JUDGMENT - Jamdar M.S.J.- The petitioner is occupying three rooms on the front side of the ground floor of a three storied structure belonging to the respon­dent, who is a practising Advocate at Chandrapur. Originally the entire house was leased out to petitioner's father in 1953 at a monthly rent of Rs. 67. Some time before 1963 (exact date is not on record) petitioner surrendered albeit at the request of the respondent, the first and second floors and back­side half portion of the ground floor and simultaneously the rent for the remaining portion was fixed at an increased rate of Rs. 80 per month. There­after petitioner again surrendered some more portion of the ground floor retaining with him the present premises which consist of the shop on the front side and two rooms behind the shop. The rent, however, was increased from Rs. 80 per month to Rs. 100 per month. 2. Presently the petitioner is conducting a shop of utensils in the front room and is using the two rooms on the back side as godown. The premises presently in possession of the respondent consist of a living room, a dining room, kitchen, a bath-room, a shed and a Verandah adjoining the living and dining rooms on the ground floor, a hall, a room and bath room on the first floor and a hall and a terrace on the second. 3. On 6-10-1975, the respondent filed an application in the Court of the Rent Controller, Chandrapur for permission to terminate petitioner's tenancy under clause 13(3)(vi) and (vii) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949- (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order). According to him, the entire building is in a dilapidated condition and requires complete demolition and construction. He also asserted that the entire reconstructed building would be required by him for his personal occupation to meet the growing needs of his family. The petitioner denied that the house needs to be demolished and reconstructed. According to him, some minor repairs are necessary, which can be done without evicting him. He further contended that respondent's need has not increased since 1966 when he surrendered additional accommodation. According to him, respondent has painted a false picture to evict him from the premises. 4. The petitioner denied that the house needs to be demolished and reconstructed. According to him, some minor repairs are necessary, which can be done without evicting him. He further contended that respondent's need has not increased since 1966 when he surrendered additional accommodation. According to him, respondent has painted a false picture to evict him from the premises. 4. Before the Rent Controller, the parties examined themselves and led evidence of the Architects on whose reports they relied for proving their rival contentions. The respondent also placed on record some documentary evidence to show the preparation made by him for reconstructing the building and to establish his financial capacity to construct the building as per the plan submitted to the municipality. The Rent Controller accepted the evidence of the respondent and his Architect about the necessity of demolition and reconstruction of the building and held that respondent's claim for getting possession of the rented premises for his bona fide occupation is genuine. He further held that as the entire building would be required by the respondent for his personal occupation, the petitioner would not have right of re-entry after completion of the reconstruction. Consequently by his order dated 31st day of August, 1978, he granted the permission applied for. Agreeing with the Rent Controller, the Resident Deputy Collector, with appellate powers vide his order dated 28th February, 1979, dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the decision of the Rent Controller. 4-A. The findings that respondent's house is in a dilapidated condition and needs to be demolished and reconstructed and that the respondent requires the entire house including the premises in occupation of the petitioner for his bona fide occupation are concurrent findings of facts and as the approach adopted by both the authorities is legal and proper, the findings cannot be disturbed even assuming that a different view of the evidence is possible. The respondent examined himself and also Architect Madankar who prepared the building plan Ext. A-3 submitted by the respondent to the municipality for reconstruction of the house in question. Shri Madankar described the present condition of the building and explained how it is essential to demolish the building and reconstruct it. It is true that the petitioner also led evidence of a Civil Engineer but the Rent Controller has given valid reasons for preferring the evidence of Architect Madankar examined by the respondent. Shri Madankar described the present condition of the building and explained how it is essential to demolish the building and reconstruct it. It is true that the petitioner also led evidence of a Civil Engineer but the Rent Controller has given valid reasons for preferring the evidence of Architect Madankar examined by the respondent. Even the petitioner was constrained to concede that the house needs repairs. It is pertinent to note that in his application itself, the respondent described in detail the dilapidated condition of various parts of the building and the evidence of his Architect established the truth of these averments. The respondent sought possession of the suit premises amongst other grounds for converting the front shop into two offices, one for himself and other for opening a Welding shop for his second son Rajiv. According to him, his office is presently located in a back side room which because of paucity of accommodation, he is required to use as his bed room. The Rent Controller has taken into consideration all the aspects of the matter including the needs of respondent's growing family and his social status as an Advocate. 