G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the decree holder is directed against the order, dated 23-11-1976, passed by the Prl. Civil Judge, shimoga, in Ex. A No. 17/1974, on his file, dismissing the appeal of the decree holdex on confirming the order, dated 13-8-1974, passed by the Munsiff, Shikaripur, in Exn. No. 99/1973, on his file dismissing the execution petition against the sixth judgment debtor, namely, District forest Officer, Sagar Division, Sagar. Shiralkoppa Town Municipality obtained a decree against respondents 1 to 5 in os 28/1961 on the file of the Munsiff, shikaripur and in execution of that decree instituted Ex. Case No. 99/73 for the recovery of Rs. 3,207-08 p. by the sale of the scheduled property on which a charge was created in the decree. ( 2 ) THE suit was instituted for recovery of taxes on the suit property. The sixth judgment debtor, namely, the District Forest officer, Sagar Division, Sagar, resisted the execution by contending that he was not a party to the proceedings in OS No. 28/ 1961 ; that he purchased the suit property even before the suit was instituted and hence no charge could be created on the suit property as on the date of the auction he was the owner of the suit property by purchase in the public auction. The learned Munsiff upheld the contention and dismissed the petition against the sixth judgment debtor. Aggrieved by the said order the Municipality went up in appeal before the Prl. Civil Judge, Shimoga, in exn. A No. 17/1974. The learned Civil judge raised the following points as arising for his consideration in the appeal. 1) Whether the decree holder can proceed against the petition schedule property for the recovery of the decretal amount on the ground that a charge has already been created on the property ? 2) Whether the charge created on the said property is proper ? 3) Whether the order of the learned munsiff calls for interference ? 4) What order ? re assessing the evidence on record the learned Prl. Civil Judge, held that since the sixth judgment-debtor in the execution petition became the owner of the property even earlier to the filing of the suit, no charge could be created on the suit property as sixth judgment debtor was not made a party to the suit. 4) What order ? re assessing the evidence on record the learned Prl. Civil Judge, held that since the sixth judgment-debtor in the execution petition became the owner of the property even earlier to the filing of the suit, no charge could be created on the suit property as sixth judgment debtor was not made a party to the suit. In that view he dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the order passed by the Munsiff. Aggrieved by the said order the Municipality has come up with the above second appeal before this Court. ( 3 ) THIS Court while admitting the appeal has raised the following point of law as arising in this case : "whether the Court below was right in holding that the sixth respondent had become the owner of the property in question prior to the date of the institution of the suit in OS No. 28/1961 ? it is on record that the suit property was sold, for the balance due from the owners towards the purchase of timber, in public auction, by the Deputy Commissioner on 27 6-1960. Recovery procedure was taken as if the money due was arrears of land revenue. The property was purchased by the sixth respondent, namely, the District forest Officer. The sale was confirmed on 6-12-1960 and possession was given on 4-12 1969 The present suit, namely, OS no. 28/1961 was instituted by the Municipality against judgment debtors 1 to 5 on 20-1 1961. That being so it was contended by the District Forest Officer that even before the suit was instituted, the property was sold in his favour and sale was confirmed on 6 12 1960 and therefore he became owner of the suit, property on 6-12-1960, much prior to the institution of the suit on 20-1-1961. In that view, it was submitted that a charge could not be created on the property for arrears of tax prior to the sale in his favour as he was act made a party to the suit. Both the courts below have upheld that contention. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel Sri B. Veerabhadrappa, appearing for the appellant, however, submitted that both the Courts below were not justified in holding that the property was transferred in favour of the sixth respondent, namely, the District Forest oftfcer, on 6-12-1960. on which date the sale was confirmed. Both the courts below have upheld that contention. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel Sri B. Veerabhadrappa, appearing for the appellant, however, submitted that both the Courts below were not justified in holding that the property was transferred in favour of the sixth respondent, namely, the District Forest oftfcer, on 6-12-1960. on which date the sale was confirmed. According to him the property becomes transferred only when a sale certificate is issued by the Deputy commissioner in favour of the auction purchaser and that was obviously after 4-12-1969, because even according to the district Forest Officer, the possession of the property was given to him only on 4-12-1969. