively interested and this was clear from the written statement initially filed by it. It cannot be forgotten that it is not the original disputant made the application before the learned O.S.D. but it is the society itself which made the application to transpose itself as co-disputant. By an application dated July 30, 1973, annexed as Annexure "A" to the affidavit of one of the heirs of the non-disputant the society applied before the learned O.S.D. and in the very first paragraph it was stated that from the very beginning the society has been keen and anxious to see that the opponent No. 1 herein inducted in the society building by the tenant member Smt. Veena G. Jaisinghani is ejected at the earliest from the society building. This application was verified by one M.P. Badlani, the Chairman of the said society on the same day. This application was verified by one M.P. Badlani, the Chairman of the said society on the same day. The argument of the learned Counsel Shri Suresh that neither the resolution authorising the Secretary of the society to get the society transposed as co-disputant No. 2 was produced nor any notice to that effect was reduced before the learned O.S.D. Therefore, merely transposing without the valid authority of the society was in terms of Panjumals case a mere idle formality and was in no way indicative of the effective interest of the society, cannot be accepted in view of the series of circumstances in this case. These circumstances were that the society filed its written statement when initially it was made opponent No. 2. Further it had filed certain documents referred to above, one of which had permitted the original disputant to give the said flat on leave and licence to non-disputant. The other document was in application of nominal membership by the non-disputant himself. Thirdly, the receipt dated April 12, 1970, by which the non-disputant paid subscription to the society for nominal membership. As stated earlier, the society has placed reliance on bye-law No. 71, according to which there was the prohibition, against the member parting with possession of the flat in favour of licensee. 13. All these acts done by the society and submitting the transposition application, was not a mere empty formality. It is true that Shri Suresh has argued that all these acts on the part of the society were without authority and, therefore, were of no consequence. This submission is only to be stated rejected inasmuch as Shri Punwani has rightly contended that the non-disputant had never objected to the jurisdiction of the learned O.S.D. Again the non-disputant had never raised a question that the resolution consenting the original disputant to give these premises on leave and licence or the transposition was not authorised by the resolutions of the society, these objections were not taken or raised before the authorities below. It is for the first time that these contentions were raised here and they cannot be allowed to be raised though I have heard the learned Counsel on these submission. I have no doubt in my mind that subsequently the original disputant as well as the society produced the resolutions which Shri Punwani says would indicate the correct position. It is for the first time that these contentions were raised here and they cannot be allowed to be raised though I have heard the learned Counsel on these submission. I have no doubt in my mind that subsequently the original disputant as well as the society produced the resolutions which Shri Punwani says would indicate the correct position. The original disputant was authorised by the society to give the disputed premises on leave and licence. It follows that this resolution authorised the disputant to give the premises on leave and licence in his capacity as a member of the society. All the circumstances on the record, therefore, indicate that the society was very such interested a recovery of the vacant possession from disputant. 14. Reliance placed by Shri Suresh on the ratio of M/s. Sabharwal Brothers and another v. Smt. Guna Amrit Thadani, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1893, has to be examined now. The question raised before the Supreme Court was whether there was any dispute between the parties touching the business of the co-operative society. The learned Judge of the Supreme Court, in deciding this point, has held in paragraph 9 of his judgment as under :--- "No doubt it was the business of the society to let out premises and a member had no unqualified right to let out his flat or tenement of another by virtue of the bye-law and a breach of the bye-law could effect the defaulting members right to membership. But we are not able to see how letting by a member to another member would touch the business of the society which included inter alia the trade of buying, selling, hiring and letting land in accordance with co-operative principles. The letting of a flat by respondent No. 1 was a transaction of the same nature as the society itself was empowered to enter into but such letting by itself did not concern the business of the society in the matter of its letting out flats. Nothing was brought to our notice to show that such a letting would affect the business of the society once it had sold the flat to the respondent No. 1. The position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant of the flat under the society. Nothing was brought to our notice to show that such a letting would affect the business of the society once it had sold the flat to the respondent No. 1. The position might have been different if the latter had himself been a tenant of the flat under the society. To touch the means "to come in contact with" and it does not appear that there is a point of contact between a letting by the respondent No. 1 and the business of the society when the society