JUDGMENT M.M Dutt, J. : In this appeal, the appellant has challenged the propriety of the judgment of M.N. Roy J. whereby the learned Judge has discharged the Rule Nisi that was issued on the application of the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The appellant is a trader and commission agent in coal and carries on the business of supply of coal and coke to different parts of India through railways in smalls, that is, less than wagon-loads. In the writ petition, the appellant has challenged the legality of the addition (amendment) made by the Railway Board on December 13, 1978 to Rule 701(7)(ix) of the Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol. I. The addition that has been made to the said Rule is as follows : “Clubbing of consignments is not permissible in the case of booking of ‘smalls’ consignments of coal, coal shale, lignite, patent fuel, soft coke, hard coke, domestic coke, coal/coke briquettes, briquettes fuel mixture and any other kind of fuel containing coal, coke and lignite as the major ingredient.” The appellant has also challenged a circular of the Railway Board dated May, 5, 1973 whereby it is directed by the Board that with effect from May 25. 1973, the prepayment of freight will be compulsory in respect of coal bonked in smalls. 3. It appears that by virtue of amendment of Rules 1 and 2 of both Eastern Railway Tariff and South Eastern Railway Tariff all traffic in coal, coal shale, lignite etc. in wagon-loads can be loaded and despatched only from colliery sidings, coke-oven plants and washeries. It is not disputed that coal in wagon-loads cannot be booked and despatched from wayside stations of any railway. What is permitted to be despatched from wayside railway stations is coal in smalls, that is, less than wagon-loads. The freight charged for the consignment of coal in smalls is higher than that of coal in wagon-loads despatched from colliery sidings, coke-oven plants and washeries. Coal in smalls is under the relevant rules required to be packed in gunny bags and then put into the wagon obviously for the reason that in the empty space in the wagon commodities other than coal are allowed by the railway administration to be loaded and despatched. Coal in smalls is under the relevant rules required to be packed in gunny bags and then put into the wagon obviously for the reason that in the empty space in the wagon commodities other than coal are allowed by the railway administration to be loaded and despatched. When this pattern of transportation of coal was going on, some traders despatching coal in smalls from the wayside railway stations insisted on the railway administration for allowing them to despatch coal in smalls after ‘clubbing’. Clubbing will enable two or more traders to jointly consign their respective quantitives of coal in smalls in wagons to the full capacity of such wagons at wagon-load freight charge. The freight charged for coal in wagon-lead, which is less than the freight for coal in smalls, will be shared by such traders, each having to pay freight in respect of his consignment much less than that charged for coal in smalls and even for coal in wagon-load. It was claimed by the traders in coal in smalls that clubbing of coal is permitted under the said Rule 701(7)(ix) before it was amended. The railway administration, however, refused to book and despatch coal in smalls after clubbing on the ground that it would tantamount to consignment of coal in wagon-loads which is, as stated already, not permissible from wayside railway stations. 4. It appears that one Laxman Prosad Tikmani filed a Writ petition in this Court challenging the action of the authorities of the Eastern Railway refusing him to give the benefit of clubbing of coal consignments in smalls under Rule 701(7)(ix). On the said petition, a Rule Nisi being Civil Rule No. 13673(W) of 1979 was issued. The said Rule came up fur final hearing before A.K. Mookerji J. The learned Judge by his judgment dated August 2, 1977 made the said Rule absolute. The learned Judge observed : “The coal consignments booked in smalls are clubbed for freight charges only. Simply because the wagon-loads are charged on the clubbed consignments it cannot be said that coals were booked in wagon-loaded. If the authorities want to prevent clubbing of coal “in smalls” in that case, the relevant rules should be amended.” Another Writ petition was filed by one Rajkumar Agarwalla giving rise to C.R. 12773(W) of 1976 and that was also disposed of by A.K. Mookerji J. on the same view. 5. If the authorities want to prevent clubbing of coal “in smalls” in that case, the relevant rules should be amended.” Another Writ petition was filed by one Rajkumar Agarwalla giving rise to C.R. 12773(W) of 1976 and that was also disposed of by A.K. Mookerji J. on the same view. 5. The railway administration did not prefer any appeal against the judgments of A.K Mookerji J; instead they got Rule 701(7)(ix) amended by the Central Government on December 3, 1978 by adding thereto a provision prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls as set out above. The appellant, as stated already, challenged the validity of the said addition as also of the circular dated May 5, 1973 of the Railway Board regarding prepayment of freight by filing a Writ petition on which the Rule Nisi out of which this appeal arises was issued. 6. At the hearing of the Rule Nisi, it was inter alia contended on behalf of the appellant that the said addition prohibiting clubbing and the said circular of the Railway Board regarding prepayment of freight were contrary to and in consistent with Rule 301 of the Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol. I and, as such, ultra vires S. 54 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, hereinafter referred to as the Act and that they were also contrary to the latter part of S. 28 of the Act and viloative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. 7. The learned Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the parties, discharged the Rule Nisi. Hence this appeal. 