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1981 DIGILAW 318 (RAJ)

Ahmed Ali v. State of Rajasthan

1981-07-31

K.S.SIDHU, M.L.SHRIMAL

body1981
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, Ahmed Ali, at present detained in the Central Jail, Jaipur, obtained a rule in this case upon the State of Rajasthan to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the detention order issued by the State Government against him vide No. F. 2/21 (17) Home-5/80 dated December 19, 1980, under section 3(2), National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and consequently directing his release from detention. 2. The impugned order of detention states that the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The petitioner was arrested on December 21, 1989, in pursuance of the detention order. The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on December 22, 1980, making it clear to him that if he was desirous of making any representation against the detention order he could do so and forward the same to the Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jaipur. The State Government placed the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board constituted by it under the Act. The Advisory Board reported that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. By its order dated, February 18, 1981, the State Government confirmed the detention order directing that the petitioners detention shall continue till December 20, 1981. The petitioner made a representation to the State Government which was rejected by it on May 19, 1981. 3. The grounds of detention which accompanied the communication dated December 22, 1980, are 8 in number. Ground No. 8 reads as under : " Jh vgen ds fo:) iqfyl }kjk yxkrkj fujks/kkRed dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gSA fnukad 21-12-59] 2-3-66] 24-11-79 ,oa 29-8-80 dks iqfyl }kjk varxZr /kkjk 110 Cr. P.C. ds vUrxZr fujks/kkRed dk;Zokgh dh xbZA bLrxklk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftuesa ls izFke rhu bLrxklksa esa ;g O;fDr ikcU/k Hkh fd;k tk pqdk gSA pkSFkk bLrkxklk vHkh fopkjk/khu gSA blh izdkj fnukad 14-6-76 dks Hkh blds fo:) xq.Mk fu;U=.k vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr bLrxklk ftyk/kh'k t;iqj ds le{k izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ifjf'k"B PCR i`"B 41 ls 47A " 4. Mr. Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner raised a number of points in support of his argument that the order of detention was passed by the detaining authority in violation of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and section 8 of the Act. He contended that grounds Nos. 1 to 5 relate incidents in the years 1977, 1978 and 1978 and that since the detention order was made in December 1980, they cannot possibly be considered as proximate so as to justify the making of this order, In other words Mr. Bhandaris argument is that all the five grounds mentioned above are State which could not possibly be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessing the conduct of the petitioner in December, 1980, to find out if the same were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Another argument raised by Mr. Bhandari is that the 8th ground which has been reproduced above is non-existent as it contains false recitals to the effect that the police had submitted information in writing to the Magistrate concerned for initiating security proceedings against the petitioner under section 110 Cr.P.C. on Three different dates December 21, 1959, March 2, 1966 and November 24, 1979. Mr. Bhandari contended that no security proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on any of these three dates and that the allegation made by the detaining authority in the 8th ground in the that behalf is false. The detaining authority has not controverted this plea of the petition in the return filed by it in answer to the writ petition. On the other hand, an affidavit has been filed on record on behalf of the detaining authority that in fact no security proceeding were initiated against the petitioner on any of these three dates mentioned above. According to the detaining authority security proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on February 20, 1959, March 2, 1965 and November 24, 1972 and that the mistake of making wrong recitals in the 8th ground was discovered by it only on January 24, 1981. When a corrigendum was issued giving the correct dates. It is further mentioned in the affidavit that correct copies of the complaints dated February 20, 1959, March 2, 1965 and November 24, 1972, were supplied to the detenue on January 24, 1981. 5. When a corrigendum was issued giving the correct dates. It is further mentioned in the affidavit that correct copies of the complaints dated February 20, 1959, March 2, 1965 and November 24, 1972, were supplied to the detenue on January 24, 1981. 5. It may therefore be safely concluded on the pleadings of the parties that no security proceedings were initiated by the police against the petitioner under section 110 Cr. P.C. on December 21, 1959, March 2, 1966 and November 24, 1979 as recited in the eight grounds of detention which was served on the petitioner on December 22, 1980. It may further be concluded that the detaining authority did not supply the detenue with the copies of any of the three complaints aforementioned on December 22, 1980 or at any time thereafter. However, the detaining authority claims that it had issued a corrigendum in respect of the 8th ground of detention on January 24, 1981, and that it had also supplied copies of the complaints to the detenue on that date. 6. Assuming for a moment that the corrigendum was issued and copies were supplied to the detenue on January 24, 1981, it will not cure the defect involved in making the detention order on the basis of the grounds including ground No. 8 which as originally drafted and served on the petitioner had no existence in point of fact. Any corrigendum or removal of this defect by the detaining authority on January 24, 1981, will not remove the infirmity which vitiates the detention order. Section 8 of the Act lays down that when a person is detained in pursuance of the detention order the detaining authority shall serve on the detenue the grounds on which the detention order was made within a period of 5 to 10 days of the making of the detention order and thus afford the detenue the earliest opportunity of making representation against the detention order. If the detaining authority is to be believed, what happened in this case was that the 8th ground of detention order, as corrected, was served on the detenu one month and three days after his arrest. The detention order, therefore, stands clearly vitiated by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of section 8 of the Act. If the detaining authority is to be believed, what happened in this case was that the 8th ground of detention order, as corrected, was served on the detenu one month and three days after his arrest. The detention order, therefore, stands clearly vitiated by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of section 8 of the Act. In Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983 , their Lordships hold that the detaining authority must strictly comply with the requirements of law in communicating the grounds of detention to the detenue within the prescribed period and that if there is any undue delay in communicating the grounds to the detenue or in supplying the documents and other supportive material to him the detention after the last date on which the grounds should have been communicated and the documents and other material supplied, will have to be pronounced as illegal. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra A. Kamat v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 765. Their Lordship held in this case that if there is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention the right to make effective representation is denied, and therefore, the detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law. It will be seen that in the present case the detaining authority did not communicate or supply to the detenue the copies of the complaints under section 110 Cr.P.C. till January 24, 1981. The 8th ground as communicated to the detenue on December 22, 1980, must therefore, be pronounced as non-existent and in that view of the matter the detention order must be struck down as illegal. 7. In view of our finding as mentioned above in respect of 8th ground,we do not think.it is necessary for us to go into the other points raised by Mr. Bhandari to the effect that all other grounds communicated to the petitioner are State and that therefore no valid detention order could be made on their basis. 8. In conclusion, we allow this writ petition, make the rule absolute and direct that the petitioner will be released from detention forth with.Writ Allowed. *******