JUDGMENT - Desai S.K. J.-This appeal arises from the order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court on 15th March 1978 on the 1st defendant's Notice of Motion No. 4186 of 1977 which was taken out in Suit No. 386t of 1977. 2. The Notice of Motion taken out by the 1st defendant was for restoration of possession of the suit shop No. 86C, V. G. Market, Grant Road, Bombay-400 007. 3. The said suit had been filed by the plaintiff on the footing that the plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the suit shop. In the suit a permanent injunction was sought against the 1st defendant requiring the 1st defendant not to disturb the plaintiff's alleged possession of the suit shop otherwise than by due process of law. Temporary orders in the same terms were also sought and Motion was taken out by the plaintiff for a temporary injunction against the lst defendant in similar terms. Ad-interim injunction was initially obtained. This was on the plaintiff's Notice of Motion dated 21st May, 1977. This Motion was numbered as 1781 of 1977. It was heard by another Judge of the City Civil Court on 7th September, 1977 and on that day after hearing the parties it was dismissed. In his Motion the 1st defendant has contended that the plaintiff had dispossessed him from the shop after obtaining ad-interim orders earlier from the Court. Accordingly, the 1st defendant sought restoration of possession of the suit shop. The 2nd defendant was the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and the 1st defendant's Notice of Motion was not directed to it. 4. The plaintiff filed his affidavit in reply to the Motion. It was interalia contended therein that the Notice of Motion taken out by the 1st defendant was not at all maintainable and that he should be required to file a substantive suit or proceeding. The plaintiff also contended that at all times he was in possession of the suit shop. The other allegations of the 1st defendant were traversed. 5. It was interalia contended therein that the Notice of Motion taken out by the 1st defendant was not at all maintainable and that he should be required to file a substantive suit or proceeding. The plaintiff also contended that at all times he was in possession of the suit shop. The other allegations of the 1st defendant were traversed. 5. After considering the affidavits filed in the first Notice of Motion and perusing the order dismissing the said Notice of Motion, the learned Judge whose order is impugned before me observed that it was not possible to say from the order dismissing the plaintiff's Notice of Motion that the Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not at all in possession of the such premises. According to the Judge, it was also not possible to hold that the plaintiff had obtained possession (after filing the suit) under the garb of the ad-interim injunction. Accordingly, he dismissed the 1st defendant's Notice of Motion with no order as to costs. It is from this order that the aggrieved 1st defendant has filed this appeal. 6. It may be mentioned that this appeal came for hearing before Kania, J. in February 1981 and was allowed. An order was made by the High Court setting aside the order of dismissal of the Motion and the same was substituted by an order appointing the Court Receiver as Receiver of the suit shop. The Court Receiver was directed to make an inventory of the articles lying in the suit shop and was ordered to put the 1st defendant in possession of the same as his agent. It would appear that this was an ex-parte decision as at that stage the respondent-plaintiff did not appear. 7. Subsequently in April 1981 the earlier ex-parte order allowing the appeal was set aside and the Appeal from Order restored and was directed to be heard in the normal course. It would appear, however, that although the earlier order of February, 1981 was vacated, the Court Receiver has continued and today the 1st defendant is in possession as the Court Receiver's agent. 8. At the hearing of this appeal Mr. Zaveri appearing for respondent No.1 (original plaintiff) has taken a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent. It would appear, however, that although the earlier order of February, 1981 was vacated, the Court Receiver has continued and today the 1st defendant is in possession as the Court Receiver's agent. 8. At the hearing of this appeal Mr. Zaveri appearing for respondent No.1 (original plaintiff) has taken a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent. It may be added that the 2nd defendants have needlessly been made a party to this Appeal from Order when initially the Motion was not directed against them. As the 2nd respondents have appeared, the appellant will have to pay their costs and this will be irrespective of the result of the Appeal. 9. The preliminary objection taken by the 1st respondent on the question whether the application can be considered as one under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code or would have to be treated as one under the inherent powers of the Court, i. e. under section 151 of the Code. 10. Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as under:-” 144 (1) Where and in so far as decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. Explanation-For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression “Court which passed the decree or order” shall be deemed to include- (a) where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance (b) where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the Court of first instance which passed such decree or order: (c) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. (2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1)”. 11. In my opinion, unless the plaintiff had secured possession of the suit shop directly under or specifically in pursuance of the orders of the Court, section 144 would have no application. The restitution which is contemplated by the said section is for the purposes of rectifying situations brought about directly in execution of orders of the Court which are subsequently set aside or modified. This restitution is a special restitution. However, Courts have armed themselves under section 151 with powers of restitution in the interests of justice which do not fall within the four corners of section 144. If at all, the 1st defendant's application for restoration of possession under his Motion will have to be considered as one falling under section 151. Since I am inclined to uphold the preliminary objection, I do not wish to express any opinion on the question whether such application is competent under section 15{ or whether because of any reason or circumstance the 1st defendant ought to be relegated to a separate suit or other proceeding. 12. Order 43 of the Code provides for appeals from orders. Appeals would seem to lie from orders made under section 141J of the Code on the footing that the determination of a question under this section amounts to a decree and is appealable as such. 12. Order 43 of the Code provides for appeals from orders. Appeals would seem to lie from orders made under section 141J of the Code on the footing that the determination of a question under this section amounts to a decree and is appealable as such. Whether an appeal would lie from a decision in similar matters not under section 144 but under the inherent powers of the Court under, section 151 is a question which has resulted in a conflict of decisions although several decisions of other High Courts have been cited, no decision of this Court is available on the point. Accordingly, it will have to be considered in this Appeal from Order whether the views of the Calcutta and Nagpur High Courts which are in favour of the appellant contention are to be preferred over those of the Punjab, Madras, Patna and Lahore High Courts which have taken the contrary view viz. that no appeal lies. 13. Although the advocates had displayed considerable industry and brought all the available authorities to the Court, in this order I will restrict myself to the consideration of the latest decision available in respect of each court. 14. We shall turn first to the authorities which support the contention which Mr. Shetty canvassed which was that such an appeal is competent. It would appear that the High Court at Nagpur had consistently !taken the view that orders though not strictly under section 47 or sections 144 and 145. but if passed under these sections read with section 151 are appeasable. This last of a line of decisions indicating this view1s Sheonandanlal v. Gopal Babaji.l The learned single Judge of the High Court refereed to the earlier decision of the very Court in MI. Champabai v. Shree Daulatram Sharma.2 and held that the right of appeal was not negatived merely because the order could not be held to be falling strictly within the perimeters of sections 47, 144 and 145 of the Civil Procedure Code. 15. The Calcutta High Court has similarly and consistently held that 'Orders regarding applications for restitution made under section 151 are appealable. 15. The Calcutta High Court has similarly and consistently held that 'Orders regarding applications for restitution made under section 151 are appealable. I will only refer to the decision of a single Judge of the said High Court in Gopal Laskar v. Harihar M.ukherjee.3 where two earlier decisions of that Court reported in Ganada Sundri v. Chandra Kumar De.4 and Sasi Kanta Acharjee v. Jalil Baksh.5 were followed. The contrary decision was not followed and was explained and held obiter. 16. It would appear that the Allahabad High Court has not made up its mind on the question and I shall refer to Allahabad Theatres v. Ram Sajiwan6 where the two judges constituting the Division Bench had expressed divergent views on the question. One of them Harish Chandra J. held that no appeal would lie against an order passed under section 151 whereas Sapre J. held to the contrary. 17. We now come to the Courts which have taken the opposite view. The earliest of the decisions which may be referred to is that of the Lahore High Court in A. R. Dawar v. Ganesh Datta7. It was observed in this decision that the application made by the appellant did not fall either within section 47 or section 144 and could fall therefore only under section 151 of the Code. It was then stated that no appeal lay under the Code against an order passed under that section. The Court thereafter allowed the appeal to be treated as a petition for revision. 18. There were earlier a conflict of decisions in the Madras High Court and it would appear that different Division Benches had taken different views on the question. Accordingly, the question was considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court7 A. The Full Bench has held that an order for restitution or refund passed under section 151 is not appealable either as a decree or as an appealable order if it does not fall either under section 47 or under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. It overruled the Madras judgments which had held to the contrary. The Court also made observations as regards the desirability of the High Court in the exercise of its rule making power of adding a suitable clause to Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code giving a right of appeal against orders under section 151. It overruled the Madras judgments which had held to the contrary. The Court also made observations as regards the desirability of the High Court in the exercise of its rule making power of adding a suitable clause to Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code giving a right of appeal against orders under section 151. All the members of the Full Bench have given their separate but concurring judgments and after fully considering the Calcutta and Nagpur decisions have expressed their inability to agree with the view taken by these Courts as regards appealability in respect of such decisions. 19. In this connection, one may refer with profit to some of the observations made by Viswanatha Sastri J. who was one of the Judges constituting the Full Bench. “An order for restitution is not an order in the suit so as to amount to a decree under section 2 (2) Civil Procedure Code, Rajagopal Chettiar v. H. R. E. Board8. It is one thing to say that a Court has inherent power to order restitution or refund of money acting ex debito Justitiae even in cases not falling within section 144, Civil Procedure Code. But it is quite a different thing to say that every such order passed in the exercise of the Court's inherent power is appealable. Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, does not confer any new powers but recognises and preserves the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The Code of Civil Procedure, though elaborate, is not exhaustive; and has not made anticipatory provision for every possible cul-de-sac. Section 151 is a recognition of this fact and of the inherent power of the Court, subject to the express provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to act ex debito justitiae and to do that real and substantial justice which it should be the aim of all Courts to render. Apart from the provisions of section ]44, Civil Procedure Code, the power to order restitution or refund of money paid out through an error or mistake of the Court or through fraud or deception practiced upon it, bas been recognised to be inherent in Courts, it being their primary duty to take care that their acts do no injury to any of the suitors. A right of appeal to a higher Court from an order of an inferior Court is not like a right to institute a suit of a civil nature which a person enjoys apart from any statutory provision. The right of appeal is a substantive right and not a matter of mere procedure: Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irwin9, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Collector of Income-taxlO. It. right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right and is not to be assumed or presumed but must be expressly given by statute or some authority equivalent to a statute. The cases on the point and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been quoted in the order of reference and need not now be repeated. Courts exercising inherent powers may, and often do, act on the analogy of statutory provisions which, though not applicable proprio vigore, are nearest in point to the circumstances before them. A Court has, however, no inherent power to entertain an appeal from an order of an inferior Court: nor can it extend by analogy, statutory provisions giving a right of appeal in particular cause to analogous cases not falling within those provisions. The statutory provision providing for appeals must be considered to be exhaustive of all the matters which are considered to be fit for appeal by the Legislature or rule-making body. There is no provision either in the body of the Code or in Order 43, Rule 1 making an order for refund or restitution passed by a Court in the exercise of its inherent powers appealable.” 20. The Patna High Court has, similarly, differing from the Nagpur and Calcutta High Courts taken the view that orders passed in the exercise of inherent power under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code are not appealable. A single Judge in Ramanandan v. Jagannath11 has observed that the mere fact that an order passed under section 151 deals with matters similar to those which might have been dealt with under section 47 or under section 154 cannot be made a ground for holding that the order is subject to appeal. To the same effect is the view taken by a single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Kaku Singh v. Gobind Singh12. To the same effect is the view taken by a single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Kaku Singh v. Gobind Singh12. In this case, Grover J. in coming to the conclusion that such orders were not appealable and that only revision was competent preferred to follow the Lahore and Patna High Courts and disagreed with the several decisions of the Calcutta High Court which were cited before him. 21. I have set out earlier the approach of Viswanatha Sastri J. I prefer the view taken by the Madras, Punjab, Patna and Lahore High Courts to the contrary view taken by the High Courts of Calcutta and Nagpur. Merely because an application for restitution is somewhat similar to applications for restitution which would be covered by section 144 would not be sufficient ground for enabling a party aggrieved by an order on such application to file an appeal merely because an appeal can be filed from orders made under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code. The right of appeal cannot be deemed conferred by analogy. It cannot be extended because it is equitable to do so. In case interests of justice so require, the aggrieved party, if the error is fundamental or if the decision is perverse, can move the higher Court in its revisional powers or the High Court in its power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. In the result, I uphold the preliminary objection. In my view, the appeal is not competent and will accordingly have to be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly. The appellant as well as the 1st respondent to bear their own costs of this Appeal. The appellant will, however, pay to the 2nd respondents, the Corporation, costs quantified at Rs. 50. 23. To enable the appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings as he may be advised to adopt, I direct the status quo to continue up to 7th December, 1981 (inclusive). From and after that date the Court Receiver appointed as Receiver under the order dated 2nd February, 1981 will stand vacated and will hand over possession of the suit shop to the 1st respondent (original plaintiff) on the 1st respondent paying to the Court Receiver all his costs, charges and expenses. From and after that date the Court Receiver appointed as Receiver under the order dated 2nd February, 1981 will stand vacated and will hand over possession of the suit shop to the 1st respondent (original plaintiff) on the 1st respondent paying to the Court Receiver all his costs, charges and expenses. This will be certainly subject to such further orders as may be passed by this Court in the other proceedings which I am told are likely to be adopted. Order accordingly. -----