JUDGMENT Mahavir Singh, J. - The petitioner was appointed a Commerce reacher in the Modern Vocational Intermediate College, opposite party No. 1. He joined the said college on 1-8-1971. (According to the petitioner he joined actually on 31-7-71 but was made to mention so under the pressure of the Principal). Anyway it makes no difference for the disposal of this case. 2. The petitioner was put on probation of one year. The management, however, terminated his services by its order dated 18-6- 72 as according to the management his work and conduct during the probationary period was not satisfactory. The order was, however. received by the petitioner on 3-7-72. No approval of the District Inspector of Schools was taken before serving this termination order. 3. The petitioner then filed a representation before the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools accepted the case of the petitioner that the order of termination of his services was illegal as his prior approval was not obtained as required under section 16 (g) (3) of the Intermediate Education Act. The Managing Committee of the college then filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education against this order of the Inspector. The Deputy Director of Education passed an order on 31-10-72 allowing the appeal in part. While he agreed with the District Inspector of Schools that the notice of termination of service of the petitioner was illegal as no prior approval was taken from him by the management, he held that on the facts and circumstances of the case it appeared that the management was right in its view about unsatisfactory conduct of the petitioner during the probationary period and so he accorded his approval to the termination of service with effect from that date, and held that the services of the petitioner would he deemed to be terminated with effect from the date of his order. i.e. 31-10-72. He further directed that the pay for three months would be payable by the management from its own fund in view of the irregularities committed by it by serving the termination order without getting prior approval. 4. The petitioner has thus come to this court. i.e. 31-10-72. He further directed that the pay for three months would be payable by the management from its own fund in view of the irregularities committed by it by serving the termination order without getting prior approval. 4. The petitioner has thus come to this court. In this writ petition, he contends that the Deputy Director of Education has wholly exceeded his jurisdiction in according post-facto approval and that in any case his services cannot be terminated on the same notice which was held also by him to be illegal and a fresh notice was required. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite parties initially contends that the view, both of the District Inspector of Schools as well as of the Deputy Director of Education was wrong, that a prior approval was needed for terminating the services of the petitioner during the period of probation. It was contended that s. 16(g)(3) of the U. P. I. E. Act did not apply to the case of a probationer. It applies only to those teachers who are in regular service after completing their probationary period. This objection, however, has no force. It was held by this court in M. B. Bareilly v. B.K. Mehrotra (1968 All L J 1127) that the provision of this I Sub-clause would apply even to a probationer. We find ourselves in agreement 1with this view of this Court. 6. It was then contended that the approval after all had been granted by the Deputy Director of Education and it makes no difference whether it was granted after or before and that the requirement of prior approval is only directory and not mandatory. This contention is also not correct. The provisions of s. 16(g)(3) of the U. P. I. E. Act are not directory but mandatory. A notice suffering from non-compliance of this provision is void ab initio and, therefore, it cannot be validated. By according sanction afterwards a fresh notice has to be issued for termination of service. The Deputy Director of Education was thus wholly wrong in ordering termination of the services of the i petitioner from the date of his order i.e. 31st October, 1972. 7. The question is then as to what is the relief that can be granted to the petitioner. The Deputy Director of Education was thus wholly wrong in ordering termination of the services of the i petitioner from the date of his order i.e. 31st October, 1972. 7. The question is then as to what is the relief that can be granted to the petitioner. The petitioner not only prayed for quashing of these orders but he also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to treat the petitioner in service as a confirmed teacher. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contends that the college is a private educational institution and not a public body or a statutory authority and even if the services of the petitioner have been wrongly terminated, the petitioner cannot claim re instatement or even a declaration that he may be deemed to be continuing in service. He referred for this to Srimati J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir (AIR 1981 S C 122) : (1980 All L J 1070) and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Laxmi Narain, (AIR 1976 S C 888). 9. These cases are, however, distinguishable inasmuch as they are suits under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The present is a case arising under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Aley Ahmad Abdi v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad (1977 L L J 249) : (1977 All L J 951) that though the committee of management of Intermediate college is not a statutory body, nevertheless a writ petition filed against it is maintainable, if such petition is for enforcement or performance of any legal obligations or duties imposed on such committee by a statute. 10. In the present case the committee of management was required to perform the legal obligation imposed upon it by s. 16(g)(3) of the U. P. I. E. Act, 1921. 11. However, in the present case, it is not necessary for us to proceed further in this respect as the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that he does not want to press for the prayer (b) about a writ of mandamus for directing opposite parties to treat him as continuing in service as a teacher as for that he may seek relief separately if necessary. He has confined the prayer to the quashing of the orders passed by the management and the Deputy Director of Education. 12. Accordingly we allow the writ petition in part only and quash the orders dated 1-7-72 (Annexure-2) and dated 30-10-72 (Annexure-8). The petitioner will get costs of this petition from the respondents.