8. The same contentions have been repeated before us by Mr. Soumen Ghose, learned Counsel for the appellant. In regard to the contention of the appellant as advanced before us against the addition to Rule 701(7) (ix) prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls, it has twofold aspects–reasonableness of the prohibition and the validity of the same. 8. The same contentions have been repeated before us by Mr. Soumen Ghose, learned Counsel for the appellant. In regard to the contention of the appellant as advanced before us against the addition to Rule 701(7) (ix) prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls, it has twofold aspects–reasonableness of the prohibition and the validity of the same. So far as reasonableness of the prohibition or the addition to the said Rule 701(7)(ix) is concerned, the case of the Eastern Railway Administration as pleaded in paragraph 4 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by one Angshuman Sarkar is, inter alia, that in or about 1971 when coal traders started large-scale booking of coal from wayside stations, situation came to such a pass that it became necessary to amend Rules 1 and 2 of Railway Tariff in 1972 permitting booking of coal, shale, lignite etc. in wagonloads only from colliery sidings, coke-oven plants and washeries in public interest. Thereafter, some coal traders demanded large-scale booking of coal in smalls after clubbing from wayside stations at the wagon-load rate of freight which is less than the rate of consignment in smalls on the ground that it was permitted under the said Rule 701(7)(ix). The said Rule did not contemplate large scale booking of coal in smalls, but some traders started submitting indents for wagon for booking huge quantities of coal in smalls by way of clubbing to circumvent the rules banning booking of coal in wagon loads from wayside railway stations. Since large-scale booking of coal in smalls after clubbing from wayside stations would lead to administrative and operational problems and vitiate public interest as booking of coal in wagan-loads from wayside stations is prohibited by law, the railway administration had to refuse demands for clubbing of coal consignments in smalls the situation having become unmanageable. After the said decision of A.K. Mookerji J in Laxman Prasad’s case (supra) or in Rajkumar Agarwallas’s case (supra) wherein it was held, inter alia, that clubbing could not be prevented without the amendment of the relevant rules, the Railway Board with the approval of the Central Government had to amend the said Rule 701(7)(ix) prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. 9. 9. The circumstances under which Rules 1 and 2 of the Railway Tariff had to be amended and the addition had to be made to Rule 701(7)(ix) prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls, have not been specifically denied in the affidavit-in-reply affirmed on behalf of the appellant. In the affidavit-in-reply much reliance has been placed on the observation of A.K. Mookerji J made in the said decisions. 10. In considering the propriety of the restriction imposed by the railway administration, it would be pertinent to keep in mind the observation of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Perth General Station Committee v. Rose, (1897) AC 497 relied on by Mr. D.N Das, learned Counsel for the South Eastern Railway, that a railway company has an absolute right to regulate its own traffic in its own way and that its own interest being the best security that its strict legal right to do so will not be abused. To this observation of Lord Halsbury L.C, adds Cumming J in Bhupendra Kumar v. King Emperor AIR 1924 Cal 692 “so long as it does not contravene any express provision of the law.” This addition is in our opinion, quite appropriate. The position that emerges is while the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the railway administration in the context of facts and circumstances is not capable of being scrutinised, such restrictions must not, however, contravene any express provision of law. This takes us to the question as to the validity of the restrictions or prohibitions. 11. We may first of all consider the contentions of the appellant against prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls by the said addition to Rule 701(7)(ix). It is contended that such prohibition or addition to the said Rule is ultra vires S. 28 read with S. 54 of the Act and also Rule 301. Section 54 deals with the power of any railway administration to impose conditions for working traffic. It is contended that such prohibition or addition to the said Rule is ultra vires S. 28 read with S. 54 of the Act and also Rule 301. Section 54 deals with the power of any railway administration to impose conditions for working traffic. Sub-section (1) of S. 54 provides : “Subject to the control of the Central Government, a railway administration may impose conditions, not inconsistent with this Act or with any general rule thereunder, with respect to receiving, forwarding or delivering of any animals or goods.” Thus S. 54(1) permits a railway administration to impose conditions with respect to receiving, forwarding or delivering of any animals or goods, but such conditions must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or with any general rule framed thereunder. Section 47 of the Act confers power on the Central Government and a railway company to frame general rules. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that general rules can also be framed under S. 54. It has been already noticed that S. 54 only confers Power on a railway administration to impose conditions. General rules can only be framed under S. 47. Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol. I contains general rules including Rules 301 and 701(7)(ix) for acceptance, carriage and delivery of goods. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that these general rules have been framed under S. 54 of the Act. There is, however, no indication in Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol. I as to under which provision of the Act the rules contained therein have been framed, but as these rules have been termed as “General Rules”, it may be presumed that these general rules have been framed under S. 47 and not under S. 54 of the Act as contended on behalf of the appellant. We may, however, proceed on the assumption that these general rules including Rules 301 and 701(7)(ix) have been framed under S. 54. Rule 301 inter alia provides as follows : “301. Coal not in wagon-loads–(1) Coal, coal shale, soft coke, lignite and patent fuel when moving in “Smalls” will be charged at Class “60” at O.R. When offered for booking at Railway Risk, the freight charges to be levied are 20 per cent higher than the freight charges leviable at Owner's Risk as illustrated below. Coal not in wagon-loads–(1) Coal, coal shale, soft coke, lignite and patent fuel when moving in “Smalls” will be charged at Class “60” at O.R. When offered for booking at Railway Risk, the freight charges to be levied are 20 per cent higher than the freight charges leviable at Owner's Risk as illustrated below. The rules and conditions of carriage will be the same as those notified for generall goods.” Rule 701(7)(ix) reads as follows : “(ix) C.C – indicates that the weight for charges is the carrying capacity of the wagon used, subject to Rule 163. The weight may be distributed over two or more consignments of goods to which the same weight conditions at the rate apply, loaded in the same wagon, provided