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel relied on S. 187 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code which was then in force. S. 187 of the Code reads :"after a sale of any occupancy or alienated holding has been confirmed in manner aforesaid, the Deputy Commissioner shall put the person declared to be the purchaser into possession of the land included in such occupancy or alienated holding, and shall cause his name to be entered in the revenue records as occupant or holder in lieu of that) of the defaulter, and shall grant him a certificate to the effect that he has purchased the occupancy or alienated holding to which the certificate refers. Relying on this section the learned counsel argued that unless the certificate of sale is issued, there is no transfer of property in favour of the auction purchaser. By leading the section, I am persuaded to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The reason is not far to seek. After the sale, there is time given to the judgment debtor, to bring an application for setting aside a sale. If there is any such application, on hearing the same the sale would be confirmed, if there is no merit in the application, and the auction purchaser is actually put in possession of the property and thereafter the sale certificate is issued in favour of the auction purchaser. This sale certificate is to be issued on a stamp paper. That being so, it is obvious, that what transfers the property is the issuance of the certificate and not merely holding of the auction sale, nor the confirmation of the said sale. This sale certificate is to be issued on a stamp paper. That being so, it is obvious, that what transfers the property is the issuance of the certificate and not merely holding of the auction sale, nor the confirmation of the said sale. They are steps to be taken before the sale certificate is issued and it is the sale certificate which transfers the property in favour of the auction-purchaser. S. 187 of the Mysore Land Revenue code is identical with S. 181 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and this question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Shiva Mart and v. Arun Nanakchand (1 ). His Lordship Justice Tarkunde, who spoke for the Bench in the course of his judgment in para 3 has observed, speaking on this aspect thus :. . . . We are of the view that S. 31aa has no application to the present case, not only because the first respondent is not in possession of the land, but also because a completed'transfer of the land has not yet taken place. It is clear from the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code that, after the auction sale of an immovable property under S. 165, an application to set aside the sale can be filed under S. 178. If no application for setting aside the sale is made under s. 179, or if such an application is made and rejected, the Collector may confirm the sale under S. 179. After the sale is confirmed, the Collector puts the person declared to be the purchaser into possession of the land and grants him a sale certificate under S. 181 No transfer of the property takes place till the sale is confirmed and a sale certificate is grant. ed to the person declared to be the pur chaser of the land". ( 6 ) THESE observations apply on all fours on the facts of the present case also, as S. 187 of Mysore Land Revenue Code is, as pointed out above, identical with S. 181 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. ( 7 ) THE Legislature also has given effect to the view by suitable wording of S. 179 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 which has received the assent of the Presi. dent on 6th March 1964. ( 7 ) THE Legislature also has given effect to the view by suitable wording of S. 179 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 which has received the assent of the Presi. dent on 6th March 1964. S. 179 of the karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 reads :"certificate of purchase. When a sale held under the Chapter is confirmed, the (Tahsildar) shall put the person declared to be the purchaser in possession of the property and shall cause his name to be entered in the land records and shall grant him a certificate in the prescribed form to the effect that he has purchased the property specified therein and such certificate shall be demade to be a valid transfer of such property". Thus, I have no hesitation to hold that it is only the issuance of the sale certificate which brings about the complete transfer of the property in question after the auction sale in favour of the purchaser. ( 8 ) IN the instant case the sale certificate could not be issued before 4 12 1969 because, that was admittedly the date on which the District Forest Officer was put in possession of the property. That being so, it is obvious that on the date of the suit i. e. , on 20-1-1961, respondents 1 to 5 continued to be the owners of the suit property. Even on the date of the decree i. e. , on 12-1 1961, the position was the same. In that view it is obvious that a charge on the suit property could be created for payment of arrears of tax and the sixth respondent was not a necessary party to the suit. The Courts below have entirely missed this aspect of law in coming to the conclusion that the sixth respondent, namely, the District Forest Officer became the owner of the property as soon as the sale was confirmed i. e. , on 6 12 1960. Hence, I am constrained to set aside the finding of the Courts below and hold that a charge could be created on the suit property for arrears of payment of Municipal tax in OS No. 28 of 1961 and that the same is legally and validly created. Hence, I am constrained to set aside the finding of the Courts below and hold that a charge could be created on the suit property for arrears of payment of Municipal tax in OS No. 28 of 1961 and that the same is legally and validly created. That being so, it is obvious that the decree holder could pursue the property for recovery of the tax crystallized in a decree in OS No. 28 of 1961, in the hands of the sixth respondent, namely, the District forest Officer, Sagar Division, Sagar. ( 9 ) THE learned High Court Government advocate, however, strenuously urged before me that under S. 143 of the Mysore land Revenue Code, there is priority of government claim and as such when once the property was sold for Gyvernment claim, there could not be any further charge left