was not itself the landlord of the flat. 15. The learned Counsel made observation the sheet-anchor of his argument that in this case all that has happened was simpliciter letting by member of the society to the non-disputant and it could not be said that it touched the business of the society. Shri Suresh after relying upon Kalawatis case in support of his submission, made this argument. Deshpande, J., (as he then was) while delivering the judgment in Kalawatis case observed as follows :--- "A dispute between a member of a co-operative housing society and his licence with regard to the possession of flat does not fall within the four corners of section 91 the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960." What the Division Bench of this Court has held in Kalawatis case was that merely a letting by a member to licensee could not be said to touch the business of the society for various reasons assigned in support of the ratio. It is not necessary to refer to all these principles which are now well-known. The only question that has to determined in this petition is whether the letting by the original member of the society to non-disputant could be said to touch the business of the society. 16. Reliance was placed by Shri Suresh on another ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in Panjumal Hasoomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh, 76 Bom.L.R. 729 is in that case what the Division Bench held was that with the previous approval of the co-operative housing society and the co-operative housing society is effectively interested in ensuring that the possession of the premises is recovered back from the licensee occupant, then in order for adding the co-operative housing society as a co-disputant of transposing it from an opponent to a co-disputant will be in order. 17. 17. In fact, the ruling in Punjumals case is contrary to the submissions made by Shri Suresh. In this case the society is effectively interested in getting possession from the non-disputant licensee in favour of the original disputant member. This has been indicated by various circumstances to which I have already made a reference and such transposition is, therefore, in perfect order. In view of the decision of Panjumals case that it does not support the petitioners case, it is unnecessary to refer to 3 or 4 unreported judgments of this Court, relied upon by Shri Punwani in support of his proposition that if a licence is created by the society the transposition of such society will be in order. Shri Punwani has relied upon the following judgements : --- (Nand Kumar M. Natekar v. Mrs. Shaila Indar Vashishth and others)5, Spl. C.A. No. 1806 of 1974, decided on February 24, 1976, by Deshpande, J. (as he then was) Mridul, J., reported in 1978 U.C.R. (Bom.) 301. (D.K. Mehta v. N.Y. Fazalbhai others)6, Spl. Civil Appln. No. 5586 of 1976, decided on June 20, 1978 by Deshpande, J. (as he then was ) and Pendse, J., reported in 1979 Bom.C.R. 68. (Appeal No. 358 of 1979, in Misc. Petition No. 1919 of 1979, delivered on February 16, 1961, by Deshpande, J. (as he then was) Rage, J.)7 (Misc. Petition No. 271 of 1979, decided on 16th 17th March, 1981, by Pendse, J.)8 18. In view of what I have observed that transposing opponent No. 2 society as co-disputant was not a mere idle formality but the society from the beginning was interested in obtaining possession from the non-disputant and it had made consistent efforts as indicated by filing written statement and by filing an application to transpose itself as a co-disputant. The transposition was in perfect order and was not a mere empty formality as observed by the Division Bench of this Court in Panjumals case (supra). 19. In view of these finding it must be held that the learned O.S.D. had correctly assumed jurisdiction since the controversy between the parties did touch the business of the society. The dispute squarely fell within the four corners of section 91 of the Societies Act. Notwithstanding arguments of the learned Counsel Shri Suresh, the learned O.S.D. had correctly assumed jurisdiction. 20. The dispute squarely fell within the four corners of section 91 of the Societies Act. Notwithstanding arguments of the learned Counsel Shri Suresh, the learned O.S.D. had correctly assumed jurisdiction. 20. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the order passed on December 30, 1974 by the learned O.S.D. This Court cannot be obvious to many decisions of the Supreme Court laying down that this Courts power to issue a writ of certiorari cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of Appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right to appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or Tribunal final on facts. The High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 interfere with findings of fact recorded by the Subordinate Court or Tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the Subordinate Court or Tribunal functions within the limit of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reapreciating it. 21. Though in this case the question posed was that of law in fact what is challenged is the concentrate findings of the lower courts to the effect that the society was effectively interested in the dispute and as it was effectively interested in obtaining possession of the flat through disputant No. 1 from the non-disputant, the dispute said to have touched the business of the society. In the view of these concurrent findings of the fact it cannot be said that the question of jurisdiction which is raised is a pure question of law. It cannot be forgotten that the non-disputant had never raised these questions before the authorities below. Looked from any angle, the petition has no merit and deserves to be dismissed with cost. Rule is, therefore, discharged. Rule discharged. ------