5. Shri Shelat, the learned Advocate for the petitioner tried to place some material on record of this petition to support his contention that the need of the “respondent has in fact diminished during all these years. He laid particular emphasis on the fact that respondent's son, who wanted to start a welding shop, is presently serving at Bombay with Mahindra Mahindra Company Limited. The respondent while refuting the contention that his need has diminished, has also placed on record some material to show that his need has in fact increased. According to him, not only his son intends to return to Chandrapur and start a welding shop as soon as the reconstruction of the house is complete but also his elder son, who is also an Engineer, intends to settle down at Chandrapur and start his industry taking advantage of the contemplated industrial development of the area. As rightly contended by Shri Udhoji, the learned Advocate for the respondent, the fact that respondent's second son is serving at Bombay need not be considered as a circumstance against the respondent because till the premises are secured the young man, who has completed his education, is not expected to sit idle. As rightly contended by Shri Udhoji, the learned Advocate for the respondent, the fact that respondent's second son is serving at Bombay need not be considered as a circumstance against the respondent because till the premises are secured the young man, who has completed his education, is not expected to sit idle. There is nothing wrong if during the period required for obtaining possession of the premises he acquired some practical experience. The findings of fact, therefore, are unassailable. 6. Shri Shelat urged that as the respondent is already in possession of a major portion of the house, his application for additional accommodation would not be maintainable in view of the proviso (a) to clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in (Eknath Bhanudas v. Shankarrao Deorao Jumde and another)1, in which it was held that a landlord in occupation of a house of his own in the city or town concerned has no right at all to apply for permission to evict his tenant under clause 13 (3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, on the ground that he needs the house or portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation. According to Shri Shelat, the ratio of this decision is available because the decision in (Ramcharan v. Resident Deputy Collector, Yeotmal and others)2, in which the proviso (a) to clause 13(3)(vi) was struck down as ultra vires being violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, is no longer good law as the proviso stands revived by the Doctrine of Eclipse in view of the dele­tion of sub-clause (f) of Article 19(1) by section 2 of the Forty-Fourth Amendment Act, 1978, which came into force on 20th June, 1979. He also contended that when the application for permission was filed, the proviso was operative because in view of the declaration of the emergency, Article 19(l)(f) was suspended. 7. The application for permission was filed by the respondent on 6-10-1975. The emergency was declared on 25th June, 1975 and the declaration was withdrawn on 26th January, 1977. No doubt during the. emergency, the fundamental rights were suspended. But Article 19 like all other fundamental rights stood merely suspended and was not abrogated. 7. The application for permission was filed by the respondent on 6-10-1975. The emergency was declared on 25th June, 1975 and the declaration was withdrawn on 26th January, 1977. No doubt during the. emergency, the fundamental rights were suspended. But Article 19 like all other fundamental rights stood merely suspended and was not abrogated. Hence, respondent's right to get relief on the basis of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution with which proviso (a) to clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order was found to be inconsistent was merely suspended. It cannot be said that the application itself was not maintainable. Moreover, as the application was not thrown out as not maintainable and was kept pending, it would be deemed to have been filed on the date on which the emergency was withdrawn and Article 19(1)(f) was restored. Admittedly the petition and the appeal pre­ferred by the petitioner were heard and decided after the emergency was with­ drawn and before section 2 of the Forty-fourth Amendment Act, by which clause (0 of Article 19(1) was deleted, came into force. The Rent Controller passed the order granting permission on 28th August, 1978, and the appeal came to be decided on 28th February, 1979. Section 2 of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment Act, 1978) was brought into force by the notification issued by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 1 of the said enactment. By this notification, the Central Government appointed the date immediately following the date on which that notification was pub­lished in the Official Gazette as the date on which section 2 of the said Act was to come into force. This notification was published in Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II, section 3, sub-section (i), G. S. R. No. 383 dated 19th June, 1979. Hence Article 19(1)(f) stood deleted with effect from 20th June, 1979. It is thus clear that both the orders were passed when the pro­viso (a) to clause 13(3)(vi) was not in operation and cannot be challenged on the basis of the said proviso as interpreted by this Court in Eknath Bhanudas Utane's case (citation supra). I am supported in this view by the decision in Special Civil Application Nos. 2467/78, 2468/78 and 2242/78 decided by Padhye J. on 8-9-1981. 8. I am supported in this view by the decision in Special Civil Application Nos. 2467/78, 2468/78 and 2242/78 decided by Padhye J. on 8-9-1981. 8. Shri Shelat contended that the permission under clause 13 (3)(vii) was bad firstly because respondent did not place before the Rent Controller relevant material to substantiate this ground and secondly because he did not plead and prove the time schedule which he would be following in demolishing and reconstructing the building. In support of the first contention, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in (Sumitra Devi Motidas Udasi v. Chunilal Bhimjibhai)3 and in support of the second contention on the decision in (Vasant Balwant Mohite and others v. Shakun B. Dhote and others)4. 