that they are booked together by one sender to one destination on one invoice. Where the rates and conditions of carriage through to destination are not the same, rule 194(3) applies. The minimum weight may also be distributed over different consignments of the same commodity up to a maximum of eight consignments per 4-wheeled wagon, twelve per 6-wheeled wagon and sixteen per bogie wagon from the said sender or different senders to the same consignee or different consignees booked on the same date from the same station to the same destination in the same wagon, provided that – (a) the sender or senders tender a separate Forwarding Note for each consignment with full particulars of all consignments proposed to be dispatched, duly endorsed on every. Forwarding Note, with the request that this be clubbed together for purposes of freight charges : (b) separate invoices and Railway Receipts are issued for each consignment, but each invoice and Railway Receipt contains details of the other consignments booked showing that the minimum condition has been complied with : (c) packages forming part of each consignment are separately distinctively marked.” 12. It has been already stated that Rule 701(7)(ix) has been amended on December 13, 1978 by the addition of a provision prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that such prohibition by the said addition being inconsistent with Rule 301 is void. Rule 301 inter alia provides that the rule and conditions of carriage so far as coal in smalls are concerned will be the same as those notified for general goods. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that such prohibition by the said addition being inconsistent with Rule 301 is void. Rule 301 inter alia provides that the rule and conditions of carriage so far as coal in smalls are concerned will be the same as those notified for general goods. It is submitted that as Rule 701(7)(iv), which admittedly relates to general goods, permits clubbing of consignments in smalls of general goods, the railway administration had no authority to prohibit clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls in violation of Rule 301. In support of this contention, much reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on the observation of A.K. Mookerji J in Raj Kumar Agarwalla’s case (C.R. No. 12773(W) of 1976) and in Laxman Prosed’s case (C.R. No. 13673(W) of 1976) referred to above, that in order to prevent clubbing of coal in smalls, the relevant rules should be amended. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that as Rule 301 has not been amended, clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls cannot be prohibited. 13. In view of Rule 301, the rules and conditions of carriage of consignments of coal in smalls will be the same as those notified for general goods. Rule 701(7)(ix) permits clubbing of consignments of goods in smalls and the carriage thereof provided certain conditions as laid down in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said Rule are complied with, Rule 301 does not confer any right, rather it puts certain restrictions on the movement of coal in smalls as in the case of general goods. Rule 301 speaks of 'rules and conditions of carriage’ so far as movement of coal in smalls is concerned. If clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls is permitted, it must conform to the conditions laid down in Rule 701(7)(ix). If the carriage of any goods is prohibited, the question of complying with the rules and conditions of carriage does not arise. Prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls by the addition to Rule 701(7)(ix). is neither a rule for carriage nor a condition of carriage within the meaning of Rule 301. Movement of consignments of goods in smalls is permitted under Rule 70l(7)(ix) on certain conditions. Prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls by the addition to Rule 701(7)(ix). is neither a rule for carriage nor a condition of carriage within the meaning of Rule 301. Movement of consignments of goods in smalls is permitted under Rule 70l(7)(ix) on certain conditions. As in the case of general goods, movement of coal in smalls is still permitted under Rule 701(7)(ix) on the same conditions. The railway administration cannot impose further conditions for movement of coal in smalls; but what has been done by the addiction to Rule 701(7)(ix) is prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. Such prohibition, as observed already, is not an imposition of a condition of carriage. At the time A.K. Mookerji J had to decide the said two cases. Rule 701(7)(ix) was not amended. It was not, therefore, permissible for the railway administration to prevent movement of consignments of coal in smalls after clubbing. It was rightly observed by A.K. Mookerji J that without the amendment of the relevant rules the railway administration could not prevent clubbing of coal in smalls. It is true that in making the said observation, the learned Judge used the expression “relevant rules”. He did not however, come to any finding as to the specific rules which were required to be amended for the purpose of preventing clubbing of coal in smalls. In our opinion, the relevant rule is Rule 701(7)(ix) which permits clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls, the railway administration has acted in accordance with the said observation of A.K. MookerJi J. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that without the amendment of Rule 301 clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls cannot be prohibited. It has been already pointed out that Rule 301 inter alia provides that movement of coal in smalls will conform to the rules and conditions of carriage prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls being neither a rule nor a condition of carriage, there is no question of amending Rule 301 for such prohibition. In the circumstances, we are the view that the contention of the appellant that addition to Rule 701(7) (ix) being contrary to and inconsistent with Rule 301 is raid, is without any substance. 14. In the circumstances, we are the view that the contention of the appellant that addition to Rule 701(7) (ix) being contrary to and inconsistent with Rule 301 is raid, is without any substance. 