JUDGMENT - Pratap S.C., J.-This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 filed against the petitioner ejectment application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act in respect of premises comprised of a hall bearing hall No.1 on the ground floor of house No. 39 known as Shri Rajput Chauhan Sanstha Panch Gantiwadi Trust situated near Dhobi Talao, Bombay. The said application was contested by the petitioner. In pursuance of section 42A of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, the trial Court framed a preliminary issue to the effect whether the petitioner herein proves that he is a tenant of the suit premises and entitled to the protection of the Rent Act. On the said issue, rival sides led evidence, oral and documentary. On a consideration of this evidence and the arguments of the respective counsel, the trial Court, by its judgment and order dated 29th June 1974, held that the petitioner herein failed to prove that he was a tenant of the suit premises. While coming to the said conclusion, the trial Court took into consideration the various documents as also the other factors and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record. Against the said judgment and order, the petitioner herein preferred, as provided by sub-section (2) of section 42A of the aforesaid Act, an appeal to a Bench of two Judges of the Court of Smal1 Causes. The Appellate Bench, by its judgment and order dated 13th April 1978, dismissed the said appeal. Against this dismissal, the petitioner preferred to this Court Special Civil Application No. 1233 of 1978 under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said petition was placed for admission before Bhasme J. on 23rd June 1978. The order passed on the said petition was “rejected”. 3. The proceedings thereafter went back to the trial Court. Consistent with the earlier decision that the petitioner herein had failed to prove that he was a tenant of the suit premises or that he was entitled to the protection of the Rent Act, the trial Court allowed the ejectment application and directed the petitioner to vacate the suit premises. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. 4. In support of the petition, I have heard Mr. K. K. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondents-trustees are represented by their learned counsel Mr. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. 4. In support of the petition, I have heard Mr. K. K. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondents-trustees are represented by their learned counsel Mr. H. C. Tunara. 5. Mr. Tunara, learned counsel for the respondents trustees, has raised a preliminary objection to the petitioner's learned counsel seeking to argue the merits of the earlier finding of the Court of Small Causes holding that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was a tenant of the suit premises and for was entitled to be protected by the Rent Act and which finding was confirmed by a Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes in appeal preferred there against under section 42A(2) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which, in the submission of Mr. Tunara, also stood confirmed by this Court by its order dated 23rd June 1978 when it rejeeted the petitioner's writ petition therefrom under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended, however, that the order of this Court was a singularly worded order “rejected” and there was nothing to indicate that the petition was heard and rejected on merits. His submission was that the petition was rejected because it was against a finding on a preliminary issue. His further submission was that the rejection was without any adjudication of the question involved. Mr. Vyas states that he had himself, at that stage, appeared in the said writ petition on behalf of the petitioner. 6. Considering these rival submissions, I am of the view that the rejection by this Court of the petitioner's earlier writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has, so far as this Court is concerned, put a finality to the decision given by the trial Court and by the Appellate Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes on the question whether the petitioner was or was not a tenant of the suit premises and whether he was or was not entitled to protection under the Rent Act. n the absence of any special circumstances and in the absence of any averment on affidavit in the present petition, the normal consequence of the judicial order “rejected” passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition of the petitioner must be given effect to. n the absence of any special circumstances and in the absence of any averment on affidavit in the present petition, the normal consequence of the judicial order “rejected” passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition of the petitioner must be given effect to. Practice of this Court in that behalf also cannot be ignored. Day after day and week after week, Article 227 petitions are placed on admission board before the Court hearing the said matters and frequently enough, after hearing the counsel- and after going through the impugned orders and judgments, the Court passes its own judicial order of adjudication on the petition by way of either “rule” or “rejected”. There is nothing brought out to stamp the instant case as an exception to the aforesaid well-settled long prevailing practice of this Court. Indeed, if another construction was to be given thereto, it can only result in a flood-gate for a number of writ petitions challenging the very same order from time to time on the ground that the previous order or orders in previously filed petition or petitions only mention “rejected” without there being any reasons given in support of the said order and, therefore, without, as the petitioner seems to suggest, any adjudication of the issues involved. Indeed and consistent with the judicial order “rejected”, it must be held that, that order itself represents the adjudication of the dispute in question. If, as the learned counsel for the petitioner now submits that the petition was rejected because it was against a finding on a preliminary issue, there was nothing to prevent the petitioner to withdraw the petition as at that stage. There was also nothing in the way of the petitioner to obtain an order that the order of rejection was on the ground that the proper stage to challenge would be after the proceedings were finally disposed of by the trial Court. AI1 that is stated in the aforesaid context is what one finds in paragraph 6 of this petition which, so far as relevant, avers that the earlier petition “... was summarily rejected by Shri Bhasme, J. on 23rd June 1978 without any adjudication of the points involved in the matter”. Vague and ambiguous, indeed, is the nature of this very averment. was summarily rejected by Shri Bhasme, J. on 23rd June 1978 without any adjudication of the points involved in the matter”. Vague and ambiguous, indeed, is the nature of this very averment. Nothing prevented the petitioner from standing on affidavit what is now sought to be stated in argument at the Bar viz., that the earlier order of rejection was not on merits but was because a petition could be filed after the proceedings were finally disposed of by the Courts below. 