over to recover the tax due to the Municipality, since the said tax dues cannot be considered to be a Government claim. S. 143 of the Code no doubt states: "the claim of Government to any moneys recoverable under the provisions of this Chapter shall have precedence over any other debt, demand or claim whatsoever, whether in respect of mortgage, judgment, decree, execution or attachment, or otherwise, howsoever, against any land or the holder thereof. It is true that S. 143 gives precedence to government claim over the claim of any debt including the debt of the Municipality towards the house tax. ( 10 ) THIS submission, however, was successfully repelled by the learned counsel for appellant by inviting my attention to S. 100 of the mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 which reads :"all sums due on account of any tax imposed in the form of a rate on lands or building, or. ( 10 ) THIS submission, however, was successfully repelled by the learned counsel for appellant by inviting my attention to S. 100 of the mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 which reads :"all sums due on account of any tax imposed in the form of a rate on lands or building, or. on both, mentioned in S. 74, shall subject to prior payment of land revenue, if any, due to the Government thereupon, be a first charge upon the building or land, in respect of which such tax is leviable, and upon the moveable property, if any, found within or upon such building or land, and belonging to the person liable for such tax or taxes and shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue Provided that no arrears of any such tax shall be recover, ed from any occupier who is not the owner, if it has been due for more than three years or for a period during which such occupier was not in occupation". Thus, it is clear that all sums due on account of any tax imposed in the form of a rate on buildings form the first charge upon the said building subject of course to the solitary exception of prior payment of land revenue, if any, due to the Government thereupon. ( 11 ) THE Land Revenue Code is of the year 1888 that being Mysore Act IV of 1888, whereas the Mysore Town Municipalities act is of the year 1951, that being Mysore act XXII of 1951. It is further clear that s. 143 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code makes a general provision regarding the claims of Government to have precedence over all others. It is a general provision. S. 100 of the Mysore Town Municipalities act makes provision for a particular item, namely, the (ax on building imposed by the Municipalicy. Therefore, it is obvious that the Mysore Land Revenue Code in the context becomes the general law, whereas the Mysore Town Municipalities act is the special law. It is settled that when there is repugnancy between the provisions of general law or the general provision of law and provision made under special law or special provision of law, the latter provisions abrogates the former. It is settled that when there is repugnancy between the provisions of general law or the general provision of law and provision made under special law or special provision of law, the latter provisions abrogates the former. Craies on Statute Law, 1971 (7th edn.) speaking on this aspect at page 371 under caption "contrariety between Statutes" states : as already stated when there are two statutes, although both are expressed in affirmative language, are contrary in matter, the latter abrogates the former, (Castrique v. Page 1853, 13 CB, 458)". Speaking on this aspect Crawford on statutory construction, 1940 edn, states at page 429 under S. 230 thus :"special and General Statutes-It is not uncommon to find one statute treating a subject in general terms and another treating only a part of the same subject matter in a more minute manner. Where this situation exists, the two statutes should be read together and harmonized. This is especially true where the two statutes are in pan materia. In the event of repugnancy the special statute should prevail, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent". The Supreme Court of India has taken the same view in the case of Damji Valji shah v. L. I. C. of India (2 ). His Lordship raghubar Dayal, J, who delivered the judgment for the Bench has stated in para 19 of the judgment thus : "further the provisions of the special act i. e. , LIC Act will override the provisions of the general Act, viz. , Companies Act which is an Act relating to companies in general". ( 12 ) THAT being so, it is obvious that S. 100 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act would prevail over S. 143 of the Mysore land Revenue Code and would to that extent override the provisions of S. 143 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code. Hence, i am constrained to hold that there is no merit in the contention raised before me by the learned High Court Government Advocate that Government claim in the instant case had precedence over the claim of the Municipality for recovery of tax, obviously because the Government claim in the instant case is only for recovery of the amount, i-e. , the balance of the sale price in the matter of sale of timber. In the circumslances, it is obvious that the Courts below were clearly in error in thinking that the charge could not be created on the suit property for payment of tax and that the same could not be enforced against the sixth respondent, the purchaser of the property in auction sale. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Executing Court and confirmed by the first Appellate Court is hereby set aside and the decree holder is permitted to proceed with the execution petition for recovery of tax dues against the sixth respondent by enforcing the charge on the suit property. No costs. --- *** --- .