14. Let us now consider whether the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) is violative of S. 28 of the Act and Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 28 which provides for prohibition of undue preference reads as follows : "28. A railway administration shall not make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to, or in favour of, any particular person or railway administration or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or subject any particular person or railway administration or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” Section 28 engrafts a rule against distinctive treatment and forbids giving of undue or unreasonable preference to any person or traffic and or subjecting any person or traffic to any undue prejudice or disadvantage. The contention of the appellant is that by prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls but, at the same time, allowing clubbing of general goods, the railway administration has subjected the appellant and other traders in coal to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage. It is, accordingly, submitted on behalf of the appellant that the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) is violative of S. 28 and is vaid. 15. We have already noticed the circumstances as pointed out by the railway administration justifying the prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. The truth or otherwise of these circumstances is not for this Court to decide. Indeed, S. 34 of the Railways Act provides for the constitution of a Railway Rates Tribunal and under clause (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 41, any complaint that a railway administration is contravening the provisions of S. 28 may be made to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint. It is, however, faintly argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that as the Tribunal is a Rates Tribunal, it can only decide complaints about the violation of S. 28 relating to fares and freights. Counsel submits that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide whether the railway administration was justified in prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. Counsel submits that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide whether the railway administration was justified in prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. This argument, in our opinion, is fallacious, The appellant wants to avail himself of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls as, in that case, freight charges will be lower. Indeed, Rule 701(7)(ix) permits clubbing of consignments of general goods for freight charges only. As clubbing is directly related to freight charges, the Tribunal will have jurisdiction to consider whether the railway administration is justified in depriving the traders in coal of the benefit of lesser amount of freight charges by prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. Be that as it may, as such arguments have been made on S.28, we propose to consider whether or not the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) is violative of the provision of S. 28 of the Act. 16. In Raigarh Jute Mills Eastern Railway, AIR 1958 SC 425, the Supreme Court had to interpret and lay down the scope of S. 28 of the Railways Act. Gajendragadkar J. speaking for the Court observed as follows : “Section 26 is obviously based on the principle that the power derived from the monopoly of railway carriage must be used in a fair and just manner in respect of all persons and all descriptions of traffic passing over the railway area. In other words, equal charges should normally be levied against persons or goods of the same or similar kinds passing over the, same or similar area of the railway lines and under the similar circumstances; but this rule does not mean that, if the railway administration charges unequal rates in respect of the same or similar class of goods travelling over the same or similar areas, the inequality of rates necessarily attracts the provisions of S. 28. All cases of unequal rates cannot necessarily be treated as cases of preference because the very concept of preference postulates the competition between the person or traffic receiving preference and the person or traffic suffering prejudice in consequence. It is only as between competitors in the same trade that a complaint of preference can be made by one in reference to the other. If there is no such competition then no complaint of preference can be made even though the charges levied against similar goods may not be equal. It is only as between competitors in the same trade that a complaint of preference can be made by one in reference to the other. If there is no such competition then no complaint of preference can be made even though the charges levied against similar goods may not be equal. It may be possible to assume that there is competition between similar commodities put on the market in the same area for domestic consumption; but no such competition can be assumed between traffic of good, for export and traffic of similar goods for home consumption. It is only when goods or persons can be said to be pari passu that a question of preference arises and so it is where the competition between two persons or classes of goods is either admitted or proved that the question of the application of S. 28 would ever arise. Then again, even as between competing goods or persons, it would not be enough to prove mere preference to attract the provisions of S. 28, for theoretically every case of preference may not necessarily be a case of “undue” preference. It is only when the tribunal is satisfied that the railway administration has shown "undue" preference in favour of a particular class of goods that a complaint can be successfully entertained under S. 41(1)(a). The position under S. 28 thus appears to be clear. Whoever complains against the railway administration that the provisions of S. 28 have been contravened must establish that there has been preference between himself and his goods on the one hand and his competitor and his goods on the others; and where it appears to the tribunal that such preference is “undue” preference, the complainant would be entitled to adequate relief under S. 41(1)(a) of the Act.” 17. Thus it appears from the above observation that in order to attract S. 28, it has to be established by the complainant that there has been undue preference between himself and his goods on the one hand and his competitor and his goods on the other. In the instant case, there is no question of any competition between the appellant and any other trader in coal or among the traders generally, so far as clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls is concerned. In the instant case, there is no question of any competition between the appellant and any other trader in coal or among the traders generally, so far as clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls is concerned. It is not the case of the appellant that the railway administration has allowed some traders to club their consignments of coal in smalls, but has disallowed the appellant and some other traders to do so. By the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix), the railway administration has prohibited clubbing of consignments of coal and, as such, there is no question of competition and, consequently, no undue preference The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, submits that the above observation of the Supreme Court relates only to the question of undue preference and not to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage referred to in the latter part of S. 28. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that when the complaint is about undue preference, as it was in the case before the Supreme Court, the question of competition between the complainant and his goods on the one hand and the competitor and his goods on the other arises. But where, as in the instant case, the complaint is about undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, the question of competition does not arise. It is contended that undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage does not postulate the existence of any competition and it may be caused even though there is no competition. 18. The terms “undue preference” and “undue prejudice” in S. 28 seem to be correlative. When preference is given to a person or traffic, it may cause prejudice to another person or traffic. Whether undue prejudice has been caused to a person and his goods has to be determined on a comparison of the positions of other persons and similar goods. If all are treated equally and subjected to the same disadvantage, the question of “undue” prejudice does not arise. In Ratgarh Jute Mill’s case (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the scope of S. 28 and not merely the circumstances when it can be said that undue preference has been given to a person or his goods. If all are treated equally and subjected to the same disadvantage, the question of “undue” prejudice does not arise. In Ratgarh Jute Mill’s case (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down the scope of S. 28 and not merely the circumstances when it can be said that undue preference has been given to a person or his goods. What has been ruled by the Supreme Court is that unless the railway administration gives undue preference between a person and his goods on the one hand and his competitor and his goods on the other, there is no contravention of S. 28. If there is no preference, there is no prejudice. Therefore, undue prejudice may be caused to a person and his goods only if undue preference is given to his competitor and his goods. 19. Mr. Bhabra, learned Counsel for the Union of India has drawn our attention to the interpretation made in two English decisions of the 2nd Section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 which is somewhat similar to S. 28. The first one is the Queen v. Railway Commissioner & Distinton Iron Company, (1889) 22 QBD 642. At page 647 of the Report Huddleston observed : “The terms are preference and advantage,” “prejudice and disadvantage,” correlative terms.” Again at pages 690 51, Huddleston J observed; “Those words, “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage.” and “prejudice or disadvantage,” must, as it appears to me, mean a preference or a prejudice with reference to competing parties – an inequality, an unfairness, with reference to others, or a prejudice to other works, and cannot mean that because there are excessive charges a prejudice arises to the applicants, for that is all that remains.” 20. The other decision which has been relied on by Mr. Bhabra is Pickering Phipps v. London and North Western Railway Company, (1892) 2 QBD 229. That case is also on the 2nd section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. Lord Herschell, at pase 236 of the Report observed : “The question, therefore, which the tribunal, whether it be the Court or the Commissioners, before whom such a question comes, has to determine is whether an undue preference or advantage is being given, or whether the one party is being unduly prejudiced or put to a disadvantage as compared with the other.” 21. The above two English decisions support the view that undue prejudice or disadvantage postulates giving of preference to one to the prejudice of another. The terms ‘preference’ and ‘prejudice’ in S. 28 are so related that in the absence of one, there is no scope for the other. In the instant case, as already stated, clubbing of consignments of coal has been prohibited. There is therefore, no question of giving of any preference, far less undue preference to any competitor of the appellant to his prejudice. The contention of the appellant that the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) is violative of S. 28 of the Act is overruled. 22. The impugned addition has also been assailed as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. it is complained by the appellant that as a result of the prohibition of clubbing of coal in smalls, the appellant and other traders in coat in smalls have been unreasonably deprived of the benefit of lesser amount of freight charges, although such benefit is still available to trader in general goods. It is submitted that by the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) the traders in coal in smalls have been classified or grouped together into a separate class, but classification or grouping is not founded on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned addition. It is, accordingly, contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) prohibiting clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, it is void. 23. The challenge by the appellant to the validity of the impugned addition on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution has been repelled by M.N. Roy J. It has been observed by the learned Judge that coal, because of its quality and character and also the incidents of its carriage, forms a class by itself, and it cannot be equated with any other commodity having different character and quality. Further, as coal and any other commodity are not equals, there is no question of discrimination between coal and such other commodity. In this connection, we may refer to a similar writ petition filed by the petitioner, K.C. Gangwal. Further, as coal and any other commodity are not equals, there is no question of discrimination between coal and such other commodity. In this connection, we may refer to a similar writ petition filed by the petitioner, K.C. Gangwal. The Rule Nisi being Matter No. 84 of 1979 that was issued on Gangwal’s writ petition came up for hearing before T.K. Basu J who, however, could not agree with the view expressed by M.N. Roy J overruling the contention of the appellant that the impugned addition was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As T.K. Basu J differed with M.N. Roy J, he has referred the Rule Nisi (Matter No. 84 of 1979) to the Division Bench for disposal. In referring the Rule Nisi, T.K. Basu J observed, inter alia. in the order of reference, as follows : “Before I proceed further. I must with respect, regret to say that I am unable to accept the reasoning of my learned brother. After all, the object of the restriction impugned in the present Rule and also impugned before M.N. Roy J was the charging of freight for the purpose of carriage. That being so, I find it difficult to appreciate as to what is the difference between coal on the one hand and, let us say, edible oils on the other. Putting it differently, I fail to see how edible oils form a different class from coal for the purpose of charging freight for carriage. My learned brother speaks of the quality and character of coal and the incidents of its carriage. With respect I fail to see how the character of coal puts it in a different class from edible oils, or for that matter, jute or cotton.” 