9. In the first case, Masodkar J. explained the distinction between repairs and alteration and held that 'alterations' contemplated by clause 13 (3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order are not controlled by word 'essential' as in case of repairs and laid down the proposition that though a landlord reason­ ably and bona fide seeking permission on the ground that he wants to recons­truct or remodel his horse though tenanted answers the terms of clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order he would be bound to place before the Rent Controller relevant material to substantiate his ground, satisfaction of the authority being an objective phenomenon. If the landlord reasonably satisfies by proof his ability to reconstruct, that he has taken steps necessary to reconstruct as by getting plans sanctioned and that it is not a mere scheme to eject the tenant and further if his proposed reconstruction does not impair the right of the tenant to restoration of his tenancy, the Rent Control Authorities would not be justified in refusing to accord permission. No doubt, as held by the learned Judge 'reconstruction' is included in 'alterations'. Clause 13 (3)(vii) covers cases of essential repairs, of alterations including demolition for reconstruction or remodelling for better use, and of demolition necessitated by the dilapidated condition of the building, whether directed by the local authority or not. The type of reconstruction in that case had nothing to do with the condition of the building and contemplated altering or remodelling the house for putting it to more profitable use. Reconstruction which is necessitated by the condition of the building, which requires imme­diate demolition having become dangerous for habitation stands on a different footing. The type of reconstruction in that case had nothing to do with the condition of the building and contemplated altering or remodelling the house for putting it to more profitable use. Reconstruction which is necessitated by the condition of the building, which requires imme­diate demolition having become dangerous for habitation stands on a different footing. There is distinction between demolition for the purpose of recons­truction or remodelling and demolition which is necessitated purely by the condition of the building, the reconstruction being consequent upon the demo­lition. If the building is such that it has become dangerous for habitation, that effective repairs cannot be carried out and the only course open is to demolish the building, then the questions whether the landlord has taken neces­sary steps to reconstruct the building and whether he has ability to reconstruct would not be relevant. 10. The respondent in this case has established by cogent evidence that it is necessary to demolish the building. He has proved that the condition of the building and especially that of the premises in possession of the petitioner, is such that repairs would not be enough and that the demolition is the only alternative. Apart from that before applying for permission, he had submitted a plan to the Municipality showing how he proposes to reconstruct the building after demolishing it completely. It is true that he did not specifically aver in his application that he has arranged for the necessary finance, but his financial capacity was not really disputed and was challenged vaguely at the tag end of his cross-examination. The respondent is a practising Advocate and the partition-deed Exh. A-4, which evidences the partition between him and other members of his erstwhile joint family, shows that extensive agricultural lands were allotted to his share, 11. In Vasant Balwant Mohite's case, Mohta J., held that the commence ment of the reconstruction or repairs and its completion within a reasonable time is a sine qua non to the provisions of clause 13(l) (vii) and 13(7) of the Rent Control Order and thus pleading and proof of time schedule is one of the necessary ingredients of clause 13 (3) (vii) and (7) of the Rent Control Order. According to the learned Judge, absence of time schedule will go a long way in presuming absence of real desire contemplated by Clause I3(3)(vii) to effect the essential repairs or alteration. 12. According to the learned Judge, absence of time schedule will go a long way in presuming absence of real desire contemplated by Clause I3(3)(vii) to effect the essential repairs or alteration. 12. Relying on this decision, Shri Shelat contended that as the respondent has not pleaded, much less proved, that he would commence the reconstruction and complete it within a reasonable time, the permission grant­ ed under Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order deserves to be quashed. It is difficult to accept this submission because the proposition sought to be relied upon is too widely stated and would not have any relevance when the reconstruction is consequent upon demolition which is absolutely essential taking into consideration the condition of the existing building. If the building is in a dilapidated condition and the only alternative is to demolish it, then proof of this circumstance alone is sufficient indication of the genuine desire or bona fides of the landlord. In a case in which demolition is absolutely necessary, the question when the landlord would reconstruct it is irrelevant. The landlord may reconstruct it or may not and in such a case time schedule cannot be insisted upon. It may be that the landlord may not have sufficient funds to reconstruct the building but as he would be required to demolish the building because the building has become inhabitable and dangerous to live in and is beyond repairs. No time schedule, therefore, can be insisted upon in such a case. It can be properly insisted upon in a case in which the demolition is to be effected for the purpose of reconstruction which is under­taken for the purpose of putting the property to better use. No time schedule of reconstruction can be insisted upon even in a case in which the condition of the building does not justify demolition and reconstruction but the land­lord independently proves that he requires the building for his own occupation and wants to reconstruct it to properly satisfy his requirement, that is to say, if the landlord claims permission under clause I3(3)(vi) as well as under clause 13(3)(vii) and proves his case under clause 13(3)(vi) then for granting his claim under clause I3(3)(vii), it is not necessary to insist that he must demolish the building and reconstruct it within a particular time. As the tenant is to be evicted under clause 13(3) (vi) also, he would have no right of re-entry under clause 13(7) and hence the time schedule becomes irrelevant and landlord's claim under clause 13(3) (vii) cannot be negatived because he has not pleaded and proved that he would commence the reconstruction and complete it within a reasonable time. 13. The respondent has established that the entire building including the premises in possession of the petitioner would be required by him to meet the needs of his family. There is, therefore, no justification for interfering with the impugned orders. The petition is dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.