7. In suppart of his contention, however, Mr. Vyas relies upon a ruling of Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Harinder Singh v. Khaliqur- Rehman1. Gaing through the same, I fail to. see haw the ratio. of the said ruling can be said to at all support the contention of the learned counsel. On the contrary, the ratio. goes against his contention. After referring to. A decision of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U. P.2 and to. decisions of certain other High Courts, the Division Bench observes as follows : “There is, therefore, a strong authority in support of the proposition that the mere ward 'dismissed' in limine is sufficient to constitute the bar of res judicata. We agree with the proposition of law that ordinarily the ward 'dismissed', in the absence of any other circumstance to the contrary, would indicate that the Court considered all the contentions of the party and, not finding any merit in them dismissed the petition an merits. To this extent, the said decisions are in full accord with Daryao's case, However, in our opinion, there may be circumstances an the record which may show that even when the ward 'dismissed' was recorded, the writ petition was not dismissed by the Court an merits but an other grounds like laches or availability of other remedy or was dismissed as withdrawn. If these facts and circumstances are established fully to the satisfaction of the Court, the dictum of the Supreme Court would be applicable and such a petitian cannat be said to. have been dismissed 911merits and if that be so., it cannot operate as res judicata.” 8. If these facts and circumstances are established fully to the satisfaction of the Court, the dictum of the Supreme Court would be applicable and such a petitian cannat be said to. have been dismissed 911merits and if that be so., it cannot operate as res judicata.” 8. Thus, the normal rule is that the ward “dismissed” or “rejected” must be held to be sufficient to constitute the bar of res judicata to a litigant earning to the same Court by a second petition an the same grounds challenging the same order. If he still desires to do so and persuade this Court to go into the merits despite the earlier judicial order of rejection, it is far him to establish circumstances from the record which would show that the normal rule should not be given effect to. As indicated, in the present case, no such circumstances have been established. The petition itself is blissfully silent on these circumstances. The original papers of the earlier writ petition produced before this Court also do not give any indication of any such circumstances as to enable this Court to draw any inference by way of exception to the general rule and to the generally established consequence of a judicial order “dismissed” or “rejected”. 9. In this view a f the matter, I find no. good reason to depart from the normal principle of law and the normal can sequence which must follow from a judicial order “dismissed” or “rejected” an on earlier petition by a litigant to this Court against the same impugned order passed by the Courts below. The order “rejected” by Bhasme J. an the earlier writ petition must, therefore, be given its full meaning and effect If so, the instant second petition against the same order passed by the Courts below must be held to be barred. 10. It may also be, to an extent, relevant to mention that the order “dismissed” or “rejected” an a writ petition under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution may not perhaps stand an the same footing as an order passed by a Court in its powers of superintendence in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. It may also be, to an extent, relevant to mention that the order “dismissed” or “rejected” an a writ petition under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution may not perhaps stand an the same footing as an order passed by a Court in its powers of superintendence in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. When this Court hearing the earlier writ petition in its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution has, after hearing the petitioner's counsel, thought fit not to interfere and to reject the said petition, sound convention and practice requires this Court to restrain its hands when a second petition against the same order is filed thereafter before this Court and not to so exercise its jurisdiction and superintending power as to result in a consequence different from the one that must follow from this Court's earlier order of rejection. 11. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection of Mr. Tunara, the learned counsel for the respondent-trustees, deserves to be upheld. 12. In the result, it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the earlier decisions of the Courts below holding that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was a tenant entitled to be protected by the Rent Act. Any such exercise would be an attempt on the part of this Court to sit in appeal over Bhasme J's earlier order. I have, therefore, not permitted Mr. Vyas to advance arguments on the merits of the earlier decision of the trial Court confirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes against which an earlier writ petition to this Court was rejected by Bhasme J. 13. So far as the order dated 27th June 1978 against which specifically the present writ petition is filed is concerned, there is not a single ground alleged against the same. Indeed, the said order is in the nature of a mere consequential order consistent with the earlier decision of the trial Court confirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes and confirmed by this Court by its order rejecting the petitioner's earlier writ petition against the said orders. 14. In the result, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. 14. In the result, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Order for possession not to be executed till and inclusive of 19th December 1981. Petition dismissed.