24. The above observation of T K. Basu J. has been strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the instant case. It appears from the above observation that the learned Judge has proceeded on the footing that the object of the impugned addition was the charging of freight for the purpose of carriage. We have earlier noticed the circumstances, as alleged by the railway administration, necessitating prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. It is not the case of the railway administration that the impugned addition has been made for the purpose of freight charges. We have earlier noticed the circumstances, as alleged by the railway administration, necessitating prohibition of clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls. It is not the case of the railway administration that the impugned addition has been made for the purpose of freight charges. T.K. Basu J has not considered the circumstances under which the impugned addition has been made. 25. Coal is not an item of general goods. Coal and its transportation problems are entirely different from general goods and that is why the railway administrations of Eastern Railway and South Eastern Railway have framed separate Tariff Rules in respect of coal. Thus coal constitutes a class by itself for the purpose of its carriage by railway. It has been already pointed out that the object of the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) was not for freight charges as contended on behalf of the appellant relying on the above observation of T.K. Basu J. Even assuming that the object of the impugned addition was for freight charges, still the carriage of coal cannot be placed under the category of general goods. Freight is the condition of carriage of all goods irrespective of any category or classification. Two different commodities cannot be said to be equals simply on the ground that both have to fulfill certain conditions of carriage. It is true that under the unamended Rule 701(7)(ix) read with Rule 301, consignments of coal in smalls could be clubbed like other general goods for the purpose of freight charges, but that did not make coal and other general goods equals for the purpose of Article 104 of the Constitution. It is now well settled that Article 14 embodying the rule of equality before law and equal protection of laws will be applicable to equals. As coal and other commodities are not equals, Article 14 is not attracted to any differential treatment between them. M.N. Roy J has, in our opinion, rightly observed that coal, because of its quality, character and incidents of carriage, cannot be equated with any other commodity. “The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules should be made applicable to all persons in spite of differences in their circumstances and conditions”. (See Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (1978) 1 SCC 37 . “The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules should be made applicable to all persons in spite of differences in their circumstances and conditions”. (See Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (1978) 1 SCC 37 . Even if coal and other commodities are treated as equals for the purpose of freight charges, it cannot be insisted that irrespective of their differences in quality and character and problems of transportation, the rule as to clubbing of consignments should apply to coal as it applies to the general goods. 26. The object of the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) prohibiting clubbing of coal in smalls is to prevent booking of coal in wagon-loads from wayside railway stations in contravention of rules 1 and 2 of the respective Coal Tariffs of the Eastern Railway and South Eastern Railway which had to be framed under circumstances stated above. It has been already observed that the truth or otherwise of the circumstances cannot be decided by us in this jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. So even if we except the contention of the appellant that by the impugned addition coal has been placed under a separate class and subjected to differential treatment so far as clubbing of consignments of coal in smalls is concerned, such classification and differential treatment are based on an intelligible differentia having a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned addition. The contention of the appellant that the impugned addition is void as it contravenes the provision of Article 14 is, accordingly, overruled. 27. We may now consider the question as to the legality of the circular of the Railway Board dated May 5, 1973 directing pre-payment of freight in respect of coal booked in smalls with effect from May 20, 1973. There are two modes of payment of freight – (i) At the time of booking consignments. (ii) At the time of delivery at the destination station. The first mode which is prepayment of freight is known as “To-pay Invoices” and the second one as “Paid Invoices”. Before the impugned circular coal in smalls, like the general goods, used to be booked under “To Pay Invoice, that is to say, the freight was to be paid at the time of delivery after the consignments reached the destination. The first mode which is prepayment of freight is known as “To-pay Invoices” and the second one as “Paid Invoices”. Before the impugned circular coal in smalls, like the general goods, used to be booked under “To Pay Invoice, that is to say, the freight was to be paid at the time of delivery after the consignments reached the destination. By the impugned circular the booking of coal is to be made under “Paid Invoices”. The contention of the appellant is that as coal in wagon-loads and the general goods in smalls are allowed to be booked under “To-pay Invoices”, the impugned circular is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and also S.28 of the Act. It is also the contention of the appellant that the impugned circular contravenes Rule 301 of Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol I. 28. On the other hand, the case of the railway administration is that coal is a low-value commodity, and in case it is allowed to be booked with “To-pay” freight and the delivery of the consignment is not taken at the destination, it would be difficult to realise the freight by auctioning the commodity which will not only take a long time, but also will cause harassment to the railway administration. The Central Government is fully empowered to decide whether the freight should be recovered at the time of booking or at the time of delivery. Wagon-load consignments of coal stand on an entirely different footing. The various conditions attached to wagon-load traffic, such as rate for charge, the minimum weight condition for wagon-load rates packing conditions and conditions of carriage etc, are entirely different from those for traffic in smalls. For a very long time, commodities like dangerous goods, explosives etc, have been subjected to the condition of compulsory prepayment when booked in smalls. A large number of other commodities have also been brought within the purview of compulsory prepayment of freight when booked in smalls. It is contended that the condition for compulsory prepayment of freight in respect of booking of coal in smalls is neither unreasonable nor does it cause undue prejudice to the traders in coal. Further, it is submitted that the circular is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or S. 28 of the Act or the said Rule 301 of the Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I Volume I. 29. Further, it is submitted that the circular is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or S. 28 of the Act or the said Rule 301 of the Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I Volume I. 29. So far as the contention of the appellant that the impugned circular is violative of the Litter part of S. 28 of the Act is concerned, the same reasons for which we rejected the contention of the appellant challenging the validity of the impugned addition to Rule 701(7)(ix) on the ground of violation of S. 28 also apply. We do not think that any useful purpose will be served by repeating those reasons. We, therefore, hold that the impugned circular does not contravene S. 28 of the Act. 30. Prepayment of freight is undoubtedly a condition or carriage. In view of Rule 301, the rules and conditions of carriage of coal in smalls will be the same as those notified for general goods. There is no dispute that 35 items of dangerous goods and explosives and 181 items of general goods have been subjected to the compulsory prepayment of freight sometime in 1975. It is, accordingly, submitted by Mr. Bhadra that the impugned circular imposing the condition of prepayment of freight for the booking of coal in smalls is quite consistent with Rule 301. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr. Ghose, learned Counsel for the appellant that on the date of the issuance of the circular, namely, May 5, 1973, no general goods having been made liable, to prepayment of freight, the impugned circular was violative of Rule 301 and was void. It is submitted that the subsequent imposition of the condition of prepayment of freight in 1975 will not validate the impugned circular which was void on the date it was issued. 31. The impugned circular has been in operation since May 20, 1973. The appellant did not challenge the validity of the impugned circular after it was issued or before 1975 when some general goods were brought under the condition of prepayment of freight. 31. The impugned circular has been in operation since May 20, 1973. The appellant did not challenge the validity of the impugned circular after it was issued or before 1975 when some general goods were brought under the condition of prepayment of freight. For the first time in 1979, that is to save after the lapse of about six years since the date of issue of the impugned circular, the appellant challenged the validity of the same by the writ petition out of which this appeal arises According to the learned Judge in view of inordinate delay the appellant is debarred from challenging the validity of the impugned circular on any ground. But apart from the question of delay let us consider whether the impugned circular contravenes Rule 301. 32. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Bhabra to Rule 110 of the Goods Tariff No. 35, Part I, Vol. I Sub-rule (1) of Rule 110 provides as follows : “110. Payment of charges (1) Except in the case of goods for which prepayment of freight is compulsory, all freight charges must be paid either when goods are presented for dispatch or at the time of delivery.” Rule 110(1) is a rule for general goods. It is true that under Rule 110(1), one has the option to pay the freight charges either when the goods are booked for dispatch or at the time of delivery as contended on behalf of the appellant, but that option will not be available in respect of goods for which prepayment of freight is compulsory. It is manifestly clear from Rule 110(1) that the Railway Board has the power to make prepayment of freight compulsory in respect of any general goods. Rule 110(1) lays down a condition of carriage of general goods, namely, payment of freight, and when such payment of freight can be made compulsory at the time of booking in respect of any general goods, it is not understandable why it cannot be so made for the movement of coal in smalls which, under Rule 301, is to conform to the rules and conditions of carriage for general goods. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the impugned circular is violative of Rule 301 and, as such, it is void. 33. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the impugned circular is violative of Rule 301 and, as such, it is void. 33. Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on certain observation of a Division Bench of this Court in an unreported decision in Baldeo Prasad v. Union of India & Ors. (F.M.A. 263 of 1978, disposed of on 19.4.1978). In that case, the learned trial Judge held that since such prepayment of freight being made compulsory was not a restriction particularly imposed on booking of coal in smalls, there was no question of any discrimination, and that in view of S.29(2) and S.54 of the Act, it was competent for the Central Government to impose such a restriction and, as such there could be no ground for challenging the restriction so imposed by the impugned circular. The Division Bench agreed with the learned trial Judge that such a restriction could be imposed by the railway administration under S. 54 of the Act, but observed that such restriction must not be inconsistent with the other provisions of the Act and the general rules. As the learned trial Judge had not decided as to whether impugned circular had violated S.28 of the Act, the judgment of the learned trial Judge was set aside by the Division Bench and the case was sent back to the learned Judge. Further, in remanding the case the Division Bench also observed that only because a restriction had been imposed in respect of 216 items, that would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the same would not constitute discrimination, for, in the opinion of the Division Banch, the real point was to see whether the disadvantage to which the consignors of coal in smalls were put was based on any reasonable grounds or not. 34. We are afraid, the above unreported Bench decision is of no help to the appellant. First, it was not a final decision, but an order of remand. Second, it did not consider Rule 110 or Rule 310. Third, it did not interpret S. 28 of the Act. In our opinion, for the same reasons as in the case of prohibition of clubbing of coal in smalls, the impugned circular does not contravene the provision of S. 28. 35. Second, it did not consider Rule 110 or Rule 310. Third, it did not interpret S. 28 of the Act. In our opinion, for the same reasons as in the case of prohibition of clubbing of coal in smalls, the impugned circular does not contravene the provision of S. 28. 35. The last question that remains to be considered is as to the challenge of the appellant to the validity of the impugned circular on the ground of its violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that by the impugned circular the railway administrations have made an unreasonable discrimination between the traders in coal in small on the one hand and the traders in coal in wagon-loads and the traders in general goods on the other. The question, however, is whether all of them are similarly situated. In other words, whether they are equals 36. So far as coal in smalls and coal in wagon-loads are concerned, there are differences between the two. If coal in smalls be represented by the letter ‘A’ and coal in wagon-loads by the letter ‘B’, we may notice the following differences between the two : (i) B can only be booked from colliery sidings, coke-even plants and washeries ; (ii) While B cannot be booked from wayside stations, A can be booked only from wayside stations ; (iii) in case of B, the despatcher or consignor must be the colliery, but any trader can be the consignor of A from wayside stations; (iv) B can only be consigned in bulk, A has to be consigned in gunny bag packages ; (v) B consignments move in rakes consisting of 70/80 wagons and go straight to the destination without any transshipment in the mean time, but that is not so in the case of A ; (vi) the rate of freight of B is less than that of A and (vii) B goes from the colliery to sponsored consumers, but A does not. It is, therefore, apparent from the above differences that traders in coal in smalls and the traders in coal in wagon-loads are not similarly situated and are not equals. So, the question of discrimination between the two classes of traders in regard to prepayment of freight does not arise. 37. It is, therefore, apparent from the above differences that traders in coal in smalls and the traders in coal in wagon-loads are not similarly situated and are not equals. So, the question of discrimination between the two classes of traders in regard to prepayment of freight does not arise. 37. As between coal in smalls and other commodities (general goods) in smalls, it is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that they are equals or similarly situated. It has been already noticed that coal is treated as a class by itself and separate Tariff Rules have been framed for coal. As between traders in coal in smalls no discrimination has been made regarding prepayment of freight. It is not only coal in smalls that has been subjected to prepayment of freight but as stated earlier, 35 items of dangerous goods and explosives and 181 items of general goods have been subjected to prepayment of freight for their carriage. We do not see any force in the contention of the appellant that as on the date of the impugned circular, no other goods in smalls were made liable to prepayment of freight, the impugned circular was void. The appellant having challenged the impugned circular as discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. it is incumbent upon him to prove the existence of such discrimination on the date the writ petition was filed. It is no argument that a few years before, there was such discrimination. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention. 38. Article 14 prohibits class legislation but permits reasonable classification. Even assuming that all commodities in smalls are equals and the impugned circular has made a classification in regard to coal in smalls, such classification, in our opinion, is a permissible one. The reason for the issuance of the impugned circular is the difficulty in realising the freight to the harassment of the railway administrations in case the freight is not paid at the destination station. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the railway administrations have not in their affidavit-in opposition cited any single instance in which they had any such difficulty in realizing the freight.. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the railway administrations have not in their affidavit-in opposition cited any single instance in which they had any such difficulty in realizing the freight.. But the railway being a vast and the biggest transport organization where huge quantities of coal are being daily transported, it is difficult to presume that there were not cases of nonpayment of freight at the destination simply because in the affidavit-in-opposition of the railway administrations such cases have not been mentioned. The impugned circular has been issued by the Railway Board, the highest authority, and it is not the case of the appellant that the circular has been issued mala fide. In the circumstances, it will not be unreasonable to presume that there were such cases necessitation the imposition of prepayment of freight in respect of coal in smalls. So, on the assumption that the impugned circular purports to make a classification, such classification is based on justifiable reasons and is, therefore, permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned circular is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The contention of the appellant in this regard is rejected. No other point had been urged in this appeal. 39. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Judge is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. In view, however of the facts and circumstances the case, there will be no order for costs. A.K. Sarkar, J. – I agree